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HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE DOCTRINE OF
THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

BY
DR J. A. DORNER,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN.

DIVISION SECOND,
FROM THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME

VOLUME III.

WITH APPENDIX,
CONTAINING A REVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSIES ON THE SUBJECT, WHICH
HAVE BEEN AGITATED IN BRITAIN SINCE THE MIDDLE OF THE
17TH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME.

BY **PATRICK FAIRBAIRN, D.D.,**
AUTHOR OF 'TYPOLOGY OF SCRIPTURE, ETC.

EDINBURGH:
T. AND T CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.
LONDON: HAMILTON, ADAMS, & CO. DUBLIN: JOHN ROBERTSON & CO.

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SECTION III.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD FORM OF CHRISTOLOGY BY A PHILOSOPHY OF A ONE-SIDED SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER.

(A.D. 1750-1800.)

INTRODUCTION.

PHILOSOPHICAL MOVEMENTS OUTSIDE OF GERMANY.

FROM what has been previously advanced, it appears that neither of the three Church tendencies antagonistic to it, Calixtinism, Pietism, or Herrnhutism, on the one hand, nor philosophy on the other hand, but its own inherent feebleness, was the proper cause of the decay of the old form of Christology, which now set in with constantly more irrestrainable vigour. As far as concerns philosophy in particular, it did but help, though undoubtedly in a decisive manner, to give full development to the seeds of ruin which Christology already contained within itself.

To have shown that the possession to which claim was laid, was a possession merely in appearance, is a merit not to be slightly estimated; but in addition to this, philosophy alone was in a position to answer certain preliminary questions, and to establish certain presuppositions, without which a satisfactory doctrine of the Person of Christ was an impossibility.

The dogmatical aberrations which we find within the Church itself, were, without exception, nothing but unvanquished rem-

nants of errors which had obtained admission from the extra-Christian world. The Christological and anthropological heresies, in particular, were but coarser or finer forms of erroneous views of the relation between God and the world in general, in other words, remains of Pantheism or Deism.

The relation between nature and grace, between the first and the second creation, is of so intimate a character, that an error in regard to the former involves also serious consequences relatively to the knowledge even of Christianity; and a right knowledge of the essence of nature is indispensable to the successful formation of Christian dogmas. If it be certain, as we have long ago shown, that the Church could not make further advances until it first thoroughly investigated the essence of human nature—a subject which had hitherto been completely thrown into the background; so also is it evident that theology is dependent for the immediate future on the progress made by philosophy.

Prior to the Reformation, the dominant philosophy had been the Aristotelian. Notwithstanding the position of antagonism which Luther assumed towards it, from the want of a more satisfactory philosophy the thinkers of the sixteenth century recurred to it ever more and more, and Protestant theology in the seventeenth century was as completely dominated by it as the Roman Catholic. The cause of its being able to serve two opposed systems at the same time, lay in the predominantly formal character of that which was borrowed from it; which character fitted it admirably for analysing and ordering matter derived from other sources, and providing, during a considerable period, new ways in which the mind could logically justify to its own satisfaction the dogma which had been assailed. The subject-matter itself was taken for granted as established, be it by the Church and tradition, or be it by the Holy Scriptures; and, indeed, the more abstruse scholastic distinctions, no less than the fundamental doctrines of redemption. How very different was the position of matters at the time of the Reformation! Then, under the influence of religion, the mind refused to be any longer content with the merely objective, threw off its chains, began to walk in its freedom, and took the course of endeavouring to understand that which in the first instance had been handed down to it in the form of tradition, and which had

rested on external authority, as something whose inner power and truth were its own support; it began to constitute the merely external its own spiritual property, to apprehend it in its most inward truth and certainty. The minds of those who were stirred by the spirit of the Reformation, refused to be bound by anything save by the inner force of truth, and for this reason they turned their backs on the system of the Romish Church. But this same spirit entered into the chrysalis state in the seventeenth century, and concealed itself under a form which more and more assumed the features of the deserted Roman Catholic Church; and, returning to a point of view substantially identical with that of Rome, Protestant theologians appeared to know of no higher goal than that of establishing a rival Church. This was shown in the most significant manner, by the mode in which the doctrines of justification and of the Person of Christ were moulded after a type which was in principle Roman Catholic. Not merely was the ethico-religious aspect of faith, according to which it is "*fiducia*" and "*certitudo salutis*," again unobservedly converted into a "good work" of an intellectualistic character, into a consent of the intellect to the ideas of orthodoxy, and into a subjection of the will under the dogmas of the Church, whose business it is to regulate the interpretation of Scripture; but the very centre of the life of the Reformation, to wit, the assurance of salvation experienced by him who is justified, and the new personality, which, through the marriage of the divine and human in faith, had become the all-sufficient starting-point of perfection, was again mutilated and buried, nay more, was changed back, under an evangelical name, into the form which it had in the Roman Catholic Church. For what else is an imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which, instead of being the beginning and principle of perfection, is made rather the goal, and does not form the point of transition to a continuous new life, but to reduce the believer again to a "*donum superadditum*" after the manner of the Romish Church; a "*donum*" which neither can nor is intended to become the essence of man? Against this very thing Luther spoke in the strongest terms, feeling well that it lay at the root of the extreme point of his antagonism to Rome.¹

¹ Compare further Luther's Commentary on Genesis, in Walch i. p. 301, § 77.

But precisely the same thing took place also in connection with Christology, where that which ought to have been regarded as a result of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" was thought to be most adequately described as a kind of "*donum superadditum*" for the humanity of Christ. Not to mention the Docetical and Catholic remnants contained in the Christology of even the "*Formula Concordiæ*." For if Jesus is not to be supposed to have been bound to fulfil the divine will (which, notwithstanding, consists universally very well with the freedom of love), what is it but a denial of His true humanity? And if the substitutionary satisfaction of Christ is to be based on the fact, that though not under obligation to fulfil the law, He notwithstanding fulfilled it by His work in acting and suffering, and thus earned a merit which can be applied on our behalf, what is it but to found the doctrine of redemption, at its very acme, on the Romish error of "*opera supererogatoria*," their meritoriousness and interchangeableness?

But where the doctrine of redemption was thus based, both subjectively and objectively, on the idea of the "*donum superadditum*," nature and supernatural grace were still conceived as foreign to, and reciprocally exclusive of, each other; and by consequence, a scientific theology, cast in one mould, was an impossibility. As regards Christology, we only discern therein the old fault of representing the divine and human as magnitudes standing in an essentially exclusive relation to each other, — a fault whose effects have so frequently come under our notice since the Council of Chalcedon, which renders a true doctrine of the God-man an impossibility, and cannot allow the divine and human to interpenetrate and form one real vital unity. It is true, Luther's idea of the "*capacitas humanæ naturæ*" for the divine was still retained: not only, however, was it not further developed, but it was also reduced down to the form of susceptibility for the divine "*idiomata*" as "*dona superaddita*;" nay more, it was soon limited and retracted. How much further were Luther's presentiments of a "new" and higher view of humanity, and of the discoursing thereof "in new tongues," from passing into fulfilment!

The entire history of Christology testifies to the fact, that if the conception of the divine and human, as two substances

absolutely opposed to each other, which gained for itself the sanction of the Church through the adoption of the Chalcedonian doctrine of the two natures in its historical sense, be true, it is impossible to avoid falling into some form of Ebi-onism or Docetism, or, at a higher stage, of Nestorianism or Monophysitism. For this reason, it was impossible that a purer form of Christology should make its appearance, until the idea of the divine and human had been thoroughly investigated and transformed.

Now the Church of the Reformation was stirred by an impulse to undertake this investigation, and to the production of a new Christian philosophy; nor was this impulse overshadowed and extinguished by the numerous parasitic formations which made their appearance in the Church, and which properly belonged to an earlier stage. Though the Lutheran theologians looked back only too frequently with longing eyes to the flesh-pots of Egypt, a return to bondage was impossible; partly owing to the meritorious efforts of the Reformed sister-Church, which in one aspect kept up more rigidly the antagonism to the Romish Church, acting the part of an awakener of the conscience of Protestantism, and rendering the selling of its birth-right an impossibility; and partly owing to the rich and healthy evangelical vigour which opposed the spread of the old leaven, and clung to the pure doctrine of justification by faith, thus preserving, at all events, the *principle* of a new theology and Christology. It was precisely the tendency to attach importance to anthropology and personality, which first made its appearance in a grand shape at the Reformation, and, in particular, the personal knowledge of salvation, that was attended by, and led to, efforts to attain to a deeper knowledge of the essence of human nature. The course taken by modern, that is, Protestant philosophy, marks, step by step, the stages through which mind arrived at self-consciousness; and even the momentary rending asunder of the human and the divine (even in Christ), and the remaining standing on the former alone, could not but in the end serve the purpose of abolishing the abstract conception of the human along with the abstract conception of the divine, of bringing about the recognition of their essential connection and unity, and of thus preparing the way for a true Christology, by removing the wall of separation which had

arisen in consequence of the two natures being represented as inmosty or essentially opposed to each other.

It cannot be denied that modern times, with their strongly subjective tendencies, have gone to an extreme in giving prominence to the human aspect of the Person of Christ; and it is not difficult to make this a ground of blame. But if this blame is to be unconditional and universal, it ought not to be forgotten that it was but the retribution for, and natural reaction against, the opposed, and equally condemnable, one-sided prominence given to the divine, which never allowed the human its due position. The Christian mind was not able to maintain itself at the eminence to which it had soared in the age of the Reformation; but still the period, which may be designated the Middle Age of Protestantism, when doctrine clothed itself in rigid iron and mail, was not destined to last too long. The principle of freedom, in a religious form, had taken too strong a hold on the inmost substance of evangelical Christendom, for it not to advance on from the consciousness of redemption as a fixed point of departure, to attempt the revision and regeneration of the dogmas, which it had received in the sixteenth century solely as an inheritance, and to seek to bring these doctrines into full inner connection and harmony with the principle of the Reformation. The uniqueness and grandeur of the Reformation consisted precisely in its carrying forward the negative and positive work that had to be accomplished simultaneously; nay more, in closest interpenetration. Whereas now, on the contrary, the history falls into two acts, of which the first bears a predominantly negative character. But still, as we shall see, even during the time of this first act, new germs shot forth in quietness and with increasing power.

To follow the course taken by philosophy from stage to stage, is not our business here, but merely to consider the influence exercised by it on Christology at each separate stage.

Holland led the way; in other words, the domain occupied by the Reformed Church, within which Des Cartes, Spinoza, and Bayle found not merely protection, but also friends. In this case also the Reformed Confession ran a more rapid course; for the Lutheran Church shut itself against the influence of these thinkers long after the first-mentioned in particular had become a power in the Reformed Church. We have already

referred more particularly above to the influence of the Cartesian philosophy on Christology. Let it suffice to add here, that the dualism it posited between the extended and the thinking substance, was throughout antichristological, and favourable to Nestorianism; nay more, it was a confirmation of that mode of thought which stretches the distinction between the two natures to the point of inner incompatibility.¹ In this respect Des Cartes remained a good Catholic. Further, however, he regarded God as infinite *being*, and that alone; man as finite *being*, and that alone. He did not yet conceive of God as spirit; still less as an ethical being, although he attributed to Him ethical predicates. Equally far removed was he from having formed the conception of an human-ethical development, as is evident from his doctrine of ready-made innate ideas. It is true, in his celebrated thesis, "*cogito ergo sum*," and in his demand that every external empirical authority should be treated with a scepticism, which he supposed would end in the attainment of self-certainty by the thinking spirit, a Protestant element is unmistakeably embodied. But how far does it stand behind that of the Reformation! For, in the first place, the spirit which possesses the self-certainty is not the self-conscious, ethico-religious spirit, but merely the thinking intelligence, which is to have self-certainty apart altogether from the content of its thought. But, in the second place, he occupies a completely empirical position, in so far as, inconsiderately and without examination, he makes a thinking Ego out of thought; and in so far as he holds this Ego to be that which is most real, that which is primarily certain, because it is that on which he deemed even the certainty that there is a God to be based. In this manner, however, all knowledge is grounded on the subjective; instead of the idea of God being recognised as the basis which bears up everything else. Herein, therefore, is already involved the germ of the absolutization of subjectivity, which, when it had at a later period attained to logical development, rejected the inconsistencies of Des Cartes, who, in opposition to his premises, reduces back the idea of God possessed by the thinking subject to God Himself, as the

¹ In comparison with this difference, the points of coincidence with the Lutheran Christology, to which we referred above (see Section Second, Chapter Third), completely disappear.

cause who originated it, and who attests it by His own truthfulness.

Whilst Des Cartes had not merely opposed thought and extension dualistically to each other, but also put them into a purely contingent, external relation to God (indeed, he philosophized altogether little regarding God Himself (the *substantia*), and rested satisfied with declarations of the most general character),—Spinoza, on the contrary, sought to do away with, at all events, the latter separation, and to identify thought and extension with the “*substantia*,” in the sense of the former being the attributes under which we are compelled to think the latter. He failed, however, to establish the duality of these attributes, or to reduce them to inner unity (Eth. i. Prop. 2, 3, 6).

Substance is Spinoza’s main idea ; it is the idea, which, if it be but thought at all, must be thought as having being ; its very essential character not only permits, but, what is more, requires us, to take our stand on it as that which is final and supreme.¹ It is infinite without limits, nay more, without determination and distinction in itself ; for “*omnis determinatio est negatio* ;”—indeed, all real distinctions in it are excluded by its absolute simplicity.

For this reason also, there is no room for growth or change in God, neither in the sense of His transforming Himself into another being, that is, of His losing His identity as a subject ; nor in the sense of His experiencing, as the same subject, alterations from without or within. For changes even of the latter kind, could only have a place in God on the supposition that He was not yet perfect, and rather still had need to overcome defects and to attain good. Both would be unworthy of God ; wherefore, also, there remains no place for “*causæ finales*.” Everything is good as it is ; all that is necessary is to know it

¹ It is the “*quod per se concipitur*,” but in such a sense that “*ejus essentia involvit existentiam* ;” it is “*causa sui*” (Def. i.). He attributes to it “*vita*,” that is, “*vim, per quam res in suo esse perseverant* ;” God has also, in his view, “*ideam sui ipsius* ;” this is His omniscience. Opp. ed. Gfrörer, pp. 67, 69 ; Cogit. metaphys. c. 6, 7. On the contrary, the “*substantia creata (natura naturata)*,” although it also “*per se concipitur*,” so that we can form a clear conception of it, is that whose “*conceptus*” remains the same, whether it has being or not ; “*cujus essentia*,” therefore, “*non involvit existentiam*.” Cogit. Met. c. 8, Eth. i. Prop. 24.

properly. The world is not substance, is not a conception in which *existence* must be thought as united with *being* (*Existenz verbunden mit dem Sein*); but it is to be conceived solely as an attribute or *modus* of God; it has being solely in God, or in that substance besides which there is no other. (*Eth. i. Prop. 14, 15.*) The "*Substantia*" alone is true being. The "*res cogitans*" and the "*res extensa*" are not substances by themselves, outside of which God is, but merely attributes of God, who alone is their substance.¹ If, therefore, Des Cartes inclines rather to Deism, to giving the world a false independence in separation from God, Spinoza inclines to the acosmistic form of Pantheism. The former was a seduction to the Reformed system as to its one aspect; he exaggerates the strict distinction which it drew between God and the world to the point of giving it a false independence outside of Him: Spinoza, on the other hand, was a seduction to the Reformed system, so far as its absolute predestinarianism allowed no independence to the world, specially not to man, either in or alongside of God.²

Des Cartes and Spinoza showed the theologians of the Reformed Church, as in a mirror, the necessity which was laid upon them of advancing on, either to assign a false deistic independence to the world (if they continued to regard the distinction between God and the world as merely separative and not also as unitive); or to condemn it to a pantheistic, yea, even acosmistic, independence (in case they adhered to their absolute determinism). Zwingli's system, under the influence of Picus of Mirandula, had evinced a tendency to the former; but it was repressed by the strict ethical determinism of Calvin.³ The system of Calvin, whilst representing God as the absolutely determining principle of the world, was preserved from Pantheism by the circumstance that, unlike Spinoza, he refused to represent Him as under a necessity of nature to determine as

¹ Ep. 21. "Deum enim rerum omnium causam immanentem, non vero transeuntem statuo." *Eth. i. Prop. 18.*

² To Spinoza the idea of necessity, absolute determinism, is the conciliatory link between the infinite and the finite. Compare Baur's "*Trinitätslehre*" iii. p. 529. Similarly, nay even in a stronger degree, does this take place in the system of the Reformed Church. The worth of the finite was deemed to consist in its necessity, not in its freedom.

³ As Sigwart has shown in detail in his work on Zwingli.

He actually does determine, as the principle whose operations are determined by its nature, and maintained Him, on the contrary, to be "*liberum arbitrium*." This it was that preserved Calvin from Pantheism. But to him also God remained the absolutely transcendent, the absolutely supernatural being; to him also, God was inwardly therefore separated in His essence from the world, and the unity of the two consists solely in the fact of the determination of the latter by the former. But this distinction between the world and God was too dearly bought. Spinoza, in reply to the view which teaches God to be, in the last instance, mere "*liberum arbitrium*," and represents this as the supreme principle, very justly asks, whether it rests with God's arbitrary will to be a thinking being or not?¹ For if the "*liberum arbitrium*" be thus put in the highest place, even the essence of God must be supposed to be dependent on it; to which we may also add, that precisely the supposition that God is mere arbitrary volition, reduces Him to the level of unethical *nature*. Furthermore, if we accept the idea of God as the absolute "*liberum arbitrium*," a Pelagianistic mode of thought might as easily (as the example of Arminianism after Duns Scotus shows) be founded thereon, as a deterministic, like that of Calvin's, especially where the doctrine of man's bearing the image of God continued to be held. In this aspect, the Calvinistic system leads at last to absolute contingency; for, in the last instance, it is contingent whether God create a world like that which determinism describes, or one such as Pelagianism pictures. The authority of the absolute predestinarianism of Calvin having been broken in Holland by Arminianism and the school of Cocceius, the determinism of Spinoza exerted the less influence. Indeed, the attention of the thinkers of the Reformed Church was predominantly turned rather in another direction, that is, in that of the deistic independence of the world. This was the case especially in England, to which the leadership in philosophy was now for a time transferred; whilst Spinoza was destined to find, and, where freedom began to be denied to the creature, could not but find, more sympathy in the Lutheran Church. So far as Spinoza held the attributes in their distinctness, like the Modi, to be something not merely subjective, but an actual enrichment of our knowledge, he had no alternative but to

¹ For example, *Ethica* i. Prop. 32, *Definitio* vii.

admit distinctions and determinations into the "substantia;" but, on the other hand, so far as they are merely subjective, there is no such thing as a knowledge of God, substance is an empty void, and the conception of God is a transcendent one, like that of the Neo-Platonists. That he had no intention of taking up the last-mentioned position is clear (compare, in particular, the Tract. de Intell. Emendat.); consequently, his doctrine of God is still marked by contradictions, and does not meet his own requirements. What was necessary, was to conceive things not merely "sub specie æternitatis," but also to contemplate the "res æternas atque fixas" in God, in their inner connection with each other and with the "substantia." Instead of this, he simply imports these same "res æternas atque fixas" out of the empirical sphere into the eternal substance, as it were for the purpose of filling up its infinite void. These eternal things, which remind us of the ideal world of Plato and Philo, are all supposed to have simultaneous being, and to constitute the truly real; the effect of which is to break down beforehand the bridge over to the actual world. For the actual world must then necessarily be, either subjective appearance, or else a useless repetition of that which already had an eternal, actual existence in God. He speaks, indeed, of the need of knowing the inner order of this ideal world. But he applies his energies principally to the object of sinking the multiplicity into the unity of the "substantia." Had he, on the contrary, sought also for the absolute principle of order, he must have been led to absolute *teleology*, that is, to a conception of God as willing, out of His own perfection (*amor*), the existence of a world destined to pass through an historical process of growth, of an ethically ordered succession and growing in reality, or of a realization of that which was in God merely in the form of eternal decrees and world-thought, and had not already actual and simultaneous reality. Spinoza was prevented from this course by a false notion of the majesty of God, of which the physical, or power, was the principal element. He supposes it to be fitting, that what the Most High wills should come immediately into being; supposing that, otherwise, God would lack for a time a good which it was His will to possess. Mere power, however, cannot give rise even to a kingdom of power: if relative independence be not conceded

to that which is brought into existence, the category of causality sinks down to a category of identity; and thus the "*natura naturata*" becomes identical again with the "*natura naturans*." Only love incorporating itself with power is able to be the principle of a relatively independent world, because it posits the world as an end to itself. Spinoza speaks very much, it is true, of the love of God. But, as viewed by him, it is merely self-communication to another being, which is again identical with God Himself: it lacks the indispensable condition of all ethical love, to wit, self-conscious reflection into itself (*Reflexion in sich*), and the willing and maintaining itself as love, even whilst communicating itself.

Being destitute of, nay more, being hostile to, any historical process, this system is unable to admit of a distinction between nature and revelation, and has, in particular, no place for the fundamental idea of Christianity, the incarnation. To his eye everything is divine, so far as it has being at all; the acosmism of his system leaves behind it nothing but Docetism. But as Spinoza, on the other hand, takes his start with the empirical world, and ever again involuntarily discriminates the world from God, the effort to contemplate the world in unity with God, leads him necessarily to lay down principles regarding the world, particularly regarding the human mind, which are favourable to a Christology, in that their aim is to bring to light the inner susceptibility, specially of human nature, to the communication of the divine essence. The strong mystical element in Spinoza's constitution here comes into consideration. The soul finds rest (*acquiescentia*) in God alone, in love to God, which flows forth from the true knowledge of God. Ordinary thought (*opinio vulgi*) is taken up solely with imaginations, with a world of images and symbols. But this gives rise to confusion, obscurity, sin, and un blessedness; for the *essence* of our spirit demands true, adequate knowledge of God, without which it can find neither rest nor joy. This true knowledge of God, to which we are destined, can only be attained by God's communicating His essence, His truth to the spirit; and whoso has acquired the true knowledge, by means of such self-communication of God, is able to show others the way thereto. The merely positive, mere external authority, the merely statutory belonging to the purely legal point of view, as such, have

nothing to do with this true knowledge of God. The mind rather knows things inwardly, in their essence or inner truth, and is thereby united with God, free, and blessed.¹ Christ is the only one among men to whom was given this adequate knowledge of God through the communication of the divine essence to His soul; He is the voice, yea, the mouth of God—a personal revelation of God to humanity. (Note 1.)

From Naturalism Spinoza was far removed (Ep. 21); his fault lies in the opposite direction, to wit, in his not permitting nature and the world to have an existence really distinct from that of God. But as this sinking of the world into God, even where it took a mystical form, was foreign to the spirit of the Reformed Church, with its ethical character, its deep, nay, almost legal awe before God, Spinoza found, on the whole, little sympathy with it, notwithstanding the pains he evidently took to tack his doctrine on to the Calvinistic predestinarianism, and to set it forth, at the same time, as the truly philosophical mode of thought.² His influence was calculated rather to be far greater in a different direction, to wit, in awakening doubts regarding an absolute predestinarianism which threatened those who held it with such Spinozistic consequences.

So much the easier is it of explanation, that after a man resembling Occam, to wit, Bayle, had made his appearance, who converted the dogmatism of Spinoza and Des Cartes into scepticism, the mind of the age turned in the opposite direction, to wit, towards *Deism*, which treated the empirical and the subjectivity of man as the firm foundation. The negative aspect of this tendency, as regards which it was at one also with Spinoza³ and his followers, is the independence of thought on the dogmas of the Church, in other words, Freethinking, which became the watchword, first in Holland, and then still more generally in England. The positive aspect is the laying stress on the in-

¹ De Intellectus Emendatione, pp. 500, 517; Tract. Theol. Polit. c. 2, p. 99; c. 3, p. 111; c. 4, p. 119.

² An inclination to Spinozism was evinced by Fredr. van Leenhoff, "Der Himmel auf Erden," Amst. 1703; by Wilh. Daurhoff and others. See Walch's "Religionsstreitigkeiten ausser d. evang. luth. Kirche," 3 Theil, pp. 904 ff. 924 ff. v. 66 ff. Also by Abrah. Joh. Cuffer, 1684, and others. In the Lutheran Church, prior to Lessing, Spinozistic elements were appropriated by Knutzen, Edelmann, and others.

³ Tract. Theolog. Polit. c. 20, pp. 240 ff.

dependence of the world relatively to God. P. Bayle presses men on to this by the consideration of evil. With its existence an absolute providence is incompatible. Manichæism was not so destitute of arguments in its favour as at first appears. A priori, indeed, dualism is easy enough to vanquish; but an a priori system cannot be the true one if it do not furnish an explanation of the facts of experience. But to this end it is not enough to assume the existence of an almighty, good principle and its providence; for such a principle could not permit of evil. Much, therefore, may be urged in favour of the idea, that the omnipotence of God is hindered by an opposed evil principle; for otherwise good alone would exist.¹ Manichæism consequently can only be overcome by faith, not by rational grounds. In his case, a correct perception of the fact, that the ethical nature of God does not permit of a determination to evil, is still combined with the Calvinistic presumption, that mere omnipotence, by itself, can work what is good; and as the world is actually marked by evil, he is led constantly to ask the question, whether we are not compelled to assume the existence of an independent causality of evil, not created by God; that is, a limitation of the expression of the divine power by a primal evil causality, independent of, and even opposed to, Him. To appeal to the freedom of the human will did not appear sufficient; for he merely saw in it the unhappy privilege of sinning—a privilege which will cease in the state of perfection.² The Church's doctrines of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ also were assailed by Bayle's scepticism. The basis of all our syllogisms is this,—that things which do not differ from a third, do not differ from each other. But the revelation of the mystery of the Trinity proves this axiom to be false, and so forth.

¹ In his *Dictionnaire*, Art. *Pyrrhon*, he represents the sceptical Abbé as saying, that, according to the doctrine of theologians, God had to choose between this our present world and one that was well-ordered and adorned with virtue; and yet He preferred the one in which sin ruled, because it would conduce more to His honour. God, however, could not prefer the useful to the good; He was not able, therefore, to choose a better world than He did, because an insurmountable hindrance lay in His way. This was taken as a point of departure by King in his "*De origine mali*," and by Leibnitz in his "*Theodicée*." Compare also the article *Manichéisme*.

² Compare *Dictionnaire*, ed. Amstd. 1715, Art. *Marcionites*. Also T. iii., the concluding dissertations on Manichæism and Pyrrhonism.

It is commonly held to be evident that the union of an human body with a rational soul constitutes a person, and that the one is inseparably connected with the other. But this must be incorrect; for otherwise God could never bring it to pass that they should not form a person (which He does, however, according to the Church doctrine of the impersonality of human nature). Accordingly, we must say,—personality is something purely accidental in relation to the unity of body and soul; and we cannot therefore know whether we are ourselves personal or not.¹

The English mind soon turned its attention decidedly to the empirical sphere. To the present day, Locke has continued the best philosophical representative of the English mind. But this system, lacking as it does an ideal character, rather patronizes than recognises Christianity, and considers it predominantly from the point of view of an approved means of furthering the common well-being:—the general well-being of the State was the central point of his interest. He does what he can to give form and fulness to freedom in the finite, but not in the absolute sphere. Finally, the Deists treated God as a means for the world, and that not for a worthy moral form thereof, but for its mere well-being. The right of freethinking was soon fought out; but when they had secured it, they were at a loss how to make a methodical, and therefore a fruitful, use of it. The reason of Deists, which, as long as it was subjected to a degree of pressure, appeared to be completely full of lofty truths, showed itself, after having conquered on a large scale, to be completely poor and destitute of inner unity and strength; and its impotence was revealed by the critical examination to which the fundamental presuppositions of empiricism were subjected by David Hume. And with this the development of philosophy in Great Britain came substantially to an end.

Nor can anything better be said of France; on the contrary, naturalism and materialism, in company with a low eudæmonism, sought to establish themselves firmly there.

Thus the first philosophical movement outside of Germany ended either in scepticism, as in Holland and England, or in atheism, or even frivolity, as in France.

In Germany it was that philosophy was destined, for the

¹ Ibidem, T. iii. 267 a.

first time, to pursue a steady and gradually progressive course. There also was it appointed that the traditional form of the doctrinal system of the Church should be made the object, not of tumultuary attacks by the arbitrary subjective fancies of men, in order afterwards to be restored in an equally arbitrary manner, but of sober examination by the greatest thinkers, who should devote serious and connected labour to the inward transformation of the old forms, and thus seek to continue the work of a philosophical reformation.

In Germany—and this was in itself a good sign—the philosophical movement began with *theosophy*. It is true the mystics and theosophers to whom our attention has been hitherto directed, were unable, owing to the singular and subjective character of their point of view, to preserve the Church from sinking back again into a state of rigidity, and to prevent the outbreak of a one-sided subjectivity, which marked the course of the entire science, and the existence of which over against the torpidity just referred to, is capable of relative justification. On the contrary, the tide of German theosophy, after reaching its highest point in Jacob Böhm, began to ebb as soon as it made efforts to attain to logical clearness; and during the time of its ebb, it turned with ever greater decision and unproductiveness to a one-sided subjectivity, nay more, passed over into a naturalism which converted the inward spiritual light of the mystics into the natural light of reason. Men like Dippel, Adam Müller, Edelmann, Knutzen, may be mentioned in this connection; and they partially gave in their adhesion to Spinozism.

Mysticism had no alternative but to pass over into philosophy. German theosophy was the starting-point of German philosophy,—in a certain sense, its mother. But the mother was first able to understand herself in the daughter. It was ordered, however, that the natural light should first be separated from the Christian, in order that that mixture of the two, which we find constantly recurring in the systems of the mystics, might finally cease, in order that the human might know and grasp itself in its own essence. Not till this had happened could the Christian mind attain to that higher unity of nature and grace, in which the distinction between the two points to their mutual connection.

After the thinking subjectivity (*die denkende Subjectivität*)

had emancipated itself, in the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf, from theology, it advanced unrestingly onwards, in the first instance, to abolish all external presuppositions, with the feeling that independence of these is an essential part of independence of thought. Theology, however, and particularly Christology, followed it step by step in this destructive career; and, accordingly, this age of the predominance of subjectivity offers a spectacle of a character diametrically opposite to that of the period preceding the Reformation. Whilst, during the period last mentioned, one member after another had been added on to Christology, as was rendered necessary by that which had once been posited; in Germany, now, on the contrary, one member was cut away after another, in the order in which they had been previously annexed. And, what is more, the same presupposition of an essential antagonism between the divine and human, which had served as the foundation and principle of the edifice, now became the principle of its overthrow; with the single difference, that the other member of the antagonism—to wit, that the divine excludes the human, and *vice versa*—was now brought into play. In another respect also is it clear that the present period was a counterpart to the previous one, to wit, that as soon as, or indeed partly before, the work of destruction was completed, it, no less than the old one, began to construct the Person of Christ by adding one member thereof to another; only that the point of departure was in this case the opposite one, to wit, the humanity. However great may be the antagonisms through which the history of this dogma pursued its way, we discern ever again clearly, when we take a survey of the whole, that the entire process is governed by a central idea, essentially one, though explicating itself in time; and that these antagonisms serve the purpose of evolving one of its momenta after the other, of chastising and refuting one one-sided tendency by its contrary. Nor will this process rest till the extremes combine and interpenetrate to form one grand whole, and the one truth dawns in all its fulness and glory on the consciousness of man. This consideration may help to put our minds into the proper historical tone for the examination of the history of our dogma during the next epoch, which in other respects also presents few elements of an encouraging character.

CHAPTER FIRST

From Leibnitz to Kant.

DESTRUCTION OF CHRISTOLOGY BY SUBJECTIVITY, OWING
TO THE PURELY NEGATIVE CHARACTER OF ITS SELF-
EMANCIPATION.

THE philosophical mind of Germany opened its career in the most direct antagonism to Spinoza's doctrine of the absolute substance, with its reduction of all beings to a state of impersonality. For, as Jacob Böhm had sought to show that every single soul is a living birth from God, so did the philosophy of Leibnitz start with the principle of *individuality*. He held the individual to be a monad, or complex of monads peculiarly determined; though he, at the same time, held each particular monad to be a reflection of the universe, a microcosm setting forth the whole in a peculiar form. The system of Leibnitz, however, is intellectualistic in character; little attention is paid to the will. These monads he represents as so independent and shy of any influence from without; he insists so strongly on their having a purely immanent development; that one might fairly fear their being totally separated from God, nay more, their falling into Atomism, though, it is true, an Atomism of a more animated character. In point of fact, the bond uniting the monads with each other and with God, is one of the feeblest and obscurest parts of Leibnitz's system;—it occupies rather the position of a postulate, of a requirement, which the system makes of itself, to advance out beyond itself. The predicates which he otherwise gives to the monads do not bear application to the Central Monad. In order, therefore, to avoid giving absolute independence to the monads, and thus also causing them, in their multiplicity, to go asunder, he represents, after a deterministic fashion, the nature and character of the series of evolutions which they undergo, as arising out of, and determined by, their original essence; evolved too in such a manner, that they combine harmoniously with the other monads, in particular as respects the activity of the body and the soul, or of the monad constituting them. In principle, a decision was

in favour of a deistic view of the world, and that in a deterministic form. Leibnitz, it is true, in opposition to the rigidity of Spinozism, gives prominence to activity; not, however, to a free self-conscious personality, for individuality, as expounded by him, does not reach even the idea of subjectivity; for he considered men to be mere unities or collections of monads, one of which governs the rest.¹

Christian Wolf put aside the doctrine of monads,² but clung both to the determinism, and to the idea of this world as the best of all possible worlds, which lay at the basis of the Theodicee of Leibnitz.³ But it was, in particular, the principle of identity, that of contradiction, that of the excluded third and the "principium indiscernibilium," on which Wolf, after the example of Leibnitz, based his method; and which dogmatically rests satisfied in formal logic with the proof of a thing's being possible, that is, not self-contradictory.

At its first appearance, the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy took up a by no means hostile position relatively to the biblical Christology, or even only to that of the Church. On the contrary, the morning of the freer German philosophy presented only the pleasing spectacle of science having voluntarily become the ally of theology. By demonstrating the full agreement of reason with the dogmas of the Church, it offered a further support to Christian faith, and supplied a weapon of defence which could not but prove welcome at the time of the rise of English Deism and French unbelief, whose representatives opposed the authority of this same reason to that of revelation. Like Leibnitz, Wolf took up a positive position relatively to Revelation, and in particular to Christology; philosophy was applied solely for the purpose of proving the truth of revelation: so much the more natural, therefore, must it appear for theology

¹ We cannot, indeed, understand how monads "which have no windows," and which cannot be influenced from without, can be governed by another. Applied to Christology, this system must lead to Nestorianism. As occasion offered, Leibnitz defended the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and Dyotheletism.

² His idea of God as the Highest Being, as the "ens perfectissimum," and his proof of immortality from the simplicity of the soul, still remind us of Leibnitz's doctrine of monads.

³ As in the case of Bayle, this conceals a dualism; finitude is conceived as a limit of God.

to recognise it as an ally. On the other hand, however, even the philosophy of Wolf itself contained elements enough calculated to bring about a different state of matters. The mathematical method of proof adopted by this school, as applied to Christology, arrived still, it is true, at full agreement with the dogma of Christ; further, Wolf himself, and in particular his followers, Carpzov and Reusch, demonstrated the necessity of the incarnation quite in the manner of Anselm's "*Cur Deus Homo?*" from the necessity of a satisfaction and substitution; but still a decidedly predominant intellectualistic tendency was given to the mind by this method of demonstration. *Doctrine* was treated as the essence of Christianity; and in view of that, they left out of sight its real central feature, which is deed, life, eternal history. Once this centre thrown into the background,—and, following the example of the sinking orthodoxy, the philosophy of this period did throw it into the background,—the proofs for the revelation in Christ become completely external; and philosophy, inasmuch as it appeals to principles of the mind itself, necessarily becomes more convincing and important than the authority of theology. If reason succeeded perfectly in proving the truth of revealed doctrines, it had freely produced them out of itself. In this way, too, revelation was naturally shown to be something that can be dispensed with, seeing that reason possessed the power to produce its doctrines out of itself. If, however, reason failed in proving the truth of the doctrines of revelation or of the Church, then, the more the mind was strengthened in its independence, and the more it became aware how much more certain and convincing its own necessary demonstrations were than any external authority, the more natural did it become for it to refuse any longer patiently to submit itself to this external authority and its utterances as the goal towards which its proofs were to strive, and to venture on deciding by its own plenipotence what is true and what is false. The simple logical law of contradictories, which at first alone asked to be admitted into theology, of itself necessarily caused matters to take this course. The Church doctrine of the Person of Christ, particularly of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," was by no means beyond the reach of attacks, even on the part of this law. And in point of fact, we find the doctrine almost universally given up, even

as early as the middle of the last century.¹ Indeed, the mind of that age in general, estranged as it was from the spirit of the Reformation, and completely devoted to bare logic, regarded the symbolical books as a crushing yoke, which to shake off was its next earnest effort. In this it succeeded even more universally after the middle of the eighteenth century. The system of the Church found but few defenders; and even those who appeared spoke with only half boldness, or they no longer felt animated by the mighty power of a faith which refers everything to Christ. With the denial of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*," a retrograde movement was begun, which landed the mind again in Nestorianism. (Note 2.) But the depreciation of the influence of the divine nature, or of the Son of God, was soon followed also by a depreciation of that divine element which comes into consideration for Christology. They were obliged to ask the question, whether it was not possible for the one personal God to exert all the influences on Jesus, which a merely Nestorian alliance of God and man leaves behind?

Accordingly, the dogma of the Trinity also was now subjected to a renewed investigation, and one constituent after another was taken away from the conception of the deity of the Son, which had been built up with so much labour. In the first instance, the keystone added by the Council of Nicæa was taken away, to wit, the *ὁμοουσία*, which affirmed the essential equality of that which is distinct, and was intended to combine in one the Sabellian momentum of the identity of essence and the Arian momentum of hypostatical distinction. So soon as predominant stress was laid on the simplicity of God,—which was the case during the Wolfian period, because it directed its attention mainly to the discrimination of God and the world,—there only remained the choice between Sabellianism and Arianism. The former found little sympathy with the thinkers of an age which was dominated by a deistic tendency,² and

¹ Köcher's "*de duarum naturarum commun. et Comm. idd. ex compendiis et system. theol. non proscribenda*," Jen. 1764. Until the time of F. Buddeus this was taught: the ancients show that it is necessary; they also have had insight. The Formula Concordiæ requires it; it is divine doctrine.—The work contains twelve pages!

² See Div. II. Vol. II., pages 374–5, on Urkasperger.

therefore passed rapidly away ; moreover, as even its earlier history teaches us, notwithstanding its richer and fuller Christian substance at the commencement, it inevitably passed over into ever more scanty forms. Arianism, on the contrary, had its way prepared, on the one hand, by Arminianism, and by S. Clarke, whose works Semler translated ; and, on the other hand, found a support in the circumstance of its satisfying the one-sided tendency of the age to the creatural aspect of Christ ; whilst, at the same time, it masked itself pretty well in relation to the Holy Scripture.

Let us consider both these tendencies into which the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity branched out, in order that we may go back to the scantiest elements of the doctrine of the Person of Christ and of God.

The most important point,—the point at which the doctrine of the Trinity had remained standing during the age of the Reformation,—concerned the question, whether the generation of the Son did not exclude aseity, and therefore involve the dependence of the Son ? In England, the affirmation of the aseity of the Son had already led some to the verge of a monarchical equality of the persons.¹ This same result now followed in Germany. Leibnitz, it is true, had endeavoured to point out the existence of a trinity in the process of the inner self-consciousness of God, similarly to Melancthon and other older writers, and, at a subsequent period, to Lessing in his “Education of the Human Race.” But Wolfian theologians, like Canz, Reusch, and Gruner, starting with the idea of the abstract simplicity of the highest being, as laid down by Wolf, converted the three persons of the Trinity into three series of thoughts and volitions, relating to the world, and having it for their subject-matter, that is, into three eternal and immanent acts, which, although simultaneous, were supposed to presuppose each the other. In the first act, God thinks the eternally present ideas of all conceivable things ; in the second act, the infinite divine understanding systematizes all these things, and thus sketches all possible mundane systems, to which His will inclined according to the measure of the goodness of each. The third act is the judgment of the understanding, which decides for the best possible world ; and in the thought thereof

¹ See Div. II. Vol. II., pp. 357 f.

the infinite will rests as its final aim, and realizes it. That this is not the Church's doctrine of the Trinity, needs no proof. Gruner already set himself consciously in opposition thereto.¹ Sailer at one time converts the persons of the Trinity into three powers, which can very well be present in one being; at another time, he treats these powers as three subjects, and accounts for the hesitation in accepting the idea of three thinking, willing subjects, by the feebleness of human knowledge, which must content itself with the fact of the mystery. Indeed, we find the theologians of Wolf's school at first reckoning the communication of mysteries (that is, of that which is not manifest) as one of the criteria of revelation, not merely relatively and for the ante-Christian ages, but also for the Christian period.² Lastly, G. Schlegel,³ not without a hollow, self-complacent feeling, resolves the Trinity into the three great activities and providences of God—creation, sustentation, the communication of knowledge by Jesus and of improvement by the Holy Ghost. Reinhard distinguishes between "essentia," which is the sum total of the divine perfections, and "substantia divina," which is the "vis agendi infinita;" that is, the substance of God, which is only one, is the divine personality. In this substance, however, there are three persons (supposita).

¹ Institut. Theol. dogmaticæ, pp. 81 ff.; although he terms his actus divinos hypostatical. Compare Baur's "Trinitätslehre" iii. 590 ff. 700 ff.; Rensch's "Introduct. in theol. revel." Jena 1760. Canz, in his "Consensus Philosophiæ Wolf. cum. Theol.," 1737, pp. 468 f., preserves a closer connection between the history of the world and his doctrine of the Trinity, which also resolves it into "Actus." According to the first "Actus," God is to be regarded as the infinite *Ratio* (as the creative cause); according to the second, as the principle of the restoration of the disturbed harmony of the world; according to the third, as communicating the good. The Trinity is thus the activity of God as power, wisdom, love: the distinction between this and similar old theories, is simply that it speaks, not of three fundamental powers (as Sailer almost did), nor of three attributes, but of three activities, agreeably to the principle that God is "actus purissimus."

² G. F. Sailer, "Ueber die Gottheit Christi," 1780. Similarly also Tollner.

³ "Erneuerte Erwägung der Lehre von der göttlichen Dreieinigkeit," 2 Thle. 1791. Compare Baur l.c. pp. 702 f. "Vereinfachte Darstellung der Lehre von Gott als Vater, Jesu dem Sohne und dem heiligen Geiste." Riga 1781.

And whereas, otherwise, "persona" is used to denote that which is concentrated or shut up in itself, and which, at the utmost, can only be communicated to the "natura," not to the "persona," Reinhard lays down as a definition,—"*Persona est, quod proprie subsistit, s. individuum subsistentiæ incompletæ per se libere agens. Incompleta subsistentia*" he styles "eum existendi modum, quo individuum sine quodam alio, per quod subsistit non potest esse." Many theologians, he goes on to say, consider this dogma the most important of all, but grant that our salvation does not depend on our conceiving it after this or that manner, for no particular view of it is contained in the Scriptures.¹

That the knowledge of the Trinity is not necessary to salvation, yea more, does not belong to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, Töllner had already, at a previous period, endeavoured carefully to show, although he himself meant to keep hold of a Trinity.² At first he taught that we must assume the existence in God of three simultaneous, eternal, truly distinct actions (working, representation, desire), which point back to three eternal, truly distinct, acting grounds. He herewith appropriates to himself, from a Sabellianism which derives the distinctions in God solely from the world, the tendency to assert the existence of distinctions in God. But as, on the one hand, he deemed the simplicity of God to come into collision with the assumption of three persons, and, on the other hand, the reduction of the three acting "grounds" to attributes or powers in God appeared not to harmonize with the Scriptures, particularly not with Christology, he inclined towards Arianism. At the beginning, he shyly expressed an opinion in its favour, after conscientious though shortsighted exegetical inquiries;³ nor did he overlook the difficulties which attend it. But it did not fail to meet with approbation.⁴ As a factor whose importance ought not to be slightly estimated, we may mention the change in the view

¹ Passim, see § 41, 42. About this time endeavours were made to prove exegetically the identity of the divine in Jesus with the Holy Ghost, and the impersonality of the latter.

² "Kurze vermischte Aufsätze" ii. 1, 1769.

³ "Theol. Untersuchungen," 1762, Bd. i. St. 1. See Arianism.

⁴ Hegelmaier published J. Vernet's "Diss. de Christi deitate," 1777, again in 1782. The elder Flatt also was devoted to Subordinationism.

taken of the system of the world, gradually brought about by the discoveries of Copernicus. Not only did men cease to regard the earth as the centre of the universe, but they took for granted that the other celestial bodies also were tenanted by rational and free beings: the question was asked,—Whether, if they fell into sin, there would not be a deliverance also for them?—which was answered in the affirmative. But as the supposition of Christ's having appeared in other heavenly bodies besides the earth, would necessarily have threatened His humanity with Docetism, some inclined to the notion that He was destined to be the Redeemer and King of this our planet, whilst in other spheres of creation, other delivering revelations of God are carried out by the heads of other circles of spirits. (Note 3.)

Up to this time the Holy Scriptures had been deemed authoritative; but the belief so long unsuspectingly cherished, that the doctrine of the symbolical books is identical with that of the Scriptures, had now come to an end. Many claimed that their efforts should be looked upon as merely leading back the doctrine of the Church, whose expressions are not contained in the Scriptures, from its artificial scholastic form to its biblical simplicity. So, for example, Morus, Less, Storr, Flatt, Reinhard, Knapp. But the authority of Scripture also was soon assailed in every sort of manner. With the publication of Ernesti's Grammatical Method, exegesis took a new flight (*Institutio Interpretis*, 1761); whilst at the same time the intention of its author was to supply the doctrine of the Church with a new weapon of defence. It proved to be so also, for the doctrine of redemption and that of faith; but not for all the Church's dogmatical positions. Furthermore, this method, which corresponds so completely to the spirit and words of the age of the Reformation, did not at once find by any means an unprejudiced application. Theology, now that it had thrown off the authority of the symbolical books, and of the "regula" or "analogia fidei" previously found therein, instead of explaining Scripture by Scripture, and placing full trust in its power and right to interpret itself, brought to its work another canon, to wit, the rational ideas, the pretended wisdom of Illuminism, and all sorts of elements which it fancied to have constituted primitive Christianity. The *historical* principle of exegesis, brought into

vogue especially by Semler, and the awakening spirit of *criticism*, which with the boldness of youth proceeded to assail the Scriptures, which had hitherto been the corner-stone of faith, had an explanation ready for every sort of difficulty presented by the sacred writings. All those parts, not only of Christology, but also of the doctrinal system of the Church in general, which it did not approve, it explained away by referring them to accommodation or to ideas of the age, or by rejecting the passages of Scripture which contained them as spurious. Semler's merits as a theologian should not, indeed, be so slightly estimated as they frequently are in the present day; for, whatever confusion and shapelessness characterized his own ideas, he had clearness enough to discern and bring light into the confusion of the Church's doctrinal positions—positions which had passed over into the region of the unintelligible. He in particular, by his works, revived the no less indispensable, critical aspect of Protestantism. The effect of his labours on theology, however,—labours on which he expended great learning,—was in the first instance only a destructive one: still he preserved his own "private faith" through all the critical processes to which it was exposed. The newly awakened freer spirit of historical investigation applied itself also with special zeal to the history of the doctrine of the Person of Christ, and found much new light of which there had been no presentiment; but its determinations were traced for the most part to a purely external, accidental origin. The fact of the development or logical view of the dogma having been a gradual work, was held to be an infallible proof of its being a purely human and worthless thing. The work of Souverain on the Platonism of the Fathers of the Church, translated by Löffler, had, in particular, the effect of causing the doctrine of the Trinity to be looked upon as an exotic plant. Gruner specially took up this point of view, in relation to the so-called mysteries of the Christian faith. Others sought to trace back the doctrine of the Trinity to a post-Babylonian, Jewish philosophy of religion; the doctrine of the Son of God, to the misunderstood Orientalism of the Old and New Testament.

(Note 4.)

As about this time also the influence of the French and English freethinkers began to be felt ever more strongly in Germany, the philosophy of Wolf gradually lost itself in

sands of popularization, and gave place to a Deism and Fatalism which it had itself aided in producing by its purely logical and formal tendency, and which naturally passed over into Materialism and Eudæmonism. Accordingly, this idealess age, shut up as it was within the circles of finitude and of bald utilitarian theories, necessarily became ever more alienated from the doctrine of the Person of Christ; the doctrine of the incarnation of God inevitably became to it a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence. In quick succession was extinguished, for the consciousness of a carnalized age, one ray after another of the glory with which the pious faith of the Fathers had seen the incarnate Son of God surrounded; and there was no more stopping, till the measure of His humiliation was full.

To rest in the Subordinationism which still hung, by the weak thread of a higher pre-existent hypostasis dwelling in Jesus, to the Church idea of the Son of God, was an impossibility: it excluded the true humanity, about which the present epoch was above all concerned, still more decidedly than the doctrine of the Church itself, because, according to Arianism, if the humanity of Jesus is to be conceived as complete, two finite personalities must have formed one person. But as the conceptions formed of the work of redemption by the theologians of that time did not at all necessitate or urge the positing of anything so monstrous as Arianism posits, in assuming the descent of an heavenly creature into a man; and as, on the contrary, a work, whose essential feature was doctrine (and such was the kind of work ascribed to Christ), could also have been performed by a man whom God had endowed with special powers, the divinity still attributed to Christ was reduced to the rank of a communicated divine power, and the doctrine of Paul of Samosata was thus once more resuscitated. This expresses itself in the great interest with which the Socinian Christology—a Christology once repudiated by the teachers of the Church with horror—began to be treated: by many, in fact, it was now adopted,¹ with the sole difference, that the remains of Supernaturalism, phantastically retained by Socinianism, were more consistently cast aside.—Thus, in their retrograde movement, theologians consistently arrived again at the very Ebionism with

¹ For example, by von Basedow, Bahrdt, and Steinbart. Oelrichs and Ziegler made their contemporaries more accurately acquainted therewith.

whose vanquishment the development of the dogma had taken its start. The few who still clung to the deity of Christ, either did so without the previous assurance and decision, and as it were on the flight; or, if they held it with greater decision, like the Tübingen school, found themselves unable to force back the tide.¹ This was further aided in particular by the rise of the so-called practical dogmatics, to which the more believing theologians, who still remained, contributed their part. The importance and truth of dogmas were measured by their practical significance;² all purely speculative elements were described as non-essential. This dislocation of the dogmatical organism, inspired as it was by the utilitarian spirit of the age, gave to knowledge a perverse position. Whilst, in point of fact, truth alone can fix for man his true practical goal, the matter was now turned upside down: the practical, action, was treated as that which first stands fast, as the point of departure; as though it were certain of itself how we are to act, and what we are to accomplish by our action. Christianity was now, accordingly, dominated by this professedly practical tendency. Whatever would not accommodate itself to this idea of the practical,—an idea formed entirely a priori, and not under the influence of the truth, of Christianity,—was thrown aside as unpractical. But this tendency, with its hostility to the speculative elements of Christianity—an hostility concealed under a beautiful, deceptive name—inflicted a severe blow on Christian piety. The practical, not being integrated by the doctrinal, was an external, finite thing, and became consequently unpractical. Many a point which forms a constitutive element of the Christian consciousness, was thus treated as non-essential, on the ground of its being unpractical; and, in particular, essential portions of Christology, and of that which is connected with it, were set aside.³ In this manner did even some more earnest theologians play into the hands of the shallowness and superficiality of the age.

¹ Besides Flatt, see Storr's "*Doctrinæ Christianæ pars theoretica*," 1793.

² To this connection belong Less, Jerusalem, Spalding, Ammon, Miller.

³ Thus Spalding, in his "*Nutzbarkeit des Predigtamtes*," speaks of the doctrines of the two natures in Christ, of the Trinity, of the atonement, of original sin, as unpractical and inapplicable to the pulpit.

As we have already seen, the heralds and heroes of Illuminism naturally went much further; and as the theologians, in consequence of the approximation of their point of view to the Pelagianism of the age, were unable to give satisfactory replies to the question, as to the necessity of a divine revelation such as faith beholds in Christ, nothing could be more natural than for the subjective mind, which had ceased to accept anything without previous proof, to go on to deny altogether the existence of a divine revelation in Christ. The idea of the redemption from the power of the flesh, promised by Christianity, naturally presented itself to the Eudæmonism of the age as a less desirable doctrine, as a doctrine that can be dispensed with: the doctrine of a supernatural interference of God in the case of the Person of Christ, necessarily seemed to it destitute of foundation; and, even apart from the representation given of this revelation by the Supranaturalists,—a representation unscientific and destitute of logical connection,—it appeared worthy of repudiation to this age, because, having lost all sense for the ideal, whatever partook of such a nature was foreign to it.¹ So completely had the organ for the apprehension even only of the grandeur of the human in Christ been lost, that they were unable to understand and explain His thought of establishing a kingdom on earth, save by imputing motives drawn from that common finite sphere, which had now come to be regarded as the only actuality.² A much more significant step backwards was thus taken than in the age of Ebionitism. The spotless character of the Redeemer was assailed: as once before the high priests, so now before the bar of "Reason," He was charged with ambition, lust of power, dishonesty; and as then, so also now, found guilty. But now was the cycle completed; the Person of Christ had now afresh, in the consciousness of the human mind, run through the same stages of humiliation that had fallen to its lot in life. After Reason had accomplished its work of effacing all higher glory from the image of the Redeemer, it seated itself on the throne which the faith of the Church had assigned to Christ as King, and placed the degraded one in the circle of sinners, to the end that it might pronounce over again His sentence of condemnation. Again, however, was the

¹ For the literature of this subject, see Reinhard's *Epit.* p. 120 ff.

² See the *Wolfenbüttler Fragmentist*; Ventarini and others.

way of humiliation to prove for Him a way to still greater exaltation and glory. His death, in the consciousness of humanity, was destined to be followed by an all the more glorious resurrection. And after a short period of rest, during which the mind meditated and repented in stillness the crime it had committed, this resurrection was accomplished.

CHAPTER SECOND.

THE KANTIAN PERIOD.

THROUGH the heaven of these frivolous and superficial thinkers, who, being destitute of feeling for that which is lofty, could find no other way of dealing with it than either annihilating or dragging it into the dust; who, blind to the true light, and intoxicated with the fancy of enlightenment, pronounced judgment on the profoundest questions which had stirred and enriched the human mind for thousands of years, with a conceit characteristic of the adherents of a hollow pretence of philosophy, there darted suddenly and unexpectedly, like a flash of lightning in an unclouded sky, Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." It cast down those dreams of wisdom as by the rush of a storm; it began to execute on Reason itself the judgment which Reason had executed on Christianity. By appealing to the moral consciousness, to which Kant gave expression in its full power and inner truth with a kind of religious enthusiasm, he overthrew the eudæmonistic tendency, which was so completely hostile to Christianity, and aroused the human mind to such a flight that the world was revived from its intellectual paralysis, and an age destitute of sympathy with the ideal was again laid hold on by its power. The newly awakening susceptibility to the ideal was necessarily accompanied by a revival of susceptibility to the centre of all that is ideal in humanity, to wit, the Redeemer.

A philosophy of so earnest a tone could not but respect the moral earnestness of Christianity, and must be far removed from the frivolity of regarding it as mere superstition, or as

an empty spiritless husk. This was soon perceived by the theologians; and they hastened accordingly to apply for the behoof of the Church's doctrinal system, that aspect of Kantianism which was favourable to Christianity.

The attempts at conciliation, however, pursued the following course. We have seen that the fundamental characteristic of this entire period was, that the subjective mind refused to believe on the mere external authority of a revelation, that it wished to be convinced of the necessity of the doctrines presented by revelation, in the way of demonstration. Meanwhile, the mind had been still more strongly confirmed in its subjective tendency; and as the idea of moral good had already opened up to it a full fountain, the waters of which streamed forth from its own inner being, it advanced so far in its self-confidence as to refuse altogether to recognise anything objective as authoritative, save such as it was necessarily led to the recognition of by thought itself. The attempts at mediation between Christianity and philosophy were necessarily based on the preliminary question, as to the possibility and necessity of a divine revelation at all for moral ends. Then came the time of "Critiques of all Revelation,"¹ or of the "Religion of Christianity," and of the "Review of the Protestant System."² The result arrived at was:—An external, immediate revelation, an interference on the part of God, may be expected when it is rendered imperative by the highest aim of the world, morality; to advance which by all moral means, belongs essentially to the nature of God. Now such a case occurs when the moral decay of humanity has gone so far that it neither knows nor is able, by itself, any longer to practise the pure moral law. It was necessary, therefore, to show that, at the time when Jesus made His appearance, the moral decay of humanity had reached this stage. To prove this historically was difficult, especially for those who started with Kantian principles; and even if it succeeded, the necessity of Christ for all ages—for example, for the present age—was not shown. And though Tieftrunk, in his "Censur des protestantischen Lehrbegriffs," retains also the miracles of Christ, the existence of a God-man was by no means shown to be a necessity. For, on the contrary, that which

¹ Fichte, 1791, "Kritik aller Offenbarung."

² Tieftrunk, 1790, 1791, "Censur des protestantischen Lehrbegriffs."

doctrine and example were supposed to effect for the raising of men from moral decay, could quite as well have been accomplished by a wise and holy man.

Kant himself now gave the matter a different turn.¹ Our first duty here is to take note of the preliminary question respecting the possibility or necessity of a revelation at all; for in it is involved, only in an abstract manner, the question as to the necessity of the revelation in Christ; nay more, the conception to be formed of the Person of Christ itself is entirely dependent on this preliminary inquiry. Kant's course of reasoning is as follows:—

I. In proof of the *possibility* and *necessity* of a revelation at all, he lays down,—

1. A deeper *foundation* in his doctrine of *radical* evil; by which he understood, not sensuality in itself, but the subordination of the moral law to sensuality. In his view, this subordination is not merely momentary and isolated, but the evil has struck its roots into man; not, indeed, as an inherited disorder, as inherited guilt or as inherited sin,—that is, not after a medical, juridical, or theological manner,—for otherwise it would not be moral evil. He designates it radical, because it shows itself as active prior to any actual employment of freedom whatever: it is, consequently, not first acquired in time, by any arbitrary act in time; and yet it contains a bias to evil, which is itself the root of all particular evil maxims and actions, because it corrupts the ground out of which all maxims flow. This tendency must have its ground in freedom; otherwise it could not be called morally evil; but because the ground does not lie in any temporal act, it points to a free, intelligible (*intelligibilis*) deed, by which the supreme maxim, the root of all others, was perverted.

2. But so certainly as this radical evil has become a power in the entire race, even so certainly must it be again overcome, and a radical *restoration* be effected by reversing the previous reversion of principles. Though the origin of good and evil is alike incomprehensible, we are still able to give to the question—"How was such a reversal possible?"—the answer, We can conceive it to be possible that the evil should be over-

¹ "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft" ("Religion within the limits of mere reason"), 1792.

come by the good ; nay more, we can conceive it to be necessary ; for this is involved in the absolute requirement of the moral law,—“Thou shalt!”—therefore thou canst. But as radical evil is only intelligible on the supposition of freedom, so also the restoration. Self-improvement is a duty ; to wait for divine help is idleness, immorality.

3. But this restoration is mediated through three momenta.

(1.) Through the *idea of a God-pleasing*, that is, perfect, moral, and therefore blessed, *humanity*. By means of that idea, man becomes conscious of his original capacity, destination and perfection ; and when taken up amongst the maxims, it works sanctifyingly, if only gradually. It is the duty of every man to rise up to it, to believe in its attainableness, to trust in its power. *a.* Empirically, indeed, its *attainableness* is neither cognizable, nor, perhaps, perfectly possible. But if the good principle have only been implanted in man, as its realization, though only gradual, lies before the eye of God as a grand unity, man is pleasing to Him on the ground of this same principle. The defects in the manifestation of the principle disappear on a view of the whole. *b.* Nor ought we to allow ourselves to be disturbed by a fear lest the new moral temper and disposition should prove *not lasting* ; for, by the exercise of the good, its power and our confidence in the might of its idea are increased. Furthermore, man does not at all need to be made certain of the unalterableness of his good disposition ; it would be rather injurious than not. *c.* As far as concerns *past* sins, the consciousness of whose ill deserts might disturb the joy of the new life, it must be borne in mind, that by his change, man takes upon himself many sufferings and much self-denial. These sufferings do not, strictly speaking, pertain to him as a new creature ; but as he notwithstanding endures them, we may regard them as sufferings substitutionarily borne by the new man for the old, and may deem the divine justice and holiness to be by this means satisfied. We need scarcely mention that, in this manner, all the methods of proving the necessity of the Person of Christ from the fact of the need felt by every individual man, hitherto attempted, were rendered invalid. In this aspect, all that remained was a conditional necessity of revelation,—to wit, its necessity, on the supposition that the decay of humanity should reach the point to which his

followers refer. This course, however, he does not take so directly, but seeks to effect the transition to Christianity in a deeper manner, to wit, by means of the idea of the kingdom of God.

(2.) The second momentum in the radical restoration of humanity is, in his view, the idea and necessity of an *ethical community*. Only in this form could he regard morality as perfectly realized and realizable. Apart from the form of a community, every one would be ethically in the condition of nature, for every one would be giving law to himself; a conflict and contradiction of the principles of virtue would thus arise, and immorality be the result. This subjective state of universal autonomy must therefore be quitted; the highest moral law must become the one universal principle.

Now, the founding of this ethical State can only be undertaken by men through religion; for one collective will must hold all the individuals together in it, in that all submit themselves to the same. And this collective will must not be a foreign will, but the moral will of all the individuals,—that is, the will of the universal moral law, or of a lawgiver to whom all are absolutely subject. To believe in such a lawgiver is duty; for without this faith, to believe in the perfection of the moral community would be impossible. A point of transition to religion is thus secured. The ethical State is at the same time a Church: in the first instance, however, merely an *ideal* one; for this community cannot be based on anything external. The pure and absolutely valid faith of reason is its law and goal: its foundation is the unconditional authority of reason, bearing in itself the moral idea: and marks of this ideal Church are, freedom, unity, universality, purity, and unchangeableness.

(3.) But this pure, ideal Church, if it is to become a reality, must necessarily in the first instance assume a *statutory* shape. In order to its entrance into the world of manifestation, the idea must assume a sensuous form. The permanent union of men into an universal visible Church presupposes a fact, a founder; owing to the peculiar nature of man, the religion of reason by itself is unable to effect an union. It is men's universal tendency to seek a sensuous confirmation for the truths of reason; and this renders it necessary to assume that the true religion of reason will be found in the sensuous.

ward way. Without the assumption of a revelation, men would have no confidence in their reason, even though it should give utterance to the same truths as revelation. Further, it is so hard to bring men to the conviction that pure moral conduct is the only true worship of God; they constantly try to make it easier by a spurious worship. Still further are they from being able to found an ethical community, without being impelled thereto by faith in an higher authority. Although, therefore, on the one hand, the ideal Church is contaminated and reduced to something statutory, by its realization being made dependent on historical and empirical conditions; although its character of *freedom* thus suffers, inasmuch as man is directed to look to a binding history, instead of to his own spirit; its character of *universality* also, because what is historical can only have a particular validity, to wit, for those to whom it comes and who can test it; its character of *unity*, because every historical Church faith splits up into many forms; its character of *purity*, because every Church brings with it a form of worship, and with every form of worship are mixed up the impure motives of fear and hope,—in other words, a court service is rendered, instead of absolute respect for the moral law; finally, its character of *immutability*, because everything empirical is subject to change;—nevertheless, if even only the beginnings of a moral union are to be brought to pass, regard must be had to the needs of weak nature—statutes must be prescribed as divine, in order that by them, as a vehicle of the religion of reason, man may be strengthened both in himself and for the labour of founding an ethical commonwealth.¹

II. But now with regard to *the relation of this theory to Christianity in general, and to the doctrine of the Person of Christ* in particular,—according to the principles just set forth, it assumes the following shape.

Neither for atonement, nor for sanctification and blessedness,

¹ Of an actual revelation of *God* there can be no word in connection with Kant, but merely of a religious faith. Similarly to Kant, going back, however, to God, C. L. Nitzsch, in his "De revelatione relig. externa eademque publica," has combined "Rationalism of substance with Supernaturalism of form." Compare C. J. Nitzsch's "System der christlichen Lehre." The Kantian Stapfer proceeded more christologically, after the manner of Lactantius, arguing from the necessity of the realization of the ideal. Schneckeburger has recalled him to recollection.

in himself does man need external help and authority : but for the founding of an ethical commonwealth faith in an external revelation is necessary ; and such an external revelation may accordingly become a means of preparing the way for the true religion of reason. Whether Christianity discharges the function of a good vehicle of the religion of reason, depends on its having a pure moral spirit. As to this matter, it depends above all on the person of the founder. According to His character and doctrine, His design was to establish a pure virtue and a kingdom thereof, a kingdom of God on earth. So far, therefore, it must be allowed that faith in Him does not contaminate pure morality, but that He is fitted to be the founder of that statutory Church which we have above shown to be necessary. If, however, we ask after the actual, historical essence of this person, we only arrive at a negative result ; and, indeed, it is of no consequence to practical religion whether our knowledge is widened so as to embrace this matter, or not. As an historical, empirical being, he cannot be allowed to have any authority. The historical features of Christ may be necessary, in order to enable us to represent to ourselves the idea of a humanity well-pleasing to God ; for we can only do this by the aid of the thought of a man who proved his morality in the midst of the sternest conflicts. In order that supra-sensuous qualities, like the idea of the good, may become concretely intuitable by us, we require an analogy with natural beings ; and we are unable to conceive of any moral worth of importance without representing to ourselves the moral actions in a human manner, without giving them dramatic shape. The worth of this, however, can only consist in its purifying the moral conceptions which already lie in us : to stamp this schematism of the imagination as a widening of our experience, and because of this necessary character (or *Unart*) of our thinking, to attempt to persuade ourselves that the moral idea must needs be actually, objectively, and historically realized, at the point from which we take our departure in dramatizing it, would be anthropomorphism. The appearance in history of a sinless being is indeed a possibility ; but, at any rate, it would be unnecessary to hold him to have been supernaturally generated, even though we might not be able absolutely to demonstrate its impossibility.

type of a God-pleasing humanity is already contained in us, in an incomprehensible manner, what need is there for further incomprehensibilities? Nay more, to exalt such a saint above all the frailty of human nature by representing his birth as supernatural, would only detract from his archetypal character; for inasmuch as his virtue would then be inborn, and not wrought out by himself, so great a distance would be put between him and us, that he would be no proof of the possibility of our realizing the ideal.—Even if the great teacher, who is held to serve as an example for the consciousness of humanity, did not completely correspond to the ideal, He might still have spoken of Himself, as though the ideal of the good were corporeally and veritably set forth in Him: He would then, namely, have referred to the disposition which He had constituted His fundamental maxim. No less would He then be able to accomplish that which He had to accomplish. Even the introduction of the pure religion of reason does not absolutely require that the founder of the ethical divine State on earth should be entirely sinless.

The moral idea had not first to derive its reality and obligatory force from Him; it bore this reality and force completely in itself, as an outflow of the moral, legislative reason. Even though there should never have existed an absolutely moral being, the idea would still equally possess objective reality. Nothing historical, nothing empirical, can by itself have obligatory force for us as example or doctrine. The historical owes its binding force to the reason. For does not the mind estimate the value of a professedly sinless being by an inner standard?

Nay more, he goes still further. An external revelation, which, as such, always leads to believing on authority, must again disappear, even though faith in it were necessary at first as a vehicle of the true religion of reason. Pure morality it is not able to produce. It is rather punishable moral unbelief to refuse to allow authority to the commands written in the heart till they have been outwardly accredited. The only value that can attach to a revelation is to lead men by the path of authority to conscious, free morality. A free morality once arrived at, this historical crutch is no longer necessary; nay more, to retain it then would be a sin. To that

radical restoration, which requires that the idea condescend to assume the form of a statutory Church faith, it is essential that the idea should clothe itself in this husk, solely to the end that the pure faith of reason might ripen to full vigour, afterwards to lay aside its husk in order that the pure moral religion may take its place, and be sustained by nothing but itself. The process of purifying the idea of the kingdom of God, which had entered into a state of humiliation,—that is, had embodied itself in the form of a statutory Church,—he did not wish to bring about in a revolutionary manner. But it is the duty and task of the statutory Church, if it is to have any right to exist at all, ever more and more to cast aside the statutory elements, and thus to labour at its own destruction. The time must necessarily come when religion will be gradually freed from all determining grounds of an empirical nature, from all statutes which are based on history, and which provisionally unite men for the furtherance of the good, by means of the faith of the Church, in order that pure reason may at last reign universally, and God be all in all. It is the duty of the wise man, whilst not prematurely withdrawing from the multitude the supports which are indispensable to it, to perceive that faith in the Son is only faith in oneself, that humanity, so far as it is moral, is the well-beloved Son of God; because it is only in virtue of this idea of humanity that it could be the end of God in creating. This idea of humanity proceeds from God's essence, is from eternity in Him. In so far, therefore, it is not a created thing, but His only-begotten Son, the Word, through which all things exist. Inasmuch as it is not our mind that takes possession of this idea, but this idea which takes possession of our mind, we, who do not understand even our susceptibility thereto, can say that the archetype has descended from heaven on us, and has condescendingly taken humanity upon itself. The Christ out of us and Christ in us are not two principles, but one. To make faith in the historical appearance of this idea of humanity in Christ a condition of salvation, would be to set up two principles, an empirical and a rational one. The latter, however, would entirely lack true substance. For what have we from the empirical without the rational, or that we have not already in the rational? The true God-man, therefore, cannot be that part

of Him which falls under the notice of the senses, and which can be known in the way of experience, but is the archetype lying in our reason. This archetype we attribute to the historical Christ, because, so far as we can judge from His example, He corresponds to the ideal of reason. This archetype is the object of saving faith; but such a faith is identical with the principle of a God-pleasing walk and conversation.

As far now as concerns the judgment of this theory, one might suppose that, strictly viewed, it effected nothing at all for Christology; that, on the contrary, it shut out the possibility of a doctrine of the Person of Christ. Whatever relates to the historical Christ, Kant leaves unconsidered; nay more, by reducing the historical element in Him to a dead mass, he makes it altogether questionable, and is unable to give the dogma of the Person of Christ any other than a symbolical meaning. It would be unfair, however, to judge him merely by what he has not accomplished. For the deity of Christ had been given up by the wise of his century long before him; he added nothing thereto; he rather confined the zeal of the demolishers within its proper limits, and showed how the despised doctrine had more ideal substance than all the wisdom of the age; instead of attacking the old faith by storm, he endeavoured to effect a conciliation with it. His deserts in connection with the present doctrine are of the following nature.

By giving prominence to the idea of the morally good, he brought his age again to the recognition of an absolute spiritual power. On the ground of this idea, he entered into a friendly relation to Christianity; for he looked upon it as the element common to reason and to a Christianity which properly understands itself. With Kant, therefore, the stormy attacks on Christology ceased, and a tendency to seek a reconciliation with it was initiated, although, it is true, scarcely the beginning of an actual reconciliation had as yet been effected. *Further*, in one aspect, his system was very favourable to a happy development of Christology; to wit, that whereas hitherto the divine had been regarded as something completely supernatural, he maintained that something dwelt in man himself, or was, at all events, destined for his essence, and connected therewith, which possesses an absolute value: thus also did he prepare the way for conceiving the human, as no longer separated from the

divine, in Christ, and for passing from the human to vindicate to Him also the divine.

The *third* respect, however, in which this system of philosophy was a pioneer to Christology was, that it first set most clearly before the mind the task of recognising no authority in the sphere of spirit so long as it was, and purposed to remain, a merely external thing; of refusing to attach worth in itself to any history, be it regarded as ever so holy, unless it be able and willing to become also an inner fact, unless it be appropriated either through the discovery of its necessity, by thought or by the life. The dogma of the Person of Christ, in particular, had become an object of such indifference, strangeness, nay more, hatred to the mind, in consequence of having been treated too much as a mere past history, and not sufficiently as an eternal history, as an eternal necessity, and as essentially connected with the life of the spirit itself. Kant took a profound view of the bondage that results from making a dogma of something merely historical, that is, of something which is only accredited by external testimony. He saw clearly that mind neither can nor may be bound by anything holding a purely external relation to it: if the history of Jesus be merely a series of events that has once happened, and be not informed by an eternal idea which comes to light therein, it is a purely external, isolated thing, to constitute which a dogma binding for faith, life, thought, is something totally inappropriate to mind. If a history is to be binding on the mind, it can only be so in virtue of the idea which has historically manifested itself therein. This idea binds the mind, because it either now is, or must one day become, an idea of the mind itself in the course of its development. In that it is bound by the idea, it binds itself; that is, it obeys simply the inner necessity of mind and of the matter itself, in recognising both the idea and the historical manifestation required by the idea. We have seen above that this effort to realize the outward as something inward, to see in what is strange something distinctively our own, to recognise no authority in the spiritual sphere save that of the truth, which has the power of proving itself to the mind (and in that very way to give authority, for the first time, its full vigour and truth), constitutes the peculiar strength and glory of Protestantism. In this serious direction Kant took a great step; for he

classed the effort to become inwardly independent of any authority purely external, under the category of moral duty. The subjective mind now takes its stand as a free-born power, justified, nay more, bound by the nobility of its nature, to obey only a spiritual authority, which, as such, either already is, or is destined to become, a determination of its own inner being. This right of the subject over against anything merely external or objective, had indeed actually been exercised before Kant's time, but capriciously, as a mere assumption; not as a duty, but rather without the recognition of that absolute idea, which holds a place above the subject with its uncertainty and arbitrariness. Kant's subjectivity, on the contrary, aimed at setting up as an inner standard, as an objective authority, the absolute power of the moral law, which is to be recognised by all rational beings. To thought was thus given the tendency no longer to regard the Person of Christ as an absolute miracle, which, because absolute, is foreign to the mind, but to render the divine appearance of the Saviour more intelligible to the human spirit.

But alongside of these light sides of his system, we must not overlook the defects which cleave to it, so far as it has anything to do with Christology.

I. He extended the power of subjectivity over objectivity very far, and continued to recognise the moral law, on which he built his Christological views, solely because it is not something external, but an outflow of the self-legislation of the reason. He did not, however, carry subjectivity through to its full logical extent. For is not the moral law also, in the first instance, simply something which we find already existing in our inner being, a spiritually empirical thing? its absolute authority is not something which we properly know, but something immediate, resting primarily on our feeling of the claims which it makes. Now, as good a right as Kant had to put everything in Christianity of an outwardly objective character to the test, and to estimate its value by its relation to the individual subject, even so truly was it his duty to put this inner history (to wit, the appearance of an idea in consciousness requiring absolute obedience) and its authority to the test. Instead of which, he suddenly brought his critical process to a halt, and allowed it to blunt its sharpness on the categorical imperative. The

absolute moral law, which, on the one hand, appears as an enrichment accruing to the subjective intellect from entering into an examination of itself, appears, on the other hand, as an authority not yet proved to the same subject, consequently as a remainder of objectivity, borrowed from history, even though that history may be an inner one. And to have pursued the path of subjectivity to the end, would have involved the criticism of this, as yet, non-justified portion of the wealth of the subject. If this be the case with the groundwork of Kant's Christology, be it as fully or as little successful in itself as it may, its real character is that of a mere postulate.

II. But apart even from the *uncertainty of its foundation*, it harmonizes neither *with itself nor with Christianity*.

1. *Not with itself*.—(1.) To the *ideal* of man he attributes absolutely binding power and absolute evidence through itself. This ideal, says he, is the archetype in the universal reason of man, which bears within itself the power of sanctifying. What, then, remains for the historical person of the God-man? His mission was not to implant the ideal, nor to inspire the conviction of its absolutely obligatory power, but solely to serve as an example. In order that the moral union may be established, and the merely natural ethical condition cease, His authority must be regarded as divine, as an authority collecting all under one will. But if the archetype is universally contained in reason, and possesses sanctifying power in and through itself, that which Christ uttered, little as it was, would yet appear to have been too much. To what purpose, then, a founder of the union who was either actually, or merely supposedly, sinless? If the idea by itself and alone has the power of improving, if the law can make alive, there is no need at all for faith in an historical, sinless person.

(2.) Much less are we able to understand how an union *based on statutory determinations*, that is, on determinations properly contradictory of the pure principles of reason, can lead to pure morality, and thus the faith in a founder of the Church, like Christ, be necessary. For inasmuch as an obedience to merely statutory, external commands would be a dependence on impure motives, a disobedience and a punishable lack of faith in the absolutely imperative and the absolutely warranted inner authority of the practical reason, Kant was logically compelled,

either to say that moral faith must be brought about by a punishable, moral unbelief, obedience by disobedience; *or* to cease affirming the necessity of a Church, with an historical founder possessed of divine authority.

(3.) He is altogether still involved in an abstract *dualism*. On the one hand, he says, reason legislates for itself, and it is its duty to obey only itself; and yet, on the other hand, he constantly goes back to the thought of a God, who lends the moral law its absolute worth because it is His will. From his abstract point of view, God wears to him the aspect of a stranger, as is particularly clear from his doctrine of the operations of grace; the aspect of one whose activity in the human mind threatens freedom with destruction. But the good ought not to be wrought out of regard to a foreign authority. And yet this foreign will is, on the other hand, to be recognised as the standard. The relation between these two absolute wills, the divine and the human, and how they can be one, when according to his principles they are two—he has not shown. It is true, however, a decision was, strictly speaking, arrived at in favour of the sole dominion of subjectivity, when he postulated the idea of God solely for the sake of helping himself out of a difficulty. The objective appeared to him to stand in so extreme and abstract an antagonism to the subjective, that it was impossible for justice to be done to both, and that the subject looked upon every species of objectivity, even though entirely impregnated by the moral idea, or the personal manifestation thereof, as a power hostile to, and restrictive of, its own freedom. For this reason, although he was disposed to recognise in Christianity the pure religion of reason, and, at all events sceptically, left the possibility of the religion of reason having been actually realized in Christ an open question, he did not know what to do with such an objectivity. For he would not allow it to be possible that mind should recognise and submit to something objective, on the ground that in so doing, it was really entering into connection simply with itself, with its own true essence, and with its destiny. This necessarily drove him on to the denial of everything objective; and attempts to enter again into connection therewith were solely the fruits of inconsistency.

2. Here, however, we are led on to consider the conflict of

this theory with *Christianity*, and in particular with the doctrine of the person of *Christ*.

(1.) Religion is, in his view, simply morals. Every motive drawn from religion corrupts the moral consciousness by heteronomy, and causes man to do the good, not for its own sake, but out of regard to a foreign authority, *God, therefore*, on Kant's principles, is a *being foreign to man*. (Note 5.) Morality and the moral law are not based on the idea of God, but the latter on the former. Nevertheless, the subjective mind attributes to its moral law, of itself and without criticism, an absolute value. We can see clearly enough, even at this point, that this perversion of ideas, this apotheosis of the moral subject, must revenge itself in the discription of morality, as merely subjective, into something accidental, and into an arbitrary product of empirical subjectivity. Kant himself, indeed, did not take this step; but he not only failed to bring the ideal subjectivity, to which he still clung, and by means of which he secured for the moral law a semblance of objectivity, into true connection with God, but also to show that the requirement made by the ideal subjectivity is the requirement made by God, by the universal reason itself. He remained standing by human reason, as he found it; and by attributing to it the absolute legislative power, which belongs alone to the absolutely universal reason, he undermined the objectivity of his moral law, and completely shut himself out from the possibility of ascribing to Him, in whom *God* became man, and out of whom, therefore, the universal reason itself speaks, any virtue binding on the individual reason. Furthermore, as he deems God to stand outside of the spirit of man as a stranger, a vital union between God and humanity, such as was effected in Christ, necessarily appeared to him an impossibility. This leads to the consideration of the point of chief importance.

(2.) The *Pelagianism* of the system. Every sort of connection between the divine life and the human was cut off for him. Divine influences on the life of the human spirit appear to him to be magical, and destructive of the idea of morality—to be a lowering of the ethical to the sphere of the mechanical. And although, on the one hand, he said,—the good is the divine will, he did not, as we have seen, cling so firmly to it as in any way to grant that if God implant His life, His will, in a being, this

life, because divine, is also good. On the other hand, however, he always represents the good as only good when and because man works it solely by his own power. In fact, where God and man are made to occupy so abstract and reciprocally limiting a position, relatively to each other, their intercourse cannot be more than a mechanical action upon each other; they cannot be properly said to interpenetrate each other: and against such a view the spirit, in defence of its subjectivity and freedom, justly protests.

But if the possibility of the influences of grace is shut out, so also is the person of a Redeemer naturally excluded. And if His activity in the kingdom of free spirits involves an inner contradiction, the Person of the God-man Himself also involves the same contradiction, only in its acutest form; so far as those impossible influences of the divine life upon the human are raised in Him to their highest degree, to the degree of the personal indwelling of God in a man. The utmost he does is to affirm for Him the dignity of the founder of a statutory Church, and of having set an example of sinlessness—be the sinlessness actual, or have it an existence solely in the faith of the multitude;—a dignity, however, which He only enjoyed temporarily and for the purpose of leading all to autonomy, that is, of making Himself dispensable.

The reverse aspect of this matter is, that man is his own redeemer. Man is reconciled by sanctification; but *he* must make himself holy. The holiness or the sanctifying power of another cannot help us. Christ's active obedience can no more profit us, than His sufferings can free us from the consciousness of punishment; for He is another than we, He is a stranger to us. But there is also no need of a mediator; man is bound to do, he therefore can do. With this autarchy of man, indeed, Kant's doctrine of radical evil badly harmonizes. To this evil as an original power, as a *being* evil, as a corruption, he assigns a place in the very foreground of all maxims. The moral idea, on the contrary, is merely a *shall*, an ideal, not being. How, then, is the conflict against evil, which has veritable being, to proceed forth from man himself, in whom the good has not veritable being? That it remains incomprehensible whence this power of the good is to be derived, Kant himself allows; but he falls back on the consideration, that the *shall* being de-

clared absolutely by reason, which has certainty in itself, the *can* must also be taken for granted. But whence does he know that reason does not contradict itself? Why has he, who elsewhere—for example, in connection with the theoretical reason—did not hesitate to posit antinomies, not posited also for the practical reason the following antinomy:—Thou shalt absolutely, but thou canst not? In this connection, it would have been still more unobjectionable, and would have excluded neither the fact of the infinite worth of the spirit, nor the absoluteness of the contents of self-consciousness; in that, on the contrary, a solution of the antinomy remained possible. For in the empirical man, who has not the power (*nicht Könnender*), there lies still an infinite susceptibility, by means of which it is possible for him to arrive at power (*ein Könnender*). Storr already justly made the fine observation, that the *can*, immediately in our own strength, does not follow from the absolute *shall*; but merely the possibility of the moral being realized in some way or other.

III. As far as Kant was from proving the necessity of a redeemer, so far are the grounds which he advanced to show that He might be *dispensed with*, and was an *impossibility*, from having demonstrative force. As the *shall* does not exclude the possibility of the *can* being brought to pass by divine power,—for the radical evil assumed by Kant rather seems to postulate such a power,—the way of its being brought to pass cannot be barred by the consideration, that what is worked by divine power would be morally worthless, because it would not be the sole deed of man. For if the will of God is the good, the higher will worked by God must also be good, because, whilst it is the will of God, it is also the will of man, if not of the natural, empirical, still of the regenerate man. Quite as untenable is the position he takes up in recognising that the moral consciousness demands the punishment of the evil that has once been done, whilst he at the same time supposes that the new man endures this punishment substitutionarily for the old: in recognising, on the one hand, that man, so long as evil still cleaves to him,—which in his view is always the case, because it only decreases by infinitely gradual degrees,—cannot in himself be justified in considering himself to be well-pleasing to God, whilst, on the other hand, he seeks to calm himself by supposing that God, who views everything

in an eternal manner, and embraces the entire series at one glance, overlooks, for the sake of the good which, as to principle, lies in the good disposition, the defects which characterize its manifestation; and that this warrants man regarding himself as good in the sight of God, even during the time of his imperfection. It deserves, indeed, honourable recognition, that Kant did not treat these anthropological needs slightly; but he was very much mistaken in supposing himself to have stilled them, and to have rendered a Saviour unnecessary, by the course which he adopted. That atoning of the guilt of the old man by the new is a bad substitute for the perfect and free forgiveness which is offered by Christianity; but it is also an inward impossibility, because the new man also, according to Kant's own principles, has enough to do with itself during every succeeding moment of its existence, and has to atone for itself. So that nothing remains for him but to suppose that punishment will not be so strictly insisted on, or, in other words, to relax from the stringency of the moral principle. To the same lowering of the highest principle leads also the second point. That God beholds the entire series of moments of time at once, cannot calm us in relation to the present; for, after all, this infinite series is imperfect at every single point; nay more, inasmuch as the attainment of perfection at all remains an uncertainty, it cannot possibly be viewed as perfect. Accordingly, the only way to attain to calm, would seem to be that of representing the actuality of virtue, its manifestation as the non-essential, and teaching the essential to consist solely in man's being good *potentiâ*. In this case, however, the moral ideal has fallen from its height. Consequently, when the good will, which is after all merely the germ out of which the actuality of virtue is to be developed, is secured, the goal is already reached: the said germ is itself already the perfect good; and that not merely because the actuality of good is naturally and necessarily developed out of it, but in itself. For, according to Kant's principles, no pledge whatever can be given that there will be an advancing growth in good, much less that it will arrive at perfection. A relapse always remains a possibility; man never can and never may know that he is reconciled with, and pleasing to, God for time and eternity. So comfortless does this theory leave us in our deepest needs, with regard both to the past, to the present, and to the future.

How very different is Christianity! Not merely does it promise full peace and reconciliation through faith in the Redeemer, but through the same faith it gives the future to be enjoyed as a present. The Christian knows himself to be pleasing to God, pure, and a child of God in Christ, and thus in a certain way anticipates future blessedness; for in Him he lays hold, not merely of an ideal of the practical reason, but of a living, operative principle, which contains within itself the pledge of future perfection. And this leads us from the position assigned by Kant to the historical Christ, to the consideration of the ideal Christ sketched by himself.

It is not the Christ in whom the Church believes; and this he does not attempt to conceal from himself. But because he is unable to find a place for the historical Christ, seeing that in his eyes the ideal of reason alone has validity, the entire wealth of ideas, which the Church recognised in its Christ, was turned over to the ideal. Around this ideal were clustered all the dignity and adornments which pious faith ascribes to Christ, as a symbolical, deeply significant decoration. All the momenta of the life of Christ are treated as beautiful investitures of the moral idea, to which such an adornment was of great advantage, especially as in the system of Kant it presents itself in a very abstract form. That idea of the morally good has a supernatural birth, for it comes from God; Christ's sufferings signify that the ideal humanity can only enter into glory through suffering; it does not celebrate its resurrection till death, and so forth.

One thing is clear, that neither so far as he tries to open up for Christ an historical position, nor so far as he considers Him to be the idea of moral humanity, does he succeed in constructing a Christology. According to the principles of Kant, the dogma of the Person of Christ does not for the future form part of dogmatics, seeing that the historical Christ has not the eternal worth which can constitute Him an object of faith; but the doctrine of the ideal Christ forms part of the doctrine of the divine image.

If, then, there have existed, or still exist, theologians who, on the basis of Kant's principles,¹ build up a doctrine of Christ which represents the Sage of Nazareth as great and exalted in

¹ Compare Köhr's "*Briefe über die Rationalismus*" xi.; Wagscheider's "*Excitationes*," § 128, 129.

more than one respect, to wit, in His entire spiritual individuality; in His intellectual and moral character, in regard to the religious and ethical principles which He taught, in regard to the fates and deeds which distinguished Him, and in that He founded a moral kingdom, an institution whose purpose is to enlighten, improve, and bless the human race; whilst at the same time they expressly warn us to be on our guard against finding in Him anything more than a product of the common causal nexus of things; or which represents Jesus Christ as the "interpres veræ divinæ voluntatis, et ipse plenus numine (τῷ θεῷ) non sine deo talis et tantus nobis propositus est," though again with a supplementary clause,¹ to the effect that the pious man is accustomed to trace back everything in humanity pleasing to God to the divine operation;—it is, on the one hand, more than the principles of such men warrant them in teaching (for even the assumption that Christ was a sinless sage is not allowable); and, on the other hand, it is not enough to preserve this dogma its place in the doctrinal system of the Church.² But a Christian system which "is unable to make Christology an integral part of itself," has pronounced its own judgment; it has really given up the claim to the title of Christian. The Person of Christ then becomes a completely non-essential and accidental thing, relatively to His doctrine; and this latter alone, as the pure religion of reason, can be deemed essential.³

As regards Kant, however, with whom this form of Rationalism, which we may designate the *practical*, shares its essential defects, he was in advance of it, partly in consistency, and partly in the merit of having prepared positively, even though distantly, the way for a Christology such as is required by modern times. If the defect of the old Christology consisted principally in its regarding the Person of Christ too predominantly as coming from without, and not sufficiently as having a relationship to, and a basis in, the race itself; and if this person had received rather an absolutely supernatural character, had become something torn off, something foreign to the consciousness of man; Kant, on the contrary, by breaking ground

¹ Wegscheider, "Institutiones," § 123, 128.

² Röhr, in fact, has a correct perception of this fact. See Letter xvii., *passim*.

³ Röhr, *passim*, p. 407.

in anthropology, and by descending into the depths of human nature, discovered in it a God-related element ; for which reason he designated it the Son of God, in whom God is well-pleased,—a designation, it is true, which, according to the Christian standard, cannot belong to it in itself, but only so far as Christ dwells in it.

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE FICHTE-JACOBI PERIOD.

WHILST nothing else was able to keep its ground before his criticism, Kant found for himself a firm hold, and a kind of conciliation with Christianity and Christology, in the idea of moral good. But even this last remainder of an objective, universally valid groundwork, was inevitably destined to be shattered and reduced to something subjective, as the self-criticising reason progressed in its work. Fichte and Jacobi were the men who carried on Kant's work to this point, though each in a different manner. How far Fichte did this, we shall see later ; but Jacobi's mode of thought has, both in itself and in virtue of its direct applications, more affinity with theology. Subjectivity advanced in Jacobi onwards to the principle,—Not because something is good, do I will it, but because I will it, it is good. The objective character of the moral law was thus undermined, or rather swallowed up and annihilated by the Ego. This, however, is merely the negative aspect of the matter. Its positive and, for us, most important aspect is, that this deeper critical investigation of itself by the spirit, led at the same time into a deeper region, into that of religion. For the lost objectivity of the moral law, which also was, in fact, unable to sustain itself, a higher objectivity, to wit, the world of faith, dawned on the mind in presentiment (*Ahnung*), in religious feeling ;—and, indeed, it is owing to this living connection with the divine that the subjective mind fancies itself exalted above the law. The advance made in the subjective, self-criticising tendency, did not render the spirit poorer, but was, at the same

time, a profounder entering into itself ;—feelings rich in pre-sage, the “immediate perception of the divine,” took the place of the practical reason, and revived its barren wastes. One-sided subjectivity had thus arrived at the last stage of its development. Subjectivity, in this its extreme form, was by its very nature indifferent to all objective knowledge : feeling has its satisfaction in itself, and abides in itself, indifferent as to whether it is the feeling of something objective, whether it perceives this objective something veritably and as it is, or merely itself in some particular determination and affection. So also is it completely indifferent as to whether the good has an objective existence : the only authority to it is its own subjective, and indeed accidental, condition. But because its justification and inner satisfaction are not due to the fact of its being the feeling of an objective something which is to some extent still reflected by it, a completely critical and sceptical relation to everything objective is very compatible therewith : the understanding, which itself is also one aspect of the spirit, may judge all objectivity by its own standard ; but even if it destroy it, feeling persists none the less in its subjective moods of presentiment, of faith, and so forth, and has the consciousness of being satisfied with its inner enjoyment, which in point of fact is an enjoyment of its own noble nature.

Following out the principles of the philosophy of Fries, De Wette transferred this æsthetic view of the world to theology.¹

His fundamental view may be described as follows : That religious feeling, which after an Hellenic manner he held to be most intimately connected with the sense of beauty, is in itself indifferent to the idea of the true. It is fitting, indeed, that the true should have a place in religion ; in this aspect it is *faith* : to beauty, on the contrary, corresponds the *feeling* which is in faith. Now this feeling is the essential element in religion ; and in moments of pious excitement, the question is not asked, whether or no that is true to which the feeling relates. The understanding also has its rights, only not in connection with a religious view of things : the view of things taken by the understanding is totally different, nay more, opposed ; for it is concerned alone about the true, to which religious feeling in

¹ “Religion und Theologie,” 1815. Hints of this may be found already in Herder’s work, “Vom Sohne Gottes,” 1797.

and by itself is indifferent. It is possible that religious emotion should become devotionally absorbed in something which the reflective understanding is compelled to pronounce untrue; but we are not therefore justified in saying that feeling is something untrue, for the category under which we class truths of the understanding is inapplicable to the sphere of æsthetical contemplation. There may, therefore, be two different, nay more, opposite modes of viewing the same object, the logical and the æsthetical.

The next doubt that then arises is, it is true, whether the unity of consciousness is not destroyed by such a deep division and duality? His answer to this question runs as follows: So far as truth is an integral element of religious feelings, so far does it remain unassailed by the understanding, whose mode of consideration always ends in mysteries, and behind which begins the kingdom of religious faith and of presentiment. The eternal ideas are the essential element in religious feelings, so far as truth is at all to be taken into consideration in connection therewith; and these ideas must be left untouched by the understanding, not indeed because it ought to put itself into a positive relation to them, or to constitute them part of itself, but because it cannot appropriate them to itself. Its sphere is the finite; the infinite transcends its measure, and exists only for feeling. But because it never arrives at a termination in its own domain, and always remains imperfect, a sphere lies constantly open to religious feeling, which is totally foreign to the understanding, though it is not assailed by it, because it begins where that ends.

The application of these principles to Christianity and to the doctrine of Christ is self-evident. In itself, the eternal idea alone is that which has proper value; it alone moves the soul. But religion, feeling, cannot dispense with the symbolization of the eternal ideas; their substance and material must have an outward husk; if their force and peculiarities are not to deliquesce and evaporate, an outward clothing must be given to the inner substance. Now this is the point at which a conciliation is possible between the culture of the present age and Christianity, so far as the latter is intimately interwoven with the marvellous history of *Christ*.

It is true, he goes on to say, it is only the idea, not the

dead, historical material in which the idea has clothed itself, that can nourish the religious sentiment. History has only value so far as it is the husk and shell of the eternal idea; and this material may calmly be left over to the decomposing or negative influence of the understanding, which, on its part, is also justified in tracing all things back to natural causes. It may and is bound to see the naked truth, that is, it may and must strip off from Christianity its glittering, miraculous husk: this is, in particular, the task of Protestant theology. But the history is not therefore made worthless; for feeling, as has been remarked, needs symbols, needs the form of beauty for its ideas; and whence is this form to be taken, if not from historical tradition? Historical tradition does not by any means, it is true, entirely harmonize with æsthetical laws, and in so far a transformation is desirable, in carrying out which the images of Hellenic religious art should be used; but, after all deductions, these husks still remain worthy of regard. Scientific systems of doctrine owe to them many a genuine expansion and development of the universal religious ideas.

He is therefore far removed from wishing to overthrow the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, although it is a self-contradictory idea to represent deity as united with humanity in one individual, because deity is thus lowered to the level of the finite, and is strictly no longer conceived as deity.¹ This doctrine, however, is to be regarded as an æsthetic idea, not as a logical conception.² History and the understanding teach us to see in Christ the human spirit, as it had attained, for the first time in the history of the world, to a perfect consciousness of itself and of its high dignity: in Him it learnt for the first time to feel itself as the Son of God, and as capable of becoming equal to the heavenly Father. In Christ, as the first-born Son of God, divine truth, the infinite depth and purity, revealed itself. He was the lofty example, to imitate which others are to strive. This truth, however, was converted even by the Apostles into a sensuous conception; they deified the earthly Person of Jesus. And ever more did the idea of the Son of

¹ Compare on this subject particularly De Wette, "Ueber den Geist der neuern protestantischen Theologie," Studien und Kritiken, 1828, 1, pp. 131-133.

² "Religion und Theologie," p. 91.

God acquire a metaphysical, whilst in reality it had only a moral significance. Long did the human mind cleave to the mythological notion of His being a descended God ; but in the present age, man's natural understanding has risen in rebellion against the formulas of the Church, marked as they are by contradictions. Many rejected the entire doctrine, or contented themselves with deeming Jesus to have been a very virtuous, wise man. But such a view neither does justice to the feelings which the Christian is bound to cherish towards the Author of his faith, nor does it exhaust the idea which dominated the Apostles and primitive Church. Such criticism finds nothing but meagre ideas clothed in husks, worthy to be rejected, for the simple reason, that its point of view lies outside of Christianity and the religious sentiment altogether ; and it accordingly judges solely with the cold understanding, instead of with feelings of enthusiasm. The pious Christian, however, convinced of the divine truth of the doctrine of Jesus, of the wisdom and grace of God visible in its introduction, and carried away by the purity and exaltedness of the character of Jesus, *believes* and *beholds* in Him the Godhead bodily. When, then, religious beauty is the subject of discourse, the doctrine of the deity of Christ has its place, to wit, as an æsthetical idea. The pious Christian does not indulge in useless speculations ; his understanding is taken possession of by the ideal vision. Away then, cries he, with all those dogmatic determinations, of which the Bible and the faith of the people know nothing : let Christ henceforth be regarded by us as a divine ambassador, as God-man, as the image of God ; let us not be too niggardly in His glorification. But forget not the distinction between a logical and an ideal estimate ! Let His entire history be viewed in a genuinely symbolical spirit ! His miraculous conception and birth symbolize the idea of the divine origin of religion and of the divine dignity of Christ. His miracles represent the idea of dominion, of the independent power of the human spirit, and inwrap within themselves the sublime doctrine of spiritual self-reliance. His resurrection, apart from its historical aspect, according to which it is a visible effect and contrivance of the divine government of the world, is an image of the victory of truth. And finally, His ascension symbolizes the eternal glory of religion.

This distinction between symbol and idea, he goes on to say, which puts us into a position to allow of the former, as a merely historical thing, being made the subject of philosophical and historical investigation, whilst the latter remains untouched, is neither capricious nor dishonest. It is not capricious; for logic claims its rights; and religious feelings, on the other hand, require symbols. It is not dishonest; for whatever portion of the eternal ideas is found in these images by the religious sentiment, did also objectively lie in the Person of Christ. In itself, however, the historical can only stand to feeling in the relation of a means of illustration, of a vehicle. One might, indeed, be inclined to ask, whether, if the religious sentiment is to be led on from those symbols to the idea, it is not essentially necessary that it regard the symbols themselves as something objective, historical? De Wette's answer to this appears to lie in the following:¹—In moments of religious excitement, the understanding does not give way to useless speculations; it is taken possession of by the vision of the ideal; and it never begins its proper action till the excitement has cooled. This implies, not indistinctly, that, in moments of religious enthusiasm, man undoubtedly does surrender himself to those symbols as to historical facts; only the understanding, which neither can nor may assume this, then recedes to the background. To feeling, on the contrary, belongs no theoretical significance. A deep and essential discord is thus posited in the organism of the spirit itself, which is only wretchedly set aside by the supposition, that in religious moments, the spirit is not at all primarily concerned about the truth, save as related to the universal, eternal ideas; and these ideas are completely independent of the Person of Christ. It may be that, at a stage when the understanding has received little culture, the symbol and the idea are, in pious moments, most intimately blended with each other; and that a pious disposition gives itself up, without therefore deserving blame, unsuspectingly and unhesitatingly to the symbol in which, not separating between substance and form, it deems itself to possess the very thing itself; but the case must be other at the stage when this distinction has already been effected, when the understanding considers itself to have recognised the history to be mere symbol. Such a gain once made, the mind,

¹ "Religion und Theologie," p. 216.

which is, after all, one and identical, will not be able in pious moments to feel and act as though it had not been made: on the contrary, if the distinction has been made with truth, and with a clear and logical rejection of the history as such, even in pious moments, the mind will not be able any longer to give itself up to the history as such, nor to the symbol, without a distinct conviction of its being merely the symbol of a subjective, æsthetical idea. But then these symbols also, taken from the Christian history, in particular from the narratives concerning the Person of Jesus, are completely subjective, arbitrary investments of eternal ideas, not at all essentially connected either with the Person of Jesus, or with any other history—investments which the mind must remain at liberty to exchange for others entirely different, until it has been shown to be necessary for it to cleave to these particular ones. The argument drawn from the necessity of keeping up the connection with history is far from sufficing here: such an argument implies that the free manifestation of a new phenomenon in humanity, as, for example, even of Christianity, is unjustifiable. But if this is to be demonstrated from the nature of the human mind, such a course of reasoning might easily end in our being compelled, out of regard to the original essential necessity we are under of representing to ourselves everything that is most glorious and great under the image of the Person of Christ, in order that it may live to our mind, to conceive Christ to be objectively such as feeling requires us to think of Him, unless we should prefer assuming the existence of a pre-established disharmony between thought and feeling, between the objective and the subjective.

It is further clear that such a separation between the understanding and the soul as implies that the mode of consideration of the latter begins where that of the former ceases, and as makes it impossible for the two to interpenetrate and combine, must also introduce a dualism into the objective world. If the understanding, when it arrived at the end of the causes,—and this is its task,—would then be under the necessity of explaining everything in a purely human manner, for example, it would have to seek to account for the Person of Christ entirely by what is contained in human nature. At this point, according to De Wette, human thought would cease to regard what had been thus explained as an act of God's; and the view taken

by piety has only one ground of justification, to wit, the circumstance that the understanding is always landed in mysteries, or, in other words, never arrives at its goal. In the manner of Jacobi, ignorance is represented as the only basis of piety. The connection of nature, when known, cannot, therefore, be regarded at the same time as a divine deed; these conceptions do not cover, they exclude each other. Here, therefore, we perceive again the fault common to all one-sided subjective systems—that of abstractly separating between God and the world. The same defect manifests itself also especially in the Pelagian character of this system. According to it, a rational, philosophical view of things does, and indeed must, ascribe the good to man; for, regarded from the anthropological point of view, which is that of philosophy, the spirit that works in man is nothing but the spirit of reason. It is, on the contrary, a beautiful religious view, to regard the enthusiasm for the good which glows in us as an outflow from God. Religiously considered, this is correct; but if it attempt to convert it into an anthropological truth, it is false.

From this it is clear that De Wette is unable to make any scientific declaration regarding the divine essence of Christ; for of divine things the subjective feeling alone, not the understanding, knows anything. Christ's person itself has no eternal worth, for it is not an eternal idea: it keeps its place merely as a symbol. To Christology, therefore, we cannot henceforth assign a place in a system of doctrine; for science is not to consist of images. What remains, after allowing that Christ is the image of an æsthetical idea, is something purely human. This human element, it is true, De Wette conceives to have been perfect; but without sufficient ground, for his system nowhere establishes the necessity for such a "Son of God" having been an historical reality; indeed, its principles rather lead to the opposite conclusion. In his view, science cannot acknowledge the existence of an anthropological need for such a complete appearance; and only in an anthropological aspect does he allow that anything is to be known. The understanding, according to him, is a born Pelagian: the sanctification, the atonement, the salvation of man, is effected not by Christ's person, but solely by the eternal idea brought to light in, though not bound to, His person. His person and history awaken, for example, the idea that only through the religious feeling of resignation,

in that we bend before God, can rest return *of itself* to the soul. This idea He suggests by doctrine and example. For this purpose, however, there is no need of a sinless founder of a religion, but merely of a founder co-ordinate with the founders of other religions. Nay more, it is scarcely necessary that we should distinctly believe in His sinlessness; for He may serve as the symbol of an eternal idea, even though He did not, as a matter of history, carry it perfectly in Himself. (Note 6.)

With this view of De Wette's, that of Hase¹ and of Colani² is akin.

To true Christological knowledge, it is necessary above all to sound the depths of the idea of deity and of the idea of humanity in their relation to each other; the possibility and significance of their union in one person will then become clear of themselves. Now, the essence of humanity, as we find from self-consciousness, is *infinitude to be created out of finitude* (§ 47). The human spirit has in itself the law of an infinite development of itself: it is accordingly free, that is, it has a determinate mode of being through itself;³ and it participates in the infinite, because it is without absolute limit. On the other hand, freedom is limited; it takes its start from nonentity, from unconsciousness, and develops itself in obedience to laws which it has not given to itself. This primal power of freedom, manifesting itself in the feeling, the volition, the knowledge of the infinite, of the beautiful, the good, the true, is nothing else but the endeavour of the spirit to be itself infinite. In itself, indeed, it is impossible that perfect *being* (Sein) should ever be the issue of *growth* (Werden), that the finite should ever become infinite; the one is the complete negation of the other. This contradiction in the spirit itself would inevitably be its ruin, did it not possess the power of appropriating a foreign element; without, however, so taking it up into itself, as that it becomes to it the same as that which is originally its

¹ Compare Hase's *Gnosis* iii. § 159-177; *Leben Jesu*, § 11-18; *Evangelische Dogmatik*, Ed. i. § 141-169; Ed. ii. 1838, § 161-170, pp. 241-287; Ed. iii. § 148-157, 169, pp. 191-227, 274 f. The dogmatical results in relation to the Christology, as also the argumentation, have remained in substance the same through the several editions. Compare in particular Ed. iii. § 157.

² *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie chrétienne*. Strassbourg.

³ "Durch sich selbst in bestimmter Art seiend."

own.¹ Such a power would enable man to constitute his own, the infinitude which is to him unattainable and which is realized in another object; and to regard the foreign power which contains the ground of his freedom as his own power: that power, however, must needs be a free one; for freedom can only be maintained by itself. Such a capability of appropriating foreign elements, without either taking them up into itself, or losing its own independence, man possesses in his love to the infinite, through which he participates in its perfection. This love of man to the infinite arises out of his effort to attain unto it; is possible only through freedom; is solely his natural development. Whoso denies the love to the infinite (God), that is, to religion, falls into contradiction with himself. One must either be God, or love God. In loving the infinite, we love the *unattainable perfection of ourselves*. Only so far as man becomes divine through continued effort, does he love God and possess religion. But because the infinite can never grow out of the finite, man is *realiter* eternally separated from God; ideally, however, his love unites him with God in an unity possible only on the ground of the difference of the subjects. This union is a progress from finite to infinite in never-ending approximation. The feeling of life freely progressing is happiness; true blessedness is godliness in love to God. For the only truly infinite life of man is his love to the infinite (§ 48–55). Faith in God has its ground in love to God; out of love, therefore, it must be possible completely to develop the *idea of God*. The love of God, however, is the unity of freedom and dependence, neither the latter alone nor the former alone; for the one leads to self-deification, the latter to annihilation in God. We thus arrive at a conception of God, according to which we are dependent on Him, because it is He who ensures our freedom, and who, on the other hand, is the archetype of our relative freedom, the unattainable perfection of itself. The idea of humanity, raised above all limitation, is the idea of God, so far as it was possible for it to be revealed to humanity (§ 105 f.).

Compared with Jacobi or De Wette, Hase's accomplished mind has plainly taken up into itself many elements of modern theology, which make it doubtful whether he ought not to be

¹ . . . ohne es doch so in sich aufzunehmen, das ihr dasselbe wie ein Eigenes wär da.

reckoned already to the Third Period, to which indeed he undoubtedly does belong as respects the domain in which his real strength lies, to wit, that of Church History. But if we do not allow ourselves to be carried away by the seductive bewitchment of striking and beautiful individual propositions, we cannot deny that the kernel of his ideas, and the warp which, notwithstanding weft of another character, determined everything in his system, belong to the epoch now under review, so far as its essential characteristic is a one-sided subjectivity, which converts the immanence of God in the world into a mere transcendence, and which constitutes the dualism between God, from whom we are "realiter eternally separated," and ourselves, an insurmountable partition-wall, notwithstanding the "infinite approximation" with which we are to console ourselves, and the love which is to unite us "ideally" with Him. This dualism brings a discord into our own destiny that can never be reconciled; for, on the one hand, in God is contained the perfection of ourselves, and consequently the *being God* (Gottsein) is to be regarded as our ideal; on the other hand, we exist alongside of God only through relative freedom, in other words, through not being God. If, then, our destination to perfection be taken in earnest, that cannot be our blessedness, to remain ever at an infinite distance from it; on the contrary, if we are condemned to be subject to the dualism between *obligation* and *being* as an eternal one, our lot will be discord and unblessedness. But if we make light of the perfection of ourselves, which is the law of our life; nay more, if we cannot look forward to a future completely free from sin, as appears elsewhere to be hinted (§ 70); one cannot understand how this is reconcilable with the at all events subjectively ethical spirit, which, in comparison with Pantheism and purely necessitarian systems, is otherwise characteristic of Hase. For love is surely that which ought to be; as it is in us, therefore, it marks the gulf, but not its filling up. Nay, even if he should speak of a love of God to us, of a love which manifests itself to us; for this alone is love! But he regards this love of God to us, if we except His self-communication in creation, as entirely shut up in God; like as the "justificatio forensis" was frequently conceived to be a loving judgment, pronounced by God eternally or temporarily in Himself alone. The cause, hereof, in Hase's case,

is plainly not any tendency to Deism, but merely a jealous guarding of his conception of freedom, which prevented him from seeing, in the act of receiving and in the willingness to allow ourselves to be determined, also an act of freedom, and from understanding that the higher stage of freedom is essentially the power of more fully submitting to be determined by, and to receive from, God; and which finally does not admit of the firm faith that God, by the manifestation of His love, "ensures freedom," which, apart from Him, would wither away and perish. Hase, it is true, refuses to allow that the essence of God is absolutely strange to, and different from, that of man; on the contrary, he believes in a merely quantitative distinction (§ 157). But precisely because the unity posited by him between the divine and the human is an immediate one, a true unity is an impossibility. "Human nature is of the same kind as the divine; it is merely quantitatively different from it, in that whilst man *strives after*, God *is*, the infinite." But precisely because, in his view, man is only God in contraction, and God man in absolute expansion, they mutually exclude each other. All this would have assumed a totally different form, if Hase had sought the infinitude of man primarily in the infinitude of his susceptibility, instead of in an immediate possession and in the productive force which he terms freedom. For then it would follow that the idea of man is not realized at all without God and His indwelling; then, instead of those loose and uncertain ties which our efforts and our love are one-sidedly supposed to establish between us and God, we should have a bond more in harmony with the idea of God as omnipotence and love than that which Hase set before us, and which he represents as consisting in our lovingly "appropriating to, without taking up into, ourselves foreign elements." The latter reminds us involuntarily of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" in the form in which it is set forth by later Lutheran dogmatists, to wit, as an appropriation without *μέθεξις*.

How, with the premises of this idea of freedom, Christology must fall out, is easy to divine. The divine nature of Christ is His untroubled piety. The positive condition of the perfection of Jesus, on God's side, was that He should be born with the uninjured germ of a perfect humanity; the negative condition, on Christ's side, was that He should prove His sinlessness also

in conflict. The Church has always had rather the will to believe, and the notion that it did believe, in the divinity of Christ, than the thing itself; for in teaching that the Son was "generated," we deny to Him absoluteness, and consequently divinity. Humanity and deity are only quantitatively distinguished from each other: it would therefore be an unconditional contradiction to represent the Deity as taking up the limited into itself; or human nature, which must be personal, in order to be truly human, as taking up the absolute into itself. Each of the two natures being in all points like the other (in allem gleich mit der andern), differs therefrom only in being the negation of that which it is to take up into itself at its union, and whose assumption, therefore, necessarily makes it a different nature from what it would be out of union therewith. In Christ the divine substance of human nature was revealed, not through any miraculous entrance of the divine nature into the human, but through the complete development of human nature. By means of the misunderstood symbol of an incarnate God, the Church has faithfully handed down the faith in the divine nature and destiny of humanity, and in its perfection in Christ. But it is now time to recognise it as the common property of humanity, that, after *Christ's example*, every son of man, so far as in him lies, is to grow to a son of God. In the life of Jesus, glorified humanity was set historically before our eyes; the pure and eternal Ego finds its highest development in surrender to (not worship of) Christ, as the one who comprised within Himself all the higher tendencies of human life. By *doctrine and life*, Jesus became the founder of a *community* animated by His spirit, intending thus to unite men for the attainment of the highest religious development; and the existence of this community is a pledge to the Christian, in the sphere of piety, for the dignity of Christ. He was the beginning of the new life, and possessed what He purposed to establish for others (§ 158, 164). His death was an example of the self-sacrifice of love, wherein is redemption. But God needs no sacrifice; He does not need to be propitiated by the sacrifice of a righteous man. The guilt and the merit of another are alike intransferable. Not the merit of a man, but alone the grace of God, reconciles and blesses the sinner. In relation also to supernatural operations of grace—in Hase's

view, nothing has value for a free being save that which is gained by freedom: everything else is esteemed only in God, not in the creature. "To the activity of Jesus entire Christendom owes religion and blessedness; but whether they could not be found also outside of Christ, is a question which science has not settled."

Hase undoubtedly uses the word in its strict sense, when he attributes to Jesus religious perfection, that is, perfect love. But his other principles cannot be made to tally therewith. If perfect love has actually found realization in Jesus, humanity is glorified in Him, its idea is realized, and therefore, according to Hase's premises, He is God; for, in his view, God is the idea of humanity. But how then can he distinguish God from man, on the one hand, merely as infinite from finite, whilst at the same time assuming that the two are realiter and eternally separated; on the other hand, attribute divine nature to man, nay more, designate him a finite-infinite being?

If God and man stand in the relation to each other described by Hase; if they are separated from each other by the eternally impassable gulf between finite and infinite, the composite term, "growing God," "perfect humanity," is a catachrestic expression, a sideroxylon. But in that case also the destination of man to perfection is not taught in proper earnest; for whilst, on the one hand, his essence is said to demand perfection, on the other hand, it is supposed to raise its voice against it. And for this no compensation is offered by what Hase says regarding the divine character or nature of man; for this natural goodness is compatible also with selfishness (§ 77). Precisely for this reason, is Colani's view to be esteemed an improvement on that of Hase. He does away with the shyness characteristic of Hase's conception of freedom relatively to God—a shyness which scarcely harmonizes with the notion of a creation by means of self-communicating love; he refuses also to treat the divine and human natures merely as infinite and finite, maintaining that to the full idea both of humanity and of deity belongs ethical infinitude or perfection. He considers Christ, therefore, to be, in an ethical respect, the actual image of God; he regards Him, not as God-man, but as man-God, because the ethical qualities of God are a reality in Him. But, he goes on to say, we must carefully distinguish between this and the

metaphysical essence of God, the determinations of which cannot pertain to Christ. In this respect, Christ is and remains merely finite. After a similar manner, the old doctrine of the "Communicatio idiomatum" also, and not the Reformed alone, had tried to discriminate the communicable from the incommunicable divine attributes; had ascribed infinitude and immeasurableness only indirectly to the humanity; and, on the contrary (passing the ethical attributes by unheeded), had treated omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, as objects of communication.

Like Hase, Colani denies the pre-existence of Christ, and the duality of the natures. Christ to him is man; a man, however, who, on the basis of a pure nature, appropriated the ethical divine attributes, and whom he therefore styles "Homme-Dieu." But the next question must be,—Is the ethical only an attribute, or is it also to be viewed ontologically? In the former case, we should have a communication of the divine attributes without the communication of the divine essence; in other words, the same opinion of a separableness of essence and attributes in God as that to which the old orthodoxy had involuntarily inclined. On the other hand, if there is divine essence in love, it must also include a substantial metaphysical being; and the participation of man in the divinely ethical is not possible apart from the metaphysical. Colani's separation of the ethical and metaphysical compels him, in order to avoid allowing an incarnation of God in Christ, to introduce into God Himself the dualism of an ethical and metaphysical essence, which stand outside of, and are indifferent to, each other.

The giving prominence to the ethical aspect of Christology, which, since the time of Kant, has been ever more completely the case, is without doubt a step in advance, for which we should be grateful. But the ethical itself is not thought in its entire absoluteness, until it is recognised as the true reality, and as the power over all reality. The realization of divine love cannot, therefore, lack divine wisdom and power.

In order to overcome the fundamental error of the point of view occupied by a one-sided subjectivity, the thing chiefly necessary is to examine into the relation between the *essence* of God and of man, and not to limit our inquiries merely to the *attributes*. If the attributes alone needed to be subjected to *consideration*, all that would be necessary would be to *conceive* ~~the~~

ledge, love, expanded "in infinitum," and the divine and human would be one. What we should then arrive at, however, would be pure identity; the perfected human would cease to be human, and at the end there would be nothing but the divine. Against such a subjective or anthropological monophysitism reacts the true conception of God and of man. It asserts itself, in the first instance, at all events negatively, in opposition to those external modes of atonement which consist solely in the annihilation of one aspect of the antagonism; and does not rest until it has arrived at the conviction, with regard to the essence of God and of man, that they do not exclude each other, either monophysitically or nestorianly, but that, on the contrary, each points to, and has its goal in, the other; and until, on the basis of the knowledge that the two natures are connected with, through the very features which distinguish them from, each other, a deeper conciliation between the divine and human essences had been found.

At all its stages, one-sided subjectivity has been unavoidably characterized by conceiving the divine and human as separated from each other by an insurmountable gulf. These stages have now been run through. At no one of them, however, so far as the task essentially was to show how the divine and the human can constitute an unity, was it found possible to construct a Christology. In every case, it was the human aspect of the Person of Christ alone that was laid hold on: the divine aspect, on the contrary, they were compelled to exclude; thus forming the most complete antagonism to the tendency of the early Church, which had been to give prominence solely to the divine. Three phases of philosophy have formed, as we have seen, the groundwork for the history of Christology since it began to give predominance to the human element in Christ—to wit, the Wolfian, the Kantian, and that of Jacobi. One-sided subjectivity, transferred in its different forms to the domain of Christology, forms, in general, the stage of subjective Rationalism. As each of these phases appeared on the scene, attempts were made to unite philosophy and theology; but the end of the matter invariably was, that justice was not done to the objective, and consequently the subjective alone remained.

to wit, that of Wolfianism, with its offshoots,

Eudæmonism and the popular philosophy, was occupied at the outset with the tearing down of the old objectivity, and settled the matter so happily, that the infinite wealth of Christianity was reduced to empty Deism, and the Father of Jesus Christ to the *être supreme*. Christology sunk even below Ebionism: the Son of God was a wise country Rabbi, a preacher of Naturalism.

The *second stage*, that of Kantianism, put an end indeed to this idealess, empty systematizing, and represented Christ as the ideal of an humanity pleasing to God. But respecting the nature of the historical God-man, and the relation of the divine in Him to the human, it had nothing whatever to say. To its theoretical atony, the dogma of the God-man was something transcendental; to its practical autarchy, superfluous and disagreeable.

The *third stage*, the *æsthetical*, promised to do away with the defect chargeable on the system of Kant, in refusing to enter on a consideration of the relation between the divine and the human, notwithstanding that this question was necessarily the most important one for Christology, and to bring the two into more essential connection. Not morality, but religion, is represented as the highest, as the alone certain, from which all other certainty proceeds; and an union of the divine spirit with the human, is assumed in religion. This union with God, however, is a natural, immediate one: freedom, the innate nobility of human nature, involves of itself the full possibility of realizing that union by itself. This religious autarchy, therefore, no less than the moral, renders a redeemer unnecessary. Moreover, the principles laid down at this stage do not allow the possibility of a perfectly sinless, religious personality. If God be merely "the Better than I" (*das Bessere, als Ich*), then, if the ideas "Man" and "God" are not to be assumed to coincide, the Ego must be essentially marked by imperfection, and Christ, were He such a sinless personality, could no longer be man, but must be God alone: as, however, He was certainly man, it is idolatry to believe in Him as the Son of God, to bow the knee before Him.

But, however far these forms of Rationalism, the negatively *rational*, the *practical*, and the *æsthetical*, were from being able to solve the problem, it must not be supposed altogether incapable

of solution, and we must not conclude therefrom the unreality of the union of the divine and human in Christ. For, on the contrary, all these theories have shown themselves to be self-contradictory. We have seen that, based as they all are on an abstract antagonism between finite and infinite, no other result could be arrived at than that at which they actually arrived, to wit, an antagonism, which fails to satisfy even the general religious feeling and even reason itself; which is therefore much less fitted to serve as the standard by which to judge the Christian religion, which posits both as one in Christ.

But even positively, it may be shown that neither of these systems has proved the problem to be insoluble. On the contrary, each of them, in its own manner, was compelled in regular progress to prepare the way for a solution:—and this is only the reverse aspect of the remark made above, to the effect that no one of them was able to construct a Christology.

If the problem were to bring the Person of Christ nearer to human thought, it was necessary, as we have seen above, that justice should be done to the human aspect. In order to complement the one-sidedly objective mode of consideration, which started from above downwards, it was necessary that a mode of consideration should be begun which starts from below upwards, in order that Christian truth might find its expression in an unity of both, higher than that which had at first been established.

In order that the matter, in this aspect, might freely take its own course, it was necessary that one-sided objectivity should be deprived of its predominance. Christianity consented even to give up all claim to external authority, and to allow subjectivity to have free play, confident that even the fiery test to which it thus exposed itself, would only demonstrate the eternal, unavoidable, inner power of the spirit created for Christ.

The work of vanquishing that one-sided objectivity, which was incapable of effecting the construction of a satisfactory Christology, was plainly sufficiently accomplished by the *first form* of Rationalism; and this is the meritorious aspect of this tendency. The ground was now cleared; the mind of man was delivered from the chains of external authority; it had come into the possession of itself. Reflecting upon itself, and investigating in general the essence and dignity of human nature, it

prepared the way for the perception of the fact, that human nature is not foreign to the divine, that the two could become one in Christ. At this point, the second form of Rationalism, that of Kant, came in and showed that the ethical was both something essential to the human spirit, and an idea of absolute value; which, in Kant's own view, involved a certain unity of the human and divine spirit. Finally, to the *third form* of Rationalism, the æsthetical, belongs the merit of having descended more deeply into the essence of divine and human nature, to the point where the divine and human life were found to be immediately connected. Besides this, Fichte's system rendered also similar positive services in relation to knowledge; for it vindicated to thought, to the reason of man, an absolute value, to wit, the inner calling to arrive at absolute certainty and truth.

Thus in three different directions—thought, volition, and feeling—were points of departure secured for the attainment of a knowledge of the unity of the divine and human in Christ. It is true, as we have already observed, the problem was as yet by no means solved; the union arrived at did not leave to the Person of Christ anything eternally distinctive. Still more important, however, is it to remark, that the union limited itself to the *faculties*—to knowledge, volition, feeling; whilst a dualistic conception was formed of the unity and power which lie at the basis of all these, and the divine and human were placed in abstract antagonism to each other. Proceeding in this way, it was impossible to form a conception of the Person of Christ as essentially one (*ἑνωσις φυσικῇ*) with God; all that could be demonstrated was an unity of faculties.

It must appear remarkable that subjectivity should thus have arrived at the anthropological correlate to the last form of the one-sidedly objective Christology, that is, the Lutheran "Communicatio idiomatum," beyond which, as we have seen, the development of the objective aspect of Christology actually neither did nor could advance, until it was freed from its one-sidedness. As the Old Lutheran dogmaticians, starting with the divine aspect, had arrived at the point of recognising the two natures in Christ to be united in the matter of attributes, so now, starting with the human aspect, the unity had been recognised as one of the faculties. The anthropological mode of considering

the Person of Jesus had now overtaken the theological. But as both were equal to each other in the matter of *gain*, so also in that of *defect*. In both aspects, the reaction which took place on the part of the unconciliated essence, has proved the unity of mere attributes or faculties to be a false one. And now one common task was devolved on both, to wit, that of carrying on the union of faculties and qualities to an union of essences. Our next duty will be to review the attempts to accomplish this object.



THIRD PERIOD.

THE AGE OF ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THAT THE DIVINE
AND HUMAN ASPECTS OF CHRIST HOLD AN EQUALLY
JUSTIFIED POSITION, AND ARE ESSENTIALLY ONE.

INTRODUCTION.

BY the end of the eighteenth century, the two main one-sidednesses, which, even though in a manifold variety of forms, had characterized Christology since the Council of Chalcedon, had found clear expression and logical development. On the one hand, the pernicious effects on the doctrine of the Person of Christ of allowing the divine to have the predominance which had been conceded to it from A.D. 451 till 1700, with the sole exception of the age of the Reformation, were now exhibited to all times; and, on the other hand, it was made no less clearly evident, that the sole dominion of subjectivity, leaving as it did to the divine in Christ a merely accidental position alongside of His personal humanity, involved the total loss of Christology. This, then, is the great lesson of the Second Period: either the Christological problem involves an impossibility; or it must be possible from the beginning, so to conceive the two factors, deity and humanity, that they shall stand in equilibrium, hold an equally justified position in Christ, and instead of excluding or curtailing, seek each other in their integrity and entirety.

The Church, which believes itself to possess in Christ the truth and the life, nay more, the central point in which are united the highest antagonisms and mysteries, feels certain that

the last result of science cannot be to convert Christ into a grand contradiction. But this faith of the Church, which felt that it was redeemed in Christ, permeated, like a golden and never broken thread, all the shakings and critical labyrinths through which the dogma, as a dogma, went. In it also, as in a continuous, living tradition, lay the deepest impulse to new *scientific* efforts. Individuals, indeed, may rescue their faith by retreating before doubt into the citadel of the soul; but the Church has no right to pursue this course: so certainly as it is its duty to seek to possess Christianity as a whole, so certainly must it overcome the enemy in a true manner. It must not, indeed, allow its faith to wait on scientific demonstration; but neither can it be willing to bear about discordant elements in its existence. Were it to consent thereto, its faith would no longer be accompanied by an honest and good conscience; the object of its faith would become to it an imagination of its own invention. Doubts as deep as those which were produced during the eighteenth century—by Germany with the greatest clearness of consciousness—and the like of which are not discoverable in the whole history of the Church,—doubts which related to the entire system of thought, to the entire edifice which had hitherto stood,—required to be inwardly overcome, if they were not meant to hold their ground; and they can only be rightly and victoriously set aside when all the truth which gave them importance, but of which a wrong estimate had been formed by previous doctrinal systems, has been incorporated with the new formation which is aimed at. The truth itself, therefore, through the medium of negation and position, which are the two essentially connected momenta of its own substance, accomplishes at once the destruction of the unsatisfactory old, and the position of the new, by the reproduction and richer self-unfolding of the old truth. A vanquishment of doubt in this way is the worthiest deed of Protestant science; but it is also the most difficult task that can be devolved on it, and only to be accomplished on the condition, that the two vital factors of the Protestant Church, the critical and the positive, united in incorruptibility and in readiness to submit to the truth, shall co-operate in a progressive productivity.

That, in opposition not only to the destructive tendency of

an age which was compelled to cease viewing Jesus as an object of faith, because it deemed Him to be a mere man, but also to the old doctrine of the Church, it had become necessary for Christology to assume a new form, was recognised, even during the time of destruction, by many an one of deeper insight; and, at all events in the manner of presentiment, glimpses were obtained of that higher unity of the divine and human, which was fitted to raise the Christian mind above the antagonistic view of the two that predominated both amongst Supernaturalists and Rationalists, and thus also above the all-absorbing conflict between Christianity and philosophy. Distinguished men of freer and deeper mind,—as, in part, Lessing, Semler, Herder (Note 7); further, Tersteegen, Claudius, Hamann, Lavater, Stilling, Kleuker, Crusius, and in particular the Würtemberg prelate Oetinger,—were unable either to feel at home in the old orthodox system, or to overlook its inner unsoundness. Nor were they able to take part exclusively with either the one or the other of the two parties, the rationalistic and the supernaturalistic, which had now arisen in theology; for they felt, and in part also clearly saw, that these antagonisms occupy essentially the same ground, to wit, that of a deistic conception of God, and consequently, on the one hand, support and sustain, and, on the other hand, overthrow, each other. Instead, therefore, of accepting a Supernaturalism which was driven to ever new concessions, they endeavoured to take up their new position even before one-sided subjectivity had been thoroughly carried out, and applied their critical doubts to a rejuvenescence of the dogma concerning which they were entertained.

Hamann's profound and rich mind was, on the one hand, far removed from a dead, spiritless orthodoxy; for which reason he remarked to Jacobi,—Every kind of clinging to words and literal doctrines in religion is a Lama-service. On the other hand, however, unlike Jacobi, he did not deem the reverence paid to Christ to be idolatry. He clung strictly to the historical, though not in the form of Supernaturalism; for, to his energetic mind, that which, in an historical point of view, was past, was also something present and divine. Creation he held to be a work of the divine humility: his favourite motto was, *πάντα θεία καὶ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα*. Language, reason, revelation, he sought to understand in their simple, fundamental essence, and their

essential connection. Reason is language, λόγος, says he; at this marrow-bone do I gnaw. He tries to demonstrate that reason and Scripture, as history, are at the bottom one, and the language of God. But "the philosophers do not know what *reason* is, as the Jews do not understand what *law* is." Both point to Christ, the historical revelation of truth and grace, by the knowledge of ignorance and sin. The speculators lack the spirit to believe the fundamental doctrines of Christianity regarding the glorification of humanity in the deity, and of the deity in humanity, by the Fatherhood and the Sonship, and to say with the Lutheran Church—"In Him rises the fountain of life, which descends from heaven on high out of His heart." Christ he held to be the head of the body, His Church; in both together is the grand plan revealed by which, in the manner most correspondent to the entire system of nature and human society, to the laws of a sound understanding, and to the conclusions of living experience, are made known the mysteries of the most high majesty of God, which was most pressingly desirous to communicate itself. "The mustard-seed of anthropomorphosis and apotheosis, hidden in the heart and mouth of all religions, appears here (in Christ and the Church) in the magnitude of a tree of knowledge and of life in the midst of the garden; all the philosophical contradictions, and the entire historical riddle of our existence, the impenetrable night of their 'Termini a quo' and 'Termini ad quem,' are resolved by the document which teaches us that the Word became flesh." But the chaotic character of Hamann's being, and his lack of thorough philosophical culture, prevented him from combining the rays which flashed into his mind into a calm and steadily shining light, and from arranging and articulating the intuitions which were so richly vouchsafed to him.¹

Superior to him in learning and philosophical culture was Oetinger, a man as pious as he was profound. (Note 8.) He was exactly acquainted with, and had worked through for himself, the various philosophical systems of his age. He

¹ See Gelzer a. a. O. pp. 204-229; Auberlen's "Die Theosophie Fr. Chr. Oetinger's," pp. 78, 296, who makes it probable that Hamann knew and made repeated use of Oetinger's works; even as, on the other hand, Herder gave shape and form to many an idea of Hamann.

classifies them as follows:—"The one aim to derive everything from Idealism, as, for example, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Wolf, Plouquet; the others, to derive everything from Materialism; so, for example, most of the Medici, Mechanici, as La Mettrie, Bagliv, Börhaave, and some who even introduce "fibras intellectivas, sensitivas, volitivas," like Robinet ("der irdischen and himmlischen Philosoph." 2ter Theil, pp. 246 ff.). Others seek to avoid these two extremes, like Newton, Cluver, and Swedenborg, to participate in both sides; but without success. All these systems fail to do justice to logical thought "propter hiatus." (Ibidem, and Lehrtafel, p. 209.) He pronounces judgment on each of them (Lehrtafel, pp. 155-175), and his result is:—As far as Materialism by itself is from being sufficient, even so far is Idealism. The latter gives us only a "principium cognoscendi," but not "essendi" (as Leibnitz treats the monads merely as *vis representativa* sui, as representative forces). Oetinger, on the contrary, insists that the will, the *motus*, the self-movement of life, above all, ought to be taken into consideration,¹ though not to the exclusion of the intellectual faculties. He describes it as the power which enters into itself for the purpose of revealing itself out of itself. When the will enters into itself, it brings forth out of its own hidden being the image of itself, it becomes a mirror to itself, in which darkness vanishes. Self-knowledge thus gives birth to a power to manifest itself to itself and to others, which is not possible without the Logos. (Lehrtafel, pp. 222 f.; Ird. und himml. Philosophie ii. 249.)

In his view, therefore, the will is before the understanding. Life and self-movement long precede the images of thought (*repræsentationes sui*, pp. 210, 221). He shows how the will, which is life in operation, is the centre of the physical creature; and how it comes into existence in consequence of God having, out of the depths of His freedom, implanted in the creature two opposed forces (one of which, after Newton, he terms the force of attraction, the other the force of repulsion), which manifest themselves in nature as *impulse*, in the soul as *will*, which is always bringing something forth.

As he deemed Materialism, with the mechanical view of

¹ Quite similarly Schelling, in his "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie," pp. 460 ff. 1856.

things to which it leads, unsatisfactory; and as Idealism also, whose essence he describes, and whose consequences he has made clear to himself (Note 9), seemed to him equally unsatisfactory; he sought to lay down a prime principle which should embrace both, without being either the one or the other, to wit, a matter which is not matter ("Ird. und himml. Philosophie" ii. 249: "Matter in God is no matter"), and also an ideal which is not a mere product of thought—a something real which is also ideal, and an ideal which is also real—something which is neither composite nor simple, which is a multiplicity of powers and yet only one power, one substance (Lehrtafel, p. 142). What he means was termed *tincture* by Böhm (p. 175). It is the key of all science, the middle thing between matter and spirit. "Is this middle thing to be a monster?" (p. 143). "But if monsters are possible and actually exist, this middle thing may be regarded as a monster too, if only it is a possible monster.—In the temple of philosophy there are priests without vocation; they are like young country fellows who have never been away from their native village, and therefore deem all that is narrated to them of the rarities which exist in foreign countries, and which they have not seen where they have lived, to be inventions, trying to cover the disgrace of their ignorance by mockery and laughter." Such is the state of things with corporeality. Without it, spirit is not perfect spirit, but merely the beginning of spirit. On the other hand, however, it is also true that matter, as it exists before our eyes, is coarse, and not spirit, nor will it become spirit: by itself, he considers it to be darkness, chaos; but spirit can be separated out of it; spirit, by working it, can give itself a body out of it; and as this corporeality can have more or fewer degrees, so also can the actuality of spirit in it have more or fewer degrees.

This ideal-real supreme principle he finds above all in God: a nature or corporeality of a higher kind, free from the defects of the earthly nature. This is spirituality as substantial reality. He usually designates it God's glory (Rakia Uesse). Though his doctrine of the Trinity is very far from being (he objects to the word person, Note 10), he evidently recognizes the existence in God's one being of the antagonistic principle, the Word or Logos, and a passive, receptive principle.

principle, of an expansum in God, which is capable of assuming all the forms that the eternal Word gives it. This passive element, or God's glory, although it is not God, is one with God, and is the light in which He dwells. By its capability of assuming different shapes (for it is the eternal nature of God in constant motion), it forms, according to Oetinger, the transition from God to the world. Through it God communicates Himself to the creature. In His glory, or "*manifestatione sui*," God assumes creatural "*modos*" or limits, and His glory is an union of the finite with the infinite. God, it is true, is spirit, not elemental essence; but through His "*Glory*," or the manifestation of Himself, He gives Himself, in His unbounded freedom, by contracting and again expanding Himself, attributes which approximate more nearly to the creature, with the design of being thus able to communicate Himself to it, with His goodness, in spirit and life, according to the spiritual-corporeal attributes of His glory. What this glory is, reveals itself. In the creatures, it is the most noble spirit, and that which causes plants to grow green, to flower, to live, or the bond connecting the forces of life. It is the seat of colours, of fruitfulness, and of love. This leads to the *creation*. God is not subject to necessity, as Spinoza teaches: out of possibility He creates an actuality, and does not exhaust Himself in the product. The product is not merely a limitation or modification of God; on the contrary, the finite receives from God self-movement and life, without God's dividing Himself. In particular, man has, in consequence of God's self-communication, the centre of his freedom in himself. The freely acting powers all have their root in the indissoluble bond of the forces of the divine life; and the forces of God are derived into the creature, which, consequently, is not an absolutely simple thing, as the Wolfians pretend regarding the soul. That which outwardly is simple, bound together into a whole by the eternal Word, is inwardly a myriad. But with this manifoldness of powers every creature is dissoluble.¹ God is *not able* to communicate indissolubility and exaltation above chaotic darkness to the creature; "for in Him alone is that bond of the powers a necessary one." The divine life also, with its *pleroma*, may

¹ The soul's immortality also, in his view, is not a natural one, but entirely mediated through Christ.

indeed (after the example of Böhm) be represented as though there were in God an eternal movement towards revelation for Himself ; consequently, a birth out of concealment and darkness. But, on the other hand, God is quite as eternally light in Himself, and absolutely free. But now, seeing that that which exists in God, in eternal indissolubility and simultaneity, is only dissolubly united in the creature, consequently goes relatively asunder, darkness and chaos are the first in the creature, and first need vanquishing—a thing which is impossible without the participation of the creature's freedom, and the gradual "derivatio" of the glory of God into it. Instead of the principle of creation out of nothing, he says,—“ God is the Father of lights, *ex essentia sua essentias generat, sed essentiarum modum creaturalem accipiunt in ipso fieri.*” He seeks, therefore, to derive the world both from the essence and from the good pleasure of God. The world comes into existence, in that God (the Word) displays His free power over His nature (“the Glory”) ; and in order to exhibit Himself as that which He is, as the life, full of eternal self-motion, as love, the “*Ens manifestativum sui*,” which gives itself certain “Gradus” and “Modi,” in order that the world may come into existence. Out of this fulness of His deity, He is able to communicate to the creature, without discription of Himself, whatever He wills, for He is spirit (spirit is wherever each part is able again to become a whole) ;¹ nay more, the creature comes into existence through the will, which posits “Gradus” and “Modi” in itself ; but, nevertheless, the distinction between the original and the derivative glory remains. God is not the Universe, but All in all, the “Universum” in Him ; not however “physice,” but through the medium of His will. God abides and dwells in Himself, although He everywhere penetrates nature ; God is independent, nature not.²

The goal of the revelations of God in the world, particularly in man, is that man may become perfect, and that the bond uniting the forces may be firmly established in him also, through the communication of that higher nature which is neither matter

¹ Compare Auberlen's “*Theosophie Oetinger's*,” p. 187.

² Oetinger here carries on the thoughts of the old Suabian theologians of the sixteenth century. Only the independence, the aseity of God, is incommunicable ; His fulness is communicable.

nor a mere image of thought, but spirit, real and manifested in corporeality.¹ To this point, however, it could only come gradually. That which is included in God without imperfection, in eternal simultaneity (to wit, contrary powers, which are eternally united), can only gradually and through conflict be brought to interpenetrate in man, and that in virtue of a self-communication of God, increasing as the measure of the susceptibility of freedom increases.

How far he was from regarding finite and infinite as mutually exclusive magnitudes, is clear even from what has preceded. But it is made especially evident by his Christology.

So far is humanity from being foreign to God, that Oetinger rather speaks of a heavenly humanity, not as really and in the form of an image eternally present in God (as the Præformalists say); but that which is without limits (the *En Soph* of the Cabalists) becomes the *Adam Kadmon*, by contraction in itself;² not as though the result were something finite—for that would be Arianism—but the infinitude remains preserved, notwithstanding that finitude exists as a determination of Himself through His will. According to Proverbs viii., Wisdom mirrored before God the original forms of all things, which are created through, and with a reference to, the Word, which was destined to become flesh. This Wisdom, however, in which the beginning of creation was visible to the angels, is *Adam Kadmon* also in his view. So high a position did he assign to the idea of man.

The necessity of the appearance of Christ he proves partly from the necessity of redemption, partly from that of perfection, which could not have existence at the beginning. Inasmuch, namely, as the powers, which in God are *ἀκατάλυτοι*, in man, as a created life, are dissoluble from within by the misuse and rising of freedom, the possibility of a fall is involved. The derivation of evil from finitude is not sufficient; it does not break forth out of nothing or out of the empty void; but lust is generated through the rising of one power over the other, whilst the different powers ought to balance each other. Evil arises out of a conflict of powers; and that is not simple finitude, but

¹ Everything, according to Oetinger, is plastic, and first attains perfection when it acquires a form.

² *Lehrtafel*, p. 128. *Theol. ex idea vitæ*, p. 216:—*Nulla neque manifestatio neque creatio fieri potest sine attractione, quod Ebræis est Zimsum.*

"finitudo interna positiva."¹ Now in Christ, the dissoluble life of the creature has become indissoluble, both physically and spiritually, through the Word of God as an indissoluble bond. Christ was able to be the Mediator, because it was given to Him to have life in Himself. He was able to bring again glory and immortality out of death, because He, the Prince of life, conquered death by death. But the same power which is able to redeem is able also to perfect. For the power of Christ not only kills and devours the impurity and death in us, but also collects and combines our forces into harmonious penetration; He constitutes the multiplicity of our powers into a living, self-perfecting unity (*Theol. ex idea vitæ*, p. 189).

Oetinger has more fully developed his Christological thoughts particularly in his *Dogmatics* ("*Theologia ex idea vitæ deducta*"). Even the method which he proposes to adopt evinces a superior mind. Wolf's mathematical or geometric method of proof did not satisfy him; it begins "*ab una aliqua idea abstracta*," and therefore presupposes simple "*principia*," which are incapable of a process or progress; for that which is absolutely simple cannot be brought to movement out of itself. He, on the contrary, adopts the "*ordo generativus*," which, as may be seen by the example of seed, begins with the whole, and develops this whole into the smallest details. The philosophy of the age he designated an artificial philosophy; it was too abstractly formal and unreal for him; it not merely tried to know too much (as, for example, in the doctrine of atoms), but also too little; seeing that it did not penetrate into the inward part of nature, and gave no intuitive knowledge. The *generative method*, on the contrary, starts with the *idea of life*.² This is also a fundamental idea of the Scriptures. No less is it also approachable in the way of presentiment by the "*sensus communis*." He, however, views the idea of life concretely; he only sees life where there is an union of contraries, which work

¹ Abhandlung über die Sünde wider den heiligen Geist, pp. 66 ff. Lehrtafel 366 f. 220. He appears even to assume a dominion of darkness, a chaotic modification of the powers, as the first form of existence which is necessary in man, until the mutually repelling and resisting powers, which really belong to each other, have interpenetrated and formed a "*contrarietas harmonica*." On the other hand, however, he held the evil produced by freedom to be in a more intensive sense evil.

² This reminds us of Schleiermacher.

in each other. The logical laws of the excluded third and of contradictories, in particular, he felt to be unsatisfactory; rather preferring to oppose to the "either—or" a "neither—nor," which is at the same time equivalent to a "as well this as that." We have remarked this already in the case of the conception of glory, which he held to be the supreme unity of the spiritual and physical,—the divine life in its revelation. He refuses, therefore, with the Federal theologians, to take his start with the idea of a covenant, because that idea makes it appear as though the life of God came on account of the covenant, instead of the covenant being established on account of the life. He rather prefers starting with the principle, that Christ is "*germinatio novæ vitæ* (Zemach), non tantum ut Architectus creaturæ, sed ut germen et principium vegetans templi non manu faciendi et totius novæ creaturæ." The goal of God has been one and the same from the beginning; every new revelation increased in clearness; but in Christ first "*immortalitas et vita plene patefacta est, et semper magis in Evangelio æterno manifestatur.*"

Whoso contemplates the universe, says he (de grat. § 1, 2), sees, on the one hand, that the earth is full of the goodness of God; but, on the other hand also, that misery has found its way into it in a variety of forms. This awakens even in the natural man the longing for a deliverer, for a Holy One, whose holiness is so rich that it can flow over to others. The entire universe suffers; the entire universe, therefore, will contain in the form of symbol harmonious foretokens of this deliverer. Whoso has those yearnings can become acquainted with that Holy One, both through history and through the emblematical language of the entire universe. When such an one reads the Scriptures with an unprejudiced mind, he discerns in very deed the truth of his presentiments of a deliverer; he sees that this redeemer bears in Himself the concentration of the entire universe corresponding to all the emblems, and that He is the image of the invisible Father in a visible form. In Him is *τὸ πᾶν*, the fullness of the Father, who fills all in all.

In the Logos, in the first instance, were "*originales rerum antequam existerunt formæ; omnia constiterunt in ipso sive archetypice, sive actu.*" In Him God as "*actus purissimus*" had become manifest primarily to Himself; but through the

medium of the "glory" or of the heavenly element, of the heavenly humanity, which the Word brought forth out of itself, He gave, and also still gives, actuality to the world of primal forms of things which is included in Himself, in that He strives to inform the world ever more completely with His fulness. In the flesh of Jesus Christ, this fulness and glory assumed a corporeal shape. Oetinger, however, rends asunder the appearance of Christ neither from the remaining revelations nor from the first creation. As Logos, Christ was, and is, Lord and Architect of nature, principle of life and all motion, working freely and omnipresently in nature and history. The Word which was given to all men from the very beginning to be the light of life, and which was active as power through the Spirit, was but made right essentially manifest through the movement of God in Mary.

He describes the nature and mode of the incarnation more precisely as follows:—That its possibility was grounded in, and its actuality brought about through, the medium of the pure corporeality of God or His "glory." (Note 11.) "Because Wisdom, before the incarnation, was the visible image of the invisible God (Col. i. 15), therefore the Son, in comparison with the Being of all beings, is something relatively corporeal, although He too is pure spirit. The heavenly humanity which He had as the Lord from heaven, was invisibly present even with the Israelites; they drank out of the rock. Therefore, also, did He enter into Mary as the power of the Highest, in order to become shadowed and corporeal in her womb; in order that He might be able to contract Himself into something dark, agreeably to the law of birth. When the humanity which He brought from heaven entered into Mary, God made Him less than the angels, He subjected Him to the grossness of the flesh. Hence it is said, 'The Word became flesh.' The weak understanding of men, says he elsewhere, has given this expression a meaning which it supposes to be purer; to wit, that divine and human nature so united themselves as to constitute one person. This also is true, but it is not in accordance with the Word of God. What is there to prevent us from understanding by the word *became*—that which was most subtle was compelled to allow itself to be resisted by that which is most coarse, until the latter was overcome by the former? It is, therefore, not merely an union of natures, but

a patience broken through by resistance. Behold how the eternal Word has been compelled to assume and suffer creatural modes!" *Lehrtafel*, pp. 273 ff.

The fundamental ideas of the Church doctrine of the "Communicatio idiomatum," he considers to be incontrovertible; but gives us to understand that, in the form in which it has been carried out, it reaches far beyond the Holy Scriptures; and he himself gives it a sense modified by the doctrine of the heavenly humanity in Christ. In this heavenly humanity the union of the divine and human was constantly a given fact, though in the first instance only potentially; in Christ it came to light as an actuality. Not, however, magically; it was not a completed fact from the moment of the conception, but was brought about by a series of successive steps. *Potuit capacitas naturæ humanæ per inhabitationem λογού successive augeri*; the "exaltatio" of Christ had "augmenta intrinseca." The Logos ennobled the life of the human soul of Christ, which He, like every other man, received in Mary in the fourth month, partly from above and partly from below. His human nature thus received more glorious qualities than were possessed by the nature of Adam before the fall. Adam did not yet possess the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν*.—The first still remains imperfect; the powers have not yet so interpenetrated as to form a higher unity (which he terms "essentiare"); for which reason the fall was so easy a possibility. *Adamo per gradus fuisset eundum ad perfectionem summam qualitatū spiritus vivifici, sed vix inchoamenta servavit. Christus autem (who also at first statum psychicum subire debuit) a prima conceptione cursu non interrupto omnia permeans tandem ἐδοξάσθη et τελειωθείς σωτηρίαν conferre et vitam in aliis generare potuit.*" He was under the necessity of beginning at the lowest stage, "ut psychicum in spirituale elevetur;" He must needs "legibus resistentis materiæ tenebræ adstringi, omnes tentationes experiri, ut carnis insita inimicitia aboleatur." (*Theologia*, pp. 193 ff. 217.) In that thus, by being filled with the sevenfold Spirit without measure, His body became spirit, spiritual, His soul, His spirit, became at the same time body, perfectly real, vital substance. Thus, in the glorified substance of the pneumatico-somatical Lord, is won, as it were, the essence of immortality, of the restoration and perfection of our nature, which becomes our

property, in particular, through the medium of the Holy Supper. The dispensing of this His *Life*, Oetinger assigns to the high-priestly office of Christ, which he conceived not merely as substitutionary and satisfactory; but Christ is also High Priest, in his view High Priest, because He is the universal organ of the divine revelations and communications of the divine life. (*Theologia*, p. 216.) Because He has the independent divine life in Himself, He is able "eam influxu septemplici in nos derivare." He communicates the fulness of His pneumatosomatic essence or His body to humanity, in order that it may become the body of which He is the head; in order that in the universal restoration it may become the *Church*, a continuation of Himself. "Believers are Christ's flesh, which is as dear to Him as ours is to us; and His flesh is as truly ours as our own. No one cherishes greater respect for His own flesh than Christ for His Church. The Church, says Tertullian, is nothing but *Christus explicatus*, Christ spread out, unfolded."¹ He teaches an union of Christ with us similar to that which existed, and still exists, between Christ and the Logos; and, like Phil. Nicolai, draws a close parallel between the incarnation and regeneration and "*unio mystica*;" as regards which, he is not satisfied with a mere divine "*operatio*," but, like the ancients, insists on a "*propinquitas essentialis*." In Christ the divine and human natures are "*personaliter*" united; in Christians, who likewise have a *θεία φύσις* in Him, "*spiritualiter*." In the one case a "*persona σύνθετος*" is produced out of two natures; in the latter case, out of the same two natures, one "*compositum mysticum*." The consequence of the "*unio personalis*" is in Christ "*communio naturarum*;" in like manner, a *communio* of our nature and the divine results from the "*unio spiritualis*," for Christ works both: *nostram individuum naturam sibi adglutinat et vicissim divinæ naturæ nos consortes facit, ita ut finitum capax sit infiniti non per localem comprehensionem sed per arctissimam consociationem.*² *Traxit carnem nostram in plenitudinem Deitatis,*" so that our race became participant of heavenly nature in Him and in us, *i.e.*, *unione tum personali tum mystica.*³

¹ Compare Auberlen, a. a. O., p. 459.

² *Theologia*, pp. 300-302.

³ *Theologia*, pp. 321, 322:—*Quodsi Christo nos tradimus, ramur ad plenitudinem illam denuo, ex qua nos Adamus*

Oetinger carried within himself the living conviction that the Reformation, after having given predominant attention to the doctrines of salvation, had now arrived at a point, when the so-called objective doctrines loudly demanded regeneration. Now, after the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans have been opened up, it is time for the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians, as well as those of John, to be examined.¹

How strange and unusual do such words sound in the eighteenth century; and yet how similar, on the other hand, are they to the voices we have heard speaking to us from the earliest age of Christianity, and from that of the Reformation! He trod most directly in the steps of Jacob Böhm, and took particular pains in many treatises to make that writer's ideas plainer, and to reduce them to a distinctly Christian shape. It is in general a characteristic feature of this new era, that it longed to escape from the abstract regions in which philosophy had dwelt in Germany since the days of Wolf and Kant, and to lay hold on the fulness and reality of life; for which reason, the most able amongst the men whose mission it was to inaugurate the new age, plunged with affection into the study of antiquity;—in doing which they always gazed with special reverence on the figure of the "Philosophus Teutonicus," who seemed to have written his works properly for a later period, and to have begun by it to be properly estimated. This cannot excite surprise, when we consider that the task now lying before the Church was to overcome one-sided subjectivity, without sacrificing the fruits of the subjective tendency as a whole; and that Böhm, with whatever power the principle of personality had asserted itself in him, was very far from moving about in merely subjective and formal determinations of thought; on

sunt, nostra fiunt; anima Christi per mysticam unionem nostra est anima, caro Christi nostra caro, vivit ille in nobis, nos in illo. Ille nos in corpore suo—immaculatos sistet, quia in ipso sumus unum corpus: nam ut Adamus fuit commune corpus nostrum, sic jam Christus est commune corpus nostrum. Unde ecclesie tanta vis, tanta fidei parrhesia, ex magnifico illo potentiarum resurrectionis promptuario. Residet igitur vis potentiarum Domini non in hoc vel illo tantum membro, sed in omnibus, at quam maxime in ipso capite, in plenitudine virum ipsius, ex qua sumimus gratiam pro gratia.—Ecce hi sunt rivuli parvi ex magno fonte et pleromate

¹ *Enchiridion.*

see Auberlen, a. a. O., pp. 233, 293, 460, 482.

the contrary, he strove to view and set forth the rhythm of the universal cosmic, and of the divine life. As men who stand in a relation to Böhm and recent times similar to that of Oetinger, we may mention in addition, Novalis and Franz von Baader.

In his various treatises, which, though never discussing the matter with completeness, are rich in deep thoughts, the latter speaks on the subject under consideration to the following effect:¹

Christ is the manifestation of the true nature of man,—a manifestation previously withheld. The manifestation of the archetypal form of man is the climax and centre, the vehicle and perfecter of the *cosmic ideas*. We ought, therefore, to point out also the cosmical momenta of the process of redemption. This he attempts, taking for his point of departure the principle,—that the normal relation of things would be for God to be the principle, man the organ, nature man's instrument, and God accordingly connected with nature through the human spirit as His organ. Man, however, has apostatized; the organ has fallen away from the principle (compare *Fermenta Cognitionis* i. § 7, pp. 14–16): man, shifted away from the centre, has become nature; nay more, nature exerts its power against him, has independence; and, from being a mere instrument or thing, has become in a sense personal. Man, on the contrary, has sunk down into the region of unpersonality and of impotence; for he has fallen away from the central soul, God, through whom alone he has true personality. But, inasmuch as the divine law had thus ceased to be human (that is, to have its realization, or as it were incarnation, in man), help could not be found save in a re-incarnation of the moral law, by which the law of nature was brought under subjection. At the foundation both of undoubting efforts after truth and of an upright moral disposition, lies, either clearly or vaguely, the hope of a future, or the conviction of an already accomplished, incarnation of the truth and of the moral law. Accordingly, the incar-

¹ Compare "Fermenta Cognitionis," Heft i., and his *Collected Writings*, vol. i. ii., especially i. 152 ff.: "Gedanken aus dem grossen Zusammenhange des Lebens," and "Sur l'Eucharistie," Bd. ii. pp. 427 ff.; "Ueber Divination und Glaubenskraft," pp. 38 ff. 58; "Ueber die Vernünftigkeit der drei Fundamentaldogmen des Christenthums," 1839, pp. 21 ff. On Baader, see Hamberger, Hoffmann, and others.

nation is also the completion of *moral and scientific conceptions*, it is the "punctum saliens" therein.

This necessity for the incarnation he expounds more precisely as follows (see Note 12). Fallen man alone stands in need of a messenger of God outside and alongside of him; for him alone is it necessary that the divine or moral law should be concentrated in one individual, in order that through a Christ outside of us, each one might be reminded of the Christ in us (Ferm. Cogn. i. 54). It is true, for the living, life flows solely from within outwards; in living creatures, God, because He is central, the central soul, reveals Himself solely by rising within us, never by entering us from without;—in which sense every man may be termed a born Christian. But still it is no less certain, that if this life inwardly sickens, and if the voice of God in the living is reduced to silence, it can only be awakened from without:—poured in from without it never can be. If the higher element which is to restore freedom is to become apprehensible and tangible to the bondsman, it must empty, depotentiate itself "per descensum." "Verbum Dei caro factum." If the image of God in man has "actu" perished, and merely exists "potentia;" and if, on the contrary, the outside world lives in Him; he can no more be helped by this "potentia," so far as it is a mere capacity stripped of all actual power, than a sick man can be helped without means: the very remembrance of his health calls for the help of a God who presents Himself to him from without, who takes a shape, who contracts Himself into an image, or of a divine form. As man, having fallen from his seat, needs for his redemption a God who places Himself on the same level with him, it is by no means religious materialism, amorous folly, harmless idolatry, when the Christian, who through Christ sees the deity, and with Him, as a Godsent, heavenly shape, soars aloft to the highest ideas, believes, and believing knows, that he can only rise by, or rather, in that divine form. By faith he touches this powerful heavenly form; faith opens, puts us *en rapport*, makes us participators in another's personality.

In order to be able to exhibit Himself in this outward region, this region of forms,¹ where everything comes forth as an indi-

¹ Ferment. Cogn. ii. § 1 ff.; and in the second vol. of his "Gesammelte Schriften," xv. p. 427.

vidual alongside of and in opposition to other individuals, the eternal Word Himself must appear in an individual shape, and empty Himself first of all of His cosmic significance, *in relation to the actus*. Accordingly, God, when taking to Himself the entire nature common to men, appeared in an individual alongside of others; and this His individuality necessarily maintains itself in the Church and through the sacraments; this necessity for the Universal One being made actively present by means of an individual, will continue until this common element shall have penetrated to the centre of all single forms, and brought everything inorganic belonging to them into subjection to itself, and organically assimilated them from within outwards, or, in other words, until God has become all in all. Even the death of Christ has been raised above its previous limited, outward presence, to a cosmical, even though hidden presence.—To the elevation of man, again, there is necessary, not merely his own self-exinanition (in faith), but also that of Christ,—both must be conjoined. The latter consisted therein, that the principle itself became also organ and instrument, spirit and nature. Entering into both, both were brought in Him, by a victorious conflict, into their true position. But the victory, which was accomplished in Him as the primal person, or the “*homme général*,” must also become ours. For we must not rest content merely with His incarnation. The birth of God is in general a threefold one. (Bd. ii.; see the Abh., p. 398):—1. The eternal birth of the Son of God from the Father; 2. the birth in Mary; 3. the birth in Christians. But Christ is the centre of all incarnation; and as the Word began it in Christ by self-exinanition, so is it continued in us. In the sacrament and for faith that empties itself, the Word empties Himself to the extent of becoming nutriment, that is, power, in order to rise again as a person in man. He gives Himself continually to us, in order to be appropriated as the germ of a new personality in man. (Note 13.) In this point also, as in so many others, Baader connects himself with Böhm and the old German Mystics.

Alongside of Baader, Novalis deserves mention. Like Baader, he turned his love towards antiquity, with the richness of presentiment which characterized it, and which especially is stored up in its mystical works; like him, he

entertained reverence for Böhm.¹ This noble soul is to be reckoned as truly as any amongst the forerunners of the new age; but he resembles the men hitherto mentioned in another respect also, to wit, that he did not work up the intuitions which hovered before his mind, into an organic whole, but remained standing at certain great, far-reaching ideas, which we will endeavour at all events to group into an outline.

The position occupied by Novalis is a very characteristic one; but, owing to the variety of elements of culture which strove in him after union, it is a strange one and difficult to describe. For the understanding of the transition from the period during which the subjective had the predominance, the study of an intellectual form like his, is uncommonly instructive: indeed, the Romantic School occupies altogether an important position in this respect. On the one hand, namely, subjectivity manifested itself in him in its extreme form; but, on the other hand, because his subjectivity was not merely that of thought, and embraced the totality of man, it brought him into connection with the objective. Still, the predominance of the subjective did not allow of a true recognition and marriage with the objective: on the contrary, he continues vacillating; now attempting to make out of the objective merely that which pleases the subject, and not permitting it to be that which it really is in itself; and again, evincing the need of entering into connection with a given object. He seems to have considered a conciliation between the two to have been effected, when he refused to allow of the object—for example, that of religion—being arbitrarily turned and twisted to please the subject in its *momentary* moods, and when he maintained that a permanent significance must be attributed to it. This significance, it is true, being posited by, can only have validity for, the subject; but still, for the subject it is something fixed and abiding amidst the ever-changing stream of thoughts or feelings, to which it can ever again revert, in order to collect and elevate itself by its aid; to which, therefore, the spirit may in a certain sense surrender itself, afterwards to rise again quickened and revived. In this way he effected the transition to a kind of objectivity.

The energy of his subjectivity, in which may be traced the

¹ Compare in Novalis' Werke, Bd. ii. pp. 43 ff., the poem to Tieck, the subject of which is Jacob Böhm.

after influence of Fichtianism, manifests itself where he speaks of the omnipotence of the will, which, as moral, is also at the same time the will of God (ii. 256). Moral feeling, says he (p. 254), is the feeling of an absolutely creative capacity; of productive freedom; of infinite personality; of the microcosm; of the proper divinity in us. The true miracle is the moral one; for *evil*, which can only be healed by a miracle, heals the power of will (p. 251). *Conviction* (p. 247) also cannot be brought about by external miracles:¹ true conviction is the highest function of our soul and personality. Will, therefore, he considers to be unlimited power in the sphere of action and conviction. Understanding, however, as he did, by the powerful act of will, elevation into the divine essence, both seemed to him to blend into one. God becomes perceptible to us in the moral sense; the more moral, the more divine (p. 256). An inward moral conviction is to him a divine *intuition*. Such a moral deed, which is at the same time inward conviction, he then designates also *faith*. To faith he attributes such might, that he says, if a man were truly to believe himself to be moral, he would be so (p. 252). This faith presupposes suffering, dying, death (p. 265). In that the heart, abstracted from all individual actual objects, feels only itself, constitutes itself an ideal object, *religion* arises. All the separate inclinations unite in one, whose wonderful object is a higher being, a deity: for which reason the genuine fear of God embraces all the feelings and inclinations (p. 266). In offering up every individual thing which lays claim to have a value by itself, as a sacrifice, we become worthy of the highest being (p. 265), and it reveals itself in us; not, however, as something foreign, but as our own proper essence. Now, though the interesting transition is here made from the self-feeling of the noble soul, spoken of by Jacobi, to the consciousness of our own divinity; still the system of Novalis treats this divinity at the same time as something objective. The strong, subjective will, faith, is as almighty and

¹ How he deemed the rationalistic and supernaturalistic modes of thought to be reconcilable is hinted, p. 247, compare 250:—Elevation (*Erhebung*) is the best means I know of passing at once out of fatal collisions. So, for example, the raising of all phenomena to the rank of miracles, of matter to the rank of spirit, of man to that of God, of all ages to that of the golden age.

miraculous as it is, because in it the universal, divine will rose again out of the death of the merely individual will; hence, also, the act of will by which faith lays hold on the divine as the true essence of man, is at the same time, and in one, both surrender and reception. He leaves behind him mere subjectivity still more decidedly in the position he assumes towards religion; for he does not remain content with the view of it as a reflective action on ourselves, but looks round for organs and mediums of the religious consciousness. Consequently, he does not (as the passage adduced from p. 266 might be taken to hint) arrive at the divine through the mere negation of everything individual, but concedes to the individual also the positive significance of being a vehicle of the divine. These organs he terms *mediators*, and even says (p. 262), it is irreligion to refuse altogether to accept a mediator.

Subjectivity, indeed, appears again to prevent him from passing over to the Christian idea of Mediator. For, to the religious mind, every object may be a temple in the sense of the Augurs; every arbitrary, accidental, individual thing may become our world-organ (p. 263), by which we discern the spirit of this temple, the omnipresent high priest and monotheistic mediator, who alone stands in an immediate relation with the Deity.—On page 261 he says, indeed,—Nothing is more indispensable to true religiosity than a middle-link which unites us with the Deity; man is absolutely unable to stand in immediate relationship with the Deity;—but then he goes on to say,—“In the choice of this middle-link, man must be completely free; the least constraint in this matter injures his religion. The middle-links are Fetishes, Stars, Animals, Heroes, Gods, Idols, a God-man. As these choices are plainly relative (that is, appropriate to the spiritual condition of some one particular people, and the reflection thereof), one is involuntarily driven to the idea, that the essence of religion depends, not on the nature of the mediator, but solely on the view taken of him, on the relation we hold to him.”

However one-sidedly idealistic this sounds, nothing more is said, when we take into consideration his further remarks, than is questionably true, to wit, that that alone can be a God to a people, which can be apprehended and represented by it, in harmony with its stage of culture. But this does not render it

impossible that humanity, for which an objective course of culture is marked out, should also carry within itself the necessity of rising above the incalculable accidentalness which characterized its choice of a mediator, to the recognition of one in a fixed eternal form. Novalis says also,—The choice is characteristic: cultivated men, therefore, will pretty nearly coincide in their choice of middle-links; whereas, on the contrary, the choice of the uncultivated will be determined by accident (p. 261). He remarks more precisely (p. 264),—We must seek God amongst men; in human events, in human thoughts and feelings, the spirit of heaven reveals itself most clearly.

Here he stands at the point of transition to the Christian Mediator. There are not lacking passages such as,—Christ is the new Adam (p. 272):—He has brought a second creation; for the annihilation of sin, this old burden of humanity, and of the belief in penances and propitiation, has properly been effected by Christianity. Whoso understands sin, understands virtue and Christianity, himself and the world: without this understanding, we cannot make the merits of Christ our own; we have no part in the second, higher creation (pp. 259, 270). But, on the other hand, he is unable to reconcile Christianity perfectly with that which he terms Pantheism, and which in his view is the highest: for which reason, he almost seems to be on the point of regarding Pantheism as the end of the Christian religion. This is set forth more in detail in pp. 262, 263; compare pp. 287, 298. How now does he reconcile the two things?

“It is idolatry in the wider sense,” says he, “if I regard this mediator really as God Himself; even as it is irreligion and unbelief to have no mediator. True religion is that which accepts the mediator as mediator, holds him to be as it were the organ of deity, its heavenly manifestation: accordingly, the Jews had in their Messianic expectation a genuinely religious tendency. But true religion appears to be again divided into Pantheism and Monotheism; and there appears to be an antinomy between the two.” By Pantheism, he understands that everything can be an organ of the deity, a mediator, in that it raises the Ego up to God: by Monotheism, he means that there exists only one such organ for us in the world, that it alone answers to the idea of a mediator, that through it

alone God reveals Himself. He does not deny the name of true religion to Monotheism. It deserves the name of religion, if it teach that man is *necessitated through himself* to choose this organ. Novalis himself, however, rather prefers the view, that the organ is constituted an organ solely by ourselves; at the same time treating its objectivity as in itself a matter of indifference. Still, a solution of this antinomy is offered by the remark made above, regarding the sameness and necessarily growing unity in the choice of a mediator. And, in point of fact, Novalis had also a presentiment thereof (p. 263). "However incompatible with each other the two may seem (to wit, the view according to which everything has a right to be an organ of God, and the view according to which Christ alone is the divine organ), their combination may be effected, if we make the monotheistic mediator (Christ) the mediator of the middle world of Pantheism, and deem the latter to be as it were concentrated in Him; so that both, though each in a different way, render each other necessary." He finds, therefore, the reconciliation in the idea of Christ as the *centre* of the world; partly because in this way the world retains its significance as an organ of religion; and partly because it can, notwithstanding, only hold this position through the medium of the universal centre, of the perfect God-man; so that the latter remains the only Mediator, even as He, on the other hand, is communicable. This, however, he has not more particularly expounded and established; but, at the same time, he applied his attention with decided preference to the idea of the universal (if even only mediated by the atonement of sin) incarnation of God. And to this point, in particular, were directed his enthusiastic hopes for the new future.¹

With these ideas is strongly akin what Schleiermacher says in the "Weihnachtsfeier," and in the "Reden über die Religion;" and partly also what Fichte said in his later period. It is time, however, to pass from the porch of the new era, and

¹ P. 285 :—That the time of the resurrection of religion has come, and that precisely the events which appeared to be directed against its revival, and threatened to complete its overthrow, have become the most favourable omens of its regeneration—this cannot remain at all doubtful to an historical soul.—Such is his language after taking a profound survey of the history of unbelief, and of the destructive tendencies of the preceding cen-

to consider how, in a *dialectic* and *strictly scientific* way, progress was made, and the vanquishment effected of the extreme subjective tendency at which we remained standing above. We will only first show how the necessity thereof was negatively displayed, particularly in Fichte.

The unsatisfactory and inwardly self-contradictory character of subjectivity, carried to an extreme, we have already seen above, where the criticism of the theology built on the principles of Jacobi landed us in the conclusion, that his system leaves, in the last instance, an essential and irreconcilable contradiction between understanding and soul, a dualism destructive of the unity of the spirit. On the one side, the understanding, a born Atheist, absolutely finite and devoted to finitude; on the other side, the soul and the emotions, perceiving the infinite, nay more, therewith alone contented and blessed. Of the divine, there still remained over here a small remainder of objectivity, so far, namely, as the higher feelings were held by Jacobi to be the work of something objective, divine, which gives itself to be immediately perceived by the spirit. So long as these feelings were not merely regarded as a becoming conscious of man's own noble nature, as self-feelings, a remainder, if only a diminished remainder, of objective significance was left to the divine. But even Jacobi already was inclined to regard the divine perceived by us as the perception of the Ego itself, and its innermost essence; which found specially distinct expression in the absolute plenipotence which he allowed to the subject to determine what is good and what is evil, to which attention was directed above. Although, according to Jacobi, the understanding is throughout finite, and finite alone, the soul is of a divine sort. Herewith was a beginning already made of allowing the objectivity of the divine to disappear in the subjective; of so heightening the latter as to exclude the former, what is robbed from the objective being added to the subjective. This tendency was still further de-

tury:—"True anarchy is the generating element of religion. Out of the annihilation of all that is positive, it raises its glorious head as the founder of a new world. Out of the universal dissolution step forth the higher organs and powers as of their own accord, as the primal kernel of the Christian formation. The Spirit of God moves over the waters, and an heavenly island becomes visible above the backward streaming waves."

veloped by Fr. Schlegel. According to Jacobi,¹ we cannot know anything of the objective divine; on the contrary, our own noble, divine nature is always near to us. A God of whom we can know nothing, because He cannot exert any influence on our system of thought, must, for that very reason, not merely be ignored, but, in the course of the progress naturally made by reason searching after unity, be excluded and denied; because the only effect of assuming the existence of such a being is to introduce a dualism into reason. What absolutely cannot be thought, against which the understanding is driven by its very nature, and not merely by the form in which it may accidentally appear to raise its voice, can only be predicated as impossible. And as in Deism the ignoring of God leads by itself to Materialism and Atheism; so the logical and scientific carrying out of the ideas of Jacobi, which connected an objective element with subjectivity merely by a slender thread, could end in nothing but the total exclusion of everything objective by the subjective; or, otherwise expressed, in the absolute, subjective idealism expounded by Fichte.

The doctrine of Fichte we can sum up in his one principle—*The Ego is one and all*. It is the only primal principle; it is absolute. On the other hand, however, it is not absolute, in so far as experience testifies of another, of an independent world, by which, as by a non-Ego, the absoluteness of the Ego is limited, that is, abolished. Thus, the objective constantly followed like a shadow the very Ego by which it was to be excluded; and from it the Ego was unable to free itself. On the one hand, in order to prove itself absolute, the Ego was compelled to strive to vanquish all objectivity; because all being which was not Ego, which was not thought, stood over against it as another, as something limiting its absoluteness; whilst, on the other hand, if it had completely succeeded herein, thought would have lost its object and content. But a thinking which lacks content is Nihilism; and even should it think itself, such a thinking of thought, which thinks nothing, is an empty thinking, a thinking of nothing. Had subjectivity, therefore, succeeded in its attempt to swallow up all being absolutely in itself, the omnipotence at which it would thus ap-

¹ Compare Jacobi's letter to Fichte, especially the passage—"Yes, I am the atheist, the godless one, etc."

parently have arrived, would be converted into Nihilism, into the downfall of thought.

Now, this content cannot be restored by the theoretical reason. For, in the view of Kant and all the writers of the stage of reflection, the sole office of reason is to reflect on what is given; it is receptive, not productive.¹ If, consequently, the theoretic reason by itself is unable to stir from the spot, the practical reason, on the contrary, contains a productive principle. In moral volition is a content posited by the will itself, to wit, the moral end which is constituted such, not from without, but by the subject itself. But in order that action may take place, some individual thing must be posited, otherwise the volition cannot be a determinate one; and as before, a non-thinking was made out of thinking, so here a non-volition would be made out of volition. The practical Ego, therefore, needs a determinate something, a non-Ego, in order to its self-realization; but it brings this non-Ego forth out of itself by its own productivity, to the end that it may realize its freedom. The content of the reason as theoretical, posited by the Ego itself as practical, is thus assigned a secondary position. Applied to the domain of religion, this signifies:—the office of the will is to give actuality to the order of the world, to God. God is the task to be realized by the practical reason; He is merely secondarily or mediately an object of the theoretical reason.

But the unsatisfactory character of this point of view becomes evident at once, when we consider that, according to Fichte, the realization of that end (or *Shall*—*Sollen*) is nothing more than an overcoming of the limits of the non-Ego, which the Ego, in order to be a practical Ego, must take upon itself. The non-Ego, therefore, is quite as truly the thing to be negatived as the thing which is indispensable; for which reason the practical Ego falls a prey to a “progressus in infinitum.” As now it is to act without purpose, to posit something which is not meant to have being (*das Nicht-sein-sollende*), to the end, not that a higher form of being may be the result, but that that which is not to have being may not be; so, as long as the practical or moral point of view is one-sidedly adhered to, the only result is an eternal unresting mobility, which strives as

¹ This is summarily expressed by Schelling in the preface to the “*Zeitschrift für spek. Physik*,” 1801, p. vi.

earnestly after being—to wit, freedom as the goal of the *shall* (Sollens)—as it flees from it; because the attainment of the goal towards which it is continually approximating, would bring stagnation and death to the practical reason. The separation of the theoretical from the practical Ego—which two, Fichte was as far as Kant from perceiving to have a common centre and root—that is, religion (not, indeed, the merely subjective religion of Jacobi), is the separation of being from moral obligation; for the cognitive faculty has being for its object, even as the practical reason has the *shall*. Both, however, are in an equally bad position: the *shall* without being, and being without the *shall*. For bare being by itself is without motion; it does not come into flux; it does not attain to organization: it is therefore indistinguishable from its contrary, the nothing. From this it follows, that the true point of view is not arrived at until the two sides hitherto separated by so wide a gulf, to wit, the theoretical and the practical reason, mutually interpenetrate. When that is accomplished, the knowing faculty is no longer merely receptive, it is no longer mere reflection on something given, but the practical reason, as an impulse, or motive power, as the principle of a process, has married itself with thought; and thought also, although it takes its start with something already existent, for it has being for its object, is then productive, or, more precisely expressed, *reproductive*. And, on the other hand, when the being which is the object of knowledge has once incorporated itself with the practical reason, this latter no longer goes on in endless unrest, but the reconciliation of spirit with itself is then concluded, because it advances onward on the eternal groundwork of being. The *shall* is then reduced, or rather raised, to the position of the animating principle of being; even as the practical impulse is then no longer a blind doing, but something rational, to wit, the explication of reason. Thus does the spirit advance onwards, in connected unity, both speculatively and practically. And although it turns now to the speculative, and now to the practical side, it is still always the one entire spirit, reconciled in itself, which acts theoretically in the knowing of the truth, and practically in the moulding of the world of morality. But this reconciliation rests on the recognition of an objective reality; though this objective reality must no longer be known as something foreign, but as that

which is essentially spiritual (and therefore capable of reproduction).

The effect of Fichte's labours was to show, in a twofold manner, that object and subject are connected with and belong to each other; this resulted from the opposed attempts to exclude the one by the other. The *first* manner was the one just considered—the exclusion of the object by the subject. As we have seen, the result was, that with the never-ending *shall* impending over it, the subject loses itself in contradictions, unless it maintain itself, partly by presupposing, and partly by finding or realizing, a non-Ego in itself, instead of annihilating it.

The *second* mode is the later form of the system of Fichte, which we may designate the Spinozistic.¹ Here the object, as abstract being, stands in exactly the same absolutely exclusive relation to the subjective as the subjective had previously held towards the objective. The transition from the first point of view to the second was easy enough to effect, whether regard be had to the point of departure, or to the goal of the former. For the goal is evidently *being*, the having attained as the end of the *shall*. As the point of departure, Fichte was compelled to assume the absolute, the unconditioned, which the will *in itself is*, which only subjects itself to limits in order to be able to act. This is the view taken of his system by Novalis, when he says,—“Fichtianism is applied religion.” The more distinctly the contradictions of a one-sidedly subjective activity manifested themselves to him, the more natural was it for him to throw himself on the other side, to wit, that of the objectivity of the subject, to fix his eye on the *per se* or the divine essence. But even thus he had not yet overcome the point of view of re-

¹ The views laid down by Fichte in his “Anweisung zum seligen Leben” (“Guide to the Blessed Life”) even yet are not unfrequently regarded as indicative of an enfeeblement of the strong Ego, which had felt itself equal to the entire sphere of the objective. But the history of the development of men like Schleiermacher, Novalis, and Schelling, who were more powerfully influenced by his system, alone forbids regarding the transition from his own subjective idealism to the Spinozistic view as anything so accidental. The last-mentioned in particular saw clearly the necessity for this transition (see the “Vorrede zur Zeitsch. f. spek. Physik,” Bd. ii. 2, 1801), and expressed the hope that Fichte would take the step, ere he had actually taken it. Daub's Theologumena also belong to this connection.

flexion, from which both—namely, the subjective or human, and the objective or divine—seem to contradict and exclude each other, but only turned it in the opposite direction. As the divine had appeared to him before to be a mere product of the subject, so now, *vice versâ*, the subject appeared to him to be but an accident of the divine substance. In both its forms, his system forms a complete conclusion to the old period, and as its recapitulation is also its topstone; thus proving that an untrue conception is formed both of the subjective and objective, each in turn, when the one is dissociated from the other; that consequently both are connected together and *essentially one*. (Note 14.) For either of them rent asunder from its essential unity with, and asserted by itself in antagonism to, the other, perishes,—perishes, in fact, through the reaction of the opposite into which it is converted. This demonstrates clearly that both, when regarded in a proper light, have an equally justified existence, and belong essentially to each other; and that the one cannot be known, cannot be thought in its truth, save as united with, or in the other. Things which are indifferent to, do not fall into conflict with, each other: only those things which essentially belong to and are one with each other, are able to pass into life and actuality by means of conflict with the various forms of one-sidedness, which as such are opposed to unity of essence. And it was manifested here on a particularly grand scale, that the conflict was simply an *endeavour after unity* on the part of elements which, though separated from each other by a false view, essentially belonged to each other; which, in fact, had been separate in order that, having mutually vanquished each other, they might thus be delivered from untruth and one-sidedness, and that the full truth, as their higher unity, might be brought to light.

SECTION I.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEW CHRISTOLOGY LAID BY
SCHELLING, HEGEL, SCHLEIERMACHER.

I. SCHELLING.

To Schelling belongs the undying merit, not merely of having discerned, but also of having taken an important step towards the abolition of the dualism which cleaves in equal measure to systems which take the objective, and those which take the subjective, one-sidedly, for their point of departure (a one-sidedness which was always reflected with peculiar distinctness in Christology, and was, as we have seen, the ultimate cause of the failure of the attempts hitherto made to construct a doctrine of the Person of Christ). He saw that it is not right to conceive subject and object as mutually exclusive and merely opposed to each other, but that the essential unity of the two must be taken as the principle of all philosophy: this essential unity he terms *Subject-Object*. (Note 15.)

This one proposition, clearly laid hold on, and both expressed and carried out with great intellectual vigour, forms the turning-point not merely in philosophy, but also in theology, which, as we have seen above, was dependent on philosophy for the next step in advance which it was necessary for it to take.¹

¹ In his "Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zu der verbesserten Fichte'schen Lehre," 1806, pp. 46, 47, Schelling says: "In relation to that which has immediately gone before, there is stirring a completely new age, and the old cannot comprehend it; nor has it even a distant presentiment how distinct and complete is the antagonism of the new to itself. The age of yore has again opened itself; the eternal primal sources of truth and of life are again approachable. Mind may again exult, and play freely and boldly in the eternal stream of life and beauty. Fichte is the philosophical blossom of this old era, and in so far its boundary line."

This is not the place to enter into the details of his philosophy; so much, however, comes here into consideration, that the old one-sidednesses were overcome, at all events as to principle, by a new principle.

The characteristic feature of all recent Christologies is the endeavour to point out the *essential* unity of the divine and human; but this unity, which stood already before Luther's eyes when he spoke of the new higher humanity, might be very differently viewed.

Schelling regarded it as absolute identity. The higher unity of the human and divine, of the subject and the object, he did not, it is true, regard as a mere abstract indifference of the two, nor as an "abstractum" or "neither—nor" of the two, arrived at by the negation of the antagonistic elements; but he allowed the antagonisms to remain, and sought to cognize them as one, in living identity.¹ The absolute, says he, may not be conceived as a pure One or being, abiding absolutely in its newness (*Neuheit*); as such, it would be without a revelation of itself, nay more, without being. For revelation is self-affirmation, and self-affirmation is being. But the absolute is also in itself multiplicity. It is the unity or copula of the contradictories, multiplicity and unity. Contradictories there must be, because there must be life; but the true identity, as it posits the antagonism, so also does it keep it under its power. In virtue hereof, it is the essentially mobile, willing, creative unity. Actual, real being, is self-revelation; but in order that the absolute may have actuality, that is, reveal itself, it must not merely be itself; in itself there must be another, and in this other it must be to itself the one. This other, or manifold, does not exist as the manifold or the other; nor must it be supposed first to arrive at the one (having previously not been one); it is rather simply the one itself, but as existing (*existirendes*), as self-revealing, which is only possible in that the one becomes to itself another, a manifold. The divine unity is from eternity a living, an actually existing unity; for the divine is precisely that which cannot otherwise exist than as *actual*. But in that God is thus nothing else but the living unity of the many, the organic unity, that is, the unity which

¹ Compare his "Darlegung des wahren Verhältnisses der Naturphilosophie zur verbesserten Fichte'schen Lehre," pp. 51 ff.

is articulate in itself, and manifests itself in that articulation, He is on that very ground necessarily a *growth* (ein Werden), like all life; for (pure) being alone has no growth;—all life realizes itself through antagonism and the vanquishment thereof. Accordingly, the divine life, in order that it might be life, has subjected itself to suffering and growth, which are the fate of all life, and has undertaken to undergo an historical process.

As, on the one hand, these principles are directly opposed to the deistic conception of God as an abstractly simple unity, and to the rigid conception of God laid down by Wolfianism, even in its supranaturalistic form; so, on the other hand, do they take a direction again towards the foundations of the Christian, Trinitarian conception of God, in that they show that, without distinguishing Himself in Himself, without another in which He, as it were, again possesses Himself, God could not be the living One, or even the One who actually is (der actuell Seiende). God, as pure being (as represented by Deism and substantial Pantheism), would be merely a possible, not an actual God.

If God is conceived merely as pure being, no such thing as a transition to the world, still less to Christology, can be found. If, on the contrary, He is living and discriminated in Himself, then new prospects in both respects are opened up. Let us now dwell for a time on Schelling's treatment of Christology. (Note 16.) First, a word on the earlier representation contained in the "*Methode des akademischen Studiums*,"¹ which continued for a considerable period to give the tone to the Christology laid down by the speculative philosophy in modern times; afterwards we will notice the later form, which evinces a not unimportant step in advance.

The divine life in its manifestation runs through (as we have seen above) a process. But finitude is the necessary form of the divine revelation. The eternal, divine idea could not become manifest in itself; in order that it may become manifest, it must subject itself to limitations. Because, however, it is unable to set itself forth in any one finite, limited form, the divine life sets itself forth in a number of individuals, in a rich history, each moment of time of which is the revelation of a particular aspect of the divine life, and in each of which God

¹ Lectures viii. ix.

is present absolutely. For this reason, the finite is not merely finite ; on the contrary, it is rather that in which God Himself has His historical life : the finite is the necessary form of revelation, of the manifested God. It is God in His growth, or the Son of God. All history thus acquires a higher significance. The human does not exclude, but contains the divine within itself ; the domain of history is the birth-place of spirit, the scene of the theogony. Thus was the idea of the incarnation of God raised to be the principle of the whole of philosophy ; and as this idea is the essence of Christianity, philosophy is reconciled with it. Everything is to be explained by this idea of the incarnation of God : nature itself points to the Son of God, and has in Him its final causes.

But with this positive, constructive aspect of the philosophy of Schelling, is no less decidedly connected the critical and negative aspect.

Theologians, says he, view Christ as a single person ; but in this aspect it cannot be doubtful that He is an historical person, capable of being comprehended, and without mystery. But seeing that an eternal idea alone, and not an individual, can be stamped a dogma, Christology as a dogma is untenable. Theologians understand it, like all doctrines, empirically, as a deed of God in time. But to this no clear idea whatever can be attached, seeing that God is eternally outside of all time. The incarnation of God, therefore, is an incarnation from eternity. Nothing, however, is lost by looking upon Christ as an eternal idea. On the contrary, the inmost essence of revelation then first comes to consciousness. The spirit of modern times has clearly and loudly testified that it cannot put up with a merely empirical manifestation ; it advances onward with visible consequence to the destruction of all merely finite forms, whose design is to support the truth by external authority, by evidences from miracles, and the like. At the same time, its intention is not to annihilate the truth, but to bring it to light. The divinity of Christianity cannot be demonstrated in an empirical manner (which, because empirical, must at the same time stand in a relation of exclusiveness to all other historical phenomena), but only by contemplating history on universal, speculative principles ; in other words, its truth can only be demonstrated by viewing the whole of history as a divine deed. Outwardly, it

can never be shown how the eternal idea subjects itself to time ; the divine is by its very nature neither cognizable nor demonstrable empirically. On the other hand, however, this entrance of the eternal idea into time, this unity of the infinite and finite, is the fundamental determination of Christianity. For this reason, the unity, not being able to be outwardly intuited, must be inwardly cognized. The beholding of this unity, of the dissolution of the antagonism between finite and infinite, falls into the subject. External things can only serve the purpose of stirring up the subjective activity by which contradictions are viewed as an unity, but not to give the intuition of the unity by its own genuinely divine essence. The sacred history must be to us merely a subjective, not an objective symbolism, such as the Greeks had, who saw the infinite solely in, and accordingly subordinated it to, the finite. On the contrary, as the Christian religion is the religion which relates to the infinite immediately in itself, the finite in it is conceived not as an objective symbol of the infinite, not, at the same time, for its own sake, but merely as an allegory of, and in entire subordination to, the infinite. Nay more, he goes still further: When contemplating the sacred history, we ought to have the distinct conviction, that the eternal idea can in no way be restricted to a determinate form of revelation. In a religion which relates immediately to the infinite, the forms are not permanent, but phænomenal, historical forms, in which the divine reveals itself only transitorily.

For this reason, the spirit of the new age aims at viewing that which the Church and its sacred documents (to which in this point must be assigned a very low place) referred to a single, empirical phænomenon—wherein also contingency was involved—in its universal and eternal necessity ; it desires the eternal idea instead of the empirical, individual phænomenon ; the view hitherto taken of the Person of Christ as the only, individual Son of God, it holds to be but an exoterical view, in which the eternal, universal truth lies concealed, as under the husk of the letter. In the day when the divine spirit first dawned on humanity as its inmost centre, the great idea of the incarnation of God, needed, says he, a mythological body and letter. But the time is coming, and is now already here, when the esoterical, being set free from its veil, must come forth and shine for

The fundamental idea of Christianity is an eternal, universal one; it cannot therefore be historically constructed without the religious construction of history. As eternal, the idea of the incarnation had an existence even outside of Christianity. But that Christianity thus existed already prior to and outside of itself is a proof of the necessity of its idea. That the highest element in the religious faith and in the philosophy of the Hindoos is summed up in the idea of the incarnation of God, and that a similar tendency is traceable in Greek philosophy and poesy—this does not lower Christianity, but is a prophecy of it in an entirely strange and remote world, and shows that the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of God contains not something absolutely new, but an eternal truth. The man Christ is in manifestation merely the apex, and, in so far also, the beginning of the incarnation; for, starting with Him, it was to be continued by all His followers being members of one and the same body, of which He is the head. That in Christ God became for the first time truly objective, is proved by history; for who before Him revealed the infinite in such a manner? The old world is the natural side of history, so far as its idea was the being of the infinite in the finite. The close of the old and the boundary line of a new age, whose ruling principle was the infinite, could only be effected by the true infinite coming into the finite, not in order to deify it, but in order to sacrifice it in His own person, and thus reconcile it to God.

According to this theory, therefore, the significance of Christ consists, not in His setting forth the concrete infinite, the absolute unity of the real and the ideal, but in His sacrificing the finite to God, or by representing, particularly through His death, the finite as nothing, and the infinite as the only true being and life. That such is his opinion, and that the dignity of Christ is not found in the absolute identity of the real and the ideal, is evident from the following. Christ also, the *climax* and termination of the old world of gods, makes the divine finite in Himself; but He stands as a phænomenon, which was ~~deceived indeed from eternity~~, but transitory in time, as the ~~two~~ two worlds. As to His working on infinite, and promises instead of ~~ack~~ the finite into the infinite.

Humanity alone is the *eternal* Son of God, born of the essence of the Father of all things, the manifest God; appearing as a suffering God, subjected to the fates of time, who, in the climax of His manifestation, to wit, in Christ, brought the world of finitude to a conclusion, and inaugurated that of infinitude or of the dominion of spirit. For this reason those mythological husks must fall away, which represent Christ as the only God-man. The eternally living spirit of all culture will clothe Christianity in new and more lasting forms; speculation, by showing that the determinations of Christianity are not limited to the past, but extend to 'an unmeasured time, prepared the way for the second birth of esoterical Christianity and the proclamation of the absolute Gospel.

This exposition of Schelling's contains most distinctly features which imply that Christ can only have been a finite phenomenon, both intensively and extensively. In the Christian religion, says he, the infinite is merely signified by the finite: the idea was never embodied in the finite. This latter was rather the manner of the Greek religion, in which, for this very reason, the infinite was made finite, and set forth in an unworthy manner. The Christian religion concerns the infinite immediately in itself: for this cause, the whole, in which the ideas of such a religion become objective, is itself *necessarily* infinite, and cannot be a world complete and bounded on all sides,—the forms not permanent, but phænomenal,—not eternal natural beings (*Naturwesen*), but historical forms, in which the divine manifests itself merely transitorily. The view taken of the infinite is such, that it is impossible for it to reveal itself in its entire fulness in an individual, seeing that it would otherwise be itself made finite, or subordinated to the finite. And because it is essential to the finite to be an inappropriate form of the infinite, the infinite cannot take up its permanent abode in any finite form: it must seek to set itself forth in some other way. This, however, can again only take place in the finite, for the infinite cannot become manifest in itself. The infinite, therefore, only goes through the finite as through transitory husks, whose variegated colours are intended to set forth its inner essence: but because this inner essence cannot be set forth in any one finite form, there is no alternative but to say, that the infinite finds its adequate revelation in the totality of finite forms. At the same

time, however, it must be added,¹ that this totality may not be conceived as bounded and closed (for in order that it might be perfectly represented in a bounded totality of finite beings, the infinite must become finite no less than if it were to find an adequate representation in a single individual); but the totality of finite beings, in which the infinite is to be represented, must be unbounded, that is, it must be no totality, but an unbounded world of finite beings. It is clear, indeed, that the solution of the question, How the infinite, if it cannot attain to representation in any finite form, can ever reveal itself or truly set itself forth at all (seeing that it can only reveal itself in finite objects, and not as it is in itself), is merely referred to a progressus in infinitum. An endless series of finite spirits is alone supposed to be able to set forth the infinitude of God, to be its adequate expression. It is quite as clear that an infinitude which is able to set itself forth in a mathematical infinitude of finitude must be still conceived as a mathematical, not yet purely as an intensive, metaphysical infinitude. If the infinite is to be defined mathematically, or, as it were, as absolute quantum, then is the finite, the determinate, indeed, its contradiction; determination is then the opposite of the infinite; then does the famous proposition of Spinoza hold good—"Omnis determinatio est negatio." On such a supposition the idea of the God-man is an impossibility. And where God is conceived as infinite in this sense, the idea of personality is diametrically opposed to Him; for the idea of the divine personality is in the richest measure concrete and determinate;—which, from that point of view, can only appear as an unworthy lowering of God.

The case is different, however, when once the idea of extensive infinitude has been exchanged for the deeper one of an intensive infinitude. It is then no longer necessary that the finite should stand over against the infinite as non-infinite; it no longer needs then merely to *appear* in the finite, as in its allegory, or to be signified by it; but it is possible for an essential union to be effected between the two, and for the infinite to have its being and life in the finite. The finite, it is true, is not infinite in the extensive meaning of the word; but it by no means contradicts its idea to be intensively infinite. In other words, the true unity between finite and infinite can only be

¹ Compare "Vorlesung über die Methode," etc., Ed. 2, p. 171.

brought to pass by rising out of the category of quantity to that of quality, from extensive to intensive infinitude; which latter may very well pertain also to a being that is finite in the extensive sense.¹

If this transition be not effected, we must remain fixed in dualism. Finite and infinite are then mutually exclusive conceptions; for if such an infinitude exist at all, there is no longer room for the finite; finitude would then be the limit and contradiction of infinitude. And so, on the other hand, if such a finitude exists, there is no room for an infinitude, but the infinite is then made finite by the finite. For this reason, it is necessary to rise from this quantitative conception of the infinite and the finite, according to which they are only mutually contradictory, to that higher conception in which both are truly conciliated with each other.

It is not to be denied that Schelling had a presentiment of that higher conception of the infinite and finite. But none the less does the other and lower conception constantly force itself forwards. He says, indeed, every form contains a particular aspect of the divine revelation, in each of which God is present absolutely; but, on the other hand, he quite as truly says, the infinite cannot be entirely present in any one form, but only in the *unbounded world* of finite forms. Each single form is but a transitory appearance of the infinite; and if the infinite is not to be supposed to be made finite, the finite can only *signify* the infinite. We see, therefore, that no true union of the finite and infinite is effected.—In this way, however, not only is the idea of a God-man, in whom the fulness of the deity dwells *σωματικῶς*, in concrete individuality, excluded, but the system is itself marked by dualism. For it still vacillates between the

¹ Intensive infinitude has its centre in the ethical, which alone is the in itself infinitely valuable and true divine being; for God is love. As Baur, when protesting against the above distinction (*Trinitätslehre* iii. 918), ignores the entire ethical, that is, *sensu eminente*, divine world, he is compelled to continue finding the distinction between God and the finite, in the sphere of the quantitative, that is, in the *quantum*,—a point of view which admits neither of a true distinction nor of a true unity. Even the old Suabian theologians (see above) discoursed far more in the spirit of speculation, when they taught that the distinction between God and the world consisted in His aseity, and not in the *quantum*. Compare on this subject also Conradi's "*Kritik der christlichen Dogmen*," 1841, pp. 150 f.

mathematical view of the infinite (from which is derived the notion that the divine is unable to reveal itself truly in a finite being, a notion which supposes indeed that the will to reveal himself is essential to the absolute Spirit, but also that it is quite as necessary to this will to remain eternally resultless) and the higher, metaphysical view.

And even if this higher view makes its appearance here and here in a more distinct manner,—for example, when he designates Christ the climax, and again, the beginning of the incarnation, commencing with whom it must be continued till all shall have become members of one and the same body, of which He is the head (passages which may be taken to evince an inclination to attach more than ephemeral worth to historical forms); still, in general, it recedes to the background before a view of the infinite more related to the principles of Spinoza which predominates in his writings), as compared with which everything finite is mere show and seeming; and it can only be regarded as the forerunner of the higher form of philosophy set forth in his “*Freiheitslehre*” (Doctrine of freedom), which it will now be our business to consider.

So long as the finite is regarded as a mere series of fugitive appearances, into no one of which the divine veritably enters to abide, so long are all these phenomena essentially equal to each other; they represent an uniform series. For this reason also, Schelling, at the stage just under consideration, so completely universalized the Christian idea of the incarnation, as to treat even the ante-Christian immediately as a representation of the divine incarnation, and to speak of a Christianity before Christianity. It is true he designates this Christianity again a mere prophecy of Christianity, and finds in Christ the beginning of the incarnation. But what the difference is between the first incarnation, prior to Christ, and that which began with Him; and whether the former also deserves the name incarnation,—he does not more precisely explain. Hence the qualitative distinction of the Christian from the ante-Christian runs the risk of being overlooked. This defect the “*Freiheitslehre*” seeks to remedy: its aim is, more distinctly than the afore-mentioned work, to arrange and organize history according to the measure in which the divine spirit rises victorious in the consciousness of man. The monotony of the forms, each of which is merely a fugitive and

essentially unsatisfactory manifestation of the infinite, is thus done away with; the historical forms acquire a more concrete, a firmer substance; and thus the victory is secured for that mode of viewing the infinite according to which, by entering into the finite, it lent it ever more an absolute worth.

All life,—this is the starting-point of the present work also,—all life is a growth, a process. Bare *Being* alone has no growth; but for that reason, it is dead, without revelation either for itself or for others; only simple, identical with itself. Now all growth or birth must be preceded by a ground, which, whilst on the one hand, the new is born out of it; on the other hand, is not the new, but holds a position of antagonism thereto, and must be overcome and overthrown by it as an imperfect mode of existence. This holds good both of the kingdom of nature and of that of history. The goal of the former is the birth of light; and darkness must precede light as the ground. The goal of the latter is the birth of spirit, free and universal. But the birth of spirit must also be preceded by a ground, which is not spirit, in order that the birth of spirit might be a possibility. Now this ground of spirit is nature, or rather the principle of nature, which must needs first work for itself in order that there might be a selfhood, an individual will (a Natural or Particular Will:—"Natur- oder Partikular-Wille"), with which spirit might in due time enter into conflict, and through which alone spirit could become *actu*, or in reality, the universal will which it is *potentia*.

God also, so far as He is life and not mere *being*, must have made Himself subject to growth. For this reason, there must be a ground out of which God also rises to the reality, to the absolute spirituality, which He is potentially at the beginning. But this ground of spirit is nature; and nature, as the ground of the divine, is the necessary presupposition of the *actu* existing God. God, however, realizes His existence as an actuality thereby, that after the ground had worked in its independence (independence, namely, of the spirit, which was still enclosed in God), with the object of preparing a birth-place for spirit, the principle of knowledge, the divine gaze at life, rises in the depths of the divine essence. This takes place in man, who is created to be the centre of (ins Centrum) nature; that is, who is on the one hand nature, but on the other hand also, is that

which nature encloses in its first centre or essence, to wit, spirit. The highest summit of this revelation of God is, as in nature, man generally; so here, the archetypal and divine man (the primal man), He who in the beginning was with God (resting), and whom all other things and man himself were created, but who also was destined to be brought forth actually (actuell).

But the birth of spirit can only be effected through the medium of conflict. The ground must resist, in order that there may be a development and a conflict, and that all the powers may pass out of their condition of mere potentiality and indeterminateness, may *actu* realize themselves. And, on the other hand, the cognitive principle must rise more and more, in order that there may be a separation, in order that the first form of existence may be recognised as one that must be overcome, as the merely natural form, whose particular will (Partikular-Wille) has to give way to the universal will. Out of this gradual birth of spirit, there thus grows the kingdom of history, which is divided into the following periods:—

The first must be the period when the ground of spirit, of the free universal will, of the true personality, is first laid.—This is the time when God reveals Himself as to His nature alone,—not, however, as to His heart, His love, or in general as to His spirituality,—in order that spirit might be a possibility. At this stage, man is merely the highest natural being; spirit has not yet dawned in him even as a principle of knowledge. For this reason, although in the first instance the natural particular will alone held sway, this was a time of blessed indeterminateness and innocence, when there was neither good nor evil—a time of unconsciousness of sin, when the spirit was absorbed in nature. Within this (which we may call) *natural* period of history, that golden age of ignorance of good and evil was followed by the age of the omnipotence of nature (of the rule of gods and heroes); then came the age when nature was glorified in the highest degree, with all the brilliance of art and ingenious science, until the principle of selfhood, which was still operating in the ground, came forth as a world-conquering principle, to found a fixed and enduring *world-empire*.

But as the essence of the ground can never by itself give birth to the true unity, the time arrives when all this glory is dissolved, when the beautiful body of the preceding world falls

to pieces, as though visited by a terrible sickness, and chaos finally begins its sway. This is the *tragical* period, the period of fate. At this point, the element of consciousness came into play; spirit, as a power standing above its productions, manifested itself, but recognised itself as in a state of impotence; for the incongruity of the natural life, in comparison with its spiritual life, no longer escaped its eye. Innocence is done away with, in that the union of spirit with nature is now recognised as sin; formal freedom is awakened, and begins the contest with that objectivity which had so long held the spirit in bondage. But this old world of the mere ground does not give way; it remains mighty, in order that the entire powers of the spirit may be sharpened and heightened, in order that everything good may become known by its antagonism. It was not good that the duality of spirit and nature should be all at once done away with; spirit needs for its birth an opponent who shall continually solicit it, and shall prevent the spiritual life from remaining hidden in the ground without actualization. For this reason also, evil manifests itself with ever increasing violence; formal freedom cannot overcome it, and the only result attained is the ever more complete separation of spirit and nature.

Now the moment when the separation is accomplished, or the age of fate, when the earth becomes for the second time formless and void, is at the same time that of the birth of the higher light (of spirit), which was from the beginning in the world, but was uncomprehended by the darkness which worked for itself, and was as yet revealed only in a closed, restricted manner. After the Iliad of history comes the Odyssey, the return of the spirit to the infinite out of its endless flight. The period of fate is followed by that of providence;¹ God reveals Himself as to His heart, His love. Freedom, that had succumbed, raises its head more gloriously again: in yielding to fate, it had but yielded to God; and that dark natural necessity, after having judged the natural aspect of the spirit, reveals itself as divine love. The absolute universal will of this love, when it lays hold on the particular will, effects the inmost reconciliation of the spirit with itself.


¹ "Philos. und Religion," p. 64: "Methode des akadem. Philosophen," p. 176.

The redemption of the personal spirit is necessarily the work of God ; it cannot proceed forth from man ; man always needs help for his transmutation (*Freiheitslehre*, pp. 473, 477). The true good can only be effected by a species of divine magic, by the immediate presence of Him who *is* (*des Seienden*) in the consciousness and in knowledge. The more mightily evil had come forth as a spiritual, personal power, in that, at that time, it had assumed entire persons and possessed itself of their consciousness, the more necessary was it that spirit likewise should appear in a personal, human form as a mediator, in order to restore the connection of creation with God at its highest stage ; *for only the personal can heal the personal*, and God must become man in order that man may come again to God. *In this person, God took nature upon Himself*, united Himself with it ; it was thus *lowered to the position of a mere potency*, of the vanquished basis of the good. As such, it can never again have the opportunity of working alone ; it can never attain to actuality as mere nature ; it is not an independent power, but merely an instrument, a means of the revelation of spirit. The restoration of the relation between the ground (which had hitherto worked independently of God as spirit) and God as spirit, first rendered healing, redemption, possible ; for in the personality of Christ, the particular will and the universal will, nature and spirit, became one. With Him begins the kingdom of spirit, that is, the time when the divine spirit is actualized, or is introduced to the actuality of its existence ; and this kingdom endures as an age of conflict between good and evil, till the end of the days (see pp. 461, 495 ff.). Christ must rule, till all His enemies are put under His feet. Those who are born out of darkness to light, enter into connection with the ideal principle as members of the body of Him in whom it has been perfectly realized, and in whom it is now a completely personal being. At last, the ideal principle, and the real principle which has become one with it, subordinate themselves in common to *spirit* ; and spirit, as the divine consciousness, lives in like manner in both principles, as the Scriptures say :—When everything shall be subject to the Son, then will the Son also Himself be subject to Him, who has subjected all things to Him, that God may be all



certainly a grand view of the universe as a

well-ordered organism, and Schelling opens up profound glimpses into the course of the history of the human mind. The Christian religion is no longer considered coldly and emptily as a doctrine, but as a continuous divine deed, as a power, as an history : the history of Christ is no longer treated as a mere empirical, single history, which itself becomes in turn meagre doctrine, but, at the same time, as an eternal history, so far as it finds its copy in humanity generally. Christianity no longer stands as one religious institution amongst others ; but as the religion, as the true mode of the existence of spirit generally, as the divine soul of history, which has incorporated itself with humanity to the end of organizing it into a great body, of which Christ is the head. (Note 17.) As compared also with what was set forth above, he takes a step in advance ; for, in consequence of viewing history as an organism, and drawing more precise boundary lines, Christianity appears more in its qualitative distinction from everything that is not Christian. The idea of the eternal incarnation of God is now no longer applied to the ante-Christian, as though there had been an incarnation of God at all times ; but in Christianity God is for the first time *actu* God, and the incarnation of God was completed. Here, too, we find no longer the above-mentioned vacillation between an external, merely extensive, and the true, intensive infinitude. On the contrary, Schelling has turned his back decidedly on the former, and has given in his adhesion to the latter. For this reason, the individual forms are no longer mere allegories, out of which the infinite is reflected ; but substantial, significant personalities, holding an articulate position in the history which constitutes itself an organism. And as the infinite significance of personality is altogether more clearly laid down in this work, and as, further, the exaltation of personality to true intensive infinitude is represented as the goal of all history ; so is the above noticed *progressus in infinitum*, which the divine revelation was supposed to make in a boundless world of finite beings, improved in the sense that the single personality is regarded as capable, and destined, through taking up the universal into the particular will, to attain absolute worth, and to be a representation, instead of a mere transitory manifestation of the divine life.



However truly all this is an essential step in advance—a step, moreover, as is self-evident, favourable to the construction of a Christology,—Schelling's view of the relation between the human and the divine, especially as expressed in his doctrine of the universal incarnation of God, does not deserve approbation.

Many consider this idea altogether, apart from Schelling's foundation, according to which the history of humanity is at the same time the history of God, to be in itself thoroughly condemnable, because it unduly exalts man. Unless, however, we are prepared to rob science and Christian life of one of its highest gains, we must not here proceed too hastily, but inquire whether we have not to do with a deep, and perhaps long-misunderstood, truth.

As we have frequently had occasion to remark above, the chief defect of the entire early Christology was that of treating Christ as an absolute miracle, as a being absolutely separated from the rest of mankind, even when viewed in the light of its divine idea, by His divine essence. We have seen also, that there lay at the basis of this treatment, the notion that the human and the divine are absolutely different; and we have found that justice was never done to the human in Christ by the old Christology, because, according to the conceptions formed beforehand, both of the divine and human, there was no room for the latter alongside of the former. The new subjective tendency had given prominence to the human, and its result was the recognition of something God-related, divine therein:—the way was thus evidently prepared for the perception of the unity of the divine and the human in Christ. Were we a priori to set our face against every view which represents the divine and human as intimately and essentially related, we should be wilfully throwing away the gains of centuries, and returning to a soil on which a Christology is an absolute impossibility.

Philosophical contemplation, it is true, delights to take its flight beyond the ages which must still elapse ere God has become all in all in humanity; jumping over the necessary middle steps, fixing its eye on the inmost essence or capacity of man, and recognising him therein to be most intimately related to God, it speaks with pleasure of an immediate unity of God and man, or of the divinity of the latter:—in doing which,

Pantheism, on the one hand, and an improper slighting of the person of the divine-human Mediator of that unity, on the other, were unavoidable. No one, occupying the platform of Christianity, has any right to raise objections to Christian philosophers who maintain that the birth from God, from divine seed (as taught by John), or the being one in the Son and in the Father, of which the Lord Himself speaks in His high-priestly prayer, and which He compares with the oneness of the Son in the Father and of the Father in the Son, must be more than a merely moral unity with God; unless he is prepared also to regard the dwelling of the Son with the Father in believers as a biblical, orientally exaggerated mode of speech: or, finally, who take what is said regarding the participation in the divine nature, attributed by Peter (see 2 Peter i. 4) to Christians, for full truth and actuality; knowing that, indescribable as is the abasement of man through sin, even so indescribable is his exaltation *through Christ*. This Christian idea, also, is not merely a grand one; but it is time it should be laid hold on, in order that we may become clearly aware what we have in Christianity, and to what dignity we are called; in order that Christ may no longer seem to occupy the position of a being who is external and foreign to our essence, but that of a true brother and companion of our humanity.

But these precious truths,—that we are to be truly the brethren of Christ, in that He is born also in us; and that, consequently, the incarnation of God is to be multiplied in infinitum, by the continuous birth of the Son of God in us, to the end that the divine life may take to itself, sanctify, penetrate, and appropriate the whole of humanity as its body, of which the head, or as its temple, of which the corner-stone, is Christ:—these high truths require to be handled by consecrated hands. If, on the contrary, they are roughly handled, they become a caricature. As soon as the mediatory process is left out of sight, and the natural man, just as he is, is regarded as the son, as the child of God, in whom God is supposed immediately to know Himself and to act, these truths are perverted into unchristian, nay more, irreligious theologoumena. Such a physical, unethical conception of God-manhood, leaves no room for a redemption, for a potentiation of the first creation by the second, pneumatical one, for perfection of an

ethical kind ;—in one word, this view is still Pelagian in character, nay more, it is lower than the common Pelagianism. For that elevation of the natural man is an usurped dignity ; in one word, a self-elevation and a lie. The natural consequence of the fancy that our nature is immediately and truly divine, is that man, with all his dreams of divinity, with all his assumed dignity, cannot take a single step forwards, even in a scientific point of view ; that we are but beset by new riddles, whilst the old ones either remain unsolved, or are made still more insoluble ;—for example, the question of the origin of evil is attended by infinitely greater difficulty, if we regard man as immediately divine.

Now, in what relation does the philosophy of Schelling stand to this matter ? The idea of the eternal incarnation of God is its leading feature ; and, in a certain sense, we can say, that Schelling has sought to solve the problem of the world by converting the whole of philosophy and theology into Christology ; by treating the entire world as the Son of God ; by carrying out the fundamental idea of Christianity into the consideration of the entire world. At the same time, by dividing history into essentially different periods, he endeavours to secure for Christianity and Christ a distinctive, not merely quantitative, but qualitative, superiority over all other religions and founders of religion. Christianity appeared to him, on the one hand, as the eternal idea of humanity, under which all things were created ; and on the other, with regard to its manifestation in time, as something entirely new, which was brought forth like a new creation, when the earth had become for the second time waste and void. The premature apotheosis of humanity is thus avoided, in so far as the divine life is supposed to have first dawned in humanity since Christ, and not to be an immediate and original possession.

Nevertheless, deeply as many of these ideas of Schelling have penetrated, and that justly, into German science, his philosophy at this stage is in satisfactory accord neither with Christianity nor with itself.

The progress made by Schelling consists in his having begun to view *personality* (as the living unity of subject and object, of single and universal) in its infinite worth. According to the “*Freiheitslehre*,” the goal of the entire process of the

world is the birth of the perfect humanity, the realization of the idea of the eternal, original, divine man ; or, regarded from above, the perfect actualization of the ideal principle, which will one day have become entirely a personal being in the members of His body (pp. 496, 457). But what place does the historical Christ occupy in the midst of this process through which humanity and God are supposed to pass ? It is not He who appears as the actor, as the redeemer and perfecter ; on the contrary, "the ideal principle" appears to be the soul of history, and that without standing in any necessary relation to His historical manifestation. It is true he gives utterance to the striking principle—"the personal alone can heal the personal ;" but he neglects to establish it, and does not allow it a thorough influence. Christ further, it is true, according to Schelling, inaugurates a new period, the kingdom of spirit. But is He only the first-born, or also the operative and permanent principle of the regeneration of the world ? Is He merely the beginning, or is He also the climax of the new age of the world ? The idea of the process to which the entire history of the world is subject, appears to involve that the highest should come at the end, rather than at the beginning, of the new period. Nay more, if the fulness of the deity had been truly and completely set forth, if God had actualized Himself in this man ; then, so far as the goal of the entire world is simply the self-actualization of God, there is no reason why the world's age should not have already terminated with Christ.¹ So that Schelling's principles would appear to compel us to say that Christ, so far as He inaugurated a new age, cannot have been the true and perfect self-actualization of God.

The deeper reason why, notwithstanding his efforts to the contrary, no necessary place can be found in his system for the historical personality of Christ, lies in the circumstance of his treating the history of humanity as fully identical with that of God. In his "Freiheitslehre," it is true, Schelling plainly

¹ Strangely enough, these words, which were contained already in the previous edition, have been misunderstood by Dr Baur (Trinitätslehre iii. pp. 963 ff.), as though my view were, that if the highest had already appeared in Christ, the further process would be superfluous and aimless. A more careful examination of my words would have saved him from the inconsistencies in which, thus viewed, they naturally involved him.

endeavours to give greater power and independence than before to the distinctions along with the unity, and represents personality as being born out of an antagonism which borders on the dualistic. These antagonisms, however, are viewed in such a way that they are at one and the same time antagonisms in the divine life itself, as well as in the world. As, however, on this supposition, God Himself is not eternally actualized in Himself, and does not superintend the process of the world as absolute spirit, but seeks His actualization in the world, the significance of finite spirits in general is reduced to that of media, through which God endeavours to realize His own existence as spirit. Because God Himself is not absolutely clear and free actuality, He cannot allow the world to hold the position of a free end to itself; and all the power of the philosophical intellect to constitute the idea of personality the principle, applies itself solely to the problem of the eternal personification of God;—for which purpose the world and its personalities are made use of as *means*. Then, however, it is plain that no essential or central significance can be ascribed to a single historical form, like that of the Person of Christ; everything falls to the account of the impelling “ideal principle.” And even an organism of personal spirits, who, in living interaction and common dependence on the personality which is the head of them all, should be the home and vehicle of the divine life, could not receive a place there. So long as the redemption and perfection of humanity is conceived merely as an immanent evolution of God in the individual forms or personalities of history, there is no room for an universal, personal mediatorship of Christ: He is but the beginning of the new age; not the head, but merely the brother of humanity. In the place of the all-determining personal head is then substituted the one universal spirit, the Spirit of God actualizing itself in humanity, as it were as an ideal Christ. If, further, God is the spirit of the world, and the growth of humanity is His growth, then He cannot pour out His entire fulness into one personality. For, so long as any growth is going on, He is not master of that fulness; only in the entirety of humanity, including also the future, is He manifest and present. A single person appears again too narrow and one-sided for the fulness of God. Then also is an external extensive

conception of the infinite again admitted, and the deeper, intensive conception put aside; the latter of which, as we have seen, is the truth of the former. The concrete human personality then forms a contradiction to the divine, which must necessarily work its ruin. In that Schelling, who, despite all his endeavours to view the absolute as a subject, as a person, nevertheless represents God merely as *becoming* a person, and that in the world, which is supposed to owe its origin to the design He had of becoming manifest for Himself, he posits in God also the existence of absolute night as the presupposition of light; he lays down physical infinitude as the primal in God; and is thus, even against his will, entangled with the systems of substantiality, which treat the infinitude of God primitively in the quantitative sense. So long as that takes place, the inadequacy between Him as substance and as person must remain absolute; and not till God's essence is conceived as absolute personality and love will the relation to the human personality, which, as such, has an infinite susceptibility, assume a different character also for the personal God.

Those aspects of this philosophy which are hostile to Christology take their start all together from a representation which is in itself discordant—to wit, from the theory of a growing God, who at the end of the world will be an *actu* existent God. Not merely is God, on such a supposition, entirely given up to time, which, according to many passages in Schelling's own writings, is opposed to His idea; but the theory contradicts itself, especially in the way in which it accounts for and more precisely defines the growth of God. In order that there may be life, says it, on the one hand, there must be a *growth*; life without growth would be dead being; but to life, to development, a ground is necessary, which is not yet the divine life *actu*, though out of it that life has first to arise. Yet, on the other hand, we are told to look forward as to a goal, to the entire vanquishment of the ground, to God's becoming entirely *actu* God. *Being*, therefore, would seem, after all, to be the goal towards which growth tends, and which will be its extinction:—we shall then have again that being, which, because it is not growth, will be destitute of life, rigid and undivine. We shall, therefore, be compelled to assume the existence of a ground, which will always remain to be overcome, in order that growth may not

cease. By adopting this supposition, however, we only fall out of Charybdis into Scylla. For then the entire development of the world, as also the evolution of God, is made aimless. The goal indeed is, that the spirit obtain complete mastery over the ground; and the spirit works continuously, as though this were its goal: on the other hand, however, this cannot be its goal; for it cannot dispense with its antagonist, lest its own living being or growth should come to an end. The result we arrive at therefore is, that spirit, the divine no less than the human, beholds itself subjected, in the last instance, to an aimless and hopeless "progressus in infinitum."

Summing up what has preceded, we are warranted in saying that the philosophy of Schelling,—not, indeed, in its actual form, but in its intention or aim, which was to assert the true conception of personality as one in which finite and infinite are united,—leads us towards a higher form of Christology.¹

II. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE HEGELIAN SCHOOL.

OUR proceeding next to the discussion of this form of Christology, must be justified preliminarily by the well-known circumstance of the philosophy of Hegel having been developed out of that of Schelling. As regards its influence on theology, the Hegelian philosophy has taken about the same course as did that of Kant. We have seen previously that theologians soon brought themselves to accept the philosophy of Kant *utiliter*, and to apply it to theology in a way that, as the founder of the Critical Philosophy himself gave to understand, in his work entitled "Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der reinen Vernunft" ("Religion within the limits of pure reason"), little harmonized with the spirit of the master. Things took a similar course in connection with Hegel; and there is, in fact, a notable difference between the doctrine of Hegel and that of

¹ Whether Schelling subsequently reached this higher form or not, cannot be definitely decided till the later phase of his system is presented to us in an authentic state. Schelling's own declarations prevent me considering myself warranted in sketching it from that portion which has hitherto been laid before the public.

several of his disciples—a difference which was first perceived at a later period.¹

Following, therefore, on the whole, the order of time, we shall give a sketch, by way of introduction, of the Christological essays of some of his followers, which appeared prior to Hegel's own "Philosophy of Religion." They failed, indeed, to form their Christology in the spirit of the entire system; and, on the contrary, in the (in itself) praiseworthy, but premature effort to conciliate the interests of Christianity and of speculation, arrived at an eclectic Christology which lacked self-consistency. The system, as laid down by Hegel himself, in so far as essential aspects of it had not yet been worked into each other, had not yet acquired a fixed and unambiguous form, was itself fitted to give rise to such attempts.

The Christology of Marheineke here first claims our attention.² His entire theology, as is well known, is built on the Trinity. The eternal Son of God, says he, who is immanent in God as the eternal Logos, does not bring any distinction to pass until the uncreated Logos becomes the divine image, until the Son of God becomes humanity. But if humanity in general is the Son of God, how does he arrive at Christ, and what place can he assign to Him? Man, says he, is first of all in a state of innocence; which, however, merely implies that the consciousness of guilt has not yet been awakened, not that the archetypal character, which, as the image of God, he was created to bear, has become a reality (§ 252 ff.). In the first instance, he has merely the capacity for that which he is one day to become. Inasmuch as he is not yet that which he is destined to become, the natural, first, or immediate existence of man is *evil*. How is it to become better? How is it to be reconciled?

This can only take place through raising the soul into a higher region, through the taking up of the human nature into the divine, which is, on the part of God, an assumption of human nature. The idea of God-manhood alone is the vehicle of the restoration of the lost unity. That is its necessity.

But the actuality also of this idea is possible; for spirit in

¹ In particular through the "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion," 1802.

² "Grundlinien der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft," § 295 till § 40.

general is properly God-man; its essence is to be the unity of divine and human nature; God is the truth of spirit, human nature is the actuality of God. Nay more, this unity which is God's essence is also an actuality, so certainly as truth and morality are in the world. In reason and freedom, God has been present in all ages to the world; He has been in it, and it in Him. The kingdom of the true and good is at all times accessible to all men; God, therefore, has been manifest and actual in His humanity.

God must, therefore, have existed always *actu*, notwithstanding that we are only to suppose Him actual in man, who grows;—that is, He has always been humanity, and that self-conscious!—But is there any need then of Christ? The unity of man with God, says he, is an historically progressive one:¹ in Christ the revelation has become perfectly human: this manifested man is God manifested in historical objectivity (*Grundlinien*, § 327). With Him God is most completely one; only on the ground of this man's unity with God can humanity likewise be united with God.² As to His derivation from nature (the natural birth must not be called in question), He is merely the Son of *man*; Jesus Christ is the Son of God, as the man who is individual in His universality and universal in His individuality; He is the human nature created by God in its full integrity and illability, and for that reason as the second Adam, the representative of humanity, He is the truth of the first Adam. The necessity of this idea is no more established than the necessity of the God-manhood being entirely realized in one individual. From his deduction it would rather follow, that God alone can deliver man by condescending to him and taking him up into Himself; and without pointing out the theological steps by which he arrives at his conclusion, he substitutes in the place of evidence, the empirical assertion, that this idea found perfect realization in Christ.

Similarly Rosenkranz:³ on the one hand, he also holds sin

¹ Consequently again, after all, not always perfected; God, therefore, was not always *actu* God.

² After sin had been asserted to be the necessary first form of the existence of all men, these declarations concerning Christ are capricious and illogical.

³ *Encyclopædie der theol. Wissensch.* 1831, § 26 f. 69-73.

to be the universal and necessary first form of human existence; and yet, on the other hand, he terms Christ sinless.—“Another Christ, as an individual phenomenon, would be as superfluous as another Adam in order to give rise to natural men.” But then he says again,—God is the essence of humanity, and this essence has an ever during and not a merely momentary manifestation; it reveals itself absolutely, not in the single appearances by themselves, but in them as a totality, in which the contingency and defects of the individual existence are abolished.¹ According to this, “the totality,” and not the individual, would be the adequate revelation of God or of the essence. Alongside of this, however, peacefully stands the assertion, that the unity of God and man has been, as a phenomenon, completely and uniquely realized in Jesus: though he shows neither its necessity nor even its possibility.²

Göschel presupposes a state of sin or of discord. Humanity is abstract towards God; the circulation of the universal life through the particular, stagnates, and man is therefore miserable. How is the redemption to be effected? Neither by the abstract self, nor by the divine essence, so far as it separated itself abstractly from the world. What is required is, that the abstractness characteristic of both sides should be done away with, that the continuity of the life should be restored. This restoration can only proceed forth from the universal, from the divine; for man has not God through himself. He can only be, or be set into God, through God, or by God's putting Himself into him. How does this take place? By His spirit, which works in men? Göschel says (though without satisfactorily establishing his position), by the self-examination of God. God puts Himself into humanity *in order that He may know it*; His living thought is deed. He puts Himself not merely into humanity in general, but becomes flesh as a single man, at a determinate time, and in a definite place, in

¹ A representation derived from Schelling, and adopted in disregard of the essence of the ethical and the religious, which was at a later period appropriated by Strauss, and which rests on a confusion of the sphere of æsthetics with that of ethics. Such theories of the complementing of the individual by the whole, are simply a relapse from the stage of Protestantism and its energetic conception of personality, to that of Catholicism.

² We shall have to speak again of Rosenkranz below.

order that He may understand this fate of man to be isolated. He thus put Himself into the midst of the entire distress of the fallen creature, and bears its sin. His dwelling would have been mere half work, would not have been a dwelling in the individual man, if the fulness of the deity had not completely and entirely emptied itself in the incarnation. Had the divine essence retained anything for itself, it would still have been abstract, and therefore incapable of delivering from abstractness. By means of this veritable and actual self-exinanition, God is recognised as the concretely universal, which is faithful: only in this revelation, only in Jesus Christ, does man know God; and he has no name in which he can worship God save that of the Son of man.¹

Having here traced back the incarnation of God to His love, which remained faithful to us in our unfaithfulness, Göschel soon afterwards endeavoured to arrive at the same result from a consideration of the divine righteousness.² A punishing judge must not withdraw his love from the criminal; that he should not do so, belongs to the establishment of the right order of things, which must exist in the form of a moral community. Even punishment itself is an act of fellowship, a communication. Righteousness requires not merely the punitive suffering of the unrighteous one, the atonement and blotting out of the wrong; but to its completeness belongs also that he who punishes suffer with him who is punished, that he take the punishment upon himself, by means of a fellowship of love, in order to vanquish it and to re-establish the communion. For this reason it was necessary for God to become man; instead of refusing to have fellowship with the guilty, He must needs suffer with them as a man. In this way is justice, which demands the re-establishment of fellowship with the organism of right, first satisfied; and thus, too, is the great act of grace wrought by God in the plan of redemption an act of justice.

With all the praise that is due to the ability and Christian spirit evinced in this attempt, there is no mistaking that in its second form it confounds justice and grace, law and Gospel. Punishment is first considered one-sidedly as a kind of self-

¹ "Aphorismen über Nichtwissen und absolutes Wissen," 1829.

² "Zerstreute Blätter aus den Hand- und Hülfsacten eines Juristen," 1832.

communication,—a view which is incompatible with the Pauline doctrine of the wrath of God, especially against unbelievers. Furthermore, the free grace of God is described as an act of justice; which has a good sense enough on the biblical, but not on the juridical conception of justice. According to the latter, it would seem as though God were a debtor to accomplish the work of the atonement. Göschel here passes over into the “*justitia dei rectoria*,” the principle of which is not the mere righteousness, but also the *φιλανθρωπία* of God. It is a merit to gather up and view in one the fundamental ideas of jurisprudence and theology; but it is not a merit to confuse them together. That God desires to hold fellowship with sinners, is derivable from His love; His justice is merely the negative condition. It is further not clear, from Göschel’s first line of argument, that it was necessary for God to carry out His will to hold fellowship with man by becoming incarnate in Christ; but merely that God must interest Himself in, must take fallen man to Himself. Why God should not be content to testify His love to men inwardly, and why He should reveal it in Christ, is not satisfactorily demonstrated. For the attempt to show that the love of God required Him by an inner necessity to empty Himself to the point of feeling Himself isolated, in order that He might *know* the fate of isolation to which man is subject, separates Christ from God in an improper manner, especially if He is to be regarded at the same time as the revelation of God,—a feature which is connected with the theopaschitic character of the entire representation.¹ Whether, lastly, the ethical categories with which Göschel seeks to operate, harmonize with the Hegelian foundation on which he wishes and supposes himself to stand, we shall show afterwards.

The most important attempt produced by the Hegelian school prior to the appearance of Hegel’s own work, was the Christology of Caspar Conradi.²

It deserves special recognition, because, in a genuinely scientific spirit, it treats the entire history of religion prior to Christ as the still one-sided momenta of the absolute religion,

¹ A word hereafter regarding his later and more important Christological services.

² “*Selbstbewusstsein und Offenbarung oder Entwicklung des religiösen Bewusstseins*,” Mainz 1831.

and keeps hold on the personal unity of God and man, or the God-man, as the goal of the entire development. History is, in his view, merely the real articulation of the same conception whose ideal, logical articulation is contained in philosophy;¹ and as this view of history is at the same time philosophy, if it be completely carried out, Christianity is historically and philosophically constructed. But the history of the religious consciousness is at the same time a history of the revelation of God. As nothing can be the content of revelation save He Himself, this history is in reality the divine self-explication; it is at the same time the history of the divine spirit, of the soul of the process.

The true life of both, of God and man, is the mutual surrender of the one to the other. That which on the part of man is surrender to God (Religion), that, says he, considered from the side of God, who is the essence of man, is the explication of the divine essence;—the substance thus becomes subjective, realizes itself in man. On the other hand, surrender to God, which is a rising in the subjective consciousness, is, on the part of the human subject, a sinking into its own substance (God), to the end of being one with it. Accordingly, the idea of the God-man is the only true form of existence of both. This act of mutual self-surrender was accomplished in the most complete possible manner in the God-man. In the person of the God-man, the human spirit surrendered itself for the first time absolutely to God, and to that free subjectivity which lays hold on His inner essence; and for the first time in Him also, did God, who is the *per se* (An sich) of human nature or the universal, attain realization, and become manifest in a complete personality. Now complete personality is the unity of two aspects, of the universal and the particular. Hence, in the religio-historical process, of which such a perfect personality was the goal, we find forms arising in both directions,—in the East, in the direction of the universal; in the West, in that of the particular. Both evinced their inner connection by the circumstance that, in the course of their development, each passed over into the other; showing clearly that the truth lies solely in the unity of both. that is, in

¹ The repute of having discovered this method of treating the history of religion belongs, indeed, to Schelling and Hegel; but Conradi conducts the goal of complete personality, whereas in Hegel's by his dislike to the Hebrew religion.

the perfect personality which combines the divine and human symmetrically in itself.

The existence of this real personality, if it become a fact, would be exempted from the general conditions of individual activity; it would be a free act of the absolute being Himself; nay more it would owe its rise to the primal ground of all being, and would therefore be, not so much an individual spirit, as spirit in general: it cannot be merely a single finite personality, but the universal, the absolute, must have a real existence in it. It is an expression of the immediate divine life, the coming forth of this primal ground:—1. *In the direction of the universal, it is birth out of spirit*; not out of a single, contingent individual or spirit,—not out of the spirit of a single people, but out of the spirit of humanity, which, as such, may be designated the pure, holy Spirit of God. In this way is excluded all the contingency, limitation, and isolation attendant on being generated: it has rather, on the one hand, a necessary, on the other, an universal existence. The pure naturalness which we find preserved in females who surrender themselves with pious simplicity to the power of the spirit, and receive its activity, alone forms the connecting link. The moment when pure universality and a pure natural subjectivity meet together, is the moment of the birth of Christ; it is the existence of pure spirit as pure naturality (Natürlichkeit);—in connection with which the question as to second causes is unnecessary. Christ accordingly was conceived and born pure, and without sin, in an innocence, in the first instance, negative.

2. But, as we have seen, the momentum of particularity is equally essential to personality. Spirit also is first posited as the universal, although it is at the same time the particular, although as the universal it at the same time has itself for itself (sich für sich hat), or, in other words, is a subject. Not till spirit becomes subject does it attain the *actuality* of its essence, Spirit in Spirit, God in God, the *Word*. Christ is the *incarnate Word*.

In His first form of existence, which was the unity of the divine and human in pure naturality, Christ was not yet a subject; He had first to *become* a subject. He is, in the first instance, mere *per se* (An sich): it was necessary that substance should reach the form of subjectivity; for otherwise it would

have remained a mere indeterminate, empty, general something; and it was necessary that subjectivity should be filled with its substance, for otherwise it likewise would be empty. The at first immediate existence of Christ must, seeing that it is spirit which in Him entered into naturality, acquire its content also for itself; in other words, that which He *is already per se*, He must also *become*, through and for Himself. To this belongs that the subjective spirit distinguish itself from itself in its immediate form, that it negative this immediacy. Thus arises conflict, the possibility of discord.

The *sinlessness* of Christ was not a mere natural innocence; it would then have been without growth, without consciousness. The possibility of the contrary must always be overcome. Nevertheless, the possibility of discord always remains a matter of mere thought; the distinction never passes into antagonism; for, as to His other aspect, Christ is pure universality (pp. 126 ff. 134). The development of Christ was at every stage a symmetrical one; the distinctions were resolved into unity. In that the subject distinguishes itself from its immediate essence, the essence enters in equal measure and at once into the subject; and at the same time, regarded from another point of view, subjectivity enters into its essence, and its essence is raised in it to subjectivity. (Note 18.)

The development of the personality of Christ, he goes on to say, in the direction it takes towards itself, necessarily reaches a point when, as to *this* direction, it must be regarded as having completed its course. But His development does not cease with the complete attainment of subjectivity. It is the universal self-consciousness that has separated itself in Him: this cannot remain a separate and independent existence, for it would then leave behind the antagonism (men) outside of itself. The personality of the individual must therefore expand itself into the personality of the race. Consequently, the further progress of Christ is, that He should know Himself as the whole, as *the truth and life of the whole*. For in Him the entire essence altogether, the genus taken together, arrives at an existence of its own. His individuality remains in the form of a determinate consciousness; but, at the same time, it has and knows as the content of its essence, the truth and the life of the whole. This personality is, on the one hand, the idea of the whole, of the universal; it

is individual actuality; it is the ground and source of life to the whole: and herein lies the necessity for every individual man seeking in Him, by faith, his own reality and truth. The whole, as an unity of faith, gathers itself around this one personality; all its movements tend towards, and meet in, this centre. But were this movement the only one, all life would be extinguished in the centre, would be concentrated in the head alone; instead of being an organism, the Church would grow torpid. For this reason, the opposed movement is quite as necessary,—to wit, that the centre should be turned towards the whole, in order that the individuals may not lose themselves in Him, but may find themselves, and that as born again in Him; indeed, all are contained in Him as to possibility. The history of the Church, therefore, is the further history of His personality. Its life has a twofold aspect, a physical and a spiritual. Because He was the *life*, He bore witness by His deeds (by the miracles, which are not to be understood mythically), and gave life. As the personal representative and embodiment of righteousness, Christ sets forth the universal life in a *spiritual* manner. His righteousness is the righteousness of the race. In virtue of this righteousness, His personality perfected itself in the *resurrection* (which was necessary to the restoration of His personality to its integrity; because corporeality also forms part thereof), and in the *ascension*, which declared that His corporeality no longer existed in any form not filled and penetrated by the inner essence of the personality. Personality has now also attained to the actual possession of its freedom over against external nature. He is now the light which has collected in a focus the all-life (*Alleben*) of the universe, and has again poured it out into the same. He still has, we may assume, an existence in space. But this existence is purely conditioned by Him. The body follows the tendency of the spirit; for the natural existence which He was, and which formed a limit, is now taken up into and animated by His infinite personality. Willing Him, man has and wills life and righteousness.

This theory contains several important points, which will come again under consideration: particularly gratifying is the vigour with which he steers towards the completion of personality in the God-man. Admirable points, also, are contained in that which he says regarding the Person of Christ as the totality

which has assumed an individual form, regarding its development and its relation to humanity. But after what has been observed in connection with Schelling, hold can be retained on all this only by the adoption of a different philosophical basis. He also views God as the World-spirit; the race as the universal, to wit, God; the history of man as the self-actualization of God (through which much obscurity and fancifulness was introduced into his use of terms). The realization of the whole in an individual can neither be maintained to be possible nor necessary, from a point of view which allows the process of the world to continue, solely because God is not yet perfectly actualized.—In order not to be forced to represent the process as ceasing after the highest point had been reached in Christ, Conradi fixes his eye on humanity, which is intended to become the Church, blessed and sanctified through faith. This, however, is only justifiable, if it be granted that humanity owes its existence to another purpose besides that of aiding the rise of the self-consciousness of God. For this purpose would have been served already by Christ.

And now let us pass on to Hegel's own Christology. In its exposition, the afore-mentioned "*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*" ("*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*") come chiefly into consideration.¹

As spirit, says he, God is triune; as spirit, it is essential to Him to manifest Himself, to posit Himself as something distinct from Himself, or to objectify Himself. In saying this, we say that God, in order to be spirit, must become to Himself another. But in the divine idea this distinction is again as immediately abolished as it is posited; and therefore, according to this immanent Trinity, the work of positing distinctions in God is not pursued in real earnest. The distinctions made are a mere play of love with itself: to the point of separation and discernption we never arrive. In order that the distinction may come forth as a fixed one, and not be ever again the identical, the Son, or the distinction in God, is sent forth out of God, to

¹ Compare Bd. ii. (*Werke* xii.), especially pp. 204–256. Further, to this connection belongs the section of the "*Phänomenologie*" entitled, "*Die offenbare Religion*;" "*Die Geschichte der Philosophie*," iii. pp. 100–108 (*Werke*, Bd. xv.); "*Philosophie der Geschichte*" (*Werke* ix.), Pp. 328 ff.

be a free being for Himself, a something actual outside of and without God. That which is sent forth is the world in general, which, because the free alone has an existence for the free, God, who is free and sure of Himself, allows to be independent. But precisely this being in independence, without God, is no true actuality. It is, therefore, the being of the world to have only a moment of being; and then to abolish this separation, this disconnection from God, to return to its source. Herein are contained all the momenta of the process, which consists in the spirit's advancing first to discord, and then to atonement; in God, as spirit, returning to Himself out of alterity. Now, the world is nature and finite spirit. But the finite spirit feels the need in itself of having the absolute truth. This of itself implies that the subject stands in untruth; yet, as spirit, it stands at the same time above the untruth, inasmuch as the untruth is that which it is to overcome. But, more carefully considered, the untruth implies that the subject is not that which it ought to be:—recognising this (and the subject is to recognise it), it recognises itself as evil, and stands in discord with itself, with God, and with the world. From this arise pain, because of sin, and the consequence of sin, evils; and the need of reconciliation.

Or otherwise: The finite spirit, in its first, immediate form, is the natural spirit. But it is precisely the essence of spirit not to be natural spirit: the being natural (*Natürlichsein*) is evil, for spirit must become actual as spirit; naturality is its inappropriate form. Now, in order that it may become spirit, it is necessary that it, the natural, the immediate, should pass into separation, into dissonance with itself. It must become aware that naturality is incongruous to its idea. Man thus recognises himself as evil; and the more the spirit dawns upon its own consciousness as unity, as the absolute, the more is the contradiction to it, as to something infinite, an infinite contradiction. Man needs atonement. How is he to attain it?

He must become that which he is according to his idea; but to this end he must pass through a training. To this training, consciousness is necessary. It enhances the pain of the separation, but it must also heal it.

In connection herewith, two points are of special importance.

1. The subject must arrive at the consciousness that the antagonism between God and man established by evil, has no

existence *in itself* (An sich, per se), but that the inner, or the truth, is that this antagonism is abolished.

2. But because the antagonism *in itself* is abolished, the subject can and must attain its abolition, or the atonement, *for itself* also.

The fact of the antagonism being *in itself* abolished, or that God and man as to their essence are not to be regarded as extremes standing absolutely and abstractly outside of each other, constitutes the condition or possibility of the subject's being able to abolish the antagonism also *for itself*. But that the *per se* (An sich), or the possibility of the reconciliation, may become an actuality, it is necessary that man become conscious of this possibility; otherwise God would remain a stranger to man, outwardly in the extremest antagonism to his naturality, which He recognises as evil.

But the great question now is: How can man arrive at the consciousness that the antagonism to God is *in itself*, or as to possibility, abolished? We must here bring under consideration the point of view of the consciousness which is to gain insight into this possibility. It is in general the point of view of infinite pain, to which the antagonism to God has revealed itself in all its harshness.

How is it to be stilled? Not by causing the spirit to lose its consciousness of the incongruity of naturality. That would be a retrograde movement, an annihilation of the antagonism by annihilating the spirit as spirit. The spirit must bear the discord; but how, then, is it to attain reconciliation?

The spirit at this stage is merely the finite spirit; it is entirely ignorant of the fact that in itself, or essentially, it is infinite; it is essential to it to conceive itself removed to an infinite distance from God. How is it to become conscious that God is nigh unto it?

Through nature? It cannot reveal God entirely; it has no soul, no spirit; it does not know God, and cannot, therefore, tell what it does not know. Only abstractly, as power and the like, can it reveal God; and this is not enough for the spiritual sufferings in which the consciousness stands. At the stage of conflict, man is already subjective spirit; the revelation that God is nigh unto, and one with the spirit, must therefore take place *through the Spirit*.

But can man's own spirit do this? Can it give him the certainty that the divine and the human are in themselves, in essence, one? It gives him rather only the consciousness of separation. The finite spirit, at this stage, has neither the right knowledge of God, to wit, that it is essential to Him to make Himself finite; nor of man, that it is essential to him to be *per se* infinite: but its entire point of view compels him to believe in an absolute separation of him, the isolated one, from God. God Himself, therefore, must show Himself near to him. It is not enough, however, that God should show Himself gracious by words and signs, as, for example, in the burning bush: that would merely be an external, isolated, fugitive connection of God with man; it would by no means prove an essential and eternal one. *The certain assurance of an inner or essential union between God and man can only be given by God Himself becoming man.* Finite man cannot know himself to be reconciled with God till he receives the consciousness of God in the finite itself. Esteeming himself absolutely separated from God, he can only be convinced that God is near to him, if God appear over against him, as one like unto himself, in an objective, sensuous manner. The only way in which God can do this, is by assuming the momentum of individuality, the form of immediacy. But this immediacy cannot be immediacy of the spiritual, save in the spiritual form, which the human form is. The object to be accomplished is not to show to man the *necessity* of the union of God and man; the point in question is not speculation, but the *certain assurance*, in an immediate manner, which may be brought about either by inner or outer intuition. As has been already remarked, it is impossible for man by himself in the state of conflict to acquire such a certain assurance by inner intuition; the idea, therefore, must submit to become a matter of external intuition, of sensation, in order that man may have immediate certainty.

For this reason, God constitutes the determination of singularity a part of Himself: and not merely that of individuality in general; for this determination would again be merely the universal one, that it is essential to God to individualize Himself. On the contrary, as what we have to do with is the certainty springing from external intuition and perception, the substantial unity of God and man—the *per*

se—must appear for others, in the form of a single, excluding man.

This other one is then, it is true, external to them; but still the *per se* (An sich) in the form of individuality is thus transferred to the domain of certainty. This is the monstrous feature, this is the hardest point in religion, and yet necessary,—Godman, appearing in human form! The appearing is for another; that other is the *Church*.¹

Now, the appearance of God in the flesh took place at a definite time, and in this particular individual, in order that a point of departure might be furnished for the consciousness of the unity of the divine and human.² Because it is phænomenal, it passes by for itself, it becomes a past history. This sensuous mode must disappear and rise into the sphere of representation. The sensuous form passes over into an intellectual element, that is, into the insight that we have here to do with the universal human, the innermost essence of which comes to manifestation. The sensuous undergoes this purification through the act of disappearing.

The death of Christ, accordingly, is the point at which it will become evident whether we regard Him with eyes of faith or not. Death is the test of His humanity; for to die is essential to everything human: it is also the test of His divinity; for in this extremity it must be shown whether Christ succumbs to death or not. Faith knows that His death was no succumbing, but the death of death; not by His own personal resurrection, but by rising again in the Church. From this point onwards His history acquires a spiritual significance.

In the accrediting of Christ, two methods may be pursued, an external and an inner one. The former, when we appeal to the history of His life, to His miracles, and so forth. But miracles are completely unfitted to accredit spirit.³ Against sensuous facts objections may always be raised; because consciousness and its object remain, in such a case, always outside of each other; because the object is not spirit. The sensuous content is not certain in itself, because it is not posited by the spirit, by the idea (*Begriff*). The divine content is not sensuous; how

¹ Compare xii. 275 fg.

² Compare xii. 257 ff.

³ See xii. 256, 263 ff.

then can it be sensuously demonstrated? According to an outward, sensuous, but also, at the same time, irreligious mode of consideration, Christ was a man, like Socrates; a teacher, who led a virtuous life, and brought that to the consciousness of men, which is in general the true, which must lie at the foundation of the consciousness of men. For this reason, another mode of contemplation is first necessary, to wit, that of faith. What the spirit is to take, is to believe as truth, must not be something to be sensuously believed, but something worthy of it, something spiritual; and it is also a chief determination that its relation to the sensuous is at the same time a negative one. What we are concerned about is not the faith in this external history, but the faith that this man was the Son of God. The sensuous content then becomes a totally different one: the individual man is "converted" by the Church, is known as God, whose proper essence it is to be God-man, His history as the history of God; the course of His life as the process and life-course of God Himself, as the Trinity, wherein the universal places itself over against itself, and is therein identical with itself:—that which is thus placed over against the universal is humanity, which is accordingly recognised in its unity with God. Thus understanding the history, the spirit passes over to the infinite, quits the soil of the finite; the latter is reduced to a subordinate position, becomes a remote image, which still subsists in the past alone, not in the spirit, which is absolutely present to itself. Consequently, not the history, not the words of the Bible, can bring forth the subject-matter of faith; but the spiritual view of faith, the testimony of the spirit (Note 19), whose first form is feeling, which, after having become certainly assured, through the manifestation of the unity of God and man, that the atonement is in and for itself accomplished, is in a position to place itself into this unity; and further, by laying hold on the atonement which is in and for itself accomplished, finds its infinite pains relieved, its infinite discord with God abolished, and its thirst for truth and reconciliation stilled (xii. 267). Now it is the business of philosophy to raise this immediate inner testimony into the element of thought, in order that the intellectual spirit may know it in its veritable necessity (p. 255).

The course, then, which Hegel pursues in the construction of his Christology, is briefly the following:—God must posit

distinctions in Himself; it belongs to the idea of vitality,¹ that God should be a process, which advances from one momentum to another. When the distinctions in God are taken seriously, a finite world is posited; in order that God also may have His *other*, the return out of which to Himself as spirit constitutes the content of the process or of His life. This return to Himself takes place in the human spirit, because God is able therein to attain to the knowledge of Himself, to absolute knowledge. In its first form, however, the human spirit is natural, finite; and the climax of finitude is evil.² Man knows himself only as separated from God; he believes God to be far from, and outside of, himself; he does not know God as his own proper essence. In order that the process may reach its goal, he must become certainly assured that God is essentially near to him, notwithstanding the disjunction. But as neither his own spirit nor nature can afford him this assurance,—for neither the one nor the other can declare anything with regard to the essential unity existing between God and man,—God must needs appear in a finite form—naturally in the form of a man, as the only one that is adequate to Him—in order that man may have in the finite, which is the spirit's proper sphere of existence when divided from God, the consciousness of God, and the sense of His nearness. This has taken place in Christianity. Man now knows that God is nigh unto him; in Christ he sees the discord done away with, he recognises that it is not essential. And as, when he appropriates Christ by faith, he knows that God lives and is near to humanity in Him; so also is his gaze expanded when, in intellectual progress, his faith rises to knowledge: he sees that the unity of God and man is not an isolated fact once accomplished in Jesus of Nazareth; but that rather, in consequence of the entrance of Christianity, the consciousness has been awakened of the universal truth, that it is eternally and essentially characteristic of God to be and to become man, that God's true existence or actuality is in humanity, which is termed His Church: and that, on the other hand, man is essentially one with God, and not, as he fancied at the stage of separation, that God is different from and strange to him; in other words, that God is the truth and essence of humanity.

¹ Compare "Religionsphilosophie" i. 35 f., Werke ix.

² Besides other passages, see 120 f.

The first thing that must surprise us, in this deduction "of the manifestation of God in the flesh at a definite time, and in this particular individual," is, that Hegel there totally quits the speculative path from above downwards, and adopts for the sole starting-point of his Christology, the need felt by men of knowing that God is nigh unto them. Beginning with the Trinity, as he does, and with the distinctions posited by God in Himself, he ought to have gone on to show that there was a necessity, first, for God's becoming strange to, and separating Himself from Himself; then, for his finding Himself by an immanent process in humanity; and lastly, for its thus finding itself in Him. Instead of this immanent process of God, who moves Himself through the world, the matter takes suddenly an external, empirical turn. No one will deny that the entire part relating to the kingdom of the Son must have fallen out in a very different manner, if, instead of suddenly springing over to the humanity, everything here also had been considered as the immanent dialectic of the process of the divine life progressively advancing in humanity. The difficulties of the Hegelian doctrine of sin must then have come clearly to light. Then, too, would have become more clear what position Christology can occupy in his system; to wit, that it marks the turning-point at which the self-consciousness was awakened, both of God in humanity and of humanity in God. Then, however, must have been more clearly declared than we now find it declared, that only an unessential significance pertains to the historical Person of Christ in this universal process; that Christ can merely denote the commencement of this true divine-human self-consciousness, but not its completion; or that He stands indeed at the entrance of the new age of the world, but is not, therefore, by any means necessarily its climax, being, on the contrary, for that very reason, as we shall see more clearly below, not its climax.

This course, the only one deserving the name of logical progress, Hegel did not pursue; and whatever may be the character of his Christology in other respects, we are compelled, *a priori*, to say that its introduction is unsatisfactory, because it is one-sidedly anthropological. But let us pass on to its more careful, critical examination. (Note 20.)

Above all, Hegel deserves perfect recognition for the ser-

ices he rendered in vanquishing the Christology of the common rationalism. For, though his genial dialectics alone did not accomplish this task ; and though we must allow that the revolution now effected in the entire mode of thought was, to a certain extent, the result of the labours of all the notable men of recent times, and that its fundamental idea, to wit, the essential unity of the divine and human, had also other main representatives, such as Schelling and Schleiermacher, the former of whom first gave utterance to the idea with the full energy of a newly-born enthusiasm, whilst the latter incorporated it with special success into theology, and in particular carried it out in a masterly manner in his Christology ; still, to Hegel belongs the epoch-making and distinctive merit of having, by a more rigid method, taken more fixed possession of the new land which Schelling had conquered, as it were, by storm ; whilst Schleiermacher began to prepare the way for it especially in a theological direction. Hegel showed, in particular, the untruth of the old determinations of the antagonism between the finite and the infinite, between God and the world, in a manner appreciable by every one who thinks ; and thus made the essential unity of the two a matter of universal conviction. What a wealth lies in the principle as thus distinctly laid down, is partly manifest even now, and will become still more clear, *the more the distinctions in this essential unity are preserved, and both prove themselves through each other*. But the more intimately this philosophy has sought to ally itself even with theology (in distinction from the older system of Schelling), the more severe a critical treatment may it claim. As the philosophy of Hegel was for a considerable time regarded, and that without its originator raising his voice in protest,¹ as a pillar of Christian orthodoxy ; as, further, even among his followers themselves, disputes have arisen as to how it is to be viewed, and each of the parties into which they are divided, particularly through Richter and Strauss, maintained that it had inherited the true ring of the master ; we will first investigate the question,—Whether Hegel has speculatively demonstrated the historical Christ to be the absolute God-man ? And as we shall be compelled to convince ourselves that his principles, especially as taken in connection with

¹ Compare Marheineke's "System der christlichen Dogmatik," 1847, p. 312.

the entire system, are essentially antichristological, we shall, *secondly*, have to test the foundations out of which this antagonism to Christianity arises.

I. Several things which occur in the account given above produce the impression that Hegel really meant to demonstrate, and supposed himself by his principles to have demonstrated, the historical Christ to be the absolute God-man. "The manifestation of God in the flesh took place at a determinate time, and in this particular individual," in order that consciousness, separated from God, might gain a consoling insight into the essential unity of God and man, and in order that man might have in the finite the consciousness of God, might have God as an immediate object before himself. That sounds quite in accordance with the teachings of the Church.

But why should not the subjective *faith* that that unity had been absolutely realized in a person have sufficed for the end in question; so that—without a correspondent, absolute, objective fact—the consciousness of the God-manhood would have had for its first form the mode of "representation" (*Vorstellung*)?

Nay more, what can be the need of even this faith, which, if no objectivity correspond to it, and if notwithstanding it must be described as necessary, is marked by the repulsive and unspeculative characteristic of a necessary deception? If all that we have to do with is the awakening of the consciousness of the essential unity with God, which is already in itself a fact, one cannot see why the spirit, in order to be able to come to itself, should cling to such an objectivity, be it actual, or be it imaginary. If the consciousness at which reason itself must arrive in the course of its own immanent progress is sufficient, one is unable to discover in this direction the need either for such an object, or even for the faith in it. Nay more, supposing it were impossible for the separated man to arrive at that consciousness in the way of a purely immanent process, and that, on the contrary, according to the language of this school, a miracle or a leap was absolutely necessary, one cannot see why this leap could not be brought to pass by an inner miracle, by a pure deed wrought by God in men's own inner being. But Hegel otherwise posits no development of the spirit save an immanent one; and such a development cannot stand in

need of a particular objectivity. The awakening of the consciousness of the essential unity of God and man, which is represented as the only thing necessary, would come of itself in the course of the regular development of the human mind. Christianity could then, it is true, no longer be said to have been brought about by the historical person of the historical God-man, or even only something specifically new.

Judging from all this, Hegel's reasonings have not demonstrated the necessity of the appearance of the absolute God-man. He has not even shown it to be necessary for the self-consciousness, in the course of its development, to take the form in which the unity of the divine and human is believed to have somewhere or other a sensuous existence; but even supposing this *faith* were shown to be a necessary stage, we should have arrived at no conclusion as to what was in Christ objectively and apart from this faith. Whether Hegel's principles would leave to Christ even a distinctive dignity,—as to this, nothing is said. It does not even follow certainly that Christ was, at all events, the first in whom the divine-human consciousness awakened, or that He was the founder of Christianity, by which, as by a turning-point, the divine-human consciousness was introduced into the world. For it is also possible that the Apostles, after they had learnt to regard Him with the eyes of faith, might have supplementarily discerned in, and declared of, Him, that unity of the divine and human which He had neither recognised in Himself nor given utterance to. Christ might have been the accidental means—not necessarily comprehending Himself that to which He gave occasion—of preparing the way for the knowledge of that in itself universal unity of the divine and human in His own followers.

Even in the account above given, however, there are scattered hints enough to show us what sort of a significance properly remains to Christ.

He speaks of three modes of viewing Christ:—1. The external, sensuous mode, which takes Christ for a man, perhaps like Socrates;—this is the unbelieving view. 2. The external, usual history must undergo a conversion through *faith*; it must be viewed spiritually, ere Christ can be known as the God-man. The history of Jesus, remarks Hegel, is only described by those on whom the Spirit had been poured out. Not till the sensuous

substance is contemplated with the eyes of faith, and is thus spiritualized, is Christ recognised as the God-man. 3. But we must not even be content with this. The mode of consideration which faith has, is still commingled with sensuous elements, though it is in part spiritual: it is in the first instance the mode of "representation" (*Vorstellung*). These sensuous elements must be swept away, in order that the pure content, the pure truth, may rise in the consciousness of the Church. Now, what is this still remaining sensuous element? It is nothing but the tendency to regard Christ as a particular person. In order that the spiritual substance may become entirely free, it must be raised into the element of thought, it must be made independent of that individual, of Christ, as a form that once existed but has again disappeared: the history of this individual will then be recognised as an universal history, as the history of God and of humanity, in their true essence, as to which they are intimately allied.

Every kind of dependence on the individual, on a single history, being thus thrown aside in the sphere of the spirit, the faith in question shows itself to be merely the starting-point in the development of the spirit winning its own reconciliation: it *believes* in the unity of the divine and human in *Christ*, in order subsequently to *know* that unity as realized *in itself*: from which moment Christ becomes an indifferent person. As regards the objective content of the faith fixed on the Person of Christ, we may not, it is true, describe it as entirely and solely false;—for the unity of the divine and human that is seen in Christ, is a true knowledge; seeing that this unity exists *per se* in all men;—but the mistaken notion is thrown aside, that He was the only God-man, or that He was God-man in a quite distinctive sense. The true insight is rather, *that God-manhood pertains to the whole of humanity*.

We have seen above, in connection with Schelling, that the element of truth in this idea is recognised also by Christianity; that it also promises to the whole of humanity, through Christ's mediation, a God-manly (*gottmenschliches*), or rather a divine-human (*göttlichmenschliches*), life. But what function is there attributed to the mediation of Christ? We have already said above, that strictly, according to the system, to take one's stand alone on the idea mediating itself with itself, the entire

process is to be regarded as a self-mediation of God, and consequently no place remains for the operation of an historical mediator. Even if we recognise—as one portion of the school does—that it was not the faith of the Church that converted Jesus into the Christ who knew Himself to be the God-man; but that He Himself first possessed the divine-human consciousness, and awakened it in humanity by His doctrine and life; we cannot assign to Christ any higher office than that of the *prophet*:—a limitation of His activity, which has been justly characterized as a principal defect of the rationalistic Christology. Moreover, the prophetic office is then of necessity differently viewed than by Christianity: it would not then point to Christ as the High Priest and King, but would itself accomplish the work of redemption by directing man to himself and his own divine essence, the *knowledge* of which is supposed to be the only thing necessary. Had Christ pointed to His own person as the redeeming person, as He unquestionably did, if such a thing as historical certainty is attainable, from this point of view it must be treated as a remainder, if even unconscious remainder, of limitation and sin; and after having given the impulse to the new development, like all other historical persons, He would have had to retire from the scene. His individual personality must in such a case be considered to be a completely secondary matter; the idea continues its work by means of ever different instruments.

But the deeper reason for Christ's not being represented here as the one who brings regeneration and redemption, is that the tendency of the entire character of the system is to emasculate the conception of sin. Much is said in the system of growth and process; and yet also far too little, that is, in an ethical and religious respect. The process is treated superficially, as a matter of *thought*. The movement proceeds forth from God, as well in the direction of separation as in that of unity. But, on the one hand, the disunion by which man is characterized is precisely the same as that in which God also stands with Himself; nay more, the latter is the absolute mode of consideration, to which this disunion appears as a thing eternally done away with. It is impossible, then, that an earnest view should be taken of sin (Note 21); nay more, we are then threatened with the conversion, not merely of sin, but

also of the alterity of God (the world), wherein the disunion is supposed to be involved into mere seeming; and in this aspect the system inclines back to Spinozism.¹ So far, on the contrary, as it aims to pass beyond Spinozism, by viewing "the substance as subject," the system displays a Pelagian character of the grandest style. For God is then not another than man, but the word "God" denotes merely the essence of humanity; and every one is redeemed by bringing his essence to development, or, more precisely expressed, by bringing it to consciousness. This essence, it is true, is not merely that of the individual, but the essence of all: still, it is his essence also *by nature*; it is not a mere susceptibility to deliverance, but an immanent power, in virtue of which man accomplishes his own deliverance,² which consists in casting aside the error,—an error even morally injurious,—that his essence is foreign to him, and not his own. For this reason the forgiveness of sin is affirmed to be merely the religious expression for moral freedom. Kant's doctrine of self-redemption is undoubtedly a different one: it represents it as effected through the medium of the will; Hegel, through the medium of thought: Kant posits a subjective freedom of choice between good and evil, which Hegel denies. This, however, does not essentially alter the matter. On the contrary, ethically considered, it wears a much more unfavourable aspect in the system of Hegel. Not a word is said of an alteration of life, of a development or regeneration of the being; the development relates solely to the theoretical aspect, to that which is intellectual. The object of consciousness remains unalterably identical; it is merely the mode of viewing it that changes: for whereas in the beginning the *per se* was conceived to be foreign to the divine, and evil, it is now represented as essentially divine, and merely the notion of its estrangement deemed to be evil:—therein, too, consists its reconciliation. That this is a flattening down of the Christian idea of regeneration, is self-evident. Furthermore, even the early Church considered the main feature of its controversy with Pelagianism to be simply, that that system mistook the distinction between *nature* and *grace*. The Church does not make the denial of human freedom altogether an essential

¹ This manifests itself more distinctly at a later period in Strauss.

² "Phänomenologie," pp. 620 ff.; "Religionsphilosophie" ii. 270-274.

point ;¹ still less does it consent to allow such a denial to stand for a recognition of grace. Grace is discriminated from nature, and characterized as Christian, by the circumstance, that what it works is accomplished through the medium of Christ.² The Pelagians also were willing to speak of grace ; but, on the one hand, they did not get beyond the prophetic office of Christ, which must by itself remain ever defenceless and without hold, so far as it is meant to designate the specific essence of Christ ; nor, on the other hand, beyond the "*gratia creans*," that is, the innate powers for good ;—points, relatively to which this philosophy is undoubtedly in a precisely similar position, notwithstanding its putting humanity, the generic, in the place of the individual as such. According to this system, therefore, all men participate in God-manhood in such a manner that a Christology is incompatible therewith. The universal God-manhood, or incarnation of God taught by Hegel, is neither derived nor derivable from Christ ; it necessarily robs Him of His specific position, and puts all men on essentially the same level with Him.

It is true, the doctrine laid down in the system, that the idea must be conceived as an energy, that is, as a power capable of realizing itself, might appear to leave a place for the entrance of the God-man. And, in point of fact, Rosenkranz, in particular, has given the matter this turn. But the writers of the school, whom we mentioned first (see above, pp. 122 ff.), made use of that principle, either not at all, or merely in passing. The ground thereof lies simply in the fact, that that principle has in the system an hostile rather than a favourable significance relatively to Christology. It is identical with the well-known proposition, that everything rational is actual ; which, however, acquires its true sense only in connection with the opposed proposition, that the actual is the *rational*. There is no need, therefore, of an objective, external reality, to enable the rational

¹ In the Lutheran Church, the type of doctrine was at first predestinarian : when it at a later period renounced this type, it did not retract that to which it really attached prime importance. Compare on this subject, Julius Müller's "*Das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und dem Gnadennittel des göttlichen Wortes*," "*Studien und Kritiken*," 1856, 2.

² Compare Schleiermacher's "*Der christliche Glaube*" i. § 11.

to become actual, the idea to prove its power: the true being, the true reality, lies in the ideal itself. This ideal, it is true, realizes itself also objectively, outwardly; but relatively to the idea, the world is the accidental, the finite, and as such, eternally inadequate to the infinitude of the idea: the idea has its true reality in itself, and is neither able, nor is it necessary for it, to manifest itself in all its fulness in any finite object whatever. But because every finite being is inadequate to the idea, the latter always resumes the former back into itself; and finite objects are posited ever afresh, not because they are capable of being filled with the absolute content, but simply because God has His life alone in the motion of a process. This is the rhythm, the pure eternal life of the spirit itself, that it constantly enters into limitation or finitude, and as constantly returns out of it again into itself, or restores itself to identity of form. If God had not this movement, He would be death itself. Finite spirits, accordingly, are only transient forms or husks which the divine spirit throws around itself, through which it passes in order to become self-conscious, in order to become a subject.

But if, according to this, the very idea of the divine life implies that God cannot find the adequate form or realization of His essence in any finite being; and if, on the contrary, it be rather involved in the idea of the finite, that it should only inadequately set forth the idea, and merely be that which has momentary being; it is clear of itself, that no place remains for a God-man in whom the fulness of the idea should take up its abode. Moreover, God would cease to be a living God if the idea should in any way attain absolute realization, whether in an individual or in the whole. For it is the inadequacy of the form to its content that solicits the process ever afresh. With the attainment of a perfect result, the process would cease, and with the process the divine life.

No less is an archetypal historical Christ rendered impossible by another aspect of the system.¹ Even as the finite cannot be otherwise posited than as the inadequate realization of the idea, so, according to the principles of the system, every spiritual being must pass through the stage of disunion whilst

¹ We come here upon a point apparently furthest removed from the system, to wit, its dualistic aspect.

undergoing its development. The first form of the life of the finite spirit is naturality, immediacy. In order to be or to become living spirit, it must undergo a process of diremption, of disunion, so as to make itself in reality the spirit which it already is *per se*. All natures, says Hegel, must pass out of their state of innocence; a disunion must be brought about, in which the *per se* (An sich) becomes *another* (ein Anderes), becomes something strange to the subject; and not till the subject has returned into its *per se* (An sich), into its vital ground, not till this subjectivity has been reduced to nought or abolished, can that reconciliation of the spirit with itself be effected, in which the subjectivity finds itself in the objectivity, in the *per se*.

The idea of development being thus connected essentially with fall and disunion, it is clear that there can be no word even of a sinless God-man, much less of the uniqueness of Christ. But if, by way of demonstrating the necessity of evil, it is laid down as an universal law of the life of spirit, that its path should lie through disunion, the master of the school may certainly lay claim, above his disciples, to the honour of consistency, in that he is more sparing of high predicates, and rather gives intelligible hints enough, that Christ, who took upon Himself all finitude, could not escape from the climax of finitude, to wit, discord with Himself and with God, towards which, on his view, the idea, in manifesting itself and in seeking to arrive at veritable distinctions, was essentially and necessarily impelled; although in faith, that is, in the representation of the Church, sinlessness is to be ascribed to Him. The true significance of this faith for thought is, that the spotless purity and sinlessness of the eternal idea pertains to humanity, so far as, in its totality, it represents the God-manhood.

Our final conclusion, therefore, is, that with the premises referred to above, the Hegelian system neither did nor could allow that the perfect unity of the divine and human had been realized in Christ in an unique manner, and that His development was sinless.

The ultimate reason of this is, that Hegel conceives God, not as absolute self-consciousness which is reflected in itself, but merely allows Him to become a subject in the endless series or totality of finite spirits; that he arbitrarily, and with an introduction of empirical knowledge into speculation, regards the

world as the *other*, through and in which God can alone know Himself; that he describes the stages of its history as the stages passed through by the divine self-consciousness in coming to itself; that, in one word, he conceives God, not as an eternal, absolute personality, nor as actually ethical, but as the spirit of the world, for whom the world only exists that it may mediate His own self-consciousness,—somewhat as the nature in and outside of man mediates his self-consciousness.

Now it is evident at once that all the antichristological principles given above are necessarily involved in this fundamental view. 1. In the first place, Christ, who appeared in the midst of the ages, cannot occupy the highest place in this process of the history of the world. For if the goal of the process through which the history of the world passes, is that God may have His self-consciousness in man; and if the sole significance and goal of history is that God may know Himself adequately in man—for which object one individual accomplishes quite as much as several;—then, if Christ should be conceived as the perfect God-man, history would come to a termination with Him. As, however, it rather properly began, instead of terminating with Christ, God cannot yet have known Himself in an absolutely perfect manner in Christ, if the final and absolute meaning and aim of the history of the world be, that He should acquire by its means the full consciousness of Himself. At the very utmost, Christ could only have formed the *beginning* of a higher stage in the process of the divine self-consciousness, beyond which, however, the following stages would be destined to advance. That on such a presupposition Christ cannot be God-man, either in an unique or even perfect manner, is self-evident. Still further consequences are deducible, when we examine the process more carefully.

2. The pulse of the entire onward movement is found in the fact, that the forms given in this world, because finite, are inadequate to the entire idea; for which reason they are resumed, negated, in harmony with the eternal righteousness of the idea, which judges that which is inadequate by passing out beyond it. In a single form, therefore, God cannot adequately represent Himself, but only, we are taught, in history as a whole.

3. As each succeeding stage of humanity is a refutation of the earlier, and falls into positive disharmony with it—by means

of which conflict alone the higher momentum is able to gain the mastery over the lower and to realize itself,—so do we find the same relation reflected in the development of the individual spirit; for only through the medium of dissonance with his first form of existence, consequently only through the consciousness of sin and guilt, can an individual accomplish his own development. If the *first* determination predicated of this process implies most decidedly that no other significance can be attributed to Christ than that which is essentially attributed to every one, in that He, like them, is thus constituted a mere momentum of the whole in which the idea sets itself forth, and which requires to be supplemented to perfection by the infinite totality of the others; the *second* implies that it was necessary for Christ also to undergo disunion, or a sinful development.

That these are, on the whole, the logical consequences of the system of Hegel, notwithstanding that other elements may be found in it, was for a considerable time denied by the leaders of his school;—most zealously by Göschel and Marheineke. But the “Life of Jesus,” by D. F. Strauss, gave rise to a crisis in the school which broke their dominion. The unflinching keenness with which Strauss deduced the consequences of the system as a whole, gave rise to the principles which he laid as axioms at the basis of his examination of the life of Jesus, and which are hostile not merely to the foundations of Christianity, but to religion in general. Of the above-mentioned writers, Conradi and Rosenkranz allowed themselves to be partially shaken in their views. Baur and his school passed over almost completely to his side. (Note 22.) Göschel, Julius Schaller, Gabler, Daub, Marheineke, and others, rose in energetic opposition to Strauss, though not without eclectically breaking with the above described premises and foundations of the system;—of whom more anon.

II. The less we can suppose ourselves in the preceding observations to have pronounced judgment on the scientific value of this view of Christ, the more necessary is it now to test the foundation on which the described results regarding the Person of Christ rest.

According to what has been advanced above (see page 147), that upon which it above all depends, is the conception of God as the mere spirit of the world; with which are further

connected the principles relating to the more precise nature of the process He undergoes. We shall here see that the identity of the process of humanity and of the divine life, in the form in which it is expounded by Hegel, is firstly *unproved*, and secondly self-contradictory.

It is true, a proof thereof seems to be given in that which is adduced above, to wit, that spirit, as spirit, must be manifest to itself, must know itself; and that this is impossible, unless it distinguish itself from itself, unless it set itself over against itself as another. But that the spirit as the other of itself is the *world*, or, what is the same thing, that spirit, in order to become another to itself, and out of the abolition of this other, to return again to itself, must first be converted into, must empty itself to, *nature*, and at once begin the return out of this alterity in *man*,—*this is nowhere proved*. This hiatus in the system, to wit, that so little is done to point out the steps by which the *alterity* of the idea is brought to pass,—in particular, by which the passage is effected from logic to natural philosophy,—has been already repeatedly blamed by others. Theologically, it may be expressed as follows:—It is not shown that this *other* of God (which belongs to the divine self-consciousness) is the world and not something else,—for example, not rather the eternal Son of God, through whom, in the opinion of so many teachers, God knows Himself eternally, as in His counterpart, the Holy Ghost. Or are we to regard it as a proof, when we are told,—The trinitarian distinctions, which the Church teaches are immanent in God, are merely a play of love with itself: in order that these distinctions may have reality, the world must be taken to be the *other* (*das Andere*) of the Idea? It may be granted that the Church has still much to do in defining more precisely the trinitarian distinctions; but as an empty play of love with itself the immanent Trinity cannot be described, seeing that it alone, now as formerly, will be in a position to secure the living, personal, ethical conception of God against Pantheism and Deism (see Div. I., vol. ii., 291). But what if it should be possible to show that the world cannot be this *other*, through which God arrives at the absolute consciousness of Himself; that, in one word, He must either know Himself absolutely without needing the mediation of the finite world, or He cannot know Himself at all? How, if it could be shown,

that if the immanent Trinity is a mere play of distinctions, the *world* also becomes an empty play : and that the true, of course also trinitarian, self-realization of God in the world is only possible on the presupposition of a God who is not merely the spirit of the world, but is also in Himself absolute personality ?

It rests, indeed, on a misunderstanding, when the charge is brought against this theory, that according to it God is dependent on the world, on the finite, because He needs its assistance in order to become self-conscious personality. For in any case it is God who determines Himself to be finite ; He alone is the determining one ; He is not determined by the world. This same objection, however, returns again in another form. If, namely, the world, and in particular the finite spirit, is necessary to God as a medium for the attainment of self-consciousness, then, both the self-knowledge of God in and through humanity, and the self-knowledge of humanity in God, are so completely identical, that the divine self-consciousness cannot attain any realization beyond the knowledge which humanity has of God. But now humanity is subjected to the law of gradualness ; consequently, God also is subjected to the same law of *becoming gradually conscious*. And there is here no escape, save by supposing the divine self-consciousness to be in some way freed from bondage to humanity and its stages of development.

To say that, according to the system, the divine self-consciousness is not absolutely complete, but has at first gradually to grow, may seem a heavy charge, especially in view of Hegel's repeated assurance that God is as truly the idea in its eternal return into itself, as in its discription into finitude. But if the system really do not intend to teach that God first arrives at His realization as a subject through humanity (which of itself would involve the realization being a gradual one), we must ask,—Does it then recognise a God above and outside of this process of humanity ? On the contrary, it considers it to be its greatest honour to have overcome this view of the world. If God were self-consciousness in eternal absoluteness, and if consequently He Himself were eternally His own *other* (sein Anderes), what ground would this system have for representing God as opening Himself to a *world* in which distinctions are taken seriously, and to a process of the world which is to overcome this veritable distinction ? Into the path pursued by

Christian theism, which starts with the idea of the personality of God as mediating itself in itself, and not as first mediated through the world, this system refuses to strike: it regards it as established, without further proof, that God arrives at the world in seeking Himself, and not out of love; that the process of the world is identical with that of the divine life. For this very reason, we must persist in maintaining that Hegel cannot avoid representing the development of the self-consciousness of God as a gradual one. Somewhat after Schelling's manner, he posits epochs in history; and as these epochs are divided from each other by the momenta which gradually arrive at actuality in the consciousness of humanity, so must we also assume that the consciousness of the divine spirit advances from momentum to momentum—a history whose result cannot be at the same time also an eternally present actuality. To what purpose otherwise the long and laborious process, if, in the proper and primary sense of the word, God as its beginning was also at the same time its result?

But if the development be gradual, then, like every history, it must be subject to the conditions of time. Hegel, it is true, tells us that the matter is not to be thus viewed; to God, the idea of time is not applicable. But how then is the consciousness of God to be eternally complete? If it be quite clear that His consciousness cannot possess this completeness in the human spirit from the beginning, seeing that it is essential to the human spirit to begin with subjection to nature, and only gradually to attain to full self-consciousness or to the knowledge of the unity of God and man, in whom alone God has an existence as spirit; then what mode of existence can that be, in which, so long as the human spirit is still imperfect, God can know and realize Himself as an absolute spirit?

Hereto the reply has been already given, that we are not to restrict our look to the present world. It is possible that our world may have been preceded by an infinite series of other worlds; or there may be other classes of beings, in which God reveals, and has always revealed Himself as an absolute spirit.¹

¹ In the "Hallische Jahrbücher," Nos. 283-289, 1838, Vatke, following the example of others before him, has repeated this theory, which, regarded from the point of view of the system, is doubly incongruous. Theories like these, which destroy the unity of the system, may evince a praiseworthy

In this way, the divine self-consciousness is supposed to be freed from its bondage to humanity and to gradualness. This escape, however, must be regarded as foreign to the system, and essentially unsatisfactory. If the history of humanity is really the history of God, there can only be a single history and a single world, for God can only have one history. After God had already attained His absolute realization as spirit in an earlier world, there would be no reason whatever for the creation of a new one, unless we should suppose that God had lost the result of His earlier development, by as it were apostatizing from Himself. If history be reason *realiter*, that is, the explication of all the logical momenta, there *can* be only one history. If a further history could be really a different one, that is, not a mere empty repetition of entirely the same logical momenta, then reason itself could not be one. But as reason is one, and this unity manifests itself in a regular succession of momenta in the history of humanity, we have no right to introduce other worlds or classes of beings with a view to evading the necessity of conceiving the consciousness of God as first growing. At all events, if the process is marked by progress, God could only have absolute self-consciousness in them as a result, not as a beginning. By such appeals, therefore, the problem is put backwards, and it is only in appearance that an advantage is gained. But if there is no progress in its process, it is scarcely allowable to speak of a process of the world, or even of a world at all; and the repetition of worlds, periods, or individuals, would be something totally empty and aimless. We must therefore abide by the position, that, *according to Hegel's system*—in case the process of history really has a substance and aim, and does not merely seem to pertain to the divine life—the *consciousness of God is not complete*, so long as that of humanity is still progressing. (Note 23.)

desire to attribute to God a consciousness which does not first grow to what it is, but is eternally identical and absolute. But these efforts could not avoid missing their goal, unless, in a manner quite similar to that in which the theory above-mentioned assumes that the world of men will have a rational future existence, without therefore supposing the present one to be necessarily stripped of divine life, the reluctance to accept a divine self-consciousness altogether independent of the process of the world were given up. At all events, we shall see immediately that the absoluteness of this self-consciousness cannot otherwise be maintained.

If, then, even the principle just laid down is opposed to the idea of God—for which reason, Hegel himself also tried, though in vain, to escape from it; if the system is thus involved in self-contradictions, because, whilst its theory necessitates subjecting God to the conditions of time, it itself treats this representation as false; the inner conflict in the philosophical groundwork of the above Christology manifests itself still more plainly, when we further ask, whether (even apart from the gradualness above referred to), on Hegelian principles, the world can in any sense be a fitting medium for the attainment of that which is the goal of the process, to wit, that God should become absolute spirit or concrete (no longer merely abstract and substantial, but at the same time subjective, that is, existing as well in as for itself) universality? The question must be answered in the negative.

This goal neither *can* nor *may* be completely reached. For the process would halt and come to an end with the attainment of perfection. The life of God would die out in arriving at its goal. In order that there may be life and consciousness, there must always again be something finite, imperfect; because the divine can only know itself as infinite spirit in doing away with the finite. Were the finite entirely abolished, contradiction and antagonism, which are the parent of all life, would fail. The process required by the idea of God as the mere spirit of the world, is marked by the self-contradictory feature, that in order to its having adequate actuality, it is compelled, on the one hand, eternally to posit a non-adequate medium (the world); and on the other hand, to do away with the same medium, on the ground that it is impossible for God truly and permanently to have His life and abode in any single form.

We thus come again upon the dualism which has so frequently made its appearance in recent philosophical systems. On the one hand, it lies in the essence of God to posit something finite, in order that by overcoming, by negating it, He may mediate and know Himself as infinite. But, on the other hand, this overcoming can never be absolute; in other words, God's knowledge of Himself as infinite can never be absolute: otherwise the divine life would stagnate. It lies in the essence of God, to arrive at concrete universality, at actuality as absolute spirit, by means of the finitude which He Himself posits. On

On the other hand, however, it is essentially characteristic of the individual to be merely an inadequate revelation of the divine idea.

Consequently, in this aspect also, we have no alternative but to say, *either* that the idea is eternally real *in itself*, and that God does not need the adequate actuality of the world in order to the attainment of absolute self-consciousness; for if His self-consciousness were bound in this way to the world, it would only be eternally dimmed and imperfect: *or*, in case the opinion, that God can only arrive at absolute self-consciousness through the medium of the world, be persisted in, the principles of this system compel us to describe this self-consciousness as eternally seeking and never finding itself.

We are compelled, therefore, to abide by the unconciliated contradiction, that God is eternally compelled to posit the finite, in order that by it He may know Himself absolutely, and arrive at God-manhood, in which alone spirit has its true existence; whilst, on the other hand, He is never able to arrive at this true existence, because it is contradictory, *firstly*, of the idea of the finite, that the entire fulness of the idea should become manifest in it; and, *secondly*, of the idea of God, who is essentially process, and only as such is life, to attain realization in the sense of becoming absolutely real. For this reason, then, finite forms, being inadequate to the divine existence, are ever again renewed, and the divine life is, and maintains itself solely as, an eternal play between the position and the abolition of the finite.¹

If now it should be attempted to silence us by saying that it is not allowed to describe this as a vain and empty play, seeing

¹ From this we can see how the absolute personality of God, and the finite value of the personality of man, stand and fall with each other. Apparently the one excludes the other; but in truth the dualism between finite and infinite cleaves to the representation of God as the spirit of the world; whilst, on the contrary, where a not merely extensive conception is formed of God, that true unity of the infinite and finite is a possibility, which allows God really to know Himself in an absolute way, in the completed Son of man, who is the adequate manifestation of the eternal Son of God. Not, indeed, so far as the Son remains by Himself is this the case, but so far as He is also the Head, and so far as the life which concentrates itself in Him expands itself in all the glory of the Church, of the body, in whose members is repeated in a relative manner that unity of the finite and infinite which exists absolutely in the Head.

that progress takes place in the process, and that what is posited, although unable as an individual phenomenon to escape the fate of finitude, being on the contrary resumed, continues to exist as a momentum in that which follows after; the only result is to add a new contradiction to the old ones. For, seeing that, on the one hand, as we have above expounded, the idea of God and of the finite laid down in the system, necessitates our assuming the process to be endless, and the result never perfectly attained; whilst, on the other hand, a progress, an increase in the spiritual life of the world and of the divine self-consciousness, is always to be supposed to take place, what else do we then arrive at but the very *progressus in infinitum* so abhorrent to the system, which must always follow where the divine is placed under the category of external infinitude? What have we but an eternal *shall*, which is always to be realized, and never actually is realized; nay more, whose eternal non-realization is guaranteed by the contradiction, that God can never cease to posit the finite, although it is also essential that He should always do away with what He posits, as being inadequate to His own manifestation?

But if this *progressus in infinitum*, in which the divine consciousness would be involved along with the world, is to be repelled, the matter only becomes still more doubtful. The *progressus in infinitum* can only be abolished on one of two suppositions,—either that it find its termination in completion; or that anything like real progress be denied, and the spirit be regarded as at once perfected in all its modes of existence. This philosophy, as we have seen, cannot adopt the former alternative; for it teaches that life would become extinct as soon as the process had arrived at an absolute result. The latter, however, the denial of all progress, would have a sense in relation to the divine self-consciousness, if it were conceived as eternally complete. But as it is supposed to be arrived at through the medium of the finite spirit and the momenta of its history, the denial of progress acquires quite a different sense, and is to be repudiated both in relation to the world and in relation to the idea of God.

First, as regards the *world*. If we deny progress to humanity, and the succession of stages in the epochs of its history, then one generation, strictly estimated, is worth as much as the other; that wherein the worth of any generation properly consists, must

be equally discoverable in all.¹ But what is this? It is the essential divinity of the race. But, according to Hegelianism, this *per se* (An sich) is the universal, is that which is absolutely alike in all. If significance pertains alone and altogether to this universal element, then the actuality, its way and manner, its successive stages and manifoldness, has no value. The only true substance of the world is the abstract, completely general determination, that God does in some way or other eternally individualize Himself. How He does this, that is, the actual, for example, the ethical substance of the individualities, is a matter of indifference. If it were not so, the measure and mode of the *actuality* of the *per se* must also be taken into consideration.

But the *in itself* (An sich) of the world is the divine essence. If the world of actuality, as to its content, is a matter of indifference for that essence; if its expansion and manifoldness, and its onward progress, is a purely accidental thing for the spirit of the world, because all that it is concerned about is the entirely abstract determination of positing and again doing away with itself, as finite, for the purpose of proving its infinitude by the constant negation of the finite that was posited; then the entire essential content of the world and history is a mere empty play, is an endless repetition: the world of actuality is a world of marrowless forms, without sense or aim, of contingencies deserted by God, because He has no content to set forth or realize in them, His sole purpose being rather to maintain *Himself* as life, by the alternate position and abolition of the finite.

Then, indeed, the great organism of spirits, of personalities, each of which for itself is of infinite depth and significance, known and brought into existence by Christianity, sinks down to an innumerable variety of specimens of the race, no one of which has a veritably distinctive, spiritual character.

The predicates which must here be denied to the Person of Christ, on the ground that the very idea of the spirit of the world renders it impossible for it ever to manifest itself in a single individual, but only in the whole, are represented indeed as pertaining to humanity; and thus humanity appears to be exalted, even though at the cost of Christ, especially as the unity of the

¹ Compare the Rechtsphilosophie of Hegel, § 345. Indeed, this idealistic philosophy has undeniably altogether an inclination to the mode of consideration of which we are about to speak.

divine and human nature is lauded as a reality, instead of being treated, after Kant's manner, as an unrealized *shall*; nay more, is lauded as real and true in an infinitely higher sense than that which is limited to one individual. But, whereas in Christianity the reverse of the degradation of man by sin is his elevation through that one individual, the reverse aspect of the apotheosis of humanity, proclaimed in particular by Strauss, is the necessity of sin so long as there is life,—the reverse of the reality of the unity of God and man is its eternal unreality, seeing that it is held to be impossible for the archetype ever to appear in an historical form. *In themselves*, all men are affirmed to be divine; actually, however, each for ever and essentially contradicts his idea. For, according to this philosophy, the idea of each one is not an individual, ideal personality, but the universal, or God, to whom, as the infinite, the finite is essentially inadequate. Instead of being an overcoming, it is an outbidding, of the Kantian dualism between *shall* and *be*; and to direct attention away from it, and from actuality, to the *per se*, which remains ever the same, even in the midst of sin and conflict, as the main matter, is to sink below Kant, and to substitute a physics, or a logic indifferent both to good and evil, in the place of ethics.

And as, *firstly*, we cannot find herein a higher view of the essence of humanity, so, *secondly*, is the idea of God also completely unsatisfactory, because in the last instance it is unethical. As the process of the world is represented as at the same time that of the divine life and its manifestation; and the content of that which is posited as, on the contrary, totally destitute of significance; God can only be the purely *formal* life, the principal unity of position and abolition. As the explication of the human self-consciousness, in its advance to ever higher stages, would be a matter of indifference to God; so also must be the completion of His own self-consciousness, which is only possible through the medium of the finite. It would not belong to His idea that He should know Himself in His inner, infinite wealth, as absolute and also ethical spirit; but merely that He be the eternal unity of the position and negation of the finite. But when content is thus kept outside of God, there, to speak in the style of the Hegelian system, an abstract and untrue conception is formed of the form, because it is not one with its substance.

Now, even absolute self-consciousness is not something

which could be attributed or denied to the absolute spirit at leisure; He is not absolute spirit without knowing Himself absolutely. If God were not absolute *self-consciousness*, He might indeed, notwithstanding, be knowledge or consciousness, but not absolute knowledge; for, though His consciousness would be filled with the manifold, the objects included in this manifold were not He Himself; and His knowledge would consequently lack essentiality, because He would not Himself be the object and substance of His knowledge. And here it is of no use to say that this *other* is essentially Himself, inasmuch as He has constituted alterity a determination of Himself; for, even supposing this were so, and that the conversion of the idea into its alterity were not so unproved as we have seen it to be, this *other* would only be *in itself* (*An sich*) God: that *He* is the *other per se*, must also become matter of consciousness, in order that it may attain absolute reality through this knowledge of Himself in the *other*. Should this be lacking, the divine consciousness would not be complete; the unity of Himself and of the other would then exist only *per se*, and would not be an object of knowledge. There would then be a momentum of truth unknown by God, existing merely in the form of immediate being; and the consciousness of God, not having risen to the completeness of self-consciousness, would itself not be absolute. Similar results may be shown to follow from the ethical determinations of the idea of God.

We by no means intend to assert that the above is the only point of view from which the world and God are discussed in his system. But when, again, the world, with its fulness of individualities, is in other connections treated not as an unsubstantial, fleeting shadow, as an accident of the divine substance, but the history of humanity as a real evolution of the divine life which had entered into it, as a realization of the infinite fulness of the divine idea; it is only a proof that two completely contradictory modes of regarding the matter stand unreconciled alongside of each other in the system, and that the purely idealistic view, which reduces the world to a kingdom of shadows, cannot be carried out, without the shadows longing ever afresh for the life-blood of actuality. When, on the other hand, there is a resolution to hold fast the absoluteness of the self-consciousness of God, and yet we are not shown how the world can

occupy the position of its medium without interfering with its absoluteness; this is merely a proof that the truth asserts itself ever afresh, in so far as it never leaves the error alone, but by means of portions of its own substance always involves it in self-contradictions, and thus leads it out beyond itself.¹

All that has preceded may serve to convince us that the Hegelian system, not being yet complete in itself, and being full of contradictions, particularly in relation to that which forms the groundwork of its representation of Christology, cannot be considered at all warranted to judge, or capable of demonstrating the impossibility of, a Christology. For this impossibility cannot be maintained unless we deprive everything actual of its significance, or without falling into the eternal dualism involved in a *progressus in infinitum*. As we have seen, Christianity stands far above it in the point which is of chief importance, to wit, in its conception of the finite and infinite. For whereas, as we have shown, the wrong conception of the infinite is allowed ever again to slip into this philosophy,—a conception which makes it inconceivable that finite should ever be infinite, or infinite finite, in other words, that the idea of the incarnation of God should ever be entirely and truly realized;—according to Christianity, it is not contradictory that true, intensive infinitude should be in the finite: indeed, it proclaims that the true reconciliation of the finite and infinite has taken place in the Son of God, and is constantly taking place in those who by faith become children of God and members of the head, which is Christ. This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of the matter.

If God be once defined as the essence of the world, it is a transposition of subject and predicate logically allowable, when Feuerbach, taking the idea seriously, counted the essence of the world to be a part of the world, made the *world* the subject, and reduced God to a mere predicate of the world. The transition was thus made to absolute Anthropologism, the fore-

¹ With this criticism of the system harmonize, in essential points, the admirable work of K. Ph. Fischer, "Die Idee der Gottheit," 1839; Billroth's "Vorlesungen über Religionsphilosophie," Leipzig 1837; Fichte's "Beiträge zur Charakteristik der neueren Philosophie," A. 2, 1841; Chalybæus' "Philosophie und Christenthum, Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Religionsphilosophie," Kiel 1853.

runner of Materialism. That portion of the school of Hegel which regards the world solely from an idealistical point of view, to wit, as a mere appearance or selfless accident, is, of course, far removed therefrom.¹ But as they were unable, with the means at their disposal, to prevent the conversion made by Feuerbach, seeing that the only power capable of holding ground against it lies in the ethical, and in religion and its logic; for religion alone gives to the conception of God an independence that secures it from being regarded merely as world; so, in order to escape from the contradictions of their master's system, they were compelled to return either to a somewhat modified Fichtean idealism or to Spinozism. In taking this course, however, one of the two aspects which Hegel had made it his chief object to combine was allowed to fall. Strauss openly confessed his intention of returning to Spinoza in order to escape from the contradictions which Hegel was unable to master. Baur also gives us to understand that the system admits of being viewed in two ways; he himself inclined more to the idealistic view. But by thus falling back on earlier points of view, the problem of overcoming Spinozism and subjective Fichtean idealism, the problem of blending substance and subject, to which Hegel had devoted his energies, was allowed to fall. For by this part of the school the two are again conceived to be mutually exclusive. In this respect, now, some other adherents of Hegel deserve our attention, who, instead of throwing aside the germs of the system which were capable of development, sought, by further developing and carrying out, to preserve the thought of that problem which marks the new element which was the object of Hegel's efforts.² In doing this, they were stirred partly by a more energetic conception of the moral; and in virtue

¹ Compare Baur's "Trinitätslehre" iii. 959, note. And yet Baur is of opinion that such a world establishes more serious and fixed distinctions in God than the doctrine of the Trinity taught by the Church.

² Julius Schaller's "Der historische Christus und die Philosophie; Kritik der dogmatischen Grundidee des Lebens Jesu von Dr. Strauss," 1838; Göschel's "Beiträge zur spekulativen Philosophie von Gott und dem Menschen und vom Gottmenschen; mit Rücksicht auf D. F. Strauss's Christologie," Berlin 1838; Conradi's "Christus in der Gegenwart, Vergangenheit und Zukunft," 1839; Rosenkranz's "Theologische Encyclopädie," A. 2, p. 184; Marheineke's "System der christlichen Dogmatik," herausgegeben von Matthies und Vatke, Berl. 1847.

thereof, and of the idea of personality therein involved, aimed at passing beyond *the first stage of modern times*, that of the immediate, abstract unity of the divine and human, which had really remained identity, and at doing justice to distinction in unity.

J. Schaller and Göschel occupy a truer position, and one more conformable to Christianity, in consequence of paying more serious attention to evil. Both deny the necessity for our development passing through sin. For, says Schaller, both this thesis and that of the unattainableness of man's destiny would completely change the human ideal, would necessitate characterizing the essence of the human spirit as fixed, unsurmountable finitude. If we reckon evil, and absolutely limited knowledge, to the essence of man, this must be his idea, his ideal; and sin must constitute a part of the conception we form of him (pp. 39, 86 f.). Göschel complains of the neglect of the doctrine of sin by premature speculation, and of judgments pronounced thereon by Hegel, which, as he supposes, do not accord with the rest of his system. The knowledge of sin has justly been termed the β and ψ of philosophy. As regards its pretended necessity, the proofs thereof undermine themselves. It is said,—Caprice, self-discrimination and separation from God, are necessary to the realization of freedom and of self-consciousness. On the contrary, merely the possibility of actual caprice and not its actuality, merely discrimination, not separation from God, is necessary to freedom and self-consciousness: it can rather be shown that the realization of caprice is diametrically opposed to freedom, and that separation brings darkness instead of knowledge. Speculation must regard evil as contingent, and must leave room in itself for the contingent.¹ In this direction, accordingly, there is nothing to prevent us from seeing in the Person of Christ the sinless realization of the idea.

The system as a whole, in its immediate form, is still more deeply affected by that which both advance in opposition to

¹ Beiträge, pp. 17–23. The proof of the non-necessity of evil is completed by Chalybeus, who directs attention to the essential distinction between sin and gradual development to perfection through imperfection: "System der speculativen Ethik" i. 143 ff.; "Wissenschaftslehre," pp. 189 ff.

presentation of God as the spirit of the world. It is truly just, says Schaller,¹ "to maintain that the absolute to be absolute as soon as it is conceived to be mediated and dependent on, the finite knowledge of man. Such a notion can only take place if God in Himself is impersonal,

He be supposed first to arrive at the consciousness of Himself in man's knowledge of Him. And if we finally reject merely the consciousness man has of God in general, to his determinate knowledge—determinate both in point of substance and form—of God, as the medium through which He acquires His form, the progress made by man in his knowledge of God must appear also as the progress of the knowledge of God Himself. Consequently, when man represents God merely as substance, God is merely substance: first when He is represented as the absolute subject does He pass out of substantiality into subjectivity; and not till He is viewed in as a person does He finally attain to actual personality. The conviction that God is thus conditioned by the consciousness, must completely overthrow the faith in God as substance, or subject, or person, and pass over into the uncertainty that, not God, but human knowledge, is the veritable absolute;² for, on such a supposition, the absolute would be completely a *product* of finite knowledge; and this knowledge, as resting in itself, would not have its presupposition in itself."

Such a subjective idealism, however, carried to its extreme does away with itself. And, apart altogether from this, one-sidedness of the position that God is just that which links Him to be, becomes clear the moment we remember that the representation of substance would vanish at once if there were really the substance;—for which reason, the faith in God as the absolute substance, is the matter-of-fact refutation of its own content. Substance, by its very idea, excludes re-

c. pp. 53 ff. Similarly also Billroth in his "Vorlesungen über die Philosophie," Leipzig 1837. Compare Frauenstädt's "Die Freiheit des Menschen und die Persönlichkeit Gottes," 1838; "Die Möglichkeit Gottes nach ihrer Möglichkeit, Wirklichkeit und Nothwendigkeit," 1839.

That is, the necessary consequence of this form of Pantheism is nihilism.

presentation,—consequently, also, the representation of itself; and it sinks everything in an unity without distinctions. On the contrary, as in the certain conviction of the truth, there lies immediately the consciousness that the truth is not first made and invented by the subject, that it is rather in and by itself the presupposition for the subject that knows; so also the faith in the personal, triune God, contains within itself the certainty that God has not first become personal and triune through man, even though man may first in time have come to the knowledge of the essence of God as a triune personality.

In a similar manner, Göschel laboured at the vanquishment of the false conception of God as the mere spirit of the world.¹ To this end, he viewed the immanent Trinity not as a mere play of the love of God with itself, but as veritable distinctions, in which God has His eternal, absolute self-consciousness and personality. At the same time, it deserves mention that he endeavours to avoid losing the bond between the immanent and the œconomic Trinity, between the divine personality, which is eternally complete in itself, and the historical personification or humanification (*Personwerdung*, *Menschwerdung*).² He justly insists on both extremes being avoided, both that of representing the divine and human as standing in an abstract relation towards each other, and that which slurs over and effaces the distinction. This confusion, he complains, is made by the school in the greatest variety of expressions; distinction is regarded as set aside by unity; the doctrine is even laid down, that because the immanence of God in, and His transcendence towards, the world interpenetrate, therefore neither of the two elements has validity and reality when absorbed, whereas the distinction is made all the clearer by the conciliation. This confusion of the distinction between the absolute and the finite spirit must be condemned on all sides by philosophy, in opposition to the school of Hegel. The causes of this obscuring of philosophy, it is asserted, are, partly, the lack of actual knowledge of sin; partly, the unreal, because not historical, representation of redemption; and partly, the misapprehension of the idea of annulment

¹ Göschel thus brought himself, however, into a difficult position, because he wished to maintain that his agreement with Hegel was full and express.

² Compare, for example, p. 264.

(*Aufhebung*),¹ in other words, the confounding of unity and identity.²

In fact, if the distinction is not preserved in the unity, the only consequence will be, that either the essential feature of subjectivity also will be found in the substance, and thus the latter be absorbed in the former; or, vice versa, the divine substance will disappear in a new form of Fichteanism.

Out of this rejection of the idea of God as the mere spirit of the world, at once follow principles involving important consequences. For now, without interfering with the actual unity between God and man, a fixed distinction can be drawn between the two, and, whilst recognising the personality of God, the infinite worth of the personality of man can also be recognised.³ In relation to this latter aspect of the matter, Schaller and Göschel have rendered essential services. The former shows, in a convincing manner, that so long as infinitude has not entered also into the form of individuality or subjectivity, and both remain outside of each other, the atonement is not yet effected. This atonement is justly considered to consist, not in a moral, but an essential unity of God and man, that is, in the idea of God-manhood. But if we attribute God-manhood to the entire human race; if we say (pp. 64 ff.) that no single individual can comprehend the fulness of divinity in itself; and if, accordingly, the human race is the real God-man; this doctrine of Christ, so far from being the annulment of the separation of man from God, and of God from man, which essentially precedes the Christian consciousness, really fixes it as irremovable. The

¹ The word "*Aufhebung*" includes both the idea of abolition or annulment and that of preserving, laying up. An element is "*aufgehoben*," when, though abolished for one stage, it is included under a higher form at the next stage.—Tr.

² Stress was laid also on the absolute independence of God on man, which is involved in aseity, out of regard to His personality, by Frauenstädt in his "*die Freiheit des Menschen und die Persönlichkeit Gottes*," with a preface by Gabler, Berlin 1838; by Gabler in his "*De veræ Philosophiæ erga christ. relig. pietate*," 1836; by Hanne, "*Rationalismus und spekulative Philosophie in Braunschweig*," 1838, and by others. Conradi also clings to the eternal, absolute reflexion of God in Himself.

³ Compare Schaller l.c. pp. 50 ff. It must not be forgotten, however, that only a preliminary, if even a very important preliminary question of Christology, is thus settled. The necessity of the God-manhood may be recognised, and yet the application to Christology turn out very differently.

participation of the individual, namely, in the race, is not *personal*, but merely *substantial*; and yet the very basis of the disjunction is, that man, as a self-knowing subject, does not know himself to be in unity with God. The absolute substance reduces not only every individual thing, but also the individual person, to mere transitory momenta of its essence. The absolute subject, also, which, as one, is without actual distinction in itself, does the same thing. The subject which feels itself to be divided does not ask for unity with the race, which, in fact, it never loses, but for unity with God; and that not merely a substantial, but a personal unity: man desires to know himself free in God. This longing for atonement, necessarily immanent in disunion, is not met by attributing God-manhood to the genus humanity, but rather thrown back as incapable of being met, and reduced to a substantial participation in divinity, of whose insufficiency for the spirit the disunion itself has the strongest consciousness. It remains, therefore, impugnably certain that the *merely substantial participation of the self-knowing subject in an impersonal God-manhood is not reconciliation, but disunion.*

If, further, Strauss, operating with the categories, "*race and specimens of the race*," had said,—In the entirety of its mutually complementary individuals, and in it alone, the human race has its perfection; the individuals as such are merely partial fragments of the whole, which has its existence in the entire expanse of humanity;—Schaller now triumphantly demonstrated, on the one hand, negatively, that the essence of spirit is entirely ignored by such categories as these, which are not at all appropriate to it; and, on the other hand, positively, that it is rather precisely the essence of spirit to be the universal in a subjective form, or to constitute a totality. That the idea and the reality should lie asunder, is the essence precisely of *nature*. This essence by itself is an unreconciled contradiction; for in nature the genus never attains a reality corresponding to it, idea, never arrives at itself in individuals, it points out beyond itself. The solution of this contradiction is spirit. By self-consciousness and will it separates itself from nature, and reduces nature to a momentum of itself. Accordingly, the individual is not merely this single individual; but as an individual, is also at the same time Ego, simple universality. It is solely in consequence of this infinite determinateness, which

ertains to it, that the individual is at the same time person. A single person has not the genus in itself as substance, but, without needing another for its complement, knows itself as, and is by itself, in its individuality, at the same time, the genus in itself. (He means to say, Totality.) In this way the universal ceases to be merely substance and *duplicates* (that is, multiples) itself. (Note 24.)

But if every spirit as such is a totality, and not a mere fragment, like the single species in nature, Christ also must be a totality, the unity of the universal and individual. The question then arises, however,—What dignity remains for the Person of Christ if all as persons are a totality? At this point Schaller is unsatisfactory. For, on the one hand, he pledges himself to show that in Christ God reveals Himself divine-humanly, in an unique manner (pp. 86 f.); and, on the other hand, without reconciling the claim with his profession, requires that, for the sake of the atonement, the entire fulness of the divine be in every believer (p. 85). If, now, it were shown in any way whatever, from the idea of God or the idea of man, that we attain to participation in this fulness *through Christ*, there would be some prospect of a conciliation of the two propositions: Christ would then be distinguished from all, not indeed by His fulness,—which, on the contrary, He does not keep for Himself; but communicates,—but by being the real source of all the communications of divine blessing to humanity within itself. Instead of this, he deserts the speculative path, and enters the purely historical one; failing, consequently, to reach the goal he had fixed for himself. On the one hand, he reminds us that men, as they are, cannot realize the idea of their personality, inasmuch as they are rather involved in conflict, in sin, and need an atonement such as can only be effected by the presence and self-revelation of God; on the other hand, that Christ is to be regarded as the first personal presence of God in the world; for all spiritual progress proceeds forth from the energy of individuality: the method of the idea is first to act grudgingly, to appear only at a single point, and then from this point to diffuse its inward fulness over many (pp. 96–99, 58). But why the inner self-communication of God could not suffice for reconciliation, and what need there was for an historical mediator, is not clear; nor is it at all more clear that the histo-

rical Christ did anything else than *occasion* the consciousness of unity with God in others : which would plainly be to assign a scanty, almost accidental, and certainly transient, significance to Him. (Note 25.) Schaller's merit consists, therefore, principally in his having shown that God-manhood can only have an adequate existence in a subject, in a personality, and not in any other form.

At the point where Schaller had let the problem fall, Göschel took up the work.¹ He endeavours to determine more precisely the idea of God-manhood, which Schaller inclined to apply in a profuse manner to all, by not resting satisfied with the mere idea of totality which every individual person is destined to be, but by reaching further, and claiming that the infinite multiplicity of these totalities should also be conceived as an *unity*, and not as a mere diffuse plurality. (Note 26.) The worth of personality, as fixed by Schaller and others, urgently called for this step to be taken, in order that the individual personalities might not appear as empty repetitions of each other, and either sink together into one uniform, indistinguishable mass, or fall asunder. What was necessary here was, to view humanity itself again as a totality of a higher order than the individual, as an organism with distinct members, without detriment to the relative totality of the individuals.

Göschel's view now is the following:—The unity of humanity is granted; but it is supposed to consist in the universal, divine-human essence of the race. This, however, is nominalistic; the utmost that is thought of is a moral personality of the race. This is not sufficient: moral personality lacks kernel, individuality, subjective personality. The personality then remains a mere *name*, by which the race is summed up in one. The race must be personality and individuality in itself. Whence otherwise would personality come; for if the race were itself impersonal, it plainly could not confer personality! Or are we to suppose the multiplicity of individuals to take the place of the individuality of the race itself? But what, then, would become of the unity? The many individuals are not one until they *all* come into existence; but the many never will become all or one, unless an individual stand at the head of the race itself as subject. The unity of the race cannot become an

¹ Beiträge, u. s. w., 1838.

ctuality, unless it have an existence entirely in one individual, and unless this one individual precede as a person by itself, the personality of the race conditioned by it, and continue to exist independently along with it.

No state, no community, has its reality merely through a common spirit which remains in itself; but is represented, and that at the first by one. In the one is a relatively Universal in the individual is personality); and this is the head. Only through a head can humanity pass realiter, and in its consciousness, from plurality to unity of being. Plurality cannot become totality without being collected in one. This one, however, must needs be an individual by itself; for at the basis of all personality lies individuality—the indivisible, independent being of the subject. The head, therefore, is not merely soul, but also body; personality is the universal; individuality is the singular: personality is the highest form of individuality, where it cherishes the universal in itself, and yet remains by and for itself.

We may not say that the many are united substantially; or they must also be united as subjects, that is, as to their highest determination; nor is the element that unites them merely their subjective thought. If the totality is merely subjectively conceived, it lacks the best, to wit, the objective reality of the person. It then has no existence save in the representation of individuals. Such a mere conceptional thing cannot have real power to effect union between individuals. If the whole had not a real existence as a personal power, above the individuals, as a mere representation, it would owe its personality to the individuals, who themselves are again what they are through the whole. For this reason, we must rather assume the existence of an actual, individual, or independent personality of the human race, in order that we may not have to rest content with a mere collective unity of a nominalistic kind. We must go on to the *idea of the primal man as the primal personality*; this primal personality is all, or the whole of humanity in one (pp. 63, 72 ff.). We may allow, indeed, that every individual be conceived as an actual specimen of the race, as a microcosm which expresses and mirrors the universal in its own way (*individuis inesse universale individualiter*); not, however, that any individual can express the whole in all its fulness, that is, "*individuo inesse universale et individualiter et universaliter*." But the idea is not so im-

potent as not to be able actually to combine universal and particular, infinite and finite; and a false conception is formed of individuality, if it is only to be supposed to be finitude calmly resting in itself; for it is rather infinitely elastic, the foundation for the highest form of the actuality of spirit, to wit, personality.¹

This primal humanity he represents more precisely as follows:—As every individual man stands over the whole of nature, so the God-man over humanity and nature; only that the latter is, precisely for that reason, the absolute spirit, the Logos. He represented humanity completely in Himself prior to its receiving existence outside of, and being filled by Him. He *is* humanity; we *have* it: He is it entirely; we participate therein. His personality precedes and lies at the basis of the personality of the race and its individuals. As idea (and in so far He is not a single individual), He is implanted in the whole of humanity; He lies at the basis of every human consciousness, without, however, attaining realization in an individual; for this is only possible in the entire race at the end of the times. With the implantation of that eternal idea, therefore, humanity is merely objectively and potentially, not actually, redeemed. But this same idea which is to attain actuality in us all,—for Christ is to be formed in us all,—cannot set itself forth in mere multiplicity; but the many are one in consequence of the eternal Word Himself becoming man. The idea lying at the basis of the consciousness of all is, accordingly, the idea of the Word becoming man in an individual personal form; and only as such can the idea redeem. In that this primal man becomes an historical person, He becomes a man; the individual appears as an individual: there thus arises the antinomy that this primal man, as historical, becomes also a member of the kind (the whole becomes a part). This is the humiliation, says he, that the Creator should be also created and born, should become Son of God of the Son of man, and take upon Him the form of a servant. The God-man in and by Himself, as un-created, is the perfect man; but in the flesh also He is the per-

¹ Compare Rosenkranz's Review of Schleiermacher's "*Glaubenslehre*," Vorrede, p. xii., where he insists on the idea being conceived energetically; which establishes the possibility of its full actuality in Christ. Fischer's "*Metaphysik*," in particular, deserves praise for the manner in which it speculatively establishes this conception.

fect, created man. Primarily, however, the revelation in lowliness is not the perfect manifestation of the perfect individual, or of the primal man. Thereto is further necessary the exaltation.

Against this position the objection has been raised,—To postulate a personal individual for the race, is necessary indeed; but God alone, not Christ, is this primal individual,¹ and God is not one of the race. To this, however, Göschel was able to reply,—Without standing in an inner relation to humanity, even God could not be its archetype: He is its archetype, because as Logos He is also the primal man. On the other hand, and approaching still nearer to the weak point, Conradi has further objected,²—"The idea of personality is essentially a concrete idea; as the truth of the individual spirit, it necessarily presupposes nature and the world as the conditions of its mediation." He himself, however, adds again,—A personality, one may designate it as one will, divine or human, out of connection with humanity and the conditions of its development, is a mere abstraction. "God Himself is not personal save in humanity."³ Conradi and Göschel, therefore, are agreed in considering individuality also to be a constituent of the idea of personality, as well in God (as Logos) as in man. The distinction between them is simply, that whereas Göschel sees in the Logos the eternal primal humanity, or the primal man; Conradi, on the contrary, lays stress on the mediatory process, and on the succession,—in his view, namely, God becomes personal in man by a process; a process, be it observed, which always presupposes its result.⁴ Let us hear more carefully what he has to say, prior to carrying out the critical comparison with Göschel to the end.

In the course of an infinitely long process, says he,

¹ Frauenstädt, "Die Menschwerdung Gottes," pp. 48-64, 53.

² "Christus in der Vergangenheit, u. s. w." Compare Vorrede, p. ix.

³ Pp. 254 ff. Deviating widely from his first work, in his later ones he represents Christ as the product of a purely immanent process of humanity; but as he desired to show that the absolute God-manhood was realized in Christ in an unique manner, in his endeavour to resolve everything creative into an infinite number of middle links and stages, he arrives at very monstrous propositions regarding an infinitely long series of humanity backwards, of Pre-Adamites, and so forth. See the "Kritik d. chr. Dogm." pp. 181 ff.

⁴ See the "Kritik d. chr. Dogm." But what becomes then of the reality of the process?

humanity brings forth its inmost universal essence, or its idea, in perfect, personal God-manhood, in Christ. The realization given to humanity in the collective sum of men, of these personal, independent beings, is not enough; *firstly*, because the idea, according to its very conception, can only have its reality in the unity of a self-consciousness, and cannot be compounded out of a multiplicity of single self-consciousnesses; *secondly*, the question would be, whether, if the sum of these single beings were taken together and weighed in a balance, the excess would fall on the side of the realizations, or on that of the negations of the idea. The realization of the idea would then be a very problematical thing;¹ and yet it is that which is absolutely necessary. Now as, on the one hand, the idea does not find its realization in plurality, but requires the unity of a personal self-consciousness, so, on the other hand, is it nevertheless true that the idea of humanity is only realized in a plurality of beings. Humanity consists in the totality of the various human individuals; it therefore sets forth its life solely in the sum-total of these individuals. Were the idea of humanity realized in one individual, this same one individual would be the actuality of humanity; in other words, we should have no humanity, but instead of it, one man. How is this contradiction resolved? Only by supposing that whilst the idea is set forth in a plurality, this plurality is conjoined again to the unity of an individual, in which the many continue to exist in their integrity and personality. The one is at the same time one of the many, included as a single individual in the nature and development of humanity: on the other hand, however, humanity is included in Him as the result of its development in the collective activity of its individuals. As regards the unity of His individual consciousness, He is a brother among many brothers; as regards His substance, He is the truth of humanity itself in the result of its development; He is the universal personality, toward which all tend, out of the split up and uncertain state into which humanity had fallen, as towards a centre, in which they find their repose and truth. But this realization of the idea in an individual does not consist in the sum of all human powers and excellences; it consists in the negation of everything one-sided, of everything individual so

¹ "Christus in der Vergangenheit, u. s. w.," pp. 258 f.

far as it is a quality existing and standing for something by itself, through the position of the perfectly free spiritual personality, so that all human virtues are contained in Him, both as to germ and as to result. (Note 27.)

Great as is the similarity between the picture sketched of the Person of Christ and the descriptions given of its actuality by Conradi and Göschel, even so important is the distinction between them referred to at the beginning. As regards the latter point, however, we shall have to say that each of them is partially justified in the position he takes up relatively to the other, and that both start alike from the same false pre-supposition. Göschel's "primal man," existing before all individuals, who is supposed to be at one and the same time both Logos and individuality, evidently leads, as Conradi justly hints, to a double humanity, an heavenly and an earthly; requires a depotentiation of the Logos to incarnation; and nevertheless, inasmuch as the complete perfection of this primal man eternally precedes the historical process, it makes the human growth of Christ again Docetical. On the other hand, to require, with Conradi, a process for the personality, not of Christ only, but also of the Logos or God, through which it first comes into existence; and to say, God is personal in humanity alone; is equivalent either to denying eternal personality and absolute self-consciousness to God, which Conradi certainly does not appear to intend; or to postulating an infinite historical series of human individuals backwards, in whom God had personal self-consciousness: and with this view the position would be incompatible which he wishes to preserve for Christ.

Both are involved in these contradictions by the common fault of proceeding too directly to the combination of actual humanity with the divine personality, as the form under which the personality of God subsists. It is a pantheistic remainder which suffers neither the idea of the personality of God nor that of man to arrive at proper development. Their antagonism may show us, that what is above all necessary is to construct the personality of God in total independence of a real Godmanhood, even if not without assuming that there is a nature, in God; and to regard the ethical essence of God, which is eternally complete in itself, as the ground of the participative and communicative process of love in the world.

III. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF SCHLEIERMACHER.

IN placing Schleiermacher alongside of Schelling and Hegel, although he is well known never to have laid claim to stand in any sort of inner relation to a determinate philosophy, or to be the founder of a philosophical school, we are justified by two considerations:—1. That he unmistakably takes the *essential* unity of God and of man for his point of departure, without giving in his adherence to that substantial Pantheism which treats the subject as a mere accident; for he, too, seeks rather to maintain the unity of subject and substance whilst allowing their distinction:¹ and 2. That he, the most determinately of the three, took up his position with that principle at the centre of Christian thought, and had the closest affinity with Christianity; accordingly, his Christology not only bears most a theological character, but also, of all recent essays in that direction, has had the strongest influence on the age. We will first notice that in his system which stands in the closest relation to speculation.

In his work entitled “Weihnachtsfeier,” the transition to Christ is effected in the following manner:—

Man in himself, says he, is the knowledge of the earth in its eternal being, and in its ever changing growth; or spirit, which moulds itself to consciousness after the manner of our earth. In this man *per se* there is no corruption, no apostasy, and no need of redemption. The individual, however, as he stands connected with the formations of the earth, is growth alone, and not the unity of eternal being and growth; he is in apostasy and corruption. We may put ourselves as we will, here is no escape: the life and joy of primeval nature, when as yet the antagonisms between phænomenon and substance, between time and eternity, had not made their appearance, are not ours. Man needs redemption. But he can only be redeemed when the man *per se*, the unity of eternal being and

¹ That these two aspects are equally essential to his system (how far he succeeded in effecting their true union is another question), is shown in an external way by the circumstance, that one party reproaches him with being predominantly subjective; another, with Spinozism; and others, with both together.

growth, dawns in him. Humanity becomes eternally this man *per se*; but this man must dawn in man as his thought; man must carry in himself the consciousness and the spirit of humanity; he must look upon and build up humanity as a living community of individuals: thus alone can he have the higher life and the peace of God in himself. This takes place in the Church. In it man is and has been set forth as he is in himself. Every one in whom that self-consciousness dawns, comes to the Church. It is, as it were, the self-consciousness of humanity; whilst, on the contrary, all around it is unconsciousness.

Now, as a thing that is growing, this community is also a thing that has already grown (als ein Werdendes auch ein Gewordenes); and inasmuch as it is a community which has come into existence through communication on the part of individuals, we seek for a point at which this communication commenced. He, however, who is regarded as the starting-point of the Church, as its *conception*—even as one may designate that first free and independent fellowship of feeling which broke out at Pentecost, its birth—must have been already born as the man *per se*, as the God-man. He must bear self-knowledge in himself, and be the light of men from the beginning of the Church. We, indeed, are born again through the *spirit of the Church*. The spirit itself, however, proceeds forth solely from the Son, and He needs no regeneration, but is the Son of man absolutely. In Christ, therefore, we see the spirit originally mould itself to self-consciousness in an individual, after the way and manner of our earth. The Father and the brethren dwell symmetrically in Him, and are one in Him. For this reason, Christ may be seen in every child; and, vice versâ, every one of us beholds his own birth in that of Christ.

As, even in this place, where Schleiermacher endeavours most clearly to effect a conciliation between the Christian consciousness and speculation, he does not give a properly philosophical deduction, but takes his start with the empirical consciousness of the antagonism between a fallen world, living in misery, and a blessed, reconciled world, on whose consciousness the eternal has dawned; so also does he proceed in his 'Glaubenslehre.'¹ The individual man knows that the con-

¹ Compare for the following account:—"Der christliche Glaube" von Schleiermacher, A. 2 u. 3, ii. § 92-105; "Reden über die Religion," 1831;

ciliation of these two phases of life has been effected by the spirit of the Church : which spirit, on its part, compels us to assume an historical starting-point, seeing that the natural original condition in which individuals are still born, proves, by the need of redemption which characterizes it, that the spiritual life which we now find in the Church cannot have existed in all ages, but must have been first implanted in humanity in time. In the above representation, which borders on speculation, there is only one other feature to be remarked, to wit, the attempt to find for Christianity, within a metaphysical view of the world, a place where it may stand in connection with the whole.

Although, then, Schleiermacher agrees with the men whose views we have just set forth in contemplating the divine and human in essential unity, the path peculiar to his mode of thought is not that which leads from above downwards : it is altogether not the speculative one. He starts with the *experience* of an existence heightened by Christianity as something absolutely settled, an existence which no philosophy can either give or take away ; and then seeks, by reflection on these Christian states of soul, and by deductions from them, to sketch as clear an image as possible of Him who alone suffices for the explanation of that higher existence.

The course which he pursues in his "Glaubenslehre" is more precisely the following :—

Taking for his point of departure an inner, ineradicable, in itself absolutely certain, experience of the power of Christianity, he makes no pretence (§ 11, 5) whatever to prove it to be either necessary or alone true ; and merely endeavours to exhibit the physiognomy of the Christian consciousness, as an empirical phenomenon, both in distinction from other forms of piety and as it is in itself.

I. Religions are distinguished from each other by their different strength, though also by differences in the character of their pious emotions. The more perfect they are, the more must they have a distinctly defined physiognomy, fixed inner and outer boundary lines ; for which in particular a fixed point of departure, a founder, is necessary. A pious community derives its outward unity from an historical commencement : for this reason, "Sendschreiben an Dr Lücke" in the "Studien und Kritiken," edited by Ullmann and Umbreit, 1829, Heft. 2, 3.

the Christian religion (which does not lack this outward unity, by which it is most distinctly separated from all others) must also have an historical commencement. No one can venture to maintain that the Jewish, Muhammedan, Christian fellowships could have risen of themselves, altogether independently of the impulse given by Moses, Muhammed, Christ. Only in the lower forms of piety, as at the lower stages of nature, are the genera less determinate: to the higher stages, on the contrary, belongs a more symmetrically complete outward and inward unity; and, in the most complete form, the inner distinctive characteristics will be most intimately allied with the external, the historical;—thus is historical unity established (§ 17).

Christianity, now, is a teleological form of piety: it is distinguished, however, from all possible forms of piety occupying this stage by the circumstance, that every single feature in it is referred to the consciousness of redemption through Jesus of Nazareth (§ 18). Herein are involved two momenta; to wit, a consciousness of sin, together with the wretchedness attendant thereon, and which is felt as punishment; and the consciousness of the grace by which the consciousness of sin is overcome.

The consciousness of grace arises for us out of the collective sum of Christian life; it exists exclusively in this circle; other religions have it not (§ 12). Whosoever has it, and in having it has approximated to a state of blessedness, is conscious of deriving it, not from the collective natural life, which is a life of sin and unbledness, but from a collective new life, which is shown to be divine, because it victoriously opposes the natural. Every Christian has the conviction that in the collective life of sin, in which he at first finds himself, he neither cherishes nor propagates that higher life, but rather co-operates in generating, as well as receives, sin: and that, even if the best individuals were to combine to oppose sin, they would merely combat single sins—nay more, they could not be anything more than an organization within the limits of the collective life of sin. So that, apart from the intervention of a new element in this collective life of sin, even the better individuals would not be able to effect an approximation to blessedness which should remove the misery.

II. This new, collective divine life, the Christian mind refers back to Christ. And, in point of fact, it cannot avoid

doing so. It is true, it neither can nor wishes to prove the truth of its utterances; herein, however, its experience is but a repetition of that which occurs everywhere in the sphere of history, to wit, that one may have a very firm conviction of the correctness of an impression, without therefore being able to demonstrate it. At the same time, the mode in which this faith arises may and must be developed; it must be shown how at the first, and how even yet, the conviction could arise that Jesus possessed sinless perfection, and that this same perfection is communicated in the fellowship established by Him.

It is not faith that first made Jesus the sinless One and the Redeemer; but it is involved in the Christian consciousness that He first implanted this faith in the Church by His sinlessness. But how far does the Church know of Him that He is a sinless One? It knows this, because in the collective life founded by Him, there is a communication of His sinless perfection. The collective life carries this communication in itself, and not any one individual, save Christ. But how this? Does not the collective Christian life, as a mass, participate to a very important degree in the universal sinfulness? Faith replies,—All this is merely the non-realization of the new collective life; it is merely the sinful in which the new element is hidden, although capable of becoming matter of experience. This experience consists in the circumstance, that the image of Christ, which exists as the collective act and collective possession of the Church, still produces on believers the impression of sinless perfection,—an impression which Jesus Himself must have originally implanted in the Church,—which becomes, on the one hand, a perfect consciousness of sin, and, on the other hand, does away with unblestness; and this is *in itself* already a communication of His perfection. The *second*, however, is, that notwithstanding all those remains of sin, the perfection of Christ has given the collective life a tendency, which, though imperfect indeed in point of manifestation, as an inward thing, or as impulse, must be allowed to correspond to its source, and will therefore work itself up to an ever purer phenomenal form. And this impulse of the historical life of the Church, which, considered quite inwardly, is perfectly pure, is *likewise* an efficient communication of the perfection.

It is further involved in the Christian

community grows, not through the addition of any new power from without, but through the continued susceptibility to that which is already given by Christianity. It is involved therein that no new form of piety can await the consciousness of God possessed by man, that, on the contrary, a new form, whatever might be its nature, would be a step backwards; seeing that Christianity contains within itself the absolute reconciliation. For this reason, it compels the conviction that all other forms of religion, being lower, are destined to pass over into it.

But by what principle can the sinlessness and perfection of Christ be deduced from what has been said above? By the conclusion from the effect to its sufficient cause.

According to what we have said above, Christianity points back to a determinate founder, for the simple reason that it belongs to the higher forms of religion; and from the character of His continued activity in the Church (for only through the Church have we any information at all respecting Christ), we may also draw a conclusion to the *archetypal* character of this *historical* founder. His archetypal character does not need to consist in His perfection and skill in single spheres of life, but in the purity and vigour of His consciousness of God, in its capability of giving an impulse to and determining all the momenta of life. None but an archetypal consciousness of God, which made its appearance in an historical shape, could found a community like that in which believers stand.

It has been objected, indeed, that in order to comprehend this imperfect result, the Church, it is not necessary to attribute to the founder an archetypal character, such as would imply that the idea itself had had being,—in other words, absolute perfection. To Christ belongs merely the dignity of our example; and it was originally an hyperbolical act of believers, when, viewing Christ in the mirror of their own imperfection, they regarded Him as an archetype;—a course which they still, in fact, continue to pursue, importing into Christ whatever archetypal elements they may in any case be able to apprehend.


To this objection, however, Schleiermacher had already furnished a reply in what we have advanced above. If an image of absolute perfection has been implanted in the Church, then in his view, inasmuch as this archetype does not lie in human nature by itself, but is merely the collective possession of the

Church—to wit, as an image of Christ—we must go back to an historical impression made by an archetypal historical founder. Inasmuch, further, as the consciousness of God implanted in the Church is endowed with unrestrained vigour, at all events in the form of an impulse which gains an ever more complete victory; and as this same impulse does not exist outside the Church, the power itself must have dwelt in the historical starting-point of the Church, which, as an impulse given by it, still continues its activity.

Further, such an impulse alone can furnish an explanation of the phenomenon, that it is an essential feature of the Christian consciousness to deem any new form of the consciousness of God an impossibility, and to regard every new form as a retrogression; or, in other words, this is the only satisfactory explanation of the consciousness common to all Christians, that Christianity, as to its inmost essence—an essence referring back to an adequate historical cause—is not perfectible, but perfect.

Further, the conviction is essential to believers, that any given state of the collective life of the Church is merely an approximation to that which was posited in the Redeemer: the image which they bear in themselves, communicated by His historical activity, is an example, if we merely call it an example, that is fitted to bring about every possible enhancement in the totality. But such an example is no longer distinguishable from the idea of an archetype:—indeed productivity lies solely in the idea of an archetype, not at all in that of an example.

If we were to deny that the archetypal character of the founder constitutes an essential element of faith, we must acknowledge it to be possible for Christendom to develop the hope that the human race will one day grow out beyond Christ, if even only in its noblest and most excellent members. Such a supposition, however, would alone put an end to Christian faith. Not indeed so much, if all that were meant were that His absolutely archetypal inner being was not able to reveal itself perfectly in doctrine and deed, under His restricted finite relations. This view, however, certainly lies outside Christianity, if it be meant that Christ was no more as to His inner essence than as to outward appearance; and that through Him His Church has received so happy an organization, that it easily allows itself to be



transformed, conformably to the more perfect archetypes as they successively make their appearance, without losing its historical identity. For Christ would thus be characterized as non-essential to the Church. Accordingly, Christianity is that form of religion whose inner, actual essence is contradicted when we attribute to its founder any other than an archetypal dignity.¹

Finally, as the faith of Christians assumes that the doctrines and ordinances of Christ have eternal validity,—a thing which is compatible with His archetypal character alone, not with His being merely an example: so also in another respect does faith point to His archetypal character, to wit, by its conviction that He is an *universal* example; for He could not be an universal example, if He were an example to the one more, to the others less, and if He did not stand in the like symmetrical relation to all the original diversities of individuals.

But how is the archetype supposed to have become matter of perception and experience, in an individual being, who has had a veritable historical existence? In works of art and in the forms of nature, each is the complement of the other, and each requires to be complemented by the other. To this must be added the consideration, that the sinfulness of the collective life of humanity, in the midst of which He existed, and out of which He cannot be explained, renders it all the more incomprehensible that He should be historically an archetype.

Relatively to the first difficulty, Schleiermacher replies:—If we grant the possibility of the consciousness of God constantly progressing in vigour, and yet deny that it has anywhere existed in perfection, we cannot maintain that the creation of man is or is being completed; for in a continuous progress perfection is never posited, save as a possibility. In that case, however, less is affirmed of man than of other beings; for concerning all those kinds of being which are more bound, we can say, that their idea attains perfect actuality in the totality of the individual beings, which complement each other. But this does not hold good of a race of beings possessed of freedom and capable of development; because in that sphere the imperfect can never become perfect through being complemented. For this reason, the perfection of this essential vital function,

¹ To other religions the persons of their founders are a matter of indifference; it forms an essential part of the substance of the Christian religion.

which is posited in the idea, must also in some way or other exist in an individual.

But if the other objection be advanced, to wit, that in view of the sinfulness of the collective life, it remains incomprehensible how Christ could be historically an archetype; and if the shift should be resorted to of saying, the archetype exists only in spirit, and has been simply transferred to Christ more or less arbitrarily, we must reply,—Were we to concede to humanity the power of generating in itself a pure, perfect archetype, it could not, by virtue of the connection between understanding and will, be in a state of universal sinfulness. Only one answer, therefore, remains to the question, how it was possible for Christ to be the archetype, to wit;—the distinctive substance of His spiritual life cannot be explained from the historical circle within which His life moved; but solely on the supposition that it was brought forth out of the universal source of spiritual life, by a creative, divine act, in which, as an absolutely greatest, the idea of man as the subject of the consciousness of God was completely realized.

III. As accordingly the historical and archetypal must be conceived to be intimately united in the Redeemer, He is like all men in virtue of the sameness of His human nature; but distinguished from all by the constant vigour of His consciousness of God, which is to be defined as, in the strict sense, a being of God in Him.

But as sinfulness and a development through sin are otherwise common to all men, does not the sinlessness which is involved in His character as an archetype, deprive Him of identity with human nature generally?¹ By no means; for sin belongs not to the essence of man, but is a disturbance of nature;² and the possibility of a sinless development is not incompatible with the idea of human nature: nay more, the recognition of this is involved in the consciousness of sin as guilt.

The position that the consciousness of God, as one of absolute vigour, ought to be conceived as a *being* of God in Him, has the following meaning:—God, namely, is, it is true, omnipresent; but as He is pure activity and not passivity, He cannot as such be perfectly there, where there is passivity either along-

¹ Compare Strauss, a. a. O., pp. 710–720.

² § 68, p. 367, A. 3.

side of or without activity. For this reason, He cannot truly have His being either in the so-called inanimate, or in the non-intelligent nature. Only so far as an individual being never comes into purely passive states, and rather, by its active susceptibility, converts the passive into active, can we strictly say that God is in him. This, consequently, can only be the case in rational beings. Even in the case of these latter beings, however, the consciousness of God has not asserted itself as pure activity in all religions, but has always been overpowered by the sensuous consciousness. God, therefore, was not truly in them. First in Christianity has it become otherwise. Here has dawned the principle of a consciousness of God which is constant in its activity, and exclusively determines every momentum. But Christianity; with this its deep impulse towards a constantly vigorous consciousness of God, is to be reduced back to Christ; on this ground we assume in Him that purely active consciousness of God, which can be styled a pure being of God in man. He is the only original place in which it is to be found: first through Him does the human consciousness of God become a being of God in human nature; and as, further, through this human nature the totality of finite powers becomes a being of God in the world, Christ is in reality the sole mediator of God's being in, and God's revelation through, the world, so far as He is the vehicle and bearer of the entirely new creation which contains and developes the consciousness of God in its full vigour.

But as the collective life of sinfulness furnishes no explanation of the rise of the founder of this new collective life, considered in relation to the archetypal character of His consciousness of God; and inasmuch as, on the contrary, the natural tendency of this same collective life is to propagate sin: it is merely an identical proposition to say that, in the form in which He manifested Himself, He can only have arisen outside of the collective life of sin. For this reason, we cannot avoid believing in Him as a being of supernatural growth. Still, it is only as looked at in relation to what went before, that is, in relation to the old collective life of sin, that Christ is something supernatural; looked at in the light of what is to come, the latter is a moral naturalization of the supernatural.

But, it is urged, on this supposition, the origin, at all events,

of this person is something supernatural, and thus an irreparable rent is made in a healthy and connected view of the world.¹ Put in this way, the objection is of a philosophical nature, and foreign to the point of view of Schleiermacher's *Dogmatics*. From another side, however, he meets this objection also, and consequently does in substance make it matter of consideration. Inasmuch, namely, as reflection on the states of the soul of pious men leads him to the conclusion that God is an eternal, absolutely simple being or life, and that time and change are to be excluded from His activity, the assumption of a personality, which first made its appearance in the midst of the times, and which requires us to presuppose for its explanation, an immediate, and new creative act, threatens to fall into conflict also with this his conception of God; and as precisely that reflection led him also to the position (§ 51, 54), that the divine causality, although, on the one hand, distinguished from that contained within the complex of nature, and thus opposed to it, on the other hand, as to its compass, is to be declared like it: a divine causality appears to be assumed by Schleiermacher in the case of Christ, to which, being supernatural, there is absolutely no correspondent natural one; nay more, which is diametrically opposed to causes operating within the sphere of nature.²

To this objection, Schleiermacher's *Exposition* contains already the following reply. As the new collective life becomes an historical, natural thing, it follows that the old collective life of sin also in itself, to wit, as to susceptibility, stands in connection with the new; and if we look at history as a whole, we must treat it as a natural course, in which the appearance even of the Redeemer is no longer a supernatural thing, but the coming forth of a new stage of development, conditioned by that which went before. By nature, namely, we must not understand merely that which has empirical actuality; but we must go back to that which we have above designated the universal source of life. If we were to refuse to do this, we should always have precisely the same existences. Whereas the rise of every individual is partly an act of the little circle with which it is connected, and partly the act of human nature in

¹ Compare Strauss, a. a. O., p. 716.

² Compare in particular Braniss's "*Kritischer Versuch über Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre*," 1824, pp. 192 ff.

general (that is, of the afore-mentioned source of life). Now, the more completely a being bears in itself the weaknesses of that circle, the more is the first mode of considering matters in the right. But the more an individual, in the nature and degree of his gifts, reaches out beyond that circle and brings forth what is new, the more are we inclined to adopt the other mode of consideration. Accordingly, in pursuance of the latter mode of consideration, Christ must be termed an original deed of human nature, that is, a deed of human nature as not affected by sin.¹ In so far, He is supernatural and an entirely new phenomenon not absolutely, but merely relatively; that is, not in relation to nature in itself, but merely in relation to the nature which had had an actual existence prior to Him.

Now, though the communication of the spirit made in the first Adam was insufficient, seeing that the spirit remained buried in the sensuous, and scarcely looked out in its entirety for a moment, even in the form of presentiment; and though the creative work first attained completion through the second equally original communication to the second Adam; still, both momenta are reducible back to one undivided, eternal divine decree, and in the higher sense, form also a natural complex, which, though unattainable by us, is one and the same. But even if this unity also lies solely in the divine thought, we can still form a more precise representation of it in the following manner.

The decree of God may be considered in such a manner, that Christ shall appear as the completion of the hitherto incomplete creation, as the second Adam, the beginner of the higher life, of the completed creation, which could not be attained through the natural complex, the development of which began with and continued onwards from Adam. The creation of man is thus divided as it were into two momenta; for which, however, analogies enough are presented by history and material nature. This mode of consideration, too, is characteristic of and natural to him, who is already redeemed. He feels and knows that he has a new life in him. This is the one.

But, further, the idea of the new creation must undoubtedly also be reduced back to that of sustainment; because otherwise

¹ That is, to speak in the language of the "Weihnachtsfeier," He is the exhibition of man as he is in himself, who, as it were, eternally, if not really, pre-exists in the primal creative power of God.

God would be brought under the conditions of time. This can be done by regarding the manifestation of Christ Himself, as the maintenance of that susceptibility to take up into itself a consciousness of God of absolute vigour, which was implanted in human nature from the beginning, and which has gone on continually developing since. Human nature appeared, it is true, at the first creation of the race, in an imperfect condition: still, even then, the manifestation of the Redeemer was implanted in it, in an a-temporal manner. Accordingly, the divine decree is one constantly engaged in being fulfilled, and that which comes earlier is always ordered with a reference to the later. The entire pre-Christian world thus bears a reference to Christ, is ordered solely with a regard to Him.¹

Viewing the matter thus, perfect justice can be done to all historical requirements, if only this archetypal character of His life be supposed to have undergone from the commencement a development, consisting in a gradual unfolding of the powers, such as is undergone by all others. If He had borne in Himself the consciousness of God from the beginning in its completeness, and not merely in the form of a germ, He would have had no childhood. But to an historical character belongs not merely that the development be gradual, but also that it be national. He could only unfold Himself in a certain similarity to those who surrounded Him. On the other hand, however, He can only have joined on to the true and correct, not to the false elements therein. This the national character of His development, however, which was necessary to the completeness of His humanity, cannot in any way have interfered with His character as an archetype, and can, therefore, have affected merely His organization, not the proper principle of His life. It did not form part of Himself as a repelling principle, or as the type of His self-activity, but merely of His susceptibility for this self-activity; in that feeling and understanding were compelled to derive their nutriment from the world by which He was surrounded.

¹ This relation between creation and sustenance is excellently held fast and carried out, in its apologetic connections, in the work of v. Drey, entitled, "Die Apologetik als wissenschaftliche Nachweisung der Göttlichkeit des Christenthums in seiner Erscheinung. Erster Band, Philosophie der Offenbarung," Mainz. 1838;—a solid work, both in point of manner and substance.

The Church formulas which speak of a duality of natures, a divine and an human, he examines more carefully, and endeavours to justify his procedure in substituting in their place a declaration, that the Redeemer was archetypal and historical; he defends, in particular, his change of the expression, "divine nature," into "absolutely perfect consciousness of God" (which, precisely because of its perfect vigour and purity, is to be described as a true being of God in Him), by the plea, that his own formula includes everything that we need. The being of *God* is the inmost and fundamental force in Him, from which proceeds forth all activity, and which holds all the momenta together: the human, on the contrary, is merely the organism of this fundamental force, and stands to it in the relation of a system by which it is appropriated and set forth,—in the relation in which all other powers in us ought to stand to our intelligence. With the former, everything is affirmed regarding Him which is necessary to His discharge of His office and to secure His dignity. Whilst, on the other hand, He is so represented that we are able to understand His person because of its likeness to us—a likeness only limited by His absolute sinlessness.

He nevertheless attempts to reconcile his view with the doctrine of the Church, and gives an exposition of his Christology, in its individual momenta,—an exposition which bears, at the same time, the character of a critical examination (§ 96–98).

In Jesus Christ, says he, the divine and human natures were united into one person: in the accomplishment of this union the divine nature alone was active, or self-communicative; during their union, however, each activity was common to both.

As regards the *first point*, the *act of union*, he remarks by way of preface, that it is to be assigned to the beginning of His life as an individual. For, to suppose that Christ was at first like us, in the sense of being a participator in sin, and that He became at a subsequent period what He now is to us, does not satisfy the Christian mind; for then, surely, it would be possible to discover the workings of sin afterwards. But he blames the expression,—the Son of God constituted human nature a part of the unity of His person. For then the personality of Christ is made dependent on the personality of the second person in the divine nature; in other words, on the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity;—a course which it is not allowable to take, over against

the Sabellian view. The worst of the matter is, however, that on this supposition the human nature can only become a person in the sense in which the term is applied to a person of the Trinity; so that, either the three persons of the Deity are to be conceived like the human personality, that is, as individual, independently subsisting beings; or, we must suppose Christ to have been an human personality merely in the sense in which the term is applied to deity, and then the humanity is docetically dissipated. This, then, is the way in which Schleiermacher justifies his sundering of Christology from the Church doctrine of the Trinity.

Docetical also, he goes on to say, it might appear, when the Church teaches that human nature was entirely passive when it was assumed. But all that is meant to be described thereby, is the implantation of the divine nature into the human, and to be declared, is that the human nature could not have taken an active part in its appropriation by the divine, either in the sense of its developing the divine out of itself, or of its drawing the divine down to itself. By itself, it had nothing more than the susceptibility or the possibility of being appropriated by the divine. Otherwise we should verge on the quicksand of denying Christ to be a new, immediate, divine deed.

But if the eternal is not by this act to be entangled with time, the Redeemer must not be regarded as a production of human nature;—this would be Ebionitical. It is equally unlawful also to say, with a view to escaping the afore-mentioned and this latter Ebionitical danger, that the humanity of Christ never had a beginning at all. That would verge on Docetism. All vacillation between the two ceases, if we grant that the divine activity which united them was an eternal activity; that, for God, there is no distinction between decree and activity. As a decree, the union was identical with, and contained in, the decree of the creation of man: temporal, however, is this decree in the aspect in which, as activity, it is turned towards us; in other words, it was temporal as it manifested itself at the actual beginning of the life of the Redeemer, through whom the eternal decree of God realized itself both in a point of space and a point of time. Accordingly, the personific activity of human nature first attained completion at the moment when Christ appeared;—as an human person, we may say, Christ was already

always growing coincidently with time. Taking this view, time relates solely and entirely to the human aspect; and the relation between it and the divine remained eternally the same.

This relation between the divine and human natures in the act of union, is further marked by the Church's doctrine of the *impersonality* and the supernatural generation of the human nature of Jesus. As the sense of the first of these two positions, he holds the following. The personific force of human nature, or of our kind, by itself, must necessarily have given to this person also the germ of an obscured consciousness of God; for which reason, such a person as this could not have been brought to pass without the aid of that uniting divine activity. Not as though the human nature would have remained impersonal without this addition; but the personification in question is simply the *completion* of the personific activity put forth by human nature; and, as thus completed, it is at the same time the humanification of God in consciousness.¹

As regards *supernatural generation*, Schleiermacher considers the miracle of the Person of Christ to have consisted solely in that supernatural activity, by which God warded off all the injurious influences connected with His derivation, fully saturated human nature with the consciousness of Himself, and thus both completed it, and introduced the divine activity in the form of the being of God in Christ. All further determinations he considers to be non-essential, destitute of dogmatical significance. Original sin is not removed from Christ by the assumption, that His conception took place without the aid of a man; because, unless Mary was sinless, she also would have contributed her share to His sinfulness. In the place of this determination, therefore, must be substituted another,—to wit, that natural generation by itself would not have sufficed for the bringing forth of the Redeemer. Because He had to bring something into the race which was not in it before, it is impossible to explain His rise by a reference to its reproductive power; but we must add to the natural generation, that divine, creative activity, by which sinful influences were warded off.

For the *state of union* of the two natures, Schleiermacher's formula then is this,—that every activity put forth during it

¹ Compare on this latter mode of consideration, which seldom makes its appearance in Schleiermacher's system, above, pp. 174 ff.

was common to both; in the sense, it is true, that the activity always proceeded forth from the divine nature, and that the human activity was taken up into the divine. But what are we to think of the moments in which the human nature suffered? Surely they could not proceed forth from the divine! Or had the human nature of Christ no such moments? In that case it would not have been at all human. The proper answer is rather, that Christ was constantly and necessarily in a state of passivity, so that all His actions depended thereon, —this state was that of sympathy with the condition of men. But whence this sympathy? As a passive thing, it could not have taken its rise anywhere save in His human nature, which perceived that condition. Did Christ, then, enter on the entire work of redemption solely and only in consequence of this, as it were, accidental perception of man's need of salvation? No; for, on the contrary, during that perception His human nature was not moved by itself, but was altogether led by the activity of the divine in Him. This divine element in Christ was love, which gave His human nature the tendency to consider the condition of men. By means of that which was thus perceived, were developed the impulses to the different helping acts; so that in every case the activity pertained to the divine, the passivity solely to the human nature.

The other passive states of His human nature, which were the result of the connection of His human organization with external nature, belonged, until they were taken up into the inmost centre of His personal consciousness, alone to the human nature, which by itself was impersonal, and remained strange to His inmost consciousness. So soon, however, as they penetrated to the centre of His consciousness, they became pervaded at the same time by a divine impulse. Every active state of Christ's, therefore, was commenced by the being of God in Him, and was completed by the human nature: every passive state ended in an activity, and by this conversion was first constituted a personal state.

But here also the idea of time threatens again to force its way into the activity of the divine in Christ. In order, therefore, to avoid attributing to the divine, activities that arise and pass away in time, we must say,—the divine essence in Christ, remaining constantly like itself, was only active in an a-tem-

poral manner. Merely the humanized, the manifested aspect of this activity, is temporal. Only when we thus fix our eye on this manifested aspect, can we attribute to Christ a true human soul;—a soul, however, which was inwardly impelled by the special presence of God in Christ,—a presence which, continuing the same and unalterable, penetrated the soul in all its various and manifold functions as they underwent ever further development. Accordingly, that which is brought to pass by the being of God in Christ, is all perfectly human, and constitutes together the unity of a natural course of life.

Herein now is involved, that Christ was distinguished from all other men principally by His *essential sinlessness*. He calls it *essential* because it had its ground in His inner being, and because it would have been the same under all outward circumstances; and the formula, "*potuit non peccare*," exhausts that which must be declared of Him, only when it is combined with the other, "*non potuit peccare*." But how does this harmonize with the truth of human nature, which is universally subject to an alternation of pleasure and pain, and with the Scriptures, which say, that He was tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin?

It is impossible, says he, that where an inner conflict has taken place, the traces thereof should ever completely disappear. But if this were the case with Christ, we should be compelled to deny His archetypal character. He must therefore be conceived free from everything that bears in any way the character of a conflict. But in such a case, is it conceivable that He should have undergone a development? It is possible enough, answers he, on the one hand, that the sensuous consciousness and the higher powers only gradually and progressively manifested themselves, so that the higher powers could only get the mastery over the lower in the measure in which they were developed; and yet that, on the other hand, this mastery was at each moment complete, in the sense of nothing being posited in the sphere of the sensuous, without having first been at once constituted an instrument of the spirit. We can represent to ourselves the growth of this personality from its first childhood onwards to the full age of manhood, as a constant transition from a condition of the purest innocence to one of pure and full spiritual vigour, which is widely different from all that

which we designate virtue. But as regards the other point, to wit, the alternation of pleasure and pain, it is possible that His human nature may have participated therein also after a sinless fashion. We must conceive of this alternation as undertaken by His own activity, not, however, as determining Him or reducing Him to dependence.

His sinlessness, however, owing to the intimate connection between understanding and will, involves that Christ can neither have produced *errors* Himself, nor appropriated the errors of others with actual conviction, and under the impression of having thus acquired truth. Nor is His *freedom from error*, in this sense, to be limited solely to His official life. Only, we must keep hold of the distinction between the reception and propagation of ideas of which others are the determinate upholders, and the formation of a judgment, which always, in some way or other, determines the mode of action. In regard to the latter, Christ cannot have erred; for that would have implied either precipitancy or a darkened sense of truth.

It is not allowable to attribute to Him, as to His human nature, any other special distinction, as, for example, natural immortality, or excellence in science or art;¹ but His perfection consisted precisely in His being the personal embodiment of the perfect religion.

But touching the facts of His *resurrection, ascension, and second coming to judgment*, no connection is discernible between them and His redemptive activity; and yet all the momenta of our faith in Him are dependent for their character on this activity. His continuous spiritual activity is necessary, it is true, to the work of redemption; but this activity is conceivable even apart from resurrection and ascension, and they are not necessarily its medium. So also the doctrine of His second coming contains nothing essentially pertaining to His dignity as a Redeemer; whatever it contributes to His dignity, we have without it, and it is merely an accidental mode of expressing the satisfaction of the yearning to be united with Christ.

¹ This is carried out more in detail in the essay (worth reading) by A. Schweizer, "Ueber die Dignität des Religionsstifters," Stud. u. Kritiken, 1834. The fundamental idea of this essay, that to Christ must be ascribed *genius* in the matter of religion, has been adopted by Dr Strauss also in his "Streitschriften."

But although no one of these three points contains an essential momentum of faith, they are of importance relatively to the authority of Christ (§ 99, 2), on the ground that His disciples so frequently appeal to them:—for example, if they have testified falsely respecting the resurrection of Christ, *either*, we must attribute to them a feebleness of mind which would not only make their entire testimony regarding Christ unreliable, but would force us to the conclusion that Christ Himself, who chose them for His apostles, could not have known what was in man: *or*, if He Himself arranged that they should regard an inward as an outward thing, and confound His resurrection in man with an objective external resurrection, He would Himself be the originator of their error. The case, however, is a somewhat different one with the ascension, because, as can be shown, we possess no report concerning it by an eye-witness or an apostle. Still more outward is the relation in which the promise of His second coming stands to the doctrine of the Person of Christ; and it would only react upon it, on the supposition that the second coming were described in some way or other, which we could demonstrate to be false.

The Christology thus sketched, which is remarkable alike for its art and its clearness, justly excited everywhere the liveliest attention, and exerted a permanent influence. Even though unsatisfactory in several essential features, so much we can say,—that it is an attempt to establish an inner, organic, vital relation between the divine and human, and to sketch a divine-human course of life in a way that had never been attempted before.

The critical review of preceding attempts given by Schleiermacher, so far as it extends, is, above all, deserving of honourable mention. However keen are his dialectics, their result is by no means merely negative; on the contrary, he has furthered the problem by a considerable step. Whoever notes carefully the services rendered by Schleiermacher in connection with Christology, will not be disposed to regard the task of viewing the divine and human in vital unity as one incapable of execution.

He has not, it is true, *demonstrated* the essential connection of the divine and human: indeed, such a demonstration would have been opposed to his principles; for he takes as his sole point of departure the consciousness of the redeemed, who

know that they have received reconciliation and an invigorated consciousness of God, solely in that fellowship which refers the mind back to Jesus of Nazareth as its founder. Instead, therefore, of deducing the actuality of the God-man from His necessity, he rather presupposes a history, the knowledge of one's own redemption, and of the existence of a redeemed society; and deduces therefrom the historical reality of the God-man, without occupying himself with questions as to the possibility or necessity of such a being.

His great merit, however, is, to have endeavoured to develop this unity of the divine and human, which to him was solely historical,—that is, which he had not yet understood in its inner necessity,—so clearly, and in such a manner as to secure both the uniqueness and specific dignity of Christ and His brotherhood with men. He believed the perfect being of God to be in Christ; and for this reason regarded Him as the complete man. And so, vice versâ, because He is the complete man, the consciousness of God has become a being of God in Him. In this way he endeavours to conciliate and combine two modes of regarding Him,—that according to which He is an immediate act of God, and that according to which He is the completion of creation. He is, as it were, the eternal idea of humanity, as such implanted in it after an a-temporal manner: and the whole of history before Christ may be regarded as the growing realization of this idea. But, on the other hand, He is also a new, divine deed,—so far, namely, as He cannot be explained out of that complex of nature which had hitherto become an actuality, but compels us to go back to the primal fount of all life.

We meet here once again with a Christology which bears both a scientific and a Christian character. The antagonism of sin and grace,—this foundation of his view of Christianity,—preserved Schleiermacher from that Pelagian by-path which gets rid of a Redeemer, because it conceives the unity of man and God either as immediate, or as of such a nature that man both is to, and can, realize it without a Mediator. Schleiermacher does not deny the original or essential unity of God and man; but he posits it merely as a capacity of our nature, as the possibility of the entrance of Christ into our race. During the first period of their actual existence, on the contrary, he held that all men participated only insufficiently in the spirit;

so that a second creation was necessary to the full completion of man. The new birth, of which Christ was the original and pure realization, he conceived, on the one hand, to be a mere realization of the eternal idea of man; though, on the other hand, he deemed the first form of his being to be still opposed to this idea. So that the regenerated and the old man remain, on the one hand, an identical personality; whilst, on the other hand, the process of development by which man is brought to himself, or to his idea, must pass through a turning-point; for he has to enter into a collective life founded by God, in which the old personality of sin dies and the new one arises—that new one which is at the same time the primal and inmost element in man, though, apart from Christ, in bondage.

This theory has been assailed fiercely, and from many directions. For the most part, however, unjustly, and from a point of view which was either unestablished, or unchristian. We will now proceed to test the value of the main attacks, and then follow with our own critique.¹

I. It has been said that "*Schleiermacher posits with his new creation an absolute miracle, which suddenly breaks up all natural connection.*" Schleiermacher himself allows that, considered in God's light, all things form a connected whole; that also, as regards the empirical connexion of nature (that is, as abstracted from that universal source of life), nothing can be conceived to be absolutely new. The new creation, therefore, he represents again as an a-temporal, eternal implanting of Christ into human nature, and as the maintenance of this implantation in such a way that it attained ever more complete realization.

But this reply, given beforehand to attacks that might well be expected, has been little noticed by his critics. For this there appear to be two reasons. The one ground, however frequently it may have been advanced, rests on a view which is foreign alike to Schleiermacher and to Christianity. Many, namely, were unable to conceive of a Christ at once archetypal and historical, save on the supposition of humanity's having gradually become ripe enough to produce such an one.² Thus considered, Schleiermacher would, it is true, be completely un-

¹ Compare on the following, Dr Kern's article, entitled "*Die Hauptthat-sachen der evangelischen Geschichte,*" in the *Tübing. Zeitschrift*, 1836, 2.

² So, at a subsequent period, also Conradi and others.

justified in assigning to Christ such a position in the midst of the ages.

But if this attack were of importance, Christianity would have to be regarded as a mere quantitative enhancement of what had preceded, not as something veritably new. The upholders of this view, however, would need first to establish their own thought, or even the proposition, that the Christian idea of regeneration is an absolute impossibility, and that it must be weakened down to that of mere improvement. But this will be impossible so long as there exists, on the one hand, a living sense of sin; and, on the other hand, a living consciousness of grace. For which reason, this attack, which aims at showing the impossibility of the appearance of a Christ in the midst of the times, who is at once archetypal and historical, may for the present be left standing as a mere assertion.

But the same charge may be brought against Schleiermacher in another way. On the one hand, namely, he wishes to have the ante-Christian period considered as a period in which Christ was growing into being, and the new creation to be accordingly placed under the category of sustenance; and yet, on the other hand, he separates so strictly the spheres of sin and of grace, that he designates the ante-Christian period one mass of sin, incapable of producing Christ out of itself.—How are these two things compatible with each other?

It must be confessed that Schleiermacher does not more precisely explain how far it is possible to conceive that Christ was growing into being in the ante-Christian world, notwithstanding that its life, as a totality, was a life of sin. Herewith, however, his case is not yet lost. He might regard the ante-Christian world as a growth of Christ, without in any way obliterating the limit fixed between the old and the new world.

For the judgment executed on the old world, by which its power and beauty fell to pieces, and its poverty and emptiness were revealed, may be regarded as the growth of Christ. Even as we now discern in the death and ruin of the old man the form of the Christ who is to rise in us, striding on through the world of sin requiring to be destroyed; so also the old world which did not fall to pieces in consequence of the mere exhaustion of spirit in general, its spirit, may be regarded

a complete incarnation—a power which stirred the mightier the more entirely the world fell. Nowhere in the whole of history do we find a merely negative criticism on any historical form; nor does any historical form fall to pieces solely in consequence of impotence of spirit, but it is brought about by a higher, positive power, which as it were exercised, prepared, and strove towards itself by means of such negation. If, then, regarded from a Christian point of view, we may recognise in the decay of the old world an activity of the divine Spirit advancing onwards to incarnation; the same thing may also be shown from another side—as, indeed, Schleiermacher also does.

The old world, although as compared with Christianity it was in itself poor and empty, passed through a cycle of development, in the course of which it enriched itself in various ways. This enrichment, it is true, never brought reconciliation; but still the susceptibility and the longing for redemption were prepared in a variety of ways. Longing implies, too, a partial possession of that which is longed for, and consequently a kind of presence thereof; though, at the same time, one that is in the first instance entirely ideal and that yearns for reality. Now, so far as that longing and hoping created for itself ever more distinctly the form which was alone able to loosen all pain, the old world was a preparation for Christ, a growth of His appearance in another respect than by a mere judgment.¹ This preparation, however, though it can in a sense be termed positive, by no means involves humanity's having been able by a gradual onward development to produce Christ; for it did not bear the character of a power to such productivity, but rather that of need.

But is not creation thus divided, as Schleiermacher says himself, into two momenta, of which the second is not the product of the first; is not the dualism of two momenta, that are incapable of being united, transferred back to the mystery and darkness of the divine decree? By no means; for we can well conceive the possibility of their being united, if we only suppose the first to have been posited for the sake of the second, nay more, through the second, as the means by which it mediates itself with itself. Not that it itself, to wit, the second, is pro-

¹ This is sought to be attained by the newer Old Testament theology of a Baumgarten, Hofmann, and in part also of Delitzsch.

duced by the first; for, on the contrary, it rather realizes itself and acquires true existence by its vanquishment. But if the matter is to be regarded thus, we must neither deem the first form to be the true one, nor consider it vigorous enough by itself to bring forth the true one; but rather regard the first form of humanity as the still imperfect one, by passing through and overcoming which the second attains realization—the second being both the properly impelling force of the process and the judicatory power concealed within the first.

II. The second principal objection is, that “*it is impossible for the archetypal to be at the same time historical.*”¹ The proof of this position has, it is true, hitherto been given by no one. And in point of fact, it can only be attempted by philosophers who regard God as the merely extensive infinite, or as the spirit of the world;—as we have already shown more precisely above. And as we know how little hold this point of view has in itself, all we have to say regarding this attack, whose professed object is to show the impossibility of a Christ of the nature of the one who lives in the faith of the Church;—it cannot affect Schleiermacher until the foundation on which it rests is properly established.

III. “*But all human development is a passage through conflict and disunion, which unavoidably manifest themselves consciousness as sin.*” We can here answer:—The method of proof by induction is in general characterized by great uncertainty, seeing that it can never lead to the goal; but in this case it is totally inadmissible; for Christianity itself takes the universal sinfulness for granted, and precisely on its account teaches that one has come into the world who was without sin. As we have likewise shown above, no one has yet proved it to be a necessity that the course of human development should in every case lie through sin. And when, for example, the principle is laid down, that a development, the subject of which

¹ So Baur, Strauss, and others. The latter advances two grounds: The case would be other with humanity than with nature, for in nature the genus is set forth alone in the totality of its individuals. Further, if the genus (that is, in his view, God) were perfectly realized in one individual it would no longer torture itself with splitting itself up into a multiplicity of individuals. Both arguments are based on the substitution of a physical æsthetical, for an ethical, view of the world.

does not distinguish itself from itself, is not possible, inasmuch as spiritual development implies that we consciously become other than we already are, we can very well suppose that as soon as the distinction makes its appearance in consciousness, and ere it has time to become a contradiction, it is immediately done away with by the will which stands in unity with consciousness; so that each particular stage of consciousness in undivided unity, becomes also, at the same time, that of the being and the will, and no hesitation on the part of the will delays the realization of that which the consciousness requires to be realized, long enough to afford opportunity for the development of sin or of a conviction of guilt.

Moreover, in point of fact, it would be proving too much to show that the course of development necessarily lies through sin.¹ For, as all human life is development, on such a supposition, sin would be necessary to human life as such. Now, this involves an inner contradiction. For what is sin, if it is not that which either is being excluded, or is already excluded, by the idea of the being to which it cleaves? Sin, therefore, can only be accidental, cannot be essential to man. For precisely then would a dualism be introduced into the idea of a moral being, if evil were represented, on the one hand, as something essential to the finite, and on the other hand, as contradictory of its idea.

If it be contradictory of the idea of man that his archetype should ever become a reality, the idea of man is self-contradictory. There then remains no alternative, but either miserably to conceal the contradiction by a "progressus in infinitum," or to say that the idea of man bears its reality in itself, and has no need to become an actuality;—a view which would reduce the whole of history, as well as the life of the individual man, to a vain show. For all the forms of manifestation must then be held to be completely alike, and all progress a matter of indifference, inasmuch as the idea has its only true reality equally in all, or rather in itself. For this reason also Schleiermacher says,—to deny that the consciousness of God exists anywhere in perfection, is equivalent to denying that the creation of man will be perfected: and then less is declared of man than

¹ As indeed, according to the remarks made above, is acknowledged by most all writers of recent date.

of any other creature; for, in the case of free individual beings, that which is imperfect cannot be rendered perfect by being complemented; whereas, on the contrary, in the case of other creatures, the defects of individuals are supplemented by the totality, so that the idea attains perfect realization.

But although it appears possible for Schleiermacher to be justified in all these points, we shall have occasion to point out defects in his Christology in the course of the following inquiry.

1. *The historical actuality of an archetypal Christ is not satisfactorily deducible from the Christian consciousness.*—The consciousness of redeemed believers and of the Church is the reflection, according to him, of a personal activity of the God-man; so that from the existence of a consciousness of a Christian mould, as the effect, a conclusion is drawn to the existence of a perfect God-man as to the only sufficient cause of that effect. Of the objection, that the Church, as a constantly imperfect result, does not require an *archetypal cause* for its explanation, he has already taken notice, as we have seen above. To this connection belongs, not so much his appeal to the Christian consciousness, which is unable to regard the belief that it is possible to advance beyond Christ as deserving the name of Christian;—which belief must necessarily arise where that cause is not supposed to have been archetypal. For if this utterance of the Christian consciousness is not to appear accidental, capricious, and non-essential even to Christianity itself, we must inquire by what inner determination of its essence the Christian consciousness arrives at its supposition that Christ is the archetype. Otherwise we should be chargeable with assuming an archetypal personality as the sufficient cause of the existing effects, in a merely external manner, by a sudden transition to the history of the Church, and the testimony given by it in its writings and through its existence. It will be necessary to point out in the inner presence of the spirit, of the Christian consciousness, the living traces and the seal of the activity of an archetypal personality,¹ instead of supplementing the argument that the new life, by the very fact of its existence, compels

¹ In the consciousness of atonement through His substitution. This, however, Schleiermacher could not fix for himself, because he regarded it as resulting solely from the principal participation in the holiness of Christ.

the assumption of such a personality as its founder, in an external manner, by reflection on external testimonies.

Schleiermacher, however, is not content either with this external method, or with merely appealing to the fact that the Christian mind does not believe in the possibility of advancing beyond Christ. He adds, on the contrary :—An archetypal cause must be assumed for the existing result, and a merely exemplary cause is not enough ; for the productive energy to which the existence of the Church, after all, testifies, can only have been exerted by an archetype,—not, however, by an example, which always remained partially imperfect. And if one should say,—The Church, as a non-sinless production, does not necessarily presuppose a productive force entirely holy ; he replies,—It is true, the manifestation of the new principle always remains imperfect ; but still an essentially holy, pure life has been implanted in humanity by Christianity, which asserts itself ever more victoriously ; further, every Christian knows that the sin which still cleaves to him is to be ascribed, not to the principle, as though it were itself an impure thing, but solely to the fact of the activity of the principle being still limited ; and finally, it is involved in the Christian consciousness that there never can be a need of a new principle—that the only thing required, is the coming forth of that which is already implanted in humanity.

Now, however true this may be, and so certainly as it must be allowed that if the principle of Christianity itself were impure, the Christian consciousness would wear a totally different aspect ; all that follows therefrom is, that some archetypal cause or other must have been at work, but not that that cause possessed at the same time *historical* reality.—But what other kind of cause can we conceive of ? The idea. It is said, the idea of an archetype, having dawned on the human mind, might have produced these results, without there being any necessity for concluding the existence of an archetypal personality. The only attempt Schleiermacher has made to meet this supposition, is the observation, that because of the connection between the will and the understanding, we are compelled also to say that the idea of an archetype implanted by Christianity in sinful humanity could not have been generated by humanity itself. This, however, can scarcely suffice. Even a fallen nature

has still a knowledge of the idea of the archetypal; but this knowledge is merely a knowledge of the law, which stands over against the Gospel, which accuses, but cannot make alive. The *idea* of the archetypal by itself (this would be the proper answer from Schleiermacher's point of view) has no productive power, but first acquires it, as Schleiermacher himself elsewhere allows, by appearing really and personally in Christ: herein, too, he otherwise deems the novelty and originality of Christianity to consist. Its qualitative distinction from everything non-Christian is, that the idea, which as idea expresses in the first instance a mere *shall*, became actuality and life in Christ, and through Him was constituted the vital principle of the Church. But he does not explain how the archetype could only become such a productive causality, or "the principle of life," by appearing in an historical form. The answer will be, on the one hand, that humanity was willed, and from the very beginning conceived, by God as an organism, whose destiny it was first to attain to its higher pneumatic life through the head which belonged to it; on the other hand, that as sinful, it can only know itself to be in vital and living fellowship with God, if He Himself come towards it and reveal Himself in a reconciliatory way: and for this purpose an historical Mediator is necessary.¹ A still more complete answer would thus be given to the objection, that, to conclude from the existence of the new life that an archetypal personality must have existed on earth in Christ, is unjustifiable, because this new life in the soul of the Christian might have its ground in a similar immediate deed of God—such a deed as Schleiermacher postulates to account for the origin of the Person of Christ.² In his own reply hereto, Schleiermacher contents himself with going back to the matter of fact, that the consciousness of redemption and of the possession of a new and pure principle, of participating in holiness and blessedness, becomes ours solely in connection with the collective Christian life; urging that this new collective life, which arose in the midst of a condition of sin and misery, which still continues to prevail outside of Christendom, must have had a founder who first bore this new element in himself as the result of immediate divine activity; nay more, that the person of this founder must have been endowed with

¹ See Div. II. Vol. I. pp. 8–10.

² Strauss a. a. O. 719.

new principle from his very birth ; for to suppose the new dawn suddenly and directly, without any corresponding influence, during the course of the life of an individual, would compel us to resort to a magical explanation ; as, on the contrary, at birth every individual stands in immediate relation to the universal source of life, and it is during the course through which his life passes that he receives interaction and incitement from without.

Schleiermacher does not show us why Christ ought to be considered the *archetypal* embodiment of the new principle, not merely the first or initiatory embodiment, endowed with power to implant the new principle in humanity. If we will say,—it follows from the productive vigour of Christ, He was the archetype ; for the distinction between an archetype and a mere example is precisely that the former alone is to act as a producing cause, whereas the latter, though it may incite, cannot produce (and, in fact, according to Schleiermacher also, the Church has the power of generatively propagating the new principle, not because it is an example ; because its inmost essence is pure and holy, though the outward manifestation is imperfect ; but in the last instance, because it pagates the historical image of Christ) ; the answer might then be—that an example which approximated to the character of an archetype, especially if faith should hold it to be an archetype, would be sufficient, supposing the only thing necessary to redemption to be a consciousness of the idea of an archetype ; and that it can be pronounced insufficient only on the supposition that we need something more than the practical office of Christ. This, as is well known, Schleiermacher also acknowledges ; but he has not clearly shown how an archetype has more influence than the awakening of the soul of the archetypal ; or, vice versâ, how far it is peculiar to the *earlier* archetypal, and to it alone, to act not merely on the intellect, but also as a real principle of life. This leads us to notice a further point.

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the new principle from his very birth; for to suppose the new life to dawn suddenly and directly, without any corresponding external influence, during the course of the life of an individual, would compel us to resort to a magical explanation; whereas, on the contrary, at birth every individual stands in an immediate relation to the universal source of life, and it is only during the course through which his life passes that he needs interaction and incitement from without.

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Son of man? But so soon as this latter is allowed, we shall be compelled to conceive this perfect man (not in point of His earthly development, but of His completion), not only as the adequate representation of the idea of *humanity*, but also immediately as the adequate representation and revelation of *God*.

However far short Schleiermacher has come of developing and giving a connected representation of all these points; and so certain as it is, on the contrary, that other elements are contained in his system which do not well harmonize with those just expounded; still, taking a view of the whole, we must allow that he also approximated nearly enough to the higher, primitive, Christian view of Christ as the head of *humanity*, and to the metaphysical significance of His person.¹

This is the place to add another word concerning Schleiermacher's doctrine of God. As is well known, he gave in his adherence to Sabellianism: which, indeed, is true also of the systems of Hegel and Schelling, so far as neither of them has an immanent Trinity. But whilst, as we have seen, Schelling, and particularly Hegel, conceive God Himself as growing in the world, and represent Him as first arriving at self-consciousness in the life of the world, through the medium of the finite—which, it is true, is never absolutely attained; Schleiermacher, on the contrary, takes an essential step in advance, when he maintains that such a process of growth, confounding as it does God with the world, and abolishing His absoluteness, must be kept far from the idea of God. In this respect, there is a similar antagonism between Schleiermacher on the one hand, and Hegel and Schelling, who convert God's absoluteness into the passible and temporal, on the other hand, as that which existed, though, it is true, on a more limited scale, between the old Sabellianism and the so-called Patripassianism. At the same time, he views God not merely as absolute substance, the abstract monas, but he maintains also that He ought to be conceived as absolute, spiritual life, and in so far, as in eternal motion; for he frequently expresses himself in very unfavour-

¹ Mention is here deserved in addition by the above passage from the "Weihnachtsfeier;" for the "man in himself" there spoken of is nothing but the archetypal spiritual man. He is not merely the ideal Christ; but, according to the passage in question, man in himself was born in Jesus Christ.

able terms regarding both the deistic and the supernaturalistic conception of God, charging it with being a dead thing.—On the other hand, for the purpose of keeping hold on the distinction between God and the world, which is marked by multiplicity and distinctions, he supposes it to be necessary to represent God as the absolute, undistinguished unity, and to controvert the doctrine of an immanent Trinity. But in this way the world and its multiplicity is set over against the absolute unity, without the links of connection between the two being pointed out; and notwithstanding his recognition of God as the absolute personality, he brings forward no principle explaining the derivation of the world. If we were to follow out the thought, how it comes that the divine causality, which is eternally identical with itself, manifests itself solely in the divisions of space and time, for which, in it, as an absolute unity, no ground can be discovered, we should, if consistent, be led, in a manner similar to that which we have found in the case of the old Sabellianism,¹ to the representation of an antagonistic eternal material standing over against the unity of divine causality and divine life, which seeks to inform the world;—which material can only be animated and bespirited (*beseelt und begeistet*) by a gradual process.² This, however, would be Monarchianism at the price of Dualism. Now this Schleiermacher does not wish; rather does he conceive God to be the eternal light which sends forth its rays everywhere alike, so that the distinctions exist solely in the world, which refracts the rays differently, and has different degrees of susceptibility. But if the distinctions of the world are not to have their causality in God, but consequently in the world itself (for he refuses to allow that they are mere subjective seeming), this contradicts the idea of God as the supreme and absolute cause. Precisely the great stress he lays on the absolute, divine causality should compel him to postulate for the distinctions in the world, which are after all real, a correspondent distinction of principles in God, as the real basis of the former, and should consequently exclude the supposition that God is absolutely destitute of distinctions.—It is true, if his system left a place for freedom as a moral faculty of choice, that dualism, that power of resistance to God, might be ethically

¹ See Div. I. Vol. II. pp. 160 ff.

² Later writers take this for their point of departure.

explained, might be found to have its ground in God, and would thus be seen to have been willed by the supreme unity. But to his being able to strike into this path, before which his determinism must have given way, it would have been necessary for Schleiermacher to form a more distinctly ethical conception of God than he actually did; which, again, was impossible, unless he assumed the existence in God Himself, without regard to the world, of an absolute personality with eternal reflection in Himself; consequently, unless he recognised self-distinctions in God, in place of the unity without distinctions to which reference has been made. It is a misapprehension, indeed, to charge Schleiermacher with entertaining a Spinozistic conception of God: he regarded God not as mere substance, not as a mere power of the world, not merely as the idea or the moral order of the world; but as the cause of all this, as the unity of idea and being;¹ consequently, as self-cognitive being and absolutely existent knowledge,² which as such does not know merely what is other than itself, and not itself, but also embraces itself. When he hesitates to describe God as personal, it is because he considered the word person to involve a limit, finite subjectivity;³ but we are not to suppose that he meant to deny to God eternally complete, spiritual absoluteness, or that, at all events, he aimed at representing it as first growing. But as he in general does not pursue the speculative path from above downwards, rather deeming an objective knowledge of God to be an impossibility; so, starting in his contemplation of matters from below, and then advancing upwards, he assigns to God merely the position of the postulate of a supreme unity, which is not a mere summing up of the multiplicity of the existent world, but a real causality; though he does not further trouble himself with the inquiry, what conception is to be formed of this unity in order that it may be the principle of a multiplicity: and as he is not willing that the term personality should be applied to God (without, however, denying the thing), so also does he refuse to allow distinctions to be imported into God (without which no clear idea can be formed of personality). He rather supposes it necessary, in order to the preservation of the distinction

¹ Compare *Dialektik*, pp. 87 f., 111 f., 113 ff., 134 f.

² Das sich selbst wissende Sein und das absolut seiende Wissen.

³ As he has explained himself in the "Reden über die Religion."

between God and the world, to keep out of God every species of distinction as something mundane. But as life and movement are inconceivable without distinctions, he must then logically arrive at the dead idea of substance, which in its turn would lead to Acosmism. From this also, as even his empirical point of view shows, he was far removed. But because, on the other hand, he sees in God merely the supreme causative *unity* of the world, he fails precisely to arrive at a sufficient distinction from the world, and is compelled to represent this latter rather as the physically necessary revelation of His life. In consequence of endeavouring completely to exclude distinctions from the absolute unity, he is unable to allow that God holds a relation to Himself, and maintains Himself, whilst communicating Himself to the world; but he is compelled to represent God, so far as he posits a vital relation between Him and the world, as life passing over into the world. He thus falls actually into the very danger of Pantheism, from which he had aimed at escaping, in denying all distinctions to God as something mundane. We should thus have arrived at Schelling's and Hegel's idea of a God who takes growth upon Himself, who actualizes Himself in the world.

According to what has been advanced above, this is diametrically opposed to the general outline of his thoughts. Instead of allowing God Himself to pass over into growth and suffering, into finitude or alterity, he rather aims most distinctly at representing God as the eternally complete and absolute spiritual life in its immutability over against the world. But then he ought consistently to renounce the idea of a self-communication of God to the world, of a *being* and *life* of God in the world, and pass over to the category of the mere action of God on the world, of its being determined by Him; which, if strictly followed out, would put an end to the intimate relation between God and humanity, which he considers to be brought about by Christianity, and lead into the ways of Deism. We thus find it proved in his case also, that there is no escape from the alternative of Pantheism or Deism, save in a trinitarian conception of God. As he does not, like the Church, secure the eternal identity, perfection, and self-assertion of God, by assuming an inner self-discrimination, even in the act of self-communication, if he cling to the latter without at the same time assuming an

act of self-assertion, he is unavoidably landed in a commixture of God with the world; or, if his aim be to prevent God's being confounded with, and losing Himself to the world, he would be compelled, out of regard to the divine immutability, to limit His self-communication to the world after a Judaistic manner, and to convert the communication of His essence, which, as absolute unity, cannot, strictly speaking, be communicated, into *actions*,—a course which we have found pursued formerly by Sabellianism.¹ Not even for the distinction between the incommunicable being and the communicable fulness of God, can a place then be left, if He is merely the absolutely undiscriminated unity. Were this point of view, to which Schleiermacher often enough passes over, carried completely out, we should arrive at a world essentially estranged from God, at the dualism characteristic of a deistic view of the world. God would then be merely the Almighty Ruler, determining all things by His actions, but no longer self-communicative love; and even Christ would then be merely the man absolutely determined by God, without having a share of His own in the divine life and substance. In this aspect, therefore, the end of Sabellianism would be an Ebionism,² such as we must again pronounce to be foreign to the Christology and piety of Schleiermacher.

The above exposition may serve to show, that though Schleiermacher meant his conception of God to be neither pantheistic nor deistic, it vacillates between the two; and that he could not free himself from this vacillation so long as he did not, on the one hand, ensure the self-assertion of God in the act of self-communication to the world, by asserting Him to be discriminated in Himself; and as, on the other hand, he did not put himself in opposition to Deism, and provide for the capability of God's communicating Himself, by representing Him as an unity discriminated in itself. And as, in the first century, though Christianity was compelled to assert the eternal absoluteness of the idea of God, in opposition to Gnostic and Patripassian doctrines, according to which He undergoes conversion and growth, yet abstract Monarchianism was unable to escape the vacillation between deistic Arianism and pantheistic Sabellianism (both which constantly passed over again into, or sought to combine with, the other), until the

¹ See Div. I. Vol. II. pp. 284 ff.

² Compare Div. I. Vol. II. pp. 284 ff.

Church had established its doctrine of the trinitarian self-discrimination of God in Himself, in virtue whereof God can be communicative, without losing Himself to the world:—so also could the step in advance taken by Schleiermacher beyond the theopaschitism of Zinzendorf, which was probably presented to his mind in youth, and the processualism of Schelling and Hegel, who represent the absoluteness of God as changing into altereity, and Himself as undergoing conversion, on the one hand; and beyond the dead idea of God laid down by Kant, on the other hand; only he made sure by recognizing the existence of distinctions in the unity of the divine life, knowledge and love, in one word, by the doctrine of an immanent Trinity. For, to posit, with Hegel and Schelling, a distinction in God, which, though real, involves the immediate recognition of the world as the son of God, would leave room neither for a distinction of God from the world,—inasmuch as, on this supposition, the world is merely God converted into altereity,—nor, therefore, for a communication of love; seeing that love presupposes, on the one hand, self-assertion in the communication, and, on the other hand, a real distinction between the giver and the receiver.

Such a form of the idea of God, however, would not merely harmonize with the general tendency of Schleiermacher to transcend Deism and Pantheism, but would also tender most important aid in the consistent carrying out of his Christological sketch.

This requires, as we have seen in the last instance, that Christ should be not merely the embodiment of the adequate *idea of humanity*, but also be the adequate *revelation of God*; and that, not only in the form of an action continuing for a longer or shorter period, but in the form of a specific and unique presence, nay more, of a self-knowledge and self-volition of God in this man.

SECTION II.

MOST RECENT TIMES.

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE PRECEDING
HISTORY OF CHRISTOLOGY.

SINCE the middle of the last century, Christology had owed its form and character predominantly to the philosophical systems successively in vogue; though efforts were always made by the authors of the systems to reconcile them in some sort with the churchly and biblical elements of Christology. An intellectual productiveness, such as had not been witnessed since the days of the Gnostics, displayed itself in a rapid succession of philosophical systems; and these found an almost too true reflection in the history of Christology, which in consequence produces, in the first instance, predominantly the impression of unsteadiness and vacillation, or even of confusion. And, in point of fact, such a state of things could not be permanent; it could only be a transition stage. Faith in the continuity of the vital operation of Christianity in the Church, is identical with the conviction, that the age when Christological theories made their appearance in almost incalculable numbers will be succeeded by an age in which the Church will cherish one common belief, at all events in regard to main points; not through the mere repristination of what has already had an existence;—for what would be the use of returning again to the sands which had brought about the universal stagnation and confusion, which would not permit of standing still and yet suffered no advance, but only a partial retraction? (Div. II. Vol. II. p. 298). The indispensable condition of the formation of such a common conviction (which, to judge from the example of the first centuries, must be possible without Synods, in virtue of the inner force of the truth itself), is, that the presuppositions which had led astray and produced the confusion

should be cast aside, and that, on the contrary, a step should be taken onwards in positive knowledge, calculated to afford satisfaction to the existing need. To this end, no *essentially* new truths were necessary; for in all ages the faith of the Church has infolded within itself the essence and entirety of Christian truth; but merely that, undergoing a scientific reconstruction, the Church should present those elements which, whilst speaking to the heart as old acquaintances, are also new, because they solve old difficulties and open up new paths.

That we have already entered on the stadium when the Church calls for the fruit of a common, and, as to the main features, harmonious and well-founded doctrine, and when labourers are preparing to meet this need, is an unmistakeable fact: the soil of Christendom has given us, as it were spontaneously, a rich crop of original systems, but there is no longer a perceptible increase. By some this is regarded as a sign of the weakness of recent theology, both by those of a neological and those of a palæological tendency; not perceiving that it would be an indication of a diseased palate to ask continually only to be tickled afresh. An historically cultivated, Christian judgment sees in this pause, not death, not a privilege to despise science, and in despair to seek to restore the old, but a summons to the labours which devolve on the new stadium. The flowers have bloomed richly, and in part splendidly; a world of new thoughts has opened itself, in part full of presentiment, and reaching into the most distant future. But the work of the bee is not to look scornfully on the industry of the trees and flowers. Its duty is skilfully to complete its own house, and to fill it with treasures for the common benefit.

The Evangelical Church may venture to hope that it will be privileged to construct a satisfactory common doctrine of the Person of Christ. Such a hope is encouraged by the intense and widespread return to the principle of the Reformation. For that principle, in the last instance, must be the source of positive Christological advances (Div. II. Vol. I. 58-72). It both will and must be the light and soul of this theological labour also; without it, all that philosophy can effect, however valuable in itself, will be merely preliminary.

If we take a survey of Christendom at the present time, for the purpose of discovering precursors or commencements of a common doctrine of the Person of Christ, which, instead of repeating the contradictions of the old form of Christology, shall give satisfactory expression to the substance of faith, the Greek Church, alas! presents as yet no contribution; the Romish Church only a limited one; but a so much the richer and more hopeful contribution the Evangelical Church, so far as it has consciously and energetically taken its stand on the groundwork of the Reformation, and thus made its own again an active principle of further union. With the greater readiness, therefore, do we dwell in conclusion on this point; because we shall thus be supplied by history itself with a counterpoise to the unsatisfactory appearance presented by the history of Christology, as though, especially in the Evangelical Church, it were merely one continuous, restless movement. Though in the course of this history we have had frequent occasion to refer to the Christian faith as the essentially identical and fixed in all these movements, still, the movement itself was, in the very nature of the case, the principal subject of consideration. The more necessary is it, therefore, now to dwell upon the evidence that this great history, with its fulness of movement, is not without a goal, but shows itself fruitful; in one word, that precisely the most violent storms, which appeared to threaten the dogma with dissolution, were compelled to serve the purpose of steering the vessel out of the quicksands into safe waters.

We have seen that after the premature expulsion of Monophysitism, which had a certain not yet properly understood right over against even the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon, a perverse and one-sided tendency took possession of the *Greek Church*. The curse of this deed weighed as a heavy burden on the development of doctrine in its midst till the Council of the year 681, and impelled it irresistibly, through a one-sided antagonism to Monophysitism, to an ever more strict and logical adoption of the dualism of two natures, which at last came to be represented as held together merely by the formal bond of the unity of the Ego, and by which Christ was reduced to a simultaneous double series of activities of knowledge and volition. The confusion thus occasioned was heightened by the predominance

which still continued to be given, in an ever more one-sided manner, to the divine nature or person, as compared with the thesis of the duality of the natures. In this direction an essentially monophysitic mode of thought lay concealed behind Dualism in its most fully developed form. Indeed, we have seen that the Council of 681, in consequence of positing an impersonal humanity, fell into contradiction with its own intent, and to a certain extent concluded with laying down that as the doctrine of the Church, by which its ostensible main purpose, to wit, the uprooting even of the offshoots of Monophysitism and the carrying out of pure Dyophysitism, was combined with something directly opposed to it. This was well, it is true, for the *faith* of the Church, which was able to feed on the truth contained in the two modes of thought, the dyophysitic and the monophysitic. But it was not good for the *knowledge* of the Church, that the last formula, in the framing of which the Greek Church took part, should have contained the requirement to cogitate contradictories at one and the same time. Nor has it for many centuries, down to the present time, expended any more labour on the problem, but merely traditionally handed down its formulas from one generation to another. Nevertheless, to the Greek Church there still belongs the merit of having maintained and carried out, during the first period, on the one hand, the truth of the divine aspect of Christ to the point of tracing it back to its ground in the Trinity; on the other hand, the truth of the human aspect in general, as to body and soul.

Looking at its history as a whole, the *Romish* Church has done least of all in furtherance of Christology; its productivity lies in other directions. It was the means, however, of bringing clearly to light the above-mentioned contradiction in the traditional doctrine which it had inherited, in that Adoptionism and Nihilianism divided themselves between the opposed principles of the Council of 681. We have seen how Scholasticism unceasingly vacillated between these two systems; how the Christological formulæ on both sides, being equally destructive of the idea of true God-manhood, partly called forth the need of surrogates for Christology (so, for example, the nihilianistic tendency), and partly invented or excited to the invention of such surrogates. The hidden Monophysitism

broke forth in the doctrine of transubstantiation : the adoption tendency invited in particular to the placing alongside of Christ a circle of saints, with whom to share His mediatorial office. The Christological confusion, and the scepticism therewith connected, reached their climax before the Reformation in Scholasticism ; and in consequence of turning its back on the Reformation, the Catholic Church, which thus became the Romish Church, was placed in such a position that its theology, so far as it did not condemn itself to Christological inactivity, notwithstanding old and new attempts at concealment, is unable to avoid falling back ever afresh into those Middle Age antagonisms, whose common character is to cherish within themselves, either in the form of identification and absorption, or in that of separation, a dualism of the divine and the human. (Note 29.)

In the *Evangelical* Church, particularly in the Lutheran branch thereof, soteriologically, or, in other words, by means of the principle of faith, mastery has been gained over that dualism which exposes the two natures of Christ both to identification and to separation. Luther, in particular, made a beginning of fixing the unity of the Person of Christ as mediated through distinction, or (not to mention here the merely formal tie of the Ego) the living unity of the entire personality of Christ. The old antagonistic elements in the principle of the Reformation were thus vanquished ; out of the confusion and dissolution of the old, a new, infinitely more fruitful, commencing point had sprung forth. But in the employment of this principle for the purposes of Christology, theology was betrayed again into one-sided courses. Their attention being directed predominantly to the doctrine of the way and means of salvation, the old Dogmaticians neglected to transform, by the aid of the principle of the Reformation, the traditional doctrine of the nature of God and man with its partially Aristotelian character. To the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Person of Christ, the formative impulse of the Reformation applied itself with merely the lesser portion of its power ; and, professedly in the interest of his doctrine of the Supper, Luther's Christological ideas were compelled, during the scholastic period of the Lutheran Church, to give way again to theories, which were in conflict with the inmost intent of

the Lutheran Church, and the old Dualism made its appearance afresh in a somewhat more disguised shape. When at last the form of doctrine produced by the Lutheran Scholasticism had lost the confidence of the Church, and had entered on a process of inner self-dissolution, there broke over the theology of the Evangelical Church a period of confusion and perplexity, which may be well compared with the condition of the Greek Church in the seventh century, and of the Romish Church prior to the Reformation. There was, however, also a difference. That which furthered the dissolution, and which appeared to be completely against the Church, was destined at this crisis, in the hand of the Lord, to give rise to new life, instead of passing into a dead traditionalism which forgets the tasks devolved upon it. The most characteristic parallel to the stadium at which the Evangelical Church now finds itself, we may rather take to be the time which succeeded the fierce struggles with the multiform Gnostic systems; when, however, be it observed, those Fathers alone cared best for the true welfare of the Church, who, like an Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, did not take up a merely negative and exclusive position towards Gnosis, but rather converted it into a fermenting principle, whose effect was to further the development of the Church's doctrinal system.

In order that we may gain a view of the present state of the Christology of the Evangelical Church, we will consider—

- I. The divine aspect;
- II. The human aspect;
- III. The union of the two.

I. As concerns the *divine aspect*.—The point of view just given suggests by itself an appropriate grouping of the still existing differences regarding the *higher principle of the Person of Christ*. Evidently for the first time since the Church earned for itself the title of *Ἐκκλησία θεολογούσα* (Div. I. Vol. I. p. 253 ff.), the scientific efforts of the present century are directed with all energy to the so-called objective dogmas of God and the Trinity. If we look at the doctrines which have not merely been inherited, but really, vitally appropriated, understood, and made an inner possession by this age; if we look to that which is the food of its religion; we are compelled to

acknowledge that in the only two respects in which such a thing is possible, there is still a perceptible disproportion between the vitality of Christian piety and the recognition of an immanent Trinity, such as is intended to be taught by the Church. The common judgment of the Church in this respect has not yet recovered the certainty of former ages; it still remains to be re-established in a higher manner. What is required in particular, is such a reproduction of the dogma as shall cause it to appear to the evangelically pious mind impossible to retain its hold on the truth of justification by faith in Christ, whilst the doctrine of an immanent Trinity is rejected, or any sort of purely monarchian view is adhered to. In this respect there is still much to be done ere the Church and its theology, in pronouncing judgment on the monarchian modes of thought prevalent in this age, can be dispensed from the serious consideration of the common debt which has not yet been discharged, and which would be only increased instead of being done away with, were we to endeavour to throw the work required to be performed by Christian thought in the spirit of evangelical faith, on our memory, or on the labours of the Church fifteen hundred years ago.¹ Still it is also unmistakeable that many antitrinitarian forms may already be regarded as mastered, and that the Church as a whole, in the present phase of its development, has a decided tendency to reproduce and establish the doctrine of an immanent Trinity in a manner adequate and homogeneous to the evangelical consciousness. Here again we find that the principal impulse proceeds from the person and work of Christ, as they are regarded by faith, under the influence of the religious experience of redemption and reconciliation.

As the older Jewish Ebionism, with its empirical and deistic mode of thought, which was unable to look upon deity and humanity save as antagonistic to each other, disappeared before Gnosis, so also Rationalism, with its deistic background, such as it made its appearance in various forms in the age of one-sided subjectivity, disappeared before the philosophy of Schelling. But as we found that a new, higher form of Ebionism, which

¹ Compare in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1856, 1, my dissertation, "die deutsche Theologie und ihre Aufgaben in der Gegenwart," pp. 24-35.

we designated the Hellenic, made its appearance at the end of the second century, with the presupposition of an immediate and universal unity of the essence of God and man ; so also, on the basis of modern philosophy, an Ebionism of a higher sort has arisen, which, like Carpocrates in old times, is inclined to give Christ a place amongst the geniuses of humanity, but without being either willing or able to assign to Him a specific position in the midst of the circle of saints. In another respect also does this mode of thought resemble those elder ones which were interwoven with Gnosis, that whilst in one aspect it is Ebionitical, in another aspect it is Docetical. For to it the main matter is the ideal Christ, in relation to whom the historical Jesus has merely an accidental significance, and is by no means His real actuality. The distinction between the Gnostic duplicity of the *ἄνω* and *κάτω Χριστός* and this modern duplicity consists mainly in the circumstance, that the latter gives its *ἄνω Χριστός* more distinctly an anthropological character, represents Him as the idea of humanity, whereas Gnosis assigned Him rather a theological position. But so far as God is supposed to be the universal essence of humanity, this modern Ebionism also acquires at the same time a theological colouring, even if man be not taken, with Feuerbach, as the proper essence of God, and thus the fall into pure anthropologism be accomplished. Whether, then, anything more or less lofty be predicated regarding Jesus, remains religiously a matter of indifference, so long as sin and atonement are not brought under consideration, so long as redemption is represented as at the utmost an intellectual process. Then the divine Spirit or the Logos, who is also the true humanity, is the Redeemer ; and so little need is there for the historical person of the God-man, that Christ is not even removed from the circle of sinners, even though sin in Him may have been reduced to a minimum. But whoso reckons Christ amongst the number of those who need salvation, has already renounced the Christian name.

We have already shown above, however, that this mode of thought is overthrown when we form an ethical conception of God ; so that we can affirm that the pantheistic no less than the deistic contradiction to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has been, as to principle, overcome for the Evangelical Church. Forming an ethical conception of God, sin and atonement

acquire their proper significance: the idea of an immediate and universal God-manhood is excluded; and yet, on the other hand, the possibility of the ideal humanity not continuing in a relation of eternal dualism to actuality, but acquiring also reality in Christ, and through Him in the race, is shown to be involved in the ethical essence of man.

Of this *ethical* aspect of the Person of Christ a more thorough estimate has been formed in the present age than ever before; it is as though the living image of the Person of Christ were about to be brought before the mind of the Church in so much the clearer and more distinct colours, the more the new Gnosticism and its mythical theories threaten to envelope it in an image of cloud. A rich, fruitful literature has begun to interpret the "Life of Jesus" in its most different aspects, to the blessing of the Church, and many a beautiful treasure has already been brought to the light.¹ With such works are further connected valuable treatises on the Sinlessness of Jesus.² In these fruitful labours, which, starting with the historical, tend towards dogmatics as their goal, men have taken part with a pleasure and love worthy of all recognition, who look upon sinlessness as the highest predicate that can be attributed to Jesus, and resist every attempt to give a metaphysical significance to His person. So, for example, the North Americans, Channing and Theodore Parker, in whom the older Socinianism has laid aside its dualistic character, and, evidently under the influence of recent German philosophy, has struck into a path on which it must be possible for it to make real progress. As compared with the legal, deistic nature of Socinianism, Parker in particular evinces a mystical tendency; though, it is true, not without pantheistic representations and an undervaluing of sin. Stranger as Parker is to the richer determinations of the doctrine of the Church, his example ought to fill us with shame, when

¹ We only need to refer to the "Life of Jesus," by Neander, Lange, Hoffmann, Oslander; to the "Bibl. Theologie," vol. i., of my highly-revered teacher, Schmid; to Rothe, T. Beck, Hofmann ("Schriftbeweis"), Ullmann, Tholuck, Lücke, Meyer, Wieseler, Ebrard, Stier, Ewald, Weiss, Hase, De Wette, Baumgarten Crusius, Brückner, Luthardt, and many others; as also to the beautiful book by the talented Edm. de Pressensé, entitled "le Redempteur," Par. 1854.

² Ullmann, "Historisch oder Mythisch?"—"Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu." Ed. 6, 1853. (English translation published by the Messrs Clark.)

we see the beautiful fruits that are produced, where the little is used in a faithful manner. There we may hope one day, earlier or later, to see the word fulfilled, "To him that *hath* shall be given."¹ For better is it livingly and freshly to possess the little we know of Christ, careless about engaging in a polemic against an inheritance which one is not yet able to appropriate to oneself, than to fancy that we have much. The disciples of the Lord also began by recognising in Him the righteous Servant of God, the holy Son of David. But under the light that streams forth from the image of Christ, the attentive and devout observer, where the process takes a normal course, will find himself growing in a self-knowledge which, as involving the consciousness of his own poverty and high destiny, is so much the more susceptible of the comprehension of the divine fulness of wisdom and love, which is in Jesus, and which streams forth quickeningly from Him. The more fully an intelligent faith becomes convinced of the unique moral dignity of Christ, the more natural, nay, the more necessary, must it become for the same faith, starting from this fixed point, to follow Christ with understanding into the sphere of His discourses, where He alludes to His peculiar and unique relation to the Father. The holiness and wisdom of Jesus, which give Him an unique position amongst sinful, much-erring men, inasmuch as they neither can nor will be regarded as a purely subjective human product, do therefore point to a supernatural origin of His person. If we are to understand its appearance in the midst of a world of sinners, we must trace it back to a peculiar and miraculously creative deed of God; nay more, if God is not to be conceived as deistically separated from the world, but as near to it in love, and as Himself essentially love, Christ, looked at in connection with God, must be deemed an incarnation of divine love, in other words, to be of divine essence; and this makes Him appear to be the point in which deity and humanity are uniquely and most intimately united.

¹ In forming this hopeful judgment, I refer to Parker's earlier writings, as I am not acquainted with his later ones. May this thinker, whom his Miscellaneous Writings show to be truly noble, and to be destined for something still better, not allow himself to be driven by contradiction into a path opposed to his own inmost nature, nor suffer restraints to be placed on the inner freedom of his further development.

It is true, many allow themselves in this article to be led astray by an abstract, subjective moralism, which is unable to fathom the depth of the ethical. But he who takes a deeper view of things, and knows that the ethical has also an ontological and metaphysical significance, to him the unique holiness and love of Christ must appear to have their ground in an uniqueness of His essence, and this latter its ground in the self-communicating, revealing love of God. For it is this same divine love, in whose light, when logically conceived, that fatalistic or naturalistic view of nature disappears, which excludes the truly rational miracles of love, and which causes it to appear natural that sin and finitude should not prevent the attainment of the goal necessarily willed by love, to wit, the perfect union of the world with God through the self-communication of God.

It is not an arbitrary procedure, but simply the necessity of the case, to see in Christ, so far as sinlessness is attributed to Him, a divine *revelation of God*, which, by realizing, discloses the archetype of holiness:—which revelation could only be brought to pass through the medium of an unique distinctive being of God in Him, by which the *image of God* attained to actual representation in the world.

This point of view is taken up by men like Weisse, Ewald;¹ as also by several of the school of Schleiermacher. They recognise Christ as the perfect revelation of God, which bears relation to the entire circle of creation with which humanity is

¹ Weisse, "Philosophische Dogmatik" i.1855, § 455 ff., with the quotations from earlier works of the author. "The incarnation is the expression of the one character, or of the one image of the character, of God:" p. 500. The Son is, in his view, the inward divine ideal world, destined to realization in a real personality. Ewald, "Geschichte Christus und seiner Zeit," 1855, pp. 447 f.: "Fulfilling the Old Testament, as the absolutely righteous one, by God's power, He became the Son of God, like no one before Him; in a mortal body, and in fleeting time, He was the purest brightness and the most glorified image of the Eternal Himself,—the Word of God speaking out of God, both through His human word and through His entire appearance and work,—the true Messiah, the eternal King of the kingdom of God, which was first completed in Him." Regarding His earthly life, see p. 445:—"Even the highest, divine power, when it wraps itself in a mortal body and appears in a determinate time, finds its limit in this body and in this time; and never did Jesus, as the Son and the Word of God, confound Himself, or presumptuously put Himself on the same level, with the Father and God."

connected, whose head He is. The pre-existence of the personific divine aspect, however, they do not recognise; but take their stand on a Monarchianism which cannot admit of distinctions in the Most High God Himself, merely allowing the manifoldness of the revelations which relate to the world (to the real world, or even to its ideal archetype in God). These distinctions, under the direction of history, of the Scriptures, and of Christian experience, are then reduced back to a triplicity. We are thus placed substantially on the point of view of Sabellianism, which at the present has numerous representatives in both the Evangelical Confessions.¹

With special clearness has this point of view been set forth recently, under appeal to Hippolytus, to the following effect.² "The personal God (the Father), removed away from all growth, is the subject of the Logos, in somewhat the same manner as *the fulness of the thoughts of the human spirit has its fountain, its central-point, its self-consciousness and Egoity* in the Logos (whereas it is through the Holy Ghost that the divine being and life unites itself intimately with the world, which is the result of the self-revelation of the Logos). The Father of the All is the primal personality; the Logos is the sum of the totality of His revealings, which is equal to the eternal divine fulness of the essence of the Father." This Logos, who is therefore "the sum of all those divine thoughts and powers that relate to the world, has, on the one hand, His conscious Egoity or personality in the eternal, primal personality of the Father; on the other hand, however, this thought-totality (Logos) is able also to express itself, to be taken up into another Ego, and thus to personify itself afresh, as it were, outside of its first originator. Accordingly, the Logos became a person in Christ also. That which was eternally present in the Father, and lived in His consciousness as a spiritual actuality, to wit, the archetype of humanity, arrived at actual manifestation in

¹ Nevertheless, we must at once arrive at something of the nature of essential distinctions in God, if the threefold revelation of God be regarded as lasting; not as a mere act, but also as revealed being; or as the image or copy and manifestation of the inward divine nature. So Weisse, Lücke, Bunsen. Weisse distinguishes in God, reason, soul of nature, will. God-Son is the ideal world of images or nature in God.

² Compare Redepenning's *Protest. Kirchenzeitung*, 1854, Nr. 9, pp. 200 f.

Christ; and in Him is the revelation of God, the divine image which sets itself forth in the world, perfected. Purposing to impress itself on the world from its very beginning; infused into it ever more fully, in the course of its developments and of the stages of its existence, it found at last complete expression within the bounds of human nature. It is an human person to which it communicated itself without restriction, to the degree to which its communications were able to be received at each of the stages through which the person passed (that is, it was appropriated by the person's own free, truly human deed); now, therefore, out from the Father, in whose eternal, primal personality it rested, it has become *for the Father a second, and in the fullest sense, objective personality*, which, at the same time, veritably shares the fulness of the divine essence, and completely embraces and reflects that essence as to its most inward being. The divine Logos is now also a full human, human-divine personality; and the humanity of Christ has become a fully deified being and life. It was possible for this to take place, for there is nothing in God which His love did not wish also to communicate to the world: all that God has and is, He also reveals entirely as He is; for His revelation is truth. It is His will to give Himself entirely and undividedly to the world. But the middle of this grand development through which the world is *becoming* the perfection which God eternally and completely *is*, the inmost focus of its gradual deification, is the Lord, the first true man, who was entirely that which humanity ought to have been from the beginning, to wit, the untroubled image of the Deity, and who now gives Himself to be the property of all, lends and stamps His image on all, and is able to make all participators in His divine nature."

According to this representation, Christ is the centre of the divine ideal world (the Logos), so far as in Him have appeared at once the archetype of humanity and the complete revelation of God. Like Hippolytus, it seeks to give the Son an objective position, as a real personality, over against the Father, in whose primal personality He previously rested: only with the distinction, that whereas Hippolytus represents this objectification, or relative finification, as already accomplished at the creation, and the Son as the personal unity of the world, out of which

it analytically arose; here, on the contrary, the objectification first takes place in Jesus. It is also to be acknowledged that this theory makes visible efforts to view the revelation in Christ as a personal one—without detriment to the full truth of His humanity; nay more, Christ is termed an human-divine personality, capable of making all participators in His divine nature. So certainly now as this corresponds to the Christian consciousness, so certainly does the inconsistency, which we have elsewhere remarked as characterizing Sabellianism, manifest itself also here. For that which bestows the personality is, after all, merely the humanity: how then can we say that the revelation and self-communication of God is completed? If God is not personally present in Jesus; if He knows and wills Himself as a person in Himself, but not in Jesus, He has not yet entirely communicated and revealed Himself; His revelation has not advanced beyond the category of influence or of a communication of *power*; and this is opposed to the recognised principle, that there is nothing in God in an eternal manner which He was not also willing to communicate to the world. In fact, also, one cannot see why a power, or, according to the “thought-totality,” *the* power of God could have been in Jesus, and not also His personal self-volition and knowledge; and indeed in such a manner, that both the Logos should know Himself as man, and this man should know God as one with his person, and thus know himself as God.¹ To term this impossible, would be simply to push the dualism which this theory justly rejects from the sphere of the natures, into the sphere of the personality. And, finally, there can be no doubt, after the observations made in connection with Schleiermacher (pp. 203–213), that if God is not in Christ in a personal form, if the personality of Christ is merely human, it cannot be consistently said of Him that He has the power to make all participators in His divine nature. From which it is also clear, that do what it will to the contrary, the Sabellian mode of thought cannot avoid reeling backwards in the direction of Ebionism.² It will be compelled also to deny redemptive power, in the proper

¹ For further remarks on this subject, see below; pp. 246 f.

² Why in general it is impossible to rest in Sabellianism, has been shown in detail above (see pp. 208 ff.). Whenever the truth of the humanity is seriously maintained, as by Origen, Photinus, and the fore-

sense, and the power of communicating the Holy Spirit, to Christ, if it should be in earnest in representing the humanity as that which bestows the personality; if, consequently, it should treat the divine in Him as mere power. (Note 30.) The Christian mind, however, persists so firmly in treating Christ (particularly out of regard to the atonement) as the miracle of love, by which God personally surrendered Himself to humanity, that, religiously considered, even patripassian views must be far more agreeable to it than Sabellian (Note 31); for, as we have seen previously, and as history has constantly shown, it necessarily dissipates the being of God in Christ into a mere working upon or in Him. But as Patripassianism endangers the absoluteness of the idea of God, there remains no other way of retaining the being of God in Christ, to which faith attaches prime importance, because it is conscious of having fellowship with God through Christ, than to say that God not merely is, but knows and wills Himself in Christ, that He is personally and indissolubly united with Jesus as the man Jesus is with Him, which points to an eternal *τρόπος υπάρξεως* of the divine in Jesus distinct from the Father, however this *τρόπος* may be more precisely described. For this peculiar being of God in Jesus is intransitory, distinguished from the being of God in the world and in believers.

This is not the place to attempt a more precise delineation of the more recent attempts to solve the trinitarian problem. The one approach to Tritheism, or desire a species of more refined Subordinationism;¹ others view the Trinity as a mere process of the divine love, or of the divine consciousness, or

runners of Socinianism, Sabellianism cherishes Subordinationism within itself. In modern times, however, this Subordinationism has usually taken an anthropological, that is, Ebionitical form; seldom an Arian form.

¹ For example, Thomasius, "Christi Person und Werk" ii. 267-274, speaks as though the Trinity had its proper existence in the essential unity of the personal Monas, which he at the same time holds to be eternal will to a trinitarian existence. By this *will* he regards the Trinity as secured. Accordingly, the persons stand over against the Monas in an almost tritheistic subordination: the one absolute personality wills three persons. At the same time, however, the Father, to whom alone he concedes aseity, that essentially divine predicate, occupies in his system the position of Monas (compare i. 92 ff.). But even of aseity itself, we ought to form rather a trinitarian conception.

even only as a matter of attributes. Scarcely an attempt has been made to bring it into inner connection with the fundamental fact of the evangelical consciousness, justification by faith. Many have almost forgotten at what point the old Church left this dogma standing; and because the main question (Div. I. Vol. II. p. 332) is too indistinctly defined, the answer also cannot turn out more advantageously. Still it is becoming ever more universally discerned, that all the essential determinations of the conception of God must be settled in the light and under the influence of the doctrine of the Trinity.¹ So also is the conviction becoming every day more general, that for Christology, the matter of prime consequence is to conceive the divine in Christ in the absolute, the highest, that is, in the personal form; and that the divine in Christ is to be distinguished both from the divine in the world and the divine in believers. As representatives of this conviction, we may adduce Nitzsch, Twesten, J. Müller, Liebner, Lange, Mehring, Merz, Ebrard, Sartorius, Thomasius, and others. Though unanimity is far from having been secured; and though the relation both of the one divine personality to the three divine persons and of the immanent to the œconomic Trinity is very differently determined; the critical review of recent essays at a doctrine of the Trinity given in the Christological work of Liebner, shows convincingly that the theologians of the last decennia have not laboured in vain at this great task, and that their tendency, taken as a whole, after vanquishing deistic and pantheistic Monarchianism, is necessarily to do battle with Sabellianism and Subordinationism in their modern anthropological form. (Note 32.)

II. *The human aspect.*—A still more satisfactory unanimity is exhibited in the prominence universally given to *the true humanity of Christ*, which had so long been misapprehended. Scarcely a theologian of any repute ventures now to deny to it

¹ So, after the example of Nitzsch, Thomasius and Liebner. If this be thoroughly thought out, it can form no contradiction that the one God should be constituted by three persons, and yet that the result should, notwithstanding, be eternally realized, nay more, that this result should be eternally constituted in and through them. For is there not a similar relation of reciprocity in every organism, between unity and articulation?

personality of its own, to characterize it as impersonal. All see now, with Luther, that it is indispensably necessary, in particular, for the work of the atonement, to regard the sacrifice of Christ as a work of His personal humanity, even though in unity with the Logos, in order that His substitutionary satisfaction may not be reduced to a dramatic show.¹ Some only appear to put the person of the depotentiated Logos in the place of a human soul:—in which way Christ would be reduced essentially to a mere theophany (see below). No less clearly do all acknowledge that the truth of the humanity requires that the growth be true, even in relation to intelligence and will; and when the Irvingites, with Menken, posit in Christ an impure nature, derived from Mary, to overcome whose rebellious will was His task—a task accomplished by Him in a normal manner—their intention is by no means to withdraw anything from the sinlessness of Jesus, but merely to assert the truth of His humanity, and of His connection with us, in such a manner as still more to exalt the merit of the fight of faith which He fought. At the same time, however, their postulate, that Christ in His conflict should occupy precisely the same position as every believer, who is as certain of the help of the Holy Spirit as it is certain that Jesus stood in need of His help, gives to the Logos so unimportant a position, that the incarnation becomes unnecessary, and believers are in a dangerous manner put almost on a level with Christ. Unanimous as is the theology of the present time in regard to the sinlessness of Jesus; predominant as is the number of those who keep firm hold on the truth of His moral development; they are not unanimous as to whether the temptation and conflicts of Christ do not require that He should have attained to ethical perfection through choice and free decision; or whether, after a more physical manner, we ought not to predicate of Him an immediate impossibility of sinning. The answer to this question depends partly on the clearness and determinateness of our knowledge of the relation between the physical and ethical in general; and partly on the other question, whether the personal unity of the Logos and of the humanity of Jesus is to be deemed a thing once for all completed by the act of incarnation, or a thing still subjected to

¹ Compare Delitzsch, "die bibl. profet. Theologie," pp. 30 f.; *Thomasius* ii. 53, 117.

growth, on the basis of an *Unio* that, whilst growing, had a veritable existence (*einer seienden Unio*).¹

Though it is undeniable that the later Lutheran Christologians have put true growth into the background, and in general approximated too nearly to Docetism, whilst the Reformed theologians have always zealously laid stress on the full actuality of the humanity; we are justified in saying, that the tendency of the Evangelical Church, taken as a whole, has been to lay hold on this true momentum of the Reformed Christology with a decision such as was scarcely evinced even by the old Reformed dogmaticians, particularly as relates to the personality and ethical development of Christ. On the other hand, it is no less pleasant to find that the truth of the Lutheran Shibboleth, "*humana natura capax divinæ*," is finding universal recognition in the Reformed Church. Scarcely a single representative of the old Dualism can now be mentioned in the Reformed Church; and this phase of opinion may now therefore be fittingly left over to the Compendiums of the History of Dogmas, as something that has been cast completely aside.² One result of the whole of recent science has been a purer recognition of the full reality of the humanity, and a higher conception of it; the knowledge of the true humanity, or of that true idea of it of which Luther had a presentiment, and for the utterance of which in new tongues he longed.³ Thus, even in the midst of the confusions of an age apparently bent only on pulling down, a wise and gracious hand has ruled and arranged that precisely that end should be attained which it was of chief consequence to attain. To the theology of the present day, the divine and human are not mutually exclusive, but connected magnitudes, having an inward relation to, and reciprocally confirming, each other; by which view both separation and identification are set

¹ The proof of Christ's having a human calling is excellently given by Rothe in his "*Christliche Ethik*" ii. pp. 284 ff. See below, pp. 256 ff.

² Compare, for example, Lange, "*Pos. Dogmatik*," p. 213; "*Leben Jesu*" ii. 79. Ebrard (with Gaupp) charges the Lutheran Church even with Nestorianism, because of the proposition, "*Christ is a persona *σύνθετος**," which he speaks of as specifically Lutheran. See the "*Christl. Dogmatik*" ii. 130-141.

³ Compare Hundeshagen, who makes some admirable remarks on the theocentric, ethical nature of man in his "*Rede über die Humanitätsidee*," 1852, pp. 18 ff., 36 ff.

aside. The clearness of the insight into this truth, which is different in different men, depends essentially on the clearness and distinctness with which God's essence is conceived as ethical, and the ethical is conceived as ontological.¹ The truth itself, however, is now recognised by Reformed theologians, both in and out of Germany. In England, by the genial Coleridge, who had sympathy and affinity with Schelling, and his talented, independent disciple, Maurice; by Jul. Hare, Thomas Arnold, Pusey, and others. In France, by Edm. de Pressensé, and the men of the Theological Faculty at Montauban, Sardinoux, and Jalaguier. In Holland, no less by Osterzee and Chantepié de la Saussaye, than by Scholten in Leyden. In Switzerland, by Hagenbach, Romang, Güder, and others. In Germany, likewise, by all the Reformed theologians of note.²

Equally important is the great agreement and the more penetrating insight, in regard to the truth that Christ, notwithstanding His homoousia, differs from all men through being the *head and representative of mankind*. This truth, which has not been derived from philosophy, but has lived eternally in the faith of Christendom, we have seen making its appearance in all the profounder works on Christology; but it first began to reveal itself in its entire significance in the present age. It is possible, indeed, so to understand it, as to make Christ again a mere kind of middle being: that would be a modern, that is, an anthropological species of Arianism without pre-existence. But this scriptural idea is not to be blamed for that. On the contrary, if it be thoroughly thought out, it shows itself to be a middle conception, enabling us to understand how the Son of God can dwell with all His fulness in a

Compare Div. II. Vol. II. pp. 218, 264.

² The only exception (if it may be referred to this connection) is the "Evang. Kirchenzeitung," which (compare the "Vorwort," 1856) appears to wish to retain the old Reformed Dualism; nay more, which in No. 23, 1845, speaks of a twofold Ego in Christ. To the Lutherans, on the contrary, what we have said above is applicable as a matter of course. Delitzsch alone greeted Günther with inconsiderate applause ("Bibl. prophet. Theologie," pp. 30 f., 217); and yet, at the same time, unsuspectingly blames the "Nestorianism of the Reformed Church as apostasy from the old Catholic confession." His praise, however, he has now retracted. The school of Erlangen also, in general, recognises the truth in question; though it has not principally carried it out and established it.

man : even as, on the other hand, we must say that the being which is destined to be the universal head of men and angels can only really occupy such an all-determining position, can only be the universal source of reconciliation and atonement, of the sanctification and perfection of spirits, nay more, even of nature, on the supposition that He is the one place in the world where God has personal being, on the supposition that He is the living seat of the personal God, in His relation to the universe. What light is shed by this truth on the doctrine of the atonement, and particularly on that of substitution, we have already hinted previously : the case is similar with the idea of the Holy Supper. Only by taking this truth for our point of departure, can we arrive at a full and living conception of the Church ; apart from it, we shall be shut up to the dry idea of the Church as an institute for pure doctrine, or for moral education, or for the redemption of individual souls, or for the arrangement of a common cultus. It, on the contrary, shows us that Christ, this divine-human person with soul and body, appropriates to Himself a constantly growing body out of the material of humanity, in that the natural individuals, which, though scattered, belong to and are destined for Him, by their divine idea, are animated by the spirit that proceeds forth from Him, are born again, and are incorporated with Him the Head. Through the idea of the head alone is it possible (but it is also required) to form of humanity, as it is before God, that conception according to which it is not merely a mass, not merely an unity of redeemed individuals, but, taken in conjunction with the world of higher spirits and nature, which is to be glorified for and through it, constitutes the unity of the perfect organism of the world. Besides those who have been mentioned before, almost all the more notable evangelical theologians of the present day have accepted this truth : but it has been advocated with special pleasure and penetrating insight by Martensen, Liebner, Rothe, and Lange. (Note 33.) In a striking manner Lange and Rothe apply it for the purpose of bringing the absolute novelty and miraculous uniqueness of Christ into harmony with the full actuality of His humanity, and its connection with the real human race. (Note 34.) That expression of Irenæus, so rich in presentiment, that Christ "*longam hominum expositionem in se recapitulatur,*" is applied as a light to history, to that of the

Old Testament in particular, though also to the extra-biblical history. The latter in particular, it appears, we may expect to have been done by Schelling in the newest phase of his system. The more this succeeds, the more will Christianity, for which the Person of Christ is eternally essential, be recognised as the centre of history, both backwards and forwards; as the absolute religion, or religion absolutely, which not only brings redemption historically, but will remain in the perfection of all things; in one word, Christ is recognised to be the centre of the revelations of God, and the eternal centre of the universe. This view of the Person of Christ, as a being of not merely ethical, or religious, or temporal-historical, but also of cosmic and metaphysical significance, is alone able to lend to His *humanity* an essential importance. At the same time, the distinction between His humanity and that of all besides Him is determined; and the doctrine of His homoousia with us receives a further development. In this His humanity is contained the all-determining centre, the real principle of the true humanity. By this doctrine of Christ, as the truly human head of creation, that which the Lutheran Christology had wished, or at all events that of which it had had a presentiment, as the fruit of its "*Communicatio idiomatum*," was brought to its truth, and to more adequate and scriptural expression. Through the medium of this truth, Christology stands in indissoluble connection with the idea of the absolute revelation of God, and with the doctrine of the Trinity. For only on one condition can Christ be regarded as the seat of the central revelation of God, after the movement of the divine heart, to wit, that He is not merely a limited, single individuality, like others, but that He was the meeting point of an universal and absolute susceptibility on the part of human nature to God, and of the absolutely universal or central self-communication of God. Because this man is the centre of the world and absolutely susceptible to God, he is also susceptible to the central, to wit, the personal revelation of God. But also vice versâ: the idea of the head shows that this man can be God. For he can only be the head of creation, on the condition that the self-revealing God dwell and be central in him;—indeed, a man of such universal susceptibility cannot be understood, save on the supposition that the Logos prepared him as an adequate place for His incarnation. Christ could not be the

head of the world if He were merely the summing up of its multiplicity, or the sum of its powers; that would be either a monstrous or a merely nominalistic unity; nay more, inasmuch as the world by itself, as to its best being, is merely susceptibility to God, that would not declare its completion, for completion consists in the filling of such susceptibility. He does, however, actually bind them together, because in Him is also a higher principle than the world, a principle which has the power of reaching out beyond, of determining, of animating and of uniting all the beings of the world. Even the natural world is an unity, solely because there is indissolubly united with it a principle which stands above and comprises it within itself, to wit, the divine Logos as world-forming and world-sustaining, who is the vehicle and representative of its eternal idea. Its principle of unity is supramundane, that is, divine; and yet also actually mundane, belonging to the world in its present shape (Col. i. 13 ff.). The world of humanity and spirits also constitutes a real unity solely in virtue of the circumstance that over its essence, which consists in free susceptibility to God, there stands the personal and universal divine principle, and that this principle, whilst standing over, is also turned towards, nay more, belongs to it, so far as it is the true κόσμος, so that without it, it cannot at all be conceived as a completed and filled unity. The cosmical seat of the central susceptibility to God represents, therefore, the seat of the possibility of the real unity and completion of the world; but the actuality thereof is derived from a higher than a merely cosmical principle, to wit, from the central, that is, personal self-communication of God. Owing, however, to the susceptibility to God imparted to the world, and by which it appropriates these self-communications to itself, these communications do not remain a foreign thing; they become, on the contrary, the constitutive factor, which belongs to the world itself as to its divine idea. For the idea of the world, as it stands eternally before God, is not terminated and completed with susceptibility to God; but, according to His unfathomable gracious will, includes also that this susceptibility be absolutely filled in itself; and at the point where the central fulfilment corresponding to this central susceptibility takes place, the world too, which as merely susceptible to God, or even sinful, was outside of God, entered into the circle of

the divine life, into the life of the triune God Himself; even as the immanent divine life explicated itself here to a cosmical life. But although, by the filling of the human susceptibility, the divine is appropriated to humanity in such a manner that this man also acquires "power over God," may, and does, count the divine part of himself; God does not lose Himself, but in that He comes into absolute possession of this man, and reckons Him part of Himself, He retains possession of, and power over, Himself. The Son or Logos is not the world, but its divine principle, which brought a world to pass, not by a necessity of nature, but according to the inner law of love, which is at the same time the law of freedom. He is also not the ideal world, nor the image of the world in God, but primarily its principle. Still, we are compelled to say that the world, both according to its idea and according to the idea of the will of the Logos, in other words, the divine idea relative to the completion of the world, first arrives at perfection, at realization, through the incarnation: that consequently, according to His self-communicative will of grace, His humanification, the result of which is the deification of man, is constituted part of the idea of humanity as viewed by the mind of God.

This leads to a further point, which is of decisive importance both in itself and in a systematical respect—a point by which the *historical* in Christ, as required in particular by the fundamental thought of Lutheranism, is raised to absolute significance, and is removed from the sphere of contingency. This is the truth, that the incarnation of God in Christ had not its sole ground in sin; but, besides sin, had a deeper, to wit, an eternal and abiding necessity in the wise and free love of God, so far as this love willed, in general, the existence of a world which should be the scene of its *perfect* revelation, and so far as, consequently, the world is marked by susceptibility to, and need of, this revelation. All that is necessary to secure the recognition of this truth by the simplest Christian consciousness, is the remembrance that Christianity is the perfect religion, *the* religion absolutely, the eternal Gospel; and that for this religion Christ is the centre, without which it cannot be at all thought. Whoso maintains that Adam might have become perfect even without Christ, inasmuch as no one can deem it possible to conceive of perfection without the perfect religion, maintains, either con-

sciously or unconsciously, the possibility of two absolute religions, one without and one with Christ ;—which is a bare contradiction. For that it makes an essential difference whether Christ, or only God in general (whether we designate Him Logos or Holy Ghost), is the central-point of a religion, no Christian will deny. Undoubtedly this truth, which, rightly viewed, is of the most thorough significance, is liable to be disfigured in a variety of ways, as we have had repeated occasion to show in the course of the previous history. But the arguments against its fundamental thought, which have been recently advanced by persons deserving of consideration, rest either on misunderstanding or prove the contrary : and only so much must be conceded, that the necessity of the truth in question will less clearly appear to theologians who are accustomed to proceed in a predominantly empirical or anthropological manner, than it must, and actually does, to those who recognise both the possibility and necessity of a Christian speculation, that takes the conception of God for its point of departure. Though it might be shown that even the former only maintain the purity of the Christian dogma in the most important points, by acting as though they did really accept this truth.

In fact, besides the many above mentioned, as Steffens, Göschel, Baader, the following thinkers also accept the truth : Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Fischer, Chalybæus, Ehrenfeuchter, Schöberlein, Nägelsbach, Kling, A. Petersen, Schmid (Note 35), Ebrard (ii. 95), and many others.

The arguments advanced against it by J. Müller and Thomasius are the following :—Thomasius is of opinion that the incarnation would, on such a supposition, cease to be a free act of the divine love ; that it would become a necessity of the divine essence ; nay more, that we should be led to an evolution of God, by which the world and God would be commingled, and the difference between the essence of man and God, and the creatural character of the former, would be denied. No less, if the destiny to incarnation should be reckoned to human nature from the beginning, instead of seeing in it merely a supplementary act of pure divine grace, would it be Pelagian.¹ It is difficult, however,

¹ "Christi Person und Werk," Bd. i. 1853, pp. 159–173, 216 ff. Compare Rocholl, "Beiträge z. G. deutsch. Theosophie," 1856, pp. 113 ff.

to see why that assertion should put a greater restraint on the free love of God than Thomasius' assumption of the necessity of the incarnation after sin. Is the creation, then, not the work of free divine love? If so, the completion of creation must also remain the work of free love, although we cannot conceive that God, in willing the world, should not also have willed it for perfection. It is true, an ethical theology will not be able to put a Scotistic or Calvinistic "*liberum arbitrium*" in the supreme place; because it considers that the highest should be classed, not under the category of plenipotence, but of wise and holy love.—As little has that truth anything to do with an identification of the essence of God and man. It is able to allow of a distinction of essence, without interfering with the circumstance that, in accordance with the law of free love, it is precisely the difference that impels the divine fulness to communicate itself, where there is susceptibility or need. Such a difference,¹ which is the presupposition of a vital unity, is opposed indeed to identity of essence, but not to that connectedness of the divine and the human which is in agreement with the principle of the divine love and the essence of the human nature created by it. On the contrary, we both can and must, in this sense, recognise an essential unity of God and man through their (distinct but not separate) *essence*—a *φυσικὴ ἑνωσις*; not merely an unity through hypothesis, will, idiomata, local indwelling, and the like, which is further removed from identity than the dualistic view, which in all ages, when it has not become antichristological, has turned into identification. So also is the fear of Pelagianism grounded in pure misunderstanding; for the opinion is not that humanity became God-manhood through the immanent development of its freedom; nor even that it can at any time whatever have had actual goodness as a natural advantage, independently of God's communicating deed. In itself, humanity merely possesses susceptibility to God, which the Logos found concentrated as in a centre in the humanity of Christ. But when J. Müller supposes² that that assertion leads to the supposition of an head, in which the whole idea of the body has already found realization, this affects solely the coarse view of Christ as the unity of humanity, according to which He is humanity itself in a col-

¹ Div. II. Vol. II. pp. 218 f.

² "Deutsche Zeitschrift f. chr. Wissenschaft," etc., 1850, Nr. 40.

lective form, but not the scriptural doctrine above expounded; and when he demands that redemption be considered as the focus of the entire system, he cannot surely intend to maintain that the Triune God also exists solely on account of sin, or that the world, after the vanquishment of sin, exists solely for redemption; but he, too, must acknowledge that Christianity has other essential relations besides those to sin and redemption. He also recognises a perfection which will endure eternally; whereas sin is a matter of history in time. Nor will it be necessary to slight the necessity for the incarnation on the side of man, which lies in the fact of sin, because we find its necessity *also* in the need of perfection, or because we assume it to have been a necessity for God, in so far as, if He willed a perfect world, He could not omit to will the God-man who is its honour and crown. The fear lest that assumption should conflict with Soteriology, and deprive the argument for the necessity of Christ from the fact of sin of its force, it would seem very possible to remove. If Christ were necessary in order that imperfection might be raised to perfection, it follows that He is still more necessary now that sin has entered the world. Are we not compelled, in any case, to say that God, inasmuch as He admitted the possibility of sin, willed also, in the plan of incarnation formed from eternity, the possibility of redemption through the incarnation, and accordingly arranged the world from the beginning with a view to this incarnation, at all events as a possibility? In no way does it follow, further (even if the doctrine in question be united with the other, that Christ is the head of humanity, which, although defensible enough, is not in itself necessary), that Christ is in *the same* sense the head of humanity and of the angels, as He is the head of believers (the Church). Still more difficult is it to see how, from both together, there should result the danger, that Christ, as the head of humanity, must necessarily be constantly pouring out the Holy Ghost on humanity, thus rendering atonement unnecessary, and substituting a magical process in the place of faith. In general, we may say that the idea of the Head, in our view, by no means involves representations of a magical substitution of Christ for us. We are of opinion, however, that this idea is the indispensable support of a true and ethical conception of substitution;¹

¹ Rothe, "Ethik" ii. pp. 280 f.

that, without it, the work of atonement must wear the appearance of something external, or even arbitrary. Herein is by no means involved a catholicizing doctrine of compensation; for it is very compatible therewith that every individual by himself should be destined to become, ethically and religiously, a perfect God-man, and that this should only be able to be attained in an individual form; in other words, that man can only attain his true essence when he takes up the articulate position in the totality of the true organism of humanity to which his individuality predetermined him.

This objection, however, leads us to consider those arguments against the above doctrine, which, when more carefully examined, turn into arguments in its favour. Thus Thomasius says:—On such a view, the setting forth of pure humanity would be the purpose of the incarnation. If he mean that this must then be its exclusive aim, after the remarks made above, he is clearly in error. But if his opinion be that this purpose is to be excluded, and that it can only be excluded by adopting the opposed assumption, this would be a proof against the latter, and would show that such an assumption admits merely of an organon of the deity, of a theophany, not of a true and veritable humanity. J. Müller advances the same objection in a still more precise form, when he gives expression to the fear that, in our view, Christ would be constituted an end in Himself, and something epideictical, instead of being a mere means. We answer,—if He were not also an end in Himself, He could not have been the (ethical) means, which He is supposed to be and is. Even supposing no man allowed himself to be redeemed, it would be of value that in him a personality capable of redeeming made His appearance. It is of value in itself; and for this reason its surrender is of value for the world, and able to be substitutionary. But even J. Müller also is compelled to acknowledge that Christ is an end in Himself, like every man, when he allows that He continues to exist after having redeemed humanity; whereas that which owes its existence solely to the circumstance that it is a means, has no right to continue to exist when the end for which the means was devised has been attained. If we do not attribute to Christ a significance for humanity reaching out beyond the time of sin, Christ would become superfluous after the accomplishment of the work

of redemption; He would owe His existence entirely to the circumstance that "intransitoriness belongs to the truth of human being;" and in the age of perfection, we should enter into an essentially different religion, a religion which is no more constantly mediated through Him; unless, indeed, we were to say that even now eternal life does not proceed forth from Him, and that we merely owe to Him the negative element of redemption,—which, however, cannot be separated from the positive. When, further, both J. Müller and Thomasius hint that, apart from the fall, there would have been no separation into first and second creation, no antagonism whatever between the commencing nature of man and the *Πνεῦμα*, it harmonizes very badly with Paul's doctrine of the first Adam (1 Cor. xv.), who is not yet *πνευματικός*, but *χοϊκός* and *ψυχὴ ζῶσα*, whereas the second Adam, the Lord from heaven, was for the first time *πνευματικός* or the *πνεῦμα*. Paul distinguishes determinately between the first and second creation by his important doctrine of the two Adams; and, indeed, also apart from sin; for he speaks of the imperfection and non-pneumatical nature of the first Adam without reference to sin. But perhaps Adam would have arrived at perfection, by an immanent development of his freedom, and independently of an external revelation, if he had not sinned? According to Paul, Adam was imperfect, even if he had not sinned; and he does not say that he could have attained to perfection without the *πνεῦμα*. It will surely be conceded, that if there was a need at all for a revelation apart from sin, the revelation must needs advance on to the apex of its perfection in the incarnation of God. But perhaps the need of an external revelation is grounded solely in sin? Perhaps Adam would have become a participator in the Pneuma or the Logos without Christ, by a normal, inner development; nor would humanity in this way have come short, because Adam (Thomasius i. 220), as its natural head, would then have been the unity in which it is one, especially as the "Patriarch Adam" would have been glorified by sanctity into spiritual life, and would thus have experienced a species of "communicatio idiomatum?" Thomasius ventures to give utterance to the latter idea; J. Müller assumes the former. But unless we assume, with J. Müller's pre-existentialism (which on its part involves quite peculiar Christological difficulties), that human nature

had at the beginning an entirely different organization from its present one, to wit, a purely spiritual one, we must abide by the principle that revelation is communicated through objective media, and not in a purely inward manner; and that this arises from the *essence* of man (even independently of sin), whose development depends in general on stimulus from without. Consequently, the denial of that truth from this side threatens to land us in a spiritualistic view of the essence of man. Thomasius, however, who fancies he sees a danger of Pelagianism, or of the commixture of things that do not belong to each other, where no such danger exists, will have to take care, with his view of Adam, not to overlook this danger where it does actually exist. For, to suppose that Adam was properly determined by God to supply Christ's place in humanity, and to occupy the position which (apart from the work of redemption) Christ occupies, is to confound in a dangerous manner the distinction between the first creation, with its Adam, and the second. It is true Thomasius (similarly Hofmann) urges further, that, apart from sin, the Logos would have been the inner bond of unity, as the "Patriarch Adam" was the external one. But in view of that which, even in his opinion, is given to us in Christ, he cannot conceal from himself that a great discrepancy would then have remained between the inner unity through the Logos and the real unity through Adam; and that in Christ's person the unity exists in an infinitely more intensive and real form, because in Him the inner and the reality are co-extensive.¹ If now it must without doubt be allowed to be a great good that the unity of humanity manifests itself in the Person of Christ quite differently from what it could ever have manifested itself in Adam (unless we should make Adam the God-man, or regard the God-man as a mere God-filled man), what could hinder God from intending for humanity from the beginning, and agreeably to its original idea, this unity, which it is professed was first intended for it afterwards; especially as the susceptibility must have been already included in that original conception of humanity? How could God have formed the resolve, or willed, prior to sin, that that full susceptibility of humanity to the Logos, which He certainly must have given to it, should remain unfulfilled, if,

¹ Thomasius shows that he had an inkling of this in i. 220.

as even Thomasius himself does not deny, other things besides redemption have been conferred on humanity through the God-man? Why should His love not have willed the revelation of itself as absolute, and have preferred that which was relatively imperfect? On Thomasius' view, it is impossible to escape from all these difficulties, unless we are prepared for a still further step. J. Müller knows well that, if it be conceded that humanity was originally willed by God as an organism, we cannot any longer deny that it is willed with a perfect head, that is, with the God-man; but he adopts the logical course of denying that original divine idea of humanity. Thomasius, on the contrary, tries ever again to conceive humanity as an organism; nor is he disposed idealistically to undervalue the outward realization and representation of the point of unity of humanity: he conceives humanity as a *kind*, the Church as an organism. But, as we have shown, his Christology, which represents precisely the head as non-necessary, harmonizes badly therewith. The only place for such a denial is in a system which teaches that humanity originally existed in atomistic separation, and that the individuals are perfectly independent of each other, that is, in the system which J. Müller consistently carries out to the point of pre-existentialism. If, on the contrary, as Thomasius maintains, humanity is to be conceived as an organism whose individualities remain permanently different, the perfection which accrues to the organism through an eternally abiding head must also be allowed to have been contained in the eternal idea of humanity as it stood before God. Yet even J. Müller, with his view, will not be able to escape the following alternative:—if in the thought of the creation of humanity all men are thought, and Christ also is a true man, it follows that He also was included in the thought of creation, and not merely first in the thought of redemption; which would be the concession of that which we assert. To deny the former, would be either to represent Christ, not as an actual man like others, but as a theophany; or to say, that the thought of creation did not include a fixed number of human personalities, which together were destined to form a whole; but that, by humanity as it stood before God, we are to understand a diffuse and unlimited multiplicity. The former, J. Müller cannot intend; the latter would not harmonize with the strictly teleological tendency

which otherwise characterizes all his thinking; it would lower the value of the individual personality, and leave the interest of reason unsatisfied, which is directed towards a wise teleological unity.—Further, even J. Müller will neither be able nor willing to deny that the perfected continue eternally different from each other: their difference, however, will consist in the difference of their individualities, and in their becoming that which they were originally intended to be, according to the divine conception and will;—for what else can the moral task be, than that every individuality morally reproduce itself in agreement with the divine idea which posited it, and thus by willing realize that idea? On this supposition, however, J. Müller is laid under the necessity of thinking humanity according to the divine idea of it, in order that its unity may be preserved in the multiplicity, not as a mere scattered multitude of men, but as an organism, whose members complement each other and form an unity through a real head. For it is impossible that the unity of men should be their deed alone, the sole product of their loving intercourse, without the participation of the creating and perfected God. They wish, indeed, to regard Christ as the all-sufficient Mediator, but proceed as though His functions had become unnecessary, and had passed away with the work of redemption. This, however, would be nothing less than to say,—if we are once reconciled, the positive life full of substance is ours of itself, independently of a continuous act of Christ, the eternal High Priest and King; and thus everything that Christ gives, would be merely an unloosing of powers present from the beginning, and not a filling of the initiatory susceptibility. As, therefore, in relation to humanity, the ultimate ground of the difference reduces itself to the question:—Is humanity willed by God as an organism, and therefore with a head in which the unity is as *realiter* realized as the permanent difference of the individuals? or, is humanity willed to be a mere diffuse mass of beings, of indeterminate number and nature, whose duty it is, by their own acts of love, to produce the real unity out of the same spirit? So also in regard to the individual, the difference reduces itself in the last instance to the question:—Is humanity, as to its original essence, merely free susceptibility for the good, for God and for His revelation; or is it to be conceived as

freedom capable of producing the good out of itself?—Now, so certainly as that this free susceptibility is destined to be filled and to receive the good for its own, even so far is it from corresponding to the position of a creature to suppose it possible for the freedom of man to be perfected without divine self-communication. The only conception we can form of the union between God and humanity, which is the end of religion, is, that the highest act of freedom, in relation to the divine, consists in its allowing itself to be determined by God and His revelation, to be filled with power and eternal life.—Only on condition of recognising that truth, can the *ethical* character of faith also be strictly maintained. For unless we acknowledge that our nature, as willed by God, is destined for Christ, and drawn towards Him by its very essence, we cannot speak of an universal human duty to believe in Christ, that is, of a duty to believe in this individual person, indicated by human nature and by the human conscience (as distinguished from merely believing His word, or, after a Nestorian manner, the divine in Him; but the duty to believe in Him as the God-man). He is not merely a vehicle of the word of God, like Moses and the prophets; but in the unity and entirety of His person, consequently also as man, He is the being to which attaches an universal and metaphysical significance for all men, yea, for all spirits. Only on this supposition, can we understand how that which necessarily holds true of all sin, holds true also of unbelief in Christ, that is, that it contradicts, not merely some positive command, but our own essential nature: only thus is it possible, that the faith which brings us into connection with this man should be the performance of a moral duty of an universal human kind; that, therefore, the law of nature should harmonize inwardly with the *νόμος πίστεως*, and that the act of faith should be in the true sense a free deed, and not in the last instance an arbitrary or a merely legal act. For this reason also do we read, “Judgment is committed to the Son, because He is the Son of man.” Even our redemption depends on our believing, not merely in the Logos, but in *Christ*; ¹ and this would be idolatry, if the humanity of Christ were not also included in the metaphysical significance of this person. We cannot, therefore, believe in Him as a redeeming person, with-

¹ See the passage quoted from Schmid in Note 35.

out also believing in Him as the perfecting person, nay more, without believing that the perfection of humanity was first set forth in Him. This is at the same time the point at which it may be clearly seen, that unless the truth in question be recognised, it is impossible to advance beyond the antagonism between Rationalism and Supernaturalism, between the first and second creation. For the entrance of the *God-man* into the order of the world and the sphere of religion retains otherwise the character of a something positive which is external to, and accidental for, the original plan of the world. The order of the world and the religion based on Christ (if they are not to be regarded as transitory in relation to the centre of Christianity, which lies in the Person of Christ, and not merely in the work of redemption) fall, apart from that truth, into so irreconcilable conflict with the unity of the divine plan of the world which is required by reason and the Christian consciousness, that Christianity must give up the claim to be the absolute religion, and theology the possibility of a connected systematic Christian view of the world.¹ Only one way of escape would then remain for theology, and that would bring about a conflict with the moral consciousness. This would be the way, with Schleiermacher, to say, that in the original plan of the world sin was ordered together with redemption, and that in this sense the first creation was *necessarily sinful*, though destined to be redeemed by the second. When the Larger Lutheran Catechism, in a similar manner (p. 503), says,—“ob id ipsum nos creavit ut nos redimeret et sanctificaret;—neque enim unquam eo propriis viribus pervenire possemus, ut patris favorem ac gratiam cognosceremus, nisi per Jesum Christum dominum nostrum, qui paterni animi erga nos speculum est;” it is an endeavour to give utterance to the pure Christian consciousness, which cannot suffer Christ to be regarded as a person of merely accidental

¹ This is recognised even by Philippi, in his way (see his “Kirchl. Glaubenslehre” i. p. 20); however much he may in other respects misunderstand or incorrectly explain the thought with which we are concerned in that truth. Philippi also, in his way, shows that we can only deny it at the price either, after the example of Rationalism, of regarding the *God-manhood* as essentially non-necessary for humanity, or, like the old Supernaturalism, the *God-manhood*; in other words, at the price either of Ebionism or Docetism. Philippi’s work on the active obedience of Christ takes the latter side. (See Div. II. Vol. II. Note 42.)

and momentary significance for piety. If, however, as is unavoidable, we give up the idea of the necessity of sin, it will be impossible to find the satisfaction of our scientific and religious interest save in that truth;—a truth which A. Osiander rejected, not for its own sake, but because of the faulty form in which it was presented, as indeed we may see from the circumstance that the “Formula Concordiæ” does not repudiate it itself. For did not Brentz, among others, give in his adherence to it? (See Div. II. Vol. II. pp. 182 ff.)

Everything concentrates itself here, in the last instance, in the question;—Whether the sole point of importance in the Christian religion is the impersonal, the as it were *thinglike* (dinglich) “meritum Christi;” or primarily and permanently the person itself,—the “meritum,” however, through the person,—and that as a divine-human unity, not as a mere theophany, not as a mere organ.¹ The tendency of the Lutheran Christology is primarily to lay stress on the Person of Christ (see Div. II. Vol. II. p. 121): the very glorification of the body and of nature, of which even Adam stood in need, it takes pleasure, especially at the present day, in bringing into connection, not merely with the Logos, but with Christ’s person and divine-human essence as bestowed on us in the Holy Supper. How far from harmonizing therewith is an opinion which compels those who entertain it to deny that from the very beginning Christ was reckoned upon for the perfecting of our nature and person; which rather, on the contrary, supposes that the same glorification would have been attained through the λόγος ἄσαρκος, and by the immanent development of freedom! *But this notion is also an empty abstraction.* As Christians, we know that we have and shall retain our perfection in Christ; and that this is from eternity the decree of God. What interest then can impel us to indulge in the arbitrary, abstract dream of a perfection rent asunder from Christ, and brought about by the mere Logos; and to rob God of the œconomically distinct trinitarian revelation, without which it is as impossible to con-

¹ The opposed view bears a Sabellian character, in so far as, regarding Christ as a mere means, after the redemption of all who believe has been accomplished, it retains a completely useless, dispensable person, which Sabellianism then, with greater consistency, allows entirely to disappear. It is connected also with the lack of development of Christian eschatology.

ceive the good and system of the world as an unity, as to conceive the loving self-revelation of God to the world to be complete and perfect? But finally, by denying that truth, we infringe also on the honour of Christ. When Paul, in Col. i. 15-17, says that all things were created for and by the love of the Son of God; no one will be able to deny that he regards this Son and His honour as the end of the completion of things even in creation. But he must have deemed the Son of God's love as He actually will be and *is* at the end, consequently as God-man, to be this aim; for if Paul did not speak of the purpose as it will be actually realized at the end, and if the humanity which Christ retains is not included in that picture of the final goal of the world which hovered before Paul's mind, it would be not merely abstract, but Nestorian. The Apostle held the Son of God's love to be the end and aim in the form in which He exists at the end, to wit, as God-man. He will not be the goal again at the end merely as that which He was already in the beginning. It is true, if we were to conceive of Christ as a mere act of God, this act would be a mere means; He is, however, the personal unity of God and of man.

This leads us to the last point, which is at the same time the most difficult..

III. *How are we to conceive the personal unity of God and man?* Or, inasmuch as neither the humanity nor the deity of Christ may be conceived to be impersonal, because it would be incompatible with the truth and completeness of either of the two aspects, how do divine and human personality agree in Christ? Were the Ego something particular by itself, separate from the essence or the nature, the problem would be insoluble, especially if the natures must be held to differ essentially from, and did not rather stand in an inward relation to, each other, through the very features which discriminate them. The latter error has been overcome. But even the Ego is nothing else than the divine and the human nature as self-knowing and self-willing. If now these are inwardly related to each other even in themselves, they will also be capable of combining to form an unity as self-knowing and self-willing. It is therefore not merely possible, but necessary, that the consequence of the indissoluble union between God and man should be, that this man, in knowing and willing him-

self, knows himself as the central susceptibility, who has become absolutely filled with that for which he possessed the susceptibility, and possesses that fulness as his own. Thus does the man who is endowed with this susceptibility know, not only himself, but also the Logos as pertaining to his own being, as a determination of himself, as the "complementum" of the full conception of himself, or as the other aspect of his idea, which has become his own property. In precisely the same manner does the Logos, in power of His love, know humanity as a determination of Himself, to give which to Himself there was in Him the eternal possibility and will. Whether, therefore, we take our start with the Logos or with man, we find that the self-consciousness (and volition) of each includes the other momentum in itself as a determination of itself. What, consequently, is present on both sides, is nothing but the *divine-human* consciousness, one and the same, which is neither a merely human consciousness of the Logos, nor a merely divine consciousness of man, but a divine-human consciousness of both, that is, as both actually exist, to wit, as united; consequently, divine-human consciousness and volition.

That in *the state of exaltation* Christ is absolutely complete God-man; that God and man are absolutely united in Him (nay more, that so long as there was self-consciousness in Jesus, there was also a divine-human consciousness, and so forth),—on this point the evangelical theologians of the present day are substantially agreed. The main point, to wit, the image of the exalted God-man as an unity, as required by the needs of the individual believer and of the worshipping Church, is thus secured. For both have to do with the living, exalted Lord. But even the knowledge of the earthly God-man and His growth has not merely scientific, but also religious interest. For the image of the exalted Lord is based on that of the historical.

In relation also to the earthly God-manhood of Christ, as we have observed, not merely is the principle that He must have undergone a true growth universally recognised; but theologians also are pretty generally agreed in the opinion, that if the unity of the divine-human life during the period of Christ's earthly existence is to be maintained, the *κένωσις* must be much more completely carried out. (Note 36.) Seeing that, as all allow, a man who is still undergoing development and growth

cannot form a personal unity with the Logos as absolutely self-conscious and actual, especially so long as the man has not even arrived at self-consciousness; and seeing that the idea of true growth does not permit of the adoption of the old expedient of constituting an unity by representing human nature as absolutely raised above itself from the very beginning; we have no alternative but to assume, that in some way or other the Logos limited Himself for His being and activity *in this man*, so long as the same was still undergoing growth. The divine, therefore, which or so far as it was not yet fully appropriated, owing to the fact of the humanity undergoing a true growth, especially because of its embryonic beginning, did not become man from the very commencement, and certainly did not form a constitutive factor of the initiatory result. The Logos put a limit on His self-communication till human susceptibility had attained more complete development; in such a manner, indeed, that every stage of Christ's existence was divine-human, and that there was never anything human in Christ which was not appropriated by the Logos, and which had not appropriated the Logos, so far as the divine-human perfection at each stage required and allowed of it.

Important differences, however, are still observable here. The one maintain that this limitation of the Logos in Jesus is to be conceived as a rooted self-depotentiation in love, as consisting in a reduction of His being to the point of adequacy to the embryonic life of a child of man, to the end that He might gradually arise out of the self-given form of unconsciousness, and in unity with man, or divine-humanly, again become conscious, again acquire His actuality in and outside of Himself. (Note 37.) On the only *other* possible view, we can merely speak of a limitation of the self-communication of the Logos to humanity, not of a lessening or reduction of the Logos Himself. According to this view, the being and actuality (the inner and the cosmical) of the Logos remained unchanged; and even this man possessed the being and actuality of the Logos as his own property in virtue of the indissoluble union established from the beginning, merely so far as was compatible with the truth of human growth. For this very reason, the eternal personality of the Logos did not immediately, and ere there was an human consciousness, become divine-human (although the being and action

of the Logos are and remain personal). The Logos, who, at the beginning, *qua* person or self-consciousness did not yet communicate Himself, remained in and by Himself (that is, He rested *relatively*,¹ and restricted His self-communication) in so far as humanity lacked the ability to receive Him. On this view, the object of the volition of the Logos is, in the first instance, solely the production of a divine-human *nature*, not a divine-human person. (Nor, in fact, does the former view bring out anything more for Christ at the beginning; the only difference is, that it supposes itself to be able to say that the Logos Himself also, for Himself, ceased for a time to exist as a self-conscious person, and was, consequently, merely divine nature.) According to the second view, the Logos so determines His nature in the first instance, as that through His union with an human nature, an *ἄριον*, a holy nature, which can be called the Son of God, shall be brought into existence;² and, united with Jesus, the Logos knows and wills henceforth all the determinations of this man as pertaining also to Himself.

The first view represents as it were everything superfluous, everything that could not yet find room in humanity, as so long either suppressed or renounced by the Logos,³ till humanity became sufficiently susceptible, supposing that in this way justice is done to the divine-human unity:—the second view, on the other hand, represents the *Logos* in Christ as personal, but the union as *not completely accomplished* until the personality of the Logos also became divine-human, through the coming into existence of an human consciousness able to be appropriated, and able also itself to appropriate.

¹ See above, Div. I. Vol. I., p. 320.

² Martensen's Dogmatik, pp. 315 f. The neuter *ἄριον*, in Luke i. 35. marks the impersonal: see Schmid's "Bibl. Theol.," Th. i. 40. Schöberlein's "Die Grundlehren des Heils," p. 65:—"His divine trinitarian being and rule underwent no interruption, notwithstanding His self-exinanition. Love remains elevated in all its humiliation. Whilst really participating in the life of the object beloved, it preserves the specific and distinctive character of its own nature."

³ Be it represented as a depositing thereof in the Father, or as a *Contractio* of the Logos, or as a negation of actuality, as a self-reduction to potentiality, the *κένωσις* must, on this view, be deemed to extend also to the self-consciousness of the Logos; for otherwise it would answer no purpose whatever, inasmuch as man is not self-conscious at first.

Which of these two views is most in harmony with the common doctrine of the Church, must be clear from the history of the dogma.¹ That the former is opposed to the ἀτρέπτως, ἀναλλοιώτως, of the Symbol of Chalcedon, no artifices can either conceal or change. For it is not very consistent, in the doctrine of God, to describe self-consciousness and inner actuality as pertaining to the *essence* of God, but to forget this same thing in Christology, and to fancy that, without detriment to or alteration of His essence, the Logos can be stripped by Himself of self-consciousness. As respects the keeping pure of the conception of God, Theopaschitism is not better; nay more, as regards the divine *essence*, it is in no respect different from the Patripassianism rejected by the Church because of its ethnical savour. It is well known that both branches of the Evangelical Church have repudiated this Theopaschitism in their confessions, because they deemed it to involve an abolition of the Trinity and Subordinationism.² We cannot say, therefore, either that it is Reformed or that it is Lutheran. This view, however, is still more completely contradictory of the Lutheran doctrine as distinguished from the Reformed, in so far as the Lutheran Christology has always attached prime importance to the "Majestas" of the humanity of Christ; whereas here, so far is this point from being made one of importance, that the "Majestas" even of the Son of God, and His government of the world, are supposed to have been suspended during the period of Christ's earthly existence.³ The old Reformed Christology, on the contrary, whose main object was to avoid confounding God and

¹ Div. I. Vol. II. 84, 85, 353 ff., 365 ff., 399 ff.; Div. II. Vol. I. 16, 17, 89-102, especially pp. 95 ff.

² F. C. p. 612. Compare Athan. Symbol. § 33, i. 978, Anm.; Can. 11, 12, of the Synod of Firmium.

³ From which the old Lutheran dogmaticians are so infinitely far removed, that even where, out of regard to the reality of the "Exinanitio," they deny to the humanity "Majestas" on earth, they still persist in maintaining that the Logos, who was united with such humanity, continued unchanged in Himself, and governed the world omnipresently; that, consequently, the existence of a divine consciousness and volition which were not yet the consciousness of the man, must be assumed during the period of growth. Here, too, the "Exinanitio" is represented as the presupposition of the incarnation;—a course commonly enough adopted by the Reformed theologians, whereas Lutherans represented the incarnation as coming first. Compare Oehler l. c. (see Note 37).

the creature, and allowing the divine "Majestas" to be participated in by the latter, was more inclined than the Lutheran rather to heighten the supreme "liberum arbitrium" or "beneplacitum" of God, in order that the possibility might lie in His absolute power, not indeed of raising the creature to absolute unity with Himself, but certainly of lowering Himself for a time. Indeed, the Lutheran dogmaticians have not infrequently evinced a disposition to find theopaschitic thoughts in the "inclinatio" of the Logos to humanity, taught by the Reformed Church.¹

It will be difficult also to avoid saying, that like as the old Patripassianism and Theopaschitism with which the Fathers of the third and fourth centuries, and especially Athanasius,² had to do battle, followed on the heels of Gnosticism, and were inwardly connected with the ethnical and pantheistic shaking of the absoluteness of the conception of God; so the favour with which modern Theopaschitism is for the moment regarded by some, is the direct fruit of the philosophical movements which we have just left behind. It is sure, however, not to be lasting; for it neither explains anything, nor is really concerned about the *κένωσις*: on the contrary, it involves in greater and more insoluble difficulties than those which were intended to be avoided:—for which reason, many who adopt it do so in such a way as at the same time to abolish it again.

The truth of the *κένωσις* of the Logos Himself is the inner, sympathetic and compassionate love which stirred in Him in eternity, in virtue of which He condescends to the creatures, who stand in need, and are susceptible of Him, to the end that He may know and possess what they possess as His own; but especially to the end that He may communicate His own fulness. *But precisely the κένωσις of self-depotentiation fails to perform that at which it aims.* For if the Logos, professedly in love, has given up His eternal, self-conscious being, where is His love during that time? Love without self-consciousness is an impossibility. *Nay more: What necessity can there be for the eternal Logos accomplishing this unethical sacrifice of Himself?*

¹ Ebrard ii. 204 ff., 142 ff. Schneckenb., in his "Vergl. Darstellung, etc.," ii. 263 f., speaks of finding the same in Turretine. See above, Div. I. Vol. II. pp. 281 ff., 292.

² See Div. I. Vol. II., 49 ff., 149 ff., 354.

Is anything effected in this way for humanity which could not be effected without this sacrifice? Is it impossible for the Logos to acquire power over the central susceptibility of humanity which He finds in Jesus, and to belong to it in an unique manner, save by ceasing to stand in any actual relation to others? or save by reducing Himself to a level of equality with this man? If the above is correct, the central feature of His entire relation to other beings than man, is that all these beings stand related to this man, who is destined to be the personal, divine-human centre of the world. On the contrary, if we were to accept this depotentiation, then, so long as the personality of the Logos was extinguished, the love of the Logos would hold no *personal* relation, not even to Jesus, and we should have none of His ever renewed condescending grace, which posits and wills this human as its own, until, with the development of the man to whom He united Himself, His personal self-consciousness was again re-established. *Nay more, on such a supposition the incarnation of the Logos is of no advantage whatever to humanity.* It does not allow of the Logos communicating Himself in ever increasing measure, and in such a manner as to direct the development of the man assumed. For if the Logos were to be supposed, after His depotentiation, to have still hovered over the God-man, in order to direct the development of the man Jesus (or, perhaps, the restoration of the Logos to Himself?), the theory would be renounced, and that *κένωσις*, which was to be an expression of the deepest love, would never have taken place. On the contrary, the Logos "over the line" ("über der Linie") would have still kept Himself back in His absolute being and self-consciousness;—indeed, if He were actually God, this could not be otherwise. Consequently, the supposition of a self-depotentiation of the Logos, instead of allowing the growing humanity to derive advantage from the incarnation of the Logos, and to receive an actual communication of His fulness, renders it necessary to look out for another principle than the Logos, to wit, the Holy Ghost, to conduct the growth of the God-man (so, for example, with Thomasius and Hofmann). In consequence hereof, this theory acquires a resemblance to the Christology of the Reformed Church, in that it supplies the place of the "*Communicatio idiomatum*" of the Logos, by the influence of the Holy

Ghost on this man. The Holy Ghost could not then any longer be said to be sent by, and to proceed forth from, the Logos (as, at all events, the Christologians of the Reformed Church teach); for otherwise His *κένωσις* would be a mere seeming: but the Holy Ghost worked on this unity apart from the Logos, worked at the same time on the depotentiated Logos. But whether the Spirit were supposed to work in, or merely on, Jesus, we should in any case have a view bearing a surprising resemblance to the Ebionitic doctrine of the growth of Christ; and the more so, as the gradual restoration of the Logos to Himself would also then be dependent on the development of Jesus and the influence of the Spirit.

What purpose then is to be served by all this machinery of a self-lowering of the Logos to the rank of a potence, if, as we have shown, in relation to that which such participation is intended to accomplish,—to wit, the self-communication of the Logos in His fulness, which the Lutheran Christologians in particular deemed to be the principal matter,—the theory, so far from explaining and rendering it intelligible, only excludes its possibility for the entire period of growth? It does *not even, with its κένωσις, help the question of the unity of the divine and human*, unless we should say that the depotentiation was in itself incarnation, that is, conversion into an human existence. This, the strongest form of Theopaschitism, would reduce the God-man to a theophany, which must necessarily cease of itself as soon as the human drama had been played out, and the Logos had been reconverted to Himself. If, however, no conversion be supposed to have taken place (as by Thomasius), and yet the *κένωσις* be assumed for the purpose of the Unio (out of regard to which, the assimilation of the two natures through the *κένωσις* of the Logos is supposed to take place), we should have nothing but two homogeneous magnitudes in or alongside of each other:—in no sense could we say that the two were in vital and intimate fellowship; still less that they were in essence related to each other. At first sight, indeed, it may appear as though such an adjustment or assimilation of the natures by means of the self-exinanition of the Logos, furthered to some extent the unity of the God-man; but a speculative, as well as an ethical and religious examination, shows us at once that a living unity is as far as possible from being

brought about by such an adjustment, and that, on the contrary, the result arrived at rather resembles a duplication of one and the same, through which the one or the other is rendered useless. If the essence of the human consists in its being the form for the divine, and if the Logos emptied Himself to a mere form, what advantage can accrue to the unity (supposing the completeness of the humanity not to be denied in connection therewith) by form being conjoined to form? If, however, not mere susceptibility, but productive freedom, be conceived as the kernel and essence of man, how can the Logos, who even during His depotentiation is the principle of freedom, become one with the human germ, by placing Himself as one potency of freedom alongside of the other? We see that the men who have adopted this theory have not sufficiently taken into consideration that it is precisely the difference, and not the likeness of the divine and human, that renders it possible for them to constitute a true unity. If we are resolved to conceive the human as form, then, in order to the constitution of a true unity, we must posit the divine as its fulness. If, in accordance with the scholastic usage of the word Form, we conceive the human as the material (*materia*) which the Logos assumes, the Logos must be described as the animating and formative principle. Two modes of viewing the matter which are not at all so different from each other as might at first sight appear; for that which the former represents from the point of view of the good as being (*des seienden Guten*), the other regards from the point of view of the good as actuality (*des actuellen Guten*), thus complementing each other. But never can a living unity be secured by putting the two together, either both as form, or both as content.

That mythologizing theory of the *κένωσις* of the Logos which perturbs the conception of God and suspends the Trinity, is invented for the purpose of securing an unity of the divine-human life, which shall be absolutely immoveable and complete from the very beginning. We have seen that, so far from furthering this unity in any degree, it renders it impossible. It leads either to the identification of the divine and the human (if the former converts itself into the latter), or to giving the two a purely external dead position alongside of each other, after the manner of Nestorianism. In order to pass out beyond both,

all that is needful is to acknowledge that there is no ground whatever why the divine-human *unity*, which begins with the "Unio naturarum," and is, it is true, never again dissolved,¹ should be conceived as absolutely complete and immoveable from the beginning. All are agreed that the truth of the human growth must be preserved; but all movement, all development, and all growth, is to be excluded from the unity. The one, however, is inseparable from the other. For inasmuch as not all the human organs exist and are fully developed from the beginning, and the Unio, therefore, so long as they do not exist, cannot extend to them (for example, to the human consciousness); inasmuch as, on the other hand, we must say, that so soon as they do exist, the Unio extends also to them: it is undeniable that the divine-human unity, and not merely the humanity, is the subject of increase. Indeed, a more careful consideration of the death of Jesus ought to lead to a recognition of this.² A true and vital conception is not formed of the unity in question till we conceive it as undergoing a constant process, consequently as in *motion*; which motion, so far from being a dissolution of the unity, is rather its constant and growing reproduction, in connection with which both the divine and human factors have functions to discharge. For if the union is to become ever more all-sided and complete, the volition of man is as necessary as the will of the Logos. It is clear, without further explanation, that room is thus for the first time made for an ethico-religious development of this man, on the basis of the divine-human unity which already lies in his holy nature.³ Now, as, during the period of the severe Trinitarian struggles, a decisive step was taken in advance, when Origen taught the Church to conceive of the generation of the Son, not as a thing which was completed once for all, but as perennial; so also does light appear to have been for the

¹ We have seen above that in the age of the Reformation attention was directed, above all, to the union of the natures. So Luther; so the Suabians: see Div. II. Vol. II. pp. 79 ff., 178 f. From that time onwards, the hypostasis of the Son, as becoming the property of the man, is no longer conceived as the original bond of unity, as was the case in the old Church, but as the *result* of the Unio.

² See Div. II. Vol. II. pp. 306 f.

³ I coincide chiefly here with Martensen—see his "Dogmatik," pp. 322 f., 331 f.; and with Rothe—see his "Ethik," ii. 282 f., 290 f.

first time thrown on the Christological problem, so far as affects the earthly life of Christ, when we not merely teach that there was in general a divine-human growth, but, in particular, also acknowledge that the act of incarnation, or the *Unio*, and therefore the unity, was one that went on constantly growing and reproducing itself on the basis of the being (*des Seins*); nay more, that will still continue growing so long as the God-man is not yet completed. At the centre of his being, it is true, this man is from the very beginning divine-human essence: but, in the first place, many things are lacking to this person; other things in it are still dissolubly united,—for example, the body is still mortal; other things are still mutable, without detriment to its identity. The divine-human articulation, the bodily and the spiritual eternal organism, of the divine-human person, needs first to be developed; and this can only take place through the continued act of the incarnation of the *Logos*. This incarnation may be termed an increasing one, in so far as through it, on the one hand, an ever higher and richer fulness becomes actually the property of the man Jesus, and he, on the other hand, becomes ever more completely the mundane expression of the eternal Son, the image of God.

We are the more warranted in hoping that these theopaschitic inclinations will be something transitory, as those who cherish them do not remain true to themselves; for, on the contrary, they approximate almost involuntarily ever afresh to the solution indicated by us, and are accustomed in this way themselves to retract their doctrine of the *Κένωσις* of the Son. (Note 38.) Still the theopaschitic Christology will never be decisively overcome, till the Christian *conception of God* has been more purely carried out: and this question thus acquires much greater significance and breadth. There is no denying that the Christology of which Zinzendorf may be regarded as the forerunner, represents a truly religious trait, to wit, the desire to conceive the divine love as having become as like to, and intimately united with, us as possible. But it is very possible for piety to assume too strong a colouring of intimacy with God; it then lacks the salt of reverence, and therefore a pure ethical character. We can only know the magnitude of the humble love of Christ, in the measure in which we recognise its exaltedness to be not merely past, but constantly present

in it. On that view, the childhood of Jesus must be regarded as presenting the deepest proof of divine love ; for the conscious life of the man Christ offered a more adequate form to the Logos. Consistency would then require the pious mind to occupy itself predominantly with the childhood of Jesus, and to put the ethical age of manhood into the background : which would be merely the evangelical form of that fundamental tendency which we have so frequently seen characterizing Roman Catholic Christology in recent times, and which threatened to deprive us again of the serious, substantial blessing, of the manifestation of Christ.¹ But a true intermixture of reverence and childlike confidence requires for its support and ground, the doctrine, that there cannot be a self-communication without, at the same time, a self-assertion of the divine ; that is, that divine love must not be thought apart from divine righteousness. Holy justice is in God the principle of self-maintenance.² On the knowledge and recognition of the divine righteousness depends not only the conscious vanquishment of the theopaschitic stage of Christology, but also the progress in the understanding of the office of Christ, particularly of His atoning work and sufferings. Now, however, as in the age of the old Gnosis, this knowledge is to a large extent darkened.³ Not till these two factors, which represent, as it were, the opposite poles of the ethical essence of God, to wit, righteousness and love, have been properly interwoven and blended, can Pantheism and Deism, the heathenish and Jewish principle in the doctrine of God, be completely overcome, and a clear theological basis be gained for a doctrine of justification and of the atonement.

It is difficult, nay, impossible, to group the main Christological differences which still remain at the present time, in accordance with the antagonism between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. The principal questions with which this age has to do, have grown beyond this antagonism, and cross each other in a great variety of ways—on the basis, it is true,

¹ Compare Div. II. Vol. II. Note 49.

² Among recent writers, Chalybæus may lay claim to have rendered the most important services in connection with the knowledge of this fundamental matter.

³ Div. I. Vol. I. 120, Note HH, 224, 226–228, 315, 316 ; Vol. II. 42.

of a rich unity and complementing, which have already been attained. But there is still much to be done. In agreement with its characteristic essence, the old Reformed Confession started by laying emphasis on holy righteousness as that which guards distinctions; the exaggeration, however, naturally led to the opposite of that which was intended.¹ The same thing holds true of the Lutheran Confession, which turned its thoughts more fully, from the very beginning, towards the love and grace of God.² Amongst the Lutherans, piety was more characterized by childlike confidence; among the Reformed, by reverence and awe. But notwithstanding fresh attempts to widen the confessionalistic antagonisms, the aim of all genuinely theological efforts which are to have a future, must be to bring about an ever more complete interpenetration of righteousness and love in the conception of, and of reverence and childlike confidence in our practical relation to, God.

¹ Div. II. Vol. III. 252.

² Div. II. Vol. II. p. 327 ff., 293-306.

NOTES.

NOTE 1, page 13.

SPINOZA, in Epp. 21, 23, 25, expresses himself to the following effect regarding Christ:—Christ's sufferings, death, burial, are to be taken historically; His resurrection, allegorically. The element of fact in the latter is reducible, in his view, to the resurrection of the image of Christ in the mind of the disciples, that is, to the knowledge of His holiness (*νεκροί*, sinners). Self-deceived, the disciples took for a truth of the material world what was merely a spiritual event: a similar experience fell to the lot of the prophets also, in their visions of a descent of God, and the like. (Epist. 23, 25; Tract. Theol. polit. c. 1, 2.) In favour of this view, speak the appearances of Christ to Paul, who also confesses to not knowing Christ any longer after the flesh; no less too, that Christ appeared, not to the people or Jewish senate, but to the believers. It is not necessary to salvation to know Christ after the flesh. In favour hereof speaks also Paul in Romans i. 20, says he, in Tract. Theol. polit. c. 4, p. 123. "Sed de æterno illo filio Dei, hoc est Dei æterna sapientia quæ sese in omnibus rebus et maxime in mente humana et omnium maxime in Christo Jesu manifestavit, longe aliter sentiendum.—Et quia hæc sapientia per Jesum Christum maxime manifestata fuit, ideo ipsius discipuli eandem, quatenus ab ipso ipsis fuit revelata, prædicaverunt seseque spiritu illo Christi supra reliquos gloriari posse ostenderunt. Ceterum quod quædam Ecclesiæ his addunt, quod Deus naturam humanam assumpserit, monui expresse, me quid dicant nescire: imo ut verum fatear, non minus absurde mihi loqui videntur, quam si quis mihi diceret, quod circulus naturam quadrati induerit." Ep. 21. With this harsh passage, however, must be further compared Tract.

Theol. polit. c. i. p. 94, and c. iv. pp. 122 f. There, he says that God can communicate Himself, as mediately, so also immediately, by means of statutory laws, the order of the world, and the like. Without the aid of corporeal media, He communicates His essence immediately to our spirit (*menti*); but ere a man can know anything that does not already lie in, or is not deducible from, the elements of our knowledge, his mind must be far more excellent than a human mind actually is. “*Quare non credo, ullum alium ad tantam perfectionem supra alios pervenisse, præter Christum, cui Dei placita, quæ homines ad salutem ducunt, sine verbis aut visionibus, sed immediate revelata sunt, adeo ut Deus per mentem Christi sese Apostolis manifestaverit, ut olim Mosi mediante voce aërea. Et ideo vox Christi, sicut illa, quam Moses audiebat, vox Dei vocari potest. (Logos?) Et hoc sensu etiam dicere possumus, Sapientiam Dei h. e. Sapientiam, quæ supra humanam est, naturam humanam in Christo assumpsisse et Christum viam salutis fuisse.*” The Holy Scriptures never say,—God appeared to Christ, as happened to the prophets, and also to Moses, to whom the law was given solely through the medium of angels or corporeal beings: but “*si Moses cum Deo de facie ad faciem loquebatur, ut vir cum socio solet (h. e. mediantibus duobus corporibus), Christus de mente ad mentem cum Deo communicavit.*” Besides Christ, no one has received revelations, save “*imaginationis ope, videlicet, ope verborum aut imaginum.*” This immediate “*Communicatio cum Deo,*” which Jesus alone had, regarded from another point of view, is a revelation of God in the form of an human soul, whose excellence was so unique that it possessed an adequate knowledge of God, nay more, that it was itself the Word of God (*Vox Dei*) to the world, which leads to life. Even the apostles had not such knowledge as He had; but, like the prophets, they in turn saw a part of the inner through Him, though in the form of a figure, that is, in such a manner that the inner appeared to them to be something external; so at the baptism of Christ, so at His resurrection, so at His ascension. (P. 99.) That the prophets, and even Moses, had merely a figurative, mediate knowledge of God, arose from the legal point of view which they occupied. What they give, they give as the revelation and law of God, but without the knowledge of the inner

goodness and truth of that which they said. Christ alone,—although even He gave laws because of the weakness of men,—had a true and adequate knowledge of things, “nam Christus non tam Propheta, quam os Dei fuit. Deus enim per mentem Christi, sicuti ante per angelos nempe per vocem creatam, visiones, etc., quædam humano generi revelavit.” In the case of Jesus, no accommodation of the revelation to His sentiments and mind took place, as in the case of the prophets; but because Jesus was destined not merely for the Jews, but for all peoples, it was necessary that He should have a mind fitted not merely to Jewish opinions, but to universal, that is, to true ideas. Because God revealed Himself to Christ or to His mind immediately, He perceived that which was revealed “vere et adequate.” But this very fact raised Him above the law, and gave Him divine freedom, although He in turn gave laws to the people on account of its hardness of heart and ignorance. We see from this, what a deep impression Christ’s image made even on the Jew Spinoza.

NOTE 2, page 21.

Doederlein, *Instit. Ch.* 1780, ii. § 253, takes the part of Nestorius, so far as to attempt to prove his complete orthodoxy. The *ἀνθρωπότητα* of human nature he takes to be, not impersonality, but the moral influence of the Son of God on the Son of man. The relation between Jesus and the Logos he designates a relation of friendship, and the “*Communicatio idiomatum*” a newer “commentum.” Similar opinions had been advanced, even before his time, by Töllner, in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, who, although belonging to the Reformed Church, must be referred to in this connection. Compare Baur’s “*Die christliche Lehre der Versöhnung*,” pp. 479–502; and Töllner’s principal work, “*Vom thätigen Gehorsam Christi*,” Breslau, 1768, which is directed against Ch. W. F. Walch’s “*Comm. de obedientia Christi activa*,” Gott. 1754. Töllner accepts only a substitutionary suffering obedience of Christ, though already also with “*acceptilatio*,” but not the active obedience; among many other reasons, urging also that, as a true man, He was under obligation to obey. Precisely because He rendered obedience, and was holy as a man, was His obedience meritorious. P. 361: —“If there remained to the human nature of Christ no inde-

pendent ground of free actions which it could call its own, then all the actions which appear such to us were merely actions of the divine nature.—It was mere seeming; it was as though the human nature performed them.” He conceives the humanity of Christ, therefore, as a complete, free, moral subject; the divine nature merely assisted or co-operated, especially to preserve Him from errors; in general, indeed, to complement humanity in cases where it might prove insufficient. Ernesti, who (like Quistorp and others) controverts Töllner, concedes that it is impossible to conceive of a man not under obligation to obey the law; but Christ was merely an instrument of the Son of God. As though he had not thus allowed his opponent to be right, in supposing that to give up the obligation to obedience was also to deny the truth of the humanity. (Compare Ernesti’s “*Neue theol. Biblioth.* ix. 1768.) No wonder that Töllner’s view made its way. Quite similarly Gruner. Even Sailer, who thought himself orthodox, calls Christ a worthy, pure man, with whom God connected Himself more closely. See his “*Von der Gottheit Christi*,” pp. 111 ff. Storr too gives such prominence to the human aspect of Jesus, that (like Anselm) he does not question His obligation as a man to fulfil the law, as a creature, for himself; and bases Christ’s ability to atone on the reward which He earned by His obedience, and which His intercessory love, as He was unable to receive it Himself, led Him to apply it for the benefit of His people. Even the so-called orthodox view ceased to assume a necessity for the propitiation grounded in the nature of the divine righteousness. Inclining towards a doctrine of happiness, for which even the righteousness of God is merely a means, they turned their attention to theories of “*Acceptilatio*” (which did still retain some trace of the offering of a sacrifice), or of a punitive example; even where the death of Christ was not treated as a mere example of holy patience in suffering, and of a holy disposition (as by Gruner).—Even Reinhard, although he says that the two natures form one person in Christ, teaches, relatively to the sinlessness of Jesus, that it proceeded from His freedom (*virtutem Christi e consilio libero profectam esse, ideoque eum potuisse tentari, at ab illa descisceret*): as Doederlein also had taught, l. c. ii. 205. Against this position, Eckstein took up arms with the essay and question, “*Ob unser Erlöser hat sündigen können?*” Meissen,

1787.—Reinhard also converted the relation of the Logos to Jesus into one of mere assistance. Compare *Epit. Theol. Chr.* pp. 126, 127, 132, 136. Christ performed His miracles, not by the divine nature, but by “*notes singulares*.” He therefore reduces the Logos in Christ, as it were, to inactivity. So much the less need we be surprised, then, when we find men like Gruner, Henke, and Griesbach arriving at similar views respecting the Person of Christ. Henke, in his “*Lineam instit. fidei chr. historico-criticarum*,” Helmst. 1793, 1795, § 97, says, —“*Sufficit nobis meminisse Jesum a se ipso et suis nobis propositum esse ut hominem quidem nostri simillimum, ut personam tamen, singulari, mirifico et unico cognationis quasi et familiaritatis cum Deo vinculo copulatum, plenum Numine, ut ipsum Numen præsens et adspectabile Joh. i. 18, xiv. 9–11, etc.*” Similarly Griesbach, in his “*Populäre Dogmatik*,” 1789, p. 182. Abrah. Teller, in his “*Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens*,” blames those severely who talk much about the “*Communicatio idiomatum* ;”—this doctrine belongs now only to history. These men were more or less conscious of entertaining Nestorian views, but tried to protect themselves by taking the field against Eutychianism, and by calling the opposed doctrine Eutychian. For example, Töllner, “*Vom thätigen Gehorsam Christi*,” p. 383 ; Schmid, in Jena, 1794.

NOTE 3, page 25.

To not a few others, the immeasurable extent of the edifice of the universe seemed to stand in contradiction with an incarnation of God on our small planet : they held it to be incredible that such a distinction should have been conferred on our little earth, which disappears like a grain of sand in the universe. The assumption that the stars are inhabited, recommended even by such men as Newton, Burnet, Whiston, Boyle, and especially Wolf, strengthened these doubts. Not to mention, that it would be unworthy of the “most high being,” of His greatness, contradictory of His immeasurableness, to become man. The latter difficulty could only disappear when philosophy had advanced to a higher stage. The former were discussed in a clever, though only partially satisfactory manner, by Becker of Rostock, in his “*Diss. de globo nostro terraque præ omnibus mundi corporibus totalibus Σκηνώσει Filii Dei nobilitato*,”

1751. Many things appear to favour the notion that the stars are inhabited. For the greater the city of God is, the greater appear His glory, His power, and His wisdom. For if those inhabitants are mortal beings, and have fallen, then we may ask, whether they have another atoner, or none at all, or Christ; and in the latter case, whether He assumed their nature, or whether, with the assumption of humanity, the nature of all was *virtualiter* assumed. In regard to the latter, we should have to say, that as the microcosm, the essence of man bears the whole of nature in itself, that the soul of Jesus is analogous to the soul of angels. Thus Koch, in his "Rechtbeleuchtetes Buch Hiob," teaches that all the inhabitants of the stars have a nature like that of man; accordingly, Christ is related to them also, and can deliver them if they fall. But this tends towards the doctrine of an ἀποκατάστασις of all things (which was taught especially by Petersen, about 1700, in his "Geheimniss des Erstgebornen aller Creaturen"); it is not scriptural; and, according to the "principium indiscernibilium," every star with its inhabitants must be so different from all others, that Christ would have been compelled to assume the nature of the inhabitants of each planet after the other, if His mission had been to redeem them. Burnet (de statu mortuorum) allows that there is this difference between the moral and rational beings of each star. But therewith is connected an unjust depreciation of this earth. According to Burnet, it is merely a ruin of the paradisaical earth, its extent is lessened, its solar position changed: similarly also Whiston and Heye. On the contrary, the earth occupies a commanding position amongst the other worlds: it is no "caput mortuum;" it is no despicable ball on which a handful of sinners roll in filth and vanity. Heye also ("Gesammlete Briefe von Cometen," Brf. 6) forms too low a conception of human nature. He says, that it is either "vanity or feebleness of understanding, to suppose that men are the most distinguished kind of creatures in the city of God, and that for their sake the heaven of heavens exists; whereas no ground is adducible for such a pretence, that an honest mole, beginning to think in his dark passages, might not adduce in favour of himself and his species. All that the incarnation proves is, that men are the most wretched and corrupt of all beings; and the notion, 'omnia propter hominem,' arose at the time when the stars

were thought to be golden nails." But Heye forgets the original dignity of man, and his exaltation through Christ. Our God looks down on the lowly. The eternal, substantial Wisdom played on the circle of the earth, and its delights were with the children of men. Our earth He has favoured with His most special, most gracious presence; us He has taken to be His brothers; here He has established His Church. Heaven and earth moved at His arrival. Not the nature of angels, but the nature of men, did He assume, in order to be able to be our representative. Accordingly, our only alternative is either to say, with Leibnitz, that the stars are inhabited by blessed spirits who have never fallen; or to deny their being inhabited at all. The former alternative is defended by Böldicke in his work, "*Abermaliger Versuch einer Theodicee*." He arrives at the result, "that the earth alone is the theatre for sinful beings, inasmuch as God foresaw all the beings who would become evil, and collected them on this earth; God's counsel to permit of evil was restricted to man; the majority of them will be damned, but they serve as a foil to the consciousness of blessedness possessed by the others, and form, consequently, one part of the goodness of the world." (This would form a Lutheran parallel to Beza's doctrine of the Damned.) This, however, would be to think meanly of man; whereas, according to the Holy Scriptures, besides the angels, there is no creature higher than man. Those, the good angels, need no redemption: concerning the evil angels, whom the Scriptures mention as rational beings, we are told that grace is denied to them without injustice. Men, therefore, are the only beings, as such, for whom the incarnation can come into consideration. Concerning man, therefore, as compared with the inhabitants of a thousand different kinds of stars, we may use the same words as Moses used regarding the people of Israel compared with the other nations:—"Where is there a people, to which the gods have drawn nigh in such a way?" And concerning our planet, as compared with a thousand others, we must say that it is the Bethlehem amongst the rest, the least city among the thousands in Judah, out of which the Lord was destined to proceed. Within the last few years, the question of the relation of astronomy to the incarnation of God has been repeatedly ventilated again. As astronomy, however, has hitherto arrived at no decision whether the

fixed stars belong to an order of bodies higher than our earth, or whether the earth is the most highly organized, the highest of all bodies, that view of the world which represents the earth as the scene of the highest events possible in the history of the universe, and in particular theology, is not yet warranted in inclining either to the one or to the other of these hypotheses. Whether the one or the other may be more favourable to it, it is bound to wait till a fixed decision has been arrived at regarding the inhabitants of the stars, their existence, and their moral constitution. This, which alone is the scientific point of view, is taken up in particular by Prof. Whewell, in his "Plurality of Worlds," 1854. Compare also Brewster's "Life of Newton," against whom Whewell directs his arguments; and "The Literary Gazette, Journal of Science and Art," Apr. 14, 1855, No. 1995, where his part is justly taken in opposition to Montagu Lyon Phillip's "Worlds beyond the Earth." In the view of Whewell, arguments in proof of the stars being inhabited, capable of satisfying science, and of moving it to determinate utterances on the subject, have, as yet, by no means been advanced. When we test the arguments drawn from the analogy of the earth and the like, they resolve themselves into the old principle, Why should it not be so?—which is to demand from others proofs, the obligation to bring which rests on our own shoulders. Where science has no definite knowledge, its best course is to assert nothing. Still less can theological certainty and truth be burdened with empirical hypotheses, which themselves confess to having wandered without experience into a sphere lying out beyond experience. Whewell warns against confounding conjectures with settled facts; against constituting articles of philosophic belief and Christian hope out of principles which rest on mere analogy and vague speculation. He himself is of opinion that the earth, ere it became habitable for man, had to run through immensely long courses of development; that even if other stars were destined for similar organisms, we have a right to doubt their having only even approximated to the stage of development at which the earth stands; that, consequently, there is no need for surprise that this highest revelation of God in Christ should have taken place on earth (which is the first star inhabited by moral beings). In the latter result, he must also be allowed to be right. Amongst German

thinkers, Weisse assumes that God has been repeatedly incarnate, on every star, according as were its needs:—which view, as has been already observed, leads to a modern form of Arianism without pre-existence, and involves the denial of the absolute metaphysical significance of Christ. Steffens (Rel. Phil. i. 205 ff.) and Hegel (Encyk. 3te Aufl. p. 263), like Whewell, regard our planetary system as the most organized part of the universe; the earth, this consecrate spot, on which the Lord appeared, as its absolute centre, which both Hegel and Becker designate the Bethlehem of the worlds. In proof thereof, Hegel urges that that which is immediately the most concrete is also the most perfect. The understanding, indeed, prefers the abstract (as the sun and fixed stars in relation to the planets) to the concrete, but not reason. We are reminded by those who thus reason, that we ought not to concede too much influence to an unfruitful astonishment at numbers and magnitudes, which stand in no relation to the spiritual life of man (A. v. Humboldt, Cosmos i. 156 f., German ed.); nor let the marvels of the telescope cause us to forget the marvels of the microscope, the marvels in little (Chalmers in Tholuck's "Vermischte Schriften," i. 209 f.). The outwardly subordinate and dependent position of the earth is very compatible with its having a high inner significance for the spiritual. According to the Ptolemaic system, the world was even externally the centre of the universe, about which all things revolve. According to Steffens, however, precisely such an external position, if the supposition were true, would contradict its significance as a spiritual centre. The true centre can never come forth into manifestation. It belongs to the ideal kingdom of dialectics, according to which the manifestation itself has not absolute significance, but first acquires it by an act of negation, which is rendered easier by the inadequacy characteristic of the manifestation in relation to the idea. Others, on the contrary, like G. H. v. Schubert, Göschel, and Lange, regard the fixed stars and their luciferic world as places of a *higher* order, the dwelling of angels and blessed spirits; the planets, however, as still uninhabited bodies, the earth being the most developed amongst them. They also cling to the idea of Leibnitz, and hold that the incarnation took place on earth, because the inhabitants of the earth alone stood in need of an incarnation, and were capable of redemption. Kurtz ("Die

Bibel und die Astronomie," 3te Ausg. 1853) urges, in opposition to the latter view (p. 378), that the incarnation includes something more and higher than a mere restoration of the human race to the like *niveau* with the other not-fallen angels; for, as God remains *man* to all eternity, man is thus exalted above all creatures, and in equal measure is the earth exalted above all other heavenly bodies, destined as it is to be the eternally abiding throne of the divine presence in its most immediate form. He decides, therefore, in favour of a middle view. The earth now, since the fall (first of the angels, who inhabited it, then of men), occupies a lower position than formerly,—lower also than that of the fixed stars; but, on the other hand, it is capable of, and destined to, the highest form of existence; it is destined to be the centre of the universe:—of which traces also are discoverable. In this way, we can reconcile the distinction conferred on the earth by the incarnation of God with its present low and subordinate position.

NOTE 4, page 26.

From Semler's time onwards, a considerable literature arose on the history of the doctrine of the Trinity and on Christology. Besides Cotta's treatise added to Gerhard's "*Loci Theol.*" T. iii. 324, Löffler ought to be mentioned, who prefaced his translation of Souverain's work, Züllich, 1792, by a "*Kurze Darstellung der Entstehungsart der Dreieinigkeitslehre von Jesu bis auf. d. nic. Kirchenvers.*;" Martini, "*Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte des Dogmas von der Gottheit Christi in den vier ersten Jahrhunderten nach Christo*," Rost. u. Leipzig, 1800; Stark, "*Geschichte des Arianismus*," Berl. 1783, 1784, 2 Th.; Eckermann, "*Handbuch der christlichen Glaubenslehre*" ii. 434 ff., 627 ff. Further, also, Essays by Keil, Planck, Schleusner, Paulus, and others, in Hencke's *Magazin*, in Velthusen's "*Commentatt. Theol.*," in Schmidt's "*Bibliothek für Kritik und Exegese*," and in Paulus' "*Memorabilien*." Alongside of these deserve mention, Semler's "*Selecta capita ex hist. eccles.*," and his "*Vorbereitung auf d. K. Grossbr. Aufgabe von der Gottheit Christi*," Halle, 1787. His advice to those who strove for the prize, was to lay down nothing definite as to the mode in which we are to conceive the deity of Christ,—at all events, nothing that can be laid hold on by the Church, or that would

bind the freedom of private religion. For the rest, Semler clung to the miraculous character of Christ, and maintained His resurrection, in particular, to be an historical fact, in opposition to the Deists. (Compare his "*Beantwortung der Fragmente eines Ungenannten, ins besondere vom Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger*," 2te Aufl. Halle, 1780). Like Lessing, he asserts that the truth of the Christian religion must be experienced, especially through its moral effects. Christianity to him was the "infinite religion;" in Christ Himself he beheld an infinitude which has been only imperfectly reached by *all* descriptions. The doctrine of the Trinity belongs "*non tam ad erudiendos animos, quam ad recreandos conscientias*," and faith in it concerns the new, infinite moral benefits conferred by God through Christianity. J. Fr. Flatt, in his "*Commentatio de symbolica Eccl. nostræ de deitate Chr. sententia*," 1788, which was crowned by the Faculty of the University of Göttingen, urges in opposition thereto, that the Holy Scriptures contain definite revelations regarding the distinctions and unity of the Trinity, especially in regard to the Son of God; and that it is incumbent on theology to show its thankfulness to God by ascertaining the true sense of Scripture, which it will then be surely possible to defend against the attacks of philosophers and of non-churchly parties. He allows that, in the matter of doctrinal definition, theologians have gone too far. Such as were counted among the orthodox have so defined the idea of *ὑποουσία* and personality, that, in order to accept them, one must renounce altogether the use of reason. But the doctrine of the Symbols contains merely so much:—The subjects A and B stand in such a relation to each other, that though they have one and the same C in common, they are distinguished from each other by a character X (p. 91). It is scarcely possible to confess more clearly, that to this theology the Trinity itself had become an unknown quantity X. There is no affirmative knowledge (*sensu ajente*) of the Trinity; but still a negative one. Not even the Kantian doctrine of the categories, or any other derived from the empirical sphere, can disprove the Trinity; for there may be categories other than those which are applicable to the world of sense.

NOTE 5, page 44.

We naturally proceed here on the presumption, that Kant had not yet distinctly gone so far as to deny the idea of a self-conscious God, distinct from the world: this first took place through Fichte; though there is no doubt that he did but draw the logical deductions from Kant's principles. For Kant, God is not yet the mere moral order of the world: he made efforts to find *points d'appui* for the theistic conception of God. He leaves the idea of God still standing; and does not yet fully carry out the thought, that the Ego of man *alone* is absolute. There is no doubt, however, that for his purpose the being, if not the idea of God, occupies a merely hypothetical, nay more, useless place. To his system it is of importance, not so much that God really exist, as that He be believed in,—not merely as the already actualized order of the world, but as the power to secure to the good the victory against evil in the world. Now, if we ask why Kant leaves so unimportant a position to the idea of the self-conscious, personal God, as has been already shown, and will become still clearer, the only ground we can assign is, that his idea of God and man was still such, that they appeared to him as magnitudes which rather exclude than belong to each other. The Deism of the last century took the ethical for its starting-point; it did not as yet postulate, however, that God should not exist at all, but merely that He should not exert any influence, because His influence was held to be disturbing. Nor could His influence be regarded as otherwise than disturbing so long as production alone, and not also reception, was deemed to constitute the essence of moral freedom; nay more, so long as the infinitude of man was not held to lie primarily in his infinite susceptibility, but merely the dilemma kept in view—What is, must either be infinite alone or finite alone. Consistency (Kant is still very far from carrying out his ideas to their logical consequences), then, requires the denial of an objective God, in order to being able to attribute infinitude, or an infinite value, to man. This exclusiveness or strangeness between the idea of God and that of man, we have found making its appearance in old time in the form of an absorption of the one by the other, or in such a shape as to leave only a shadow of it behind, in that the one lays immediate claim to that which belongs to the

other. Kant's system forms the modern, that is, anthropological, counterpart to the old Docetism. For it leaves to the divine, as compared with the human, merely the semblance of an existence. On this ground, notwithstanding Baur's objection (*Trinitätslehre* iii. 781), I have left the word "strange," or foreign, standing in the text. It is not intended to denote anything but what I elsewhere mean in using the word "exclusive." Baur's exposition, however, seems to me to Fichtianize Kant; as is also the case with his representation of Hegel.

NOTE 6, page 58.

In his later publications, this noble-minded man, who never relaxed his efforts to arrive at the truth, and always retained an open eye for it, approximated ever more closely to objective Christianity. So particularly in his "*Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkte des Glaubens dargestellt*," Basel, 1846. In this work, he assigns even to the idea of faith a more objective significance relatively to knowledge. It is true he repudiates the doctrine of the Trinity, consequently also the pre-existence of Christ and the doctrine of two natures; he views the resurrection as an objective vision of the Apostles: the miracles of Christ are to him relative workings of His heightened spiritual power. But he tries to effect a reconciliation between the common-sense or natural view of the Sacred History and the ideal or believing view taken by the Church, by means of a more living conception of God, by the idea of God's immanence in the world and His action in nature. Christ was born a Saviour; He did not first become one; the "Word," that is, the revealing activity of God as directed towards the world, was in the beginning with God, a determination or quality of His essence; and at the same time God's entire essence was in this activity; it was God, not different from Him, not a mere outflow from Him. And this self-revealing God revealed Himself at last, in His entire unity and fulness, in Christ (p. 328). "The new, blessed, joyous life, the restoration of the true life of humanity, has for its beginning and centre the historical person, which is its perfection, archetype, and example.—In the Christian faith there is an ideal element, which has universal validity, and a real element. The former consists of the universal, eternal truths; the latter, of that which is dis-

tinctive of Christianity and alone sufficient for salvation. That a man has lived, by whom all those truths were not merely taught, but livingly revealed, accomplished, and realized; that in Him the unity of the deity and humanity was an actual fact; that He effected the atonement and founded the kingdom of God—this gives to faith its completion. It is this realistic momentum of realization that distinguishes Christianity from all other religions, and gives it the victory over every kind of idealistic or rationalistic doctrine which aims to place itself above it." P. 33

NOTE 7, page 73.

More important than Lessing's construction of the Trinity (in his "Education of the Human Race") on the ground of the necessity of the self-objectification of spirit, is his demand that the truth be believed in for its own sake; especially as he conceives truth as a self-witnessing *power*, and not merely intellectually, and compares it with the sun, which gives information of itself by the warmth it diffuses. Semler's "private religion" is likewise a living trace of the knowledge that in Christianity much, if not all, depends on the "testimonium Sp. S." Herder also was stirred by a desire for a more living doctrine of God; but remains too much in the sphere of fancy and æsthetics to be able to give utterance to anything more than deeper, indeterminate presentiments.—Schwarz's book on Lessing is written to serve a particular purpose, and in consequence of the endeavour to represent him as the leader of Illuminatism, and of undervaluing the positive germs in his writings, does him injustice. He treats the mystical and speculative element in Lessing almost as though it had no existence. A more correct estimate is formed of Lessing by H. Ritter, Bohtz, Zimmermann, Schlosser iii. 2, 173 ff. For all the men mentioned above, however, we must refer to the admirable work of Gelzer, "Die deutsche poetische Literatur, u. s. w." 2te Ausg.—In an exceedingly striking manner, he calls our attention, with reference to the less gratifying later period of these men (of Lessing and Herder on the one hand, and Lavater, Hamann, and Claudius, on the other), to the fact that, as regards religious things, they belonged to the class of intuitive natures, which find the (religious) truth at a first immediate glance, and possess it more in the

form of feeling than in that of distinct knowledge. When speaking of Herder, and similarly also in reference to Hamann and Claudius, he remarks, that everything necessarily depended on whether this ingenuousness and simplicity of feeling, this certainty of the inner sense, would remain unassailed through their entire life. Their own training, and the direction taken by their efforts, rendered this impossible: they were compelled to look about for a groundwork of conceptions and thoughts on which presentiment and inner intuition could securely rest; the duty was devolved on them of transforming feelings and intuitions into clear and logical thought. This conversion, which was an effort to make the infinite in them finite and clearly perceptible, involved, for them, as they themselves frequently sorrowfully complained, the momentary or longer loss of inner hold, especially as the age in which they lived afforded them so little support. This penetrating and true, but for this very reason, humane and Christian judgment of these forerunners of the present age, shows us, at the same time, the inner necessity for a clear, logical systematization of the new ideas—a work which they were unable to accomplish—and its importance to the realization of an harmonious spiritual existence. For, merely to return to the rigid formulæ of the dogmas of the Church, would be an impoverishing, because an ossification of the mind; like as when it falls ever more completely a prey to mere negations.

NOTE 8, page 74.

As Hamann is called "the Magician of the North," so (and with still greater justice) is Oetinger designated "the Magician of the South;" for both gave utterance to higher truths than their age was capable of comprehending, and were accordingly regarded as a kind of mystery by their contemporaries, reaching already forward into the future. We must not omit, however, to mention that for many years Oetinger has numbered many friends in South Germany. Any one who should closely observe the connection between the life and the science of the Church would be able to discover in the peculiar form taken by the religious life, especially in Würtemberg, one main cause of the various movements in the domain of science, which have proceeded forth from that country. Whilst the official Church,

with its theology, which was connected with the philosophy of Wolf and with Eclecticism, was becoming ever more barren and dry, Würtemberg had its great theologian, Joh. Albr. Bengel, and his scholars and friends, Hiller, Steinhöfer, Roos, Reuss, Rieger, Ph. Burk, Storr the elder, and many others, whose life and vigour were sustained by the Scriptures, which they heartily loved and faithfully searched, when, far and wide, the salt had lost its savour. Owing to the services rendered by these men, a stream of living theology ran like a brook of fresh water, without pretence, it is true, and mostly unobserved, through the land. For though their interest was, in the first instance, exegetical and mainly practical, they preserved or even prepared the soil for a more living and fruitful theology, whose turn to be recognised by the public life of the Church was destined in due season to arrive. They were by no means opposed to a more comprehensive regeneration of theology. On the contrary, the closest bonds united them, and especially Bengel, with men of philosophical or theosophical mind, like Oetinger, Phil. Matth. Hahn, and Fricker. Compare Auberlen, pp. 2-37. The need of apprehending Christianity in its universal and cosmical significance had found satisfaction, in the case of Bengel and his successors, particularly in Eschatology; and Oetinger also participated in their predilection for apocalyptic studies. But his great mind passed from the post-existence of Christianity, back to its pre-existence, to the creation of nature and of man; he establishes the most intimate connection between the first and second creation by means of the "sensus communis;" and in direct antagonism to the prevailing philosophy of the age, which was hostile to all realism, and scarcely allowed Christianity a petitionary position alongside of their enlightened philosophy, he strove to produce a "philosophia sacra," with Christ for its centre, whose task it is to be the true philosophy. Oetinger lacked, it is true, the historical eye in theology; hence also the absence of a churchly tone; but still his theosophy is distinguished from that of Jacob Böhme in this respect, that he sees in the world, not a process arising out of the necessity of the divine nature, but one of will and freedom.

From Swedenborg, Oetinger appropriated little more than a few ideas relating to the condition of the soul after death, and

to the future world: for the rest, his system had quite different roots from the mechanical, ghostly system of Swedenborg, which emasculated the realism of the Bible. Oetinger's principal writings are, "*Theologia ex idea vitæ deducta in sex locos redacta, quorum quilibet I. secundum sensum communem, II. secundum mysteria scripturæ, III. secundum formulas theticas novo et experimentalis modo pettractatur*, Auct. M. Fridr. Christoph Oetinger," 1765 (translated into German by J. Hamberger in 1852); "*Oeffentliches Denkmal der Lehrtafel der weil. Würtemb. Prinzessin Antonia*," Tüb. 1763; "*Irdische und himmlische Philosophie Swedenborg's in A.*" 2 Th. 1765; "*Inquisitio in sensum communem*," 1753; Oetinger's "*Selbstbiographie*," published by Hamberger in 1845. The wish expressed by me in the first edition of this work, that a comprehensive exhibition might soon be given of Oetinger's views, has been meanwhile satisfied in an excellent manner by Auberlen in his "*Theosophie Oetinger's nach ihren Grundzügen*," 1848.

NOTE 9, page 76.

Compare *Lehrtafel*, p. 135. "But what is idealism? A horror of materialism, like the shyness of a horse. I will not give a definition of it. But, he goes on to say, according to idealism, Christ is not come in water, blood, and spirit, but alone in spirit. The right idealists will first come when the false prophet shall work miracles out of the real idealism. The idealism of the present day is merely the advanced guard of the future idealism, and so forth. (Idealism is to him so akin to evil, because he regards the latter as a fantastic imagination, which assumes to itself the semblance of being.) The idealist replies to me,—Ah, thou weak philosopher, how little thou understandest our secrets. That is not our meaning.—I, however, say,—The fear of the coarse materialistic ideas of extension makes you so scrupulous. I know how many years I have been an idealist. Nothing but the words of Jesus have broken the spell. I wish that they may see the intelligible beauties in Christ, the Architectus of nature, which I see; but they are hidden from their eyes." In the "*Irdische und himmlische Philosophie*" ii. 341, he says that Corporeality is a perfection, that is, when it is purified from the defects which cleave to earthly corporeality. These defects are impenetrability, resist-

ance; and coarse commixture. Elsewhere he characterizes the idealistic fleeing before corporeality in general as an after-effect of the Platonic philosophy, beyond which Christian philosophy ought to have advanced. Compare besides, his treatise, "Wie man die heilige Schrift lesen soll," p. 31.

NOTE 10, page 76.

On the one hand, Oetinger adopts the cabbalistic notion of the ten effluxes or brightnesses of God (Sephiroth), of which the three first are held to denote the three persons of the Trinity, and the remaining seven are identified with the seven spirits of the Apocalypse. For further details, see Auberlen, pp. 163 ff. On the other hand, he says in the "Lehrtafel," p. 211:—"Independence, self-knowledge, and love, are three principles; a birth in the bosom of the Father; one indeed, for they are life in all things; but still distinct in the sources of self-motion:" in each other, they are only an intimate indissoluble bond of divine life: pp. 227 ff. These *principia* or sources of self-movement, however, are not in his view persons; nay more, according to "Lehrtafel," p. 164, they are not in God Himself, but in the "glory" (that is, in the nature of God), out of which, through the Word which calls forth light out of darkness, all things became and still become. In the place of the Trinity of the Church, Oetinger would undoubtedly put the distinction between the primal beginning or the *un-ground* (Ungrund) and the Word and nature (the "glory") in God.

NOTE 11, page 82.

"Biblisches Wörterbuch," pp. 347 ff. Compare the above theories (Div. II. Vol. II. 324 f.) of a heavenly humanity of Christ. It was taught with special zeal by Joh. Wilh. Petersen (compare "das Geheimniss des Erstgeborenen aller Creaturen," Frankfort, 1711). "Jesus Christ," says he, "was God-man from the beginning: in His image Adam was created." P. 2. The Son of God is the only-begotten in the unutterable *præ-eternity*, begotten by the Father before the decree of creation; but He became the First-born because of the creation determined on by God, and proceeded forth from God. God then encompassed Him, prior to time, with a tempered *lucifer* ~~element~~ (the

nacle), which is His divine humanity, in order that in and through Him, as a convenient means, He might both create and unite the creature, which is otherwise distinct from the Creator, at an infinite distance, and also that the creature might be able to bear Him with a light thus moderated in the First-born;—indeed, the Fathers, too, speak of such a “*sese temperare et demittere*” of the Logos for the good of the world. Such a heavenly humanity is not a creation, but a generation or emanation from God. He appeals at the same time to the book of an English countess, “*de principiis philosophiæ antiquissimæ et recentissimæ*,” in particular of God, Christ, and the creatures; as also to Guil. Postellus Absonditorum—Clavis, who says:—“*Cum Deus infinitus condiderit omnia, ut a creaturis rationalibus comprehendere posset et laudari, sit autem impossibile infinitum a finito comprehendere, opus fuit, ut ante omnia divina bonitas ita se accommodaret capacitati tam angelicæ quam nostræ, ut finitum infinito uniret.*” Such a “*temperamentum*” was given in the pre-existent soul of Christ. Through it Christ is the Creator of the world, the revealer in the Old Testament, and so forth. P. 29 f. That English countess says,—“*Deus cum lux esset omnium intensissima et quidem infinita, summa tamen etiam bonitas propter hanc bonitatem creaturas quidem condere voluit quibus sese communicaret; hæ tamen—ejus lucem neitiquam potuissent tolerare.—Diminuit ergo in creaturarum gratiam, ut locus ipsis esse posset, summum illum intensæ lucis gradum, unde locus exoriebatur quasi vacuus circularis, mundorum spatium. Hoc vacuum non erat privatio vel non Ens, sed positio lucis diminutæ realis, quæ erat anima Messia, Hebræis Adam Kadmon dicta, qua totum illud spatium implebatur. Hæc anima Messia unita erat cum tota illa luce divinitatis, quæ intra vacuum illud gradu leniori remanserat, unumque cum illa constituabat subjectum. Hic Messias (Logos et Primogenitus Dei) filius appellatus deinde intra sese, facta nova etiam suæ lucis diminutione pro creaturarum commoditate condebat omnium creaturarum seriem, quibus divinitatis suæque naturæ lumina ulterius communicabat.—Trinitas ergo hic occurrit divinæ repræsentationis, primusque conceptus est Deus ipse infinitus, extra et supra productionem consideratus; Secundus est Deus idem, quatenus in Messia, et Tertius idem Deus quatenus cum Messia in creaturis, gradu*

luminis minimo ad perceptionem creaturarum accommodato." P. 41 f. In this "Ens medium" is no "corruptio, mors, defectus;" it is "balsamum in quo omnia præservari possunt a decrementis et morte quæ ipsi unita sunt, adeoque hic omnia sunt nova, vegeta et virescentia." According to Petersen, all divine *συγκατάβασις* has taken place in this heavenly humanity, which it was given to believers even in Old Testament times to enjoy. P. 70. Light is thrown on a multitude of passages of Scripture by this doctrine; the conversion of the Jews is lightened by it; it may aid also in furthering an union with the Reformed, for it accords well with the absoluteness of a divine decree (to wit, according to Paul, of apocatastasis), and renders intelligible both the real unitability of the divine and human, and the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper.

NOTE 12, page 87.

"Gedanken aus dem grossen Zusammenhange des Lebens," p. 152, ferm. cognit. L. i. 54. Similarly St Martin, "Esprit des Choses" ii. 301 ff., 341. "La Divinité se rendit Christ dans cette même image éternelle d'où Adam avait été créé.— Il s'est venu ensevelir dans notre matière." The Word of God "ici bas se trouve expatriée." As to his true essence, man is nothing but a desire for God, destined to "faire un avec la Divinité." But an alteration has taken place: we are prisoners of nature, which we drew down when we fell ourselves. A restoration requires that the Word unclothe itself, and enter into the same elementary basis, which is our prison. Thus are the divine, the spiritual, and the natural world united in Christ, in order that He might be the means of salvation in all directions, and come nigh unto the sick. In the view of St Martin also, Christ is the key of all science, even of nature. Through the *Word*, if we are united with Him, through Jesus, we can understand the language of all things, that is, them themselves.

NOTE 13, page 88.

In his work, "Ueber die drei Fundamental artikel," etc., 1839, Baader endeavours to expound more precisely the nature and mode of the incarnation of God in Christ; but as he does little more than repeat the ideas of Böhme in a pretty obscure

manner, we shall pass over details. His main thought is, that for the explanation of the incarnation of the Word, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the essence or the nature of God and God Himself. Out of the divine nature or essence was derived Adam's original body, a heavenly even though created substance, wasted by sin, but continuing to exist potentially in humanity. Now, the Word did not enter immediately into this withered (heavenly) essence, which continued to exist (as the seed of the woman); but the Word, the creative substance, awakened in Mary this wasted substance, which had undergone a silent death, and entered at once, as to His *nature* or essence, into it. The doctrine of a nature in God, and of an original, higher human essence, is meant to serve the purpose of mediating between the Son of God and humanity, of explaining both how the humanity (Mary) could participate in this economy, and how the Son of God could empty Himself to this humanity. According to Eckhart, the creating divine *nature* was impersonal prior to this event (that is, the *creative* divine nature first attained to a *personal* self-representation in Christ). Akin hereto is the thought which is advanced by other writers,—for example, Brentz and Andreae,—that the divine nature, and not the person, is the assuming agent, but that personality is the “terminus” of the assuming nature. For the rest, Baader also teaches that the powers which in Adam were dissoluble, were indissoluble in Christ.

NOTE 14, page 99.

We will here add a more careful characteristic of Fichte at his second stadium; the more so, as at *this* stage a conciliation might be again attempted between theology and philosophy. In his “Anweisung zum seligen Leben” (especially in the 6th Lecture and Appendix) he speaks as follows:—

The only true being and life is the divine life, which freely manifests itself in the life of the man who is devoted to God. In this activity, it is not the man who acts, but God Himself, who works his work through man. God has, firstly, an inner hidden *being*. But then, He is *also there* (ist auch da), that is, He appears in time and place, or has an *ex-istence*; this existence is at the same time a knowledge. But this existence is again God Himself, His being, not different from Him; and it

becomes conscious in man. God and man are thus absolutely one, and insight into this unity is the deepest knowledge that can be attained. The philosopher now, so far as he knows, gains this insight independently of Christianity, and, in fact, in a better form. Still it remains eternally true, that before Christ this jewel of knowledge was nowhere possessed; and, indeed, all our knowledge has its roots in Christianity.

Consequent philosophical insight teaches us that the eternal Word is born in the same manner as in Jesus Christ, becomes flesh, that is, a personal, sensuous human existence, in all ages, in every one who surrenders himself to the divine. But how does this possibility of the birth of the Word in man, which is conferred upon all, become an actuality? Christianity teaches—through Christ.

So much now is true, that Christ is distinguished from thousands of generations before and after Him by the sole possession of this truth, and that all who, since His day, have attained to union with God, have done so alone through Him. This uniqueness of Jesus, however, is not a metaphysical, but an historical proposition. It is not certain that a man cannot attain to that knowledge and to the blessed life, even without Christ. For this reason also, it is by no means sure that Christianity, as a religion based on an historical person, will endure eternally. If a man is really united with God, it is a matter of indifference how he arrived at the union: it would be useless and perverse, instead of living in the thing itself, to be always repeating the remembrance of the way. If Jesus were to come again, it is to be expected that He would be satisfied with the dominion of Christianity in the heart, and would not ask whether His merit were praised or passed over in connection therewith. The metaphysical, eternal truth alone gives blessedness; the historical, on the contrary, is a mere fact, standing purely by itself; in so far it is one-sided, and merely a transition-point in this truth, which is concentrated on one point.

That the whole of humanity proceeded forth from the essence of God, is the eternal, metaphysical truth. But in Christianity the emphasis is laid not on this, but on the single fact of the incarnation of God in Christ:—this is the temporal element in Christianity.

That God existed immediately, purely, and unmixedly, as

He is in Himself, in Jesus of Nazareth, without any mixture of darkness, obscurity, individual limitation, in a personal human form, is merely an historical addition, it is not metaphysical.

The knowledge of the absolute identity of humanity with deity as regards the properly real in the former, Christ without doubt possessed. How did it arise in Him? In us it arises, not out of His history, but out of speculative philosophy; nay more, in order to our understanding merely the organ Christ, it is necessary that we should have gained an insight into that unity in another way. But Christ does not present Himself to us as one who has attained this knowledge by speculative philosophy, discursive thought, learning, or tradition, but absolutely through His existence. This knowledge was to Him the first and absolute thing, without any middle link whatever; it did not arise out of other states: not from the annihilation of the particular personal Ego did it proceed, as it does in our case; but it was immediately identical with His self-consciousness. He was the absolute reason, the absolute religion, which had become an immediate self-consciousness. God was His own self; He had no self-consciousness. Not Jesus was God to Him, but God was Jesus, appeared as Jesus.

All this, however, He was not singly; but metaphysical knowledge shows that what He was, is the proper reality of all: nay more, that this is His reality, solely because it belongs in general to the idea of humanity as a reality. If His eternity is to be maintained, it can only be at the cost of the metaphysical truth. The latter is only for universality; it is only the procession of humanity in general that can be explained by going back to God; and it is a perverse undertaking to try to give a metaphysical character to this His uniqueness, seeing that it has, after all, merely an historical value. But as it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the incarnation of God in a single individual in the way of metaphysical laws, and these laws point merely to an universal incarnation of God, the gaps in the chain of proof are filled out by inventions.

This theory, therefore, takes the unity of the divine and human for its point of departure, representing it, however, immediately, as absolutely universal; Christ has no special place; all men are equal to Him in that which constitutes their proper reality. All have God entirely in themselves; only not

in an equally realized form. To Christ belongs the place of the beginner, of the first as to time, in relation to insight into the proper, that is, the divine, reality of man: but this insight is in no respect dependent on His person.

Herein is involved that Christianity contains nothing essentially new. Each man *per se* is immediately, not through the medium of Christ, but by nature, God. In this way, however, the idea of regeneration is curtailed; Christianity does not form a turning-point, either in history as a whole, or in the life of the individual. The reason hereof is, that God, as the only reality—a reality non-mediated in itself—is supposed to have an immediate existence in man; that unity of essence is confounded with identity.

Theories (the like of which we shall find further on) which, whilst, it is true, representing God as the only reality, teach Him also to be engaged in a process, and undergoing a mediation through humanity, are able to regard history as an articulate organism, and to hold fast a fixed distinction between Christianity and all other religions. Fichte, however, though he also holds God to be the only reality, represents Him not as undergoing a process, but as eternally identical with Himself: hence his system does not allow of our retaining the idea of the regeneration of humanity through and in Christ.

It is unable also to allow that God became *man*. God, who is the One not mediated with Himself (*der mit sich Unvermittelte*), who is simple eternal being, is immediately in every one; He is the only reality in every one. Whatever, therefore, is in or of them, besides this simple divine element, is not reality, is mere accident. There is no distinction between individuals, personalities, in relation to that which constitutes their proper reality: the divine is the only reality in all. That which constitutes them distinct, to wit, their personality, individuality, must therefore be unreal. We are thus landed completely again in the Spinozistic view.

Now, as Christ was individuality, personality, He also is not entirely reality: remains of the unreal must cleave also to Him; as a person, we cannot conceive even Him without uncleanness and darkness. So far as He attains the true reality, or is the true existence of God, He is no more an individual, but His personality is annihilated. Accordingly, precisely the full, actual

existence of God would do away with His humanity. God did not become *man* in Him.

We have thus the contradiction, that, on the one hand, God is eternally destined to become man (for, according to Fichte, this is to be seen by us to be metaphysical, consequently necessary, although not shown by him to be such); and on the other hand, this can never take place, because personality is conceived as a limit of the divine, and it therefore must be done away with precisely when God attained a complete existence in man. The ground of this contradiction is plain. This ground is the error which necessarily cleaves to the stage of reflection, that the infinite excludes the finite, so that any union formed by the former with the latter must annihilate instead of raising it to true, infinite personality.

NOTE 15, page 100.

Compare particularly the "Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik," 1801, ii. 2, § 1, 22. The summary view of his system which it is there his intention to give, has still great affinity with the principles of Spinoza. Compare in particular § 28, 30, 32, according to which quantitative differences (he recognises no other difference, § 23) are posited by no means in themselves, but merely in appearance; the process, therefore, which Schelling endeavours notwithstanding to set forth in the whole of his work, is merely a subjective one. He does not here yet regard the one as in itself that which moves itself; but the process and the movement fall into the subject. This is Spinozism which has passed through the stage of Fichteanism. Here, therefore, Schelling stands where Fichte also subsequently arrived. The *process* recognised by him, however, even though primarily merely subjective, contained within itself the principle of a further movement. This showed itself partly already in the "Methode des akadem. Studiums," 1803, and "Darlegung des wahren Verh." 1806. The development of the process, too, in Schelling's hands related ever more and more to the volitional aspect; whereas Hegel treats the process as one of thought. Compare also "Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie," 1856, pp. 460 ff.

NOTE 16, page 102.

That the "other," without which God cannot be conceived as absolute life, becomes in his view at once "the many," the world, concerning which at this stage it is impossible for him as yet to lay claim to any knowledge (save such as is purely empirical), is a leap involving very important consequences, but not scientifically justified. It throws together into one, two problems, that of the eternal theogony and that of cosmogony; and by this commixture he is driven, against his will, to convert the essential unity of the divine and human into identity. The unity with which Christology is particularly concerned, cannot be understood, if the two members of the antagonism are not thought out purely by themselves, according to their idea. In other words, the unity is not the true one, if the members of the antagonism are united merely by identity, and not rather by that which distinguishes and opposes them. Compare above, Div. II. Vol. II. pp. 217 f. An unity grounded in mere identity, or in an identity actually existing prior to the distinction, is the negation of the antagonism, instead of the conversion of its members into momenta of a higher unity.

NOTE 17, page 114.

Akin to Schelling's view of nature and history, and their inner relation to each other and to Christianity, are the ideas of H. v. Schubert and Steffens. I will only quote a few words of the latter in the present connection (compare his "Anthropologie" ii. 353 ff., 455 ff., and "Wie ich wieder Lutheraner ward"):—"At the subhuman stages, the various kinds are rent asunder, and their scattered forms point to the centre of all genera, to wit, the human kind. But the human genus also is not free from the beginning; on the contrary, wild conflict and animal desires set it on fire, till personality is formed. Freedom first comes into existence when our own will is absorbed in, and made a sacrifice to, the eternal law. Sacrificing our self-will, we gain our most proper will. This is then our will, and yet at the same time not our will; it is the Saviour in us, the eternal love, and confirms in each one the eternal personality.

The revelation of the eternal personality of God, the Son from eternity, the true primal form and the inner fulness of all

law from the very beginning, was the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. His veiled personality existed from the very beginning, and, as a hint of future blessedness, looks out of nature. Deliverance cannot lie in anything that is earthly perceived or heard. Every earthly form passes away; but the Son appeared, the perfect redemption of creation, the atoning centre of history, even as earthly man is the atoning centre of nature. Only in close union with this personality, does our eternal, never vanishing primal form come forth, the heart, the redeemed abyss, as the seat of love; the glorified countenance, as the disclosed heaven, the inner light, the essence of the soul, blessedness.—The Saviour bore and overcame the secret pain, the inner woe of the whole of creation, and by His death broke the hard crust that encompassed it, so that the spring of unfathomable love, and of the eternal, personal life, may bud forth in every heart. Accordingly, in the organic epoch of history the Spirit of God passes like a judge over the world, and prepares the time, when, in the freedom of God, in the love of the Son, in the revelation of the Spirit, that deep unity of all life shall be revealed by the redeemed primal forms of a new heaven and a new earth.—Elsewhere he says,—Whoso has understood that unity of *nature* and *spirit*, that glory of the Son (who sets forth their unity, but is not explicable from history, but only from Himself), he alone has a faint idea of the profound significance of the Supper, and of the blessedness of close union with it.—These thoughts are more fully carried out in his “Religionsphilosophie” i. 410 ff., with special reference to miracles, p. 440 ff. The sole aim of all the developments in nature, up to the highest stage, is the revelation of the divine love. But this can only reveal itself, when that which alone *is*, to wit, the eternal personality, *becomes*, or comes into existence, out of itself; when the most hidden task of creation is accomplished by the person itself. The second Adam, the divine person of all personality, the centre of history, as man was already in Adam the centre of nature, has all power over creation. Himself a miracle, the person from God, He brings the miracle to completion and substance by the regeneration of the universe.

NOTE 18, page 129.

At a later period, it is true, unconciliated herewith, the opinion made its appearance—"One of the necessary conditions of the personal Self, is that it itself will to be by itself; out of this flow consciousness of guilt, and pain, and suffering, because of sin:" p. 265 ff. Among the pure results of the development of humanity before Christ, must be mentioned also the consciousness of guilt, repentance; this must, therefore, have a place in Him who is the pure perfection of the personal self. His sinlessness was not the pure negation of sin, but sinfulness done away with, sinfulness which had not arrived at a state of permanence, at objective reality. Accordingly, He suffered for His own sin; but this does not exclude suffering for the sake of the sin of others.—In his "*Kritik der Dogmen nach Anleitung des apost. Symbol.*" 1841, pp. 132–153, he endeavours to mediate more exactly between the two:—"Sinlessness pertains to Christ, in virtue of the entrance of the totality of the idea of humanity into His individuality: sinfulness pertains to Him, so far as the reduction of this universal idea to a concrete human individuality necessarily presupposes the antagonism between the individual and the universal. A sinless *birth* out of the true essence of humanity must be predicated for Him; but this does not necessarily involve a sinless development. On the contrary, an human development was only possible in Him, on the supposition that in Him also there were two tendencies, one to individual independence of being, another to the universal,—that He had a will of His own opposed to the universal, a will which aimed at maintaining itself against the universal, and resisted the sacrifice of the entire natural life to which it was urged; which will must first be really overcome. He had to arrive at the personal resolve of will to sacrifice Himself through vacillation; and the natural will, which permitted a chain of seductive thoughts to arise out of itself (Matt. iv.), also offered resistance to the carrying out of the pure resolve. In relation to this we must say,—We are no more justified in styling the non-existence of the absolute perfection which is the final goal, sin, than the innocent conflict between the natural and the spiritual aspect, which the vocation involves. The movements of the natural life or natural will of Christ were not at all evil

in themselves, not even when they were reflected in the consciousness and thoughts; there is only sin in the spirit when it allows itself to be determined, and determines itself, in opposition to its nature and calling. So far is the natural aspect from being in necessary contradiction to the spiritual or universal, that, on the contrary, it also must be embraced by the universal and by the will of the spirit, in such a manner, indeed, that the spirit posits rule and order. Conradi's principles would lead us to assume a necessary and eternal sinfulness, seeing that even in the state of perfection, the universal is not permitted to destroy the momentum of independence, of individual volition.—Sin is contradiction to the *ought*, to the law of life, not the abstract; for otherwise, undoubtedly, imperfection and growth would also be sin; but against the law with those very requirements which it makes of every stage of life.

Conradi has neither proved, nor indeed did he wish to prove, that Christ ever stood in an abnormal relation to this law, be it as to the personal or as to the natural aspect of His being. Moreover, such a notion would contradict what he says elsewhere regarding the immediate holy nature of Christ. In virtue thereof, the tendency of Christ towards Himself necessarily was also a tendency towards this holy nature, towards its preservation and development.

NOTE 19, page 136.

Compare ix. 342:—"As the Greeks spiritualized their heavenly gods, so Christians, on their part, endeavoured to find a deeper meaning in the historical portions of their religion. As Philo found that deeper things were hinted at in the Mosaic narrative, and idealized the external portion of the narrative; so did the Christians do the same, partly for polemical reasons, partly, and still more, out of regard to the thing itself." In the further course of the work, he says, "Dogmas were introduced into the Christian religion, it is true, by philosophy; but they are not therefore foreign to Christianity; on the contrary, they concern it closely. For it is a matter of perfect indifference whence anything is come; the only question is—is it true, in and by itself? and profoundly speculative elements are interwoven with the manifestation of Christ itself." To wit, at all events, in so far as there ferments in *faith* in Christ, the specu-

lative idea of the universal consubstantiality of God and man; and as the same substance is cherished, though, it is true, in the form of representation, which philosophy, when it casts aside the sensuous and empirical, recognises as universal truth, and as in no sense bound to, or dependent on, any one individual. That this is Hegel's meaning, is if possible still more clear from xv. 104 ("History of Philosophy" iii.). The fundamental idea (of the essential unity of God and man) must needs become universal consciousness, universal religion. For this reason, it retains and receives shape for the presentative consciousness, in the form of the outward consciousness, not merely of universal thought.¹ That would otherwise be a philosophy of the Christian religion; for the point of view of philosophy is the idea in the form of thought. By what means this idea as religion is, belongs to the history of religion; that is, its development, its form. What he understood by the form which was to be thrown aside, he shows by the example of the history of the Fall, the truth in which is known when we see it to be the history of all (pp. 105, 106). He draws a sharp distinction between the metaphysical and the historical in the Person of Christ, and by no means posits an essential connection between the two. What is His historical dignity, is not more precisely expounded, where we should have first expected it, to wit, in the philosophy of religion: indeed, by itself, it is destitute of essential interest. He rather hastens on, in the present connection also, to the *death* of Christ, not in order that we may contemplate Him as a glorified, perfected personality (in this sense the Church also holds the historical appearance of Christ to be marked by an inadequacy, which was first overcome after His death); but that we may learn to look away from Him as an individual, and rise from a merely religious to a speculative view.

NOTE 20, page 138.

What Baur (Trinitätslehre iii. 908 f., compare 974 f.) advances against this blame amounts at last to this—that Hegel neither was nor could in general have been concerned

¹ "Daher behält und erhält sie die Gestalt für das vorstellende Bewusstsein, in Form des äusserlichen Bewusstseins, nicht des nur allgemeinen Gedankens."

about the construction of the historical Person of Christ, inasmuch as the historical individual is something contingent. We are not yet here touching on the question, whether Christ is contingent for the Christian consciousness, as Moses was for the Jewish. But it is no less marked by contingency to suppose the God-manhood to have been realized primarily in the form of transference into another; and an attempt is notwithstanding made to construct the accidental. Or was God under the necessity of realizing the divine-human consciousness first of all in this form? This would be nothing less than to say that the Church *must* have had a divine-human consciousness *prior* to Christ. Baur himself afterwards says the opposite of this. By this anthropological method, a relation is *apparently* established between Christ and the Church, and it has worked confusion. For the rest, it contains also an element whose proper place is where the world is regarded merely in the light of a means for the actualization of the divine self-consciousness. It involves further an ethical trait, which many of his followers completely lost, instead of seeking to give it a foundation in the idea of God.

NOTE 21, page 143.

Julius Müller has justly directed attention to the amphiboly in Hegel's idea of Evil in "The Christian Doctrine of Sin." At one time, the *immediate* in general appears as the evil, the animal; at another time, the awakening of man to consciousness, the self-discrimination from this his immediacy (for example, "the fall is the eternal myth of man, through which he becomes man"); and lastly, the self-fixation in opposition to the universal divine spirit ("to remain at the point of view of separation from the universal divine spirit, through which, it is true, man first becomes man, is evil").

One might seek to unite all this by representing evil as, in general, the non-correspondence to the idea of the spirit. But even the first separation of the spirit, existing for itself, from its own immediate state, he calls sin; though only so far as this separation, which, though necessary, is again to be done away with, *appears* as sin in the *consciousness of man*. In itself, it is rather a step in advance. For the rest, the self-establishment in this antagonism is not treated as a deed of the will, conse-

quently not as guilt, but simply as a defect of knowledge; even as the atonement is conceived, not as something embracing the totality of the life, but as a process of consciousness.

NOTE 22, page 149.

With regard to Christ, Strauss says, in his "Leben Jesu" ii. 734 and 715 (Ed. 1):—"That is not at all the mode in which the idea realizes itself, to pour out its entire fulness into one exemplar, and to be niggardly towards all others; but it loves to spread out its fulness in a variety of exemplars, which reciprocally complement each other, in the change of individuals which posit and again do away with themselves."—P. 717:—"Neither in general an individual, nor in particular an historical commencing point, can be at the same time archetypal." In vol. ii. 716-718, and 734, he says that Christ also was compelled to experience the lot of the finite spirit, to wit, inner conflict and vacillation between good and evil. In Himself, as to His inner kernel, it is true, He was archetypal; human nature in general (that is, God) was this kernel; but His historical appearance cannot have been pure, and that alone which appears of Him is an historical individual. This by no means excludes the idea of the incarnation of God, or of the God-man. On the contrary, that which was thought by the Church as an history occurring once for all, must now be thought as an universal actuality. The key of the whole of Christology (pp. 734, 735) is, that we posit an idea, namely, a real idea, instead of an individual, as the subject of the predicates which the Church attaches to Christ. Conceived as in an individual, a God-man, the qualities and functions attributed to Christ by the doctrine of the Church contradict each other; conceived as in the idea of the genus, they agree together. Humanity is the union of the two natures, is the incarnate God, and so forth. This universal and eternal incarnation is more real and true than the assumption that it took place once. Humanity is that which is born of the Holy Ghost; its spirit is the worker of miracles, the sinless, the dying, the one that rises again, nay, more, even the one that ascends to heaven:—explanations of the Christian dogmas, exact resemblances of which we have already frequently met with in the course of our investigation. Christology falls herewith entirely back into anthropology; the

one Christ of the Church is resolved into the idea, to wit, God, who is the universal essence of humanity, and into Jesus of Nazareth (*ἄνω* and *κάτω Χριστός*). Concerning the latter, he says (p. 735):—“*This individual, by His personality and His fates*, became the occasion of raising the truth that humanity is the God-man to universal consciousness.” The shyness towards Rationalism, which represented Christ as the teacher of a pure, excellent religion (p. 710), plainly appears from this to have little ground, although, philosophically considered, speculative Rationalism alone deserves the praise of unflinching logical consistency. At a later period, both in his “*Streitschriften*” (see in particular iii. 69 ff.) and elsewhere in a still more popular manner, he has expressed himself somewhat differently regarding Christ. Christ is described as “a religious genius, who, owing to the peculiarity of His constitution, or to His moral vigour, may possibly have worked some of the miracles of healing; and although He is not in all respects the accomplished reality of the idea, but merely as regards religion, in religious matters it is impossible to transcend Him, because He has reached the highest goal thereof, to wit, that a man should know himself in his immediate consciousness to be one with God.” *Leben Jesu*, Ed. 3, 1839, ii. 777, 778:—“Putting aside the ideas of sinlessness and absolute perfection as incapable of accomplishment, we regard Christ as the one in whose self-consciousness the unity of the divine and human made its appearance for the first time, and that with such an energy as to overcome and reduce to a vanishing minimum all the hindrances which lay within the entire compass of His heart and life:—so far, therefore, He holds an unique and, save by Him, unattained position in history. The commencement may be conceived as also the greatest of a series, so far as an idea is used to possess and display most vigour at its first appearance, but not as the absolutely greatest; for, on the contrary, the religious consciousness which He gained for Himself and expressed, could not withdraw itself from the need of purification and expansion.” Similarly Baur (*Trinitätslehre* iii. 969, 963) says,—“If the negativity of the idea, which is the immanent principle of the history of the world, consists in the circumstance, that in its living self-motion it passes out beyond every finite form, and thus negatives and resumes it into itself, with what

right can the exception be established which, according to the doctrine of the Church, must be made in the case of the one individual? The entire process (of God and humanity) must then cease at once," and so forth. P. 964 ff.,—"The case is a similar one with absolute sinlessness (or archetypicality), so far as it is to be attributed to one individual. That it appears as an impossibility in the system, this only shows the impossibility of the thing itself." It contradicts the essence of the finite spirit. It can only be sinfulness done away with, sinfulness that has not attained to permanence, says he, with Conradi. See above, pp. 129 ff.

NOTE 23, page 153.

The only way in which we could escape attributing to it a gradual development, would be by supposing the self-conscious God or the idea to have eternal reality in itself. This might be understood in two ways; to wit, either as denoting that God, in freedom and independence of the world and its course of development, is eternally and absolutely self-conscious in Himself; or that He is the spiritual substance, which, because it remains ever like itself, has nothing either to seek or to find in the course of the development of humanity, but, reaching out beyond individuals as its manifestations, unites in itself all essentiality, all substantiality, so that outside of it there can only be that which is unessential, accidental. The first explanation would correspond to the Christian idea of God; the second is adopted by Baur (see the "Trinitätslehre" iii. 925-928):—"Spirit *per se* has eternally effected its return to itself, and is one with itself: God is not merely the process, that is, the actuality of the world, which in positing and abolishing runs on into the infinite; but, above all, the unity or the principle of the process in which all the antagonisms of the world are merely ideally contained." "That in general there is a finite world for the realization of the idea, is the necessary condition of the concrete divine self-consciousness; but that which realizes itself in the individual beings of the finite world is the non-essential relatively to the essential being of the idea." Taking such a view, we can say that God is not the spirit of the world, namely, so far as the concrete content of the world is something unsubstantial, something which has only a semblance of being. But

in so far as the world has a moment of being, and God actualizes Himself as spirit only through its mediation, He is also the spirit of the world. Baur tries to conceive the mediatory process, on the one hand, as eternally complete; on the other hand, as progressive. But he fails to combine the two, for it is an inner impossibility. Complete it is (p. 924), so far as the idea in its eternal essential being contains everything that is realized in the actuality of the world. This perfection, however, which would lie in the *per se* (An Sich), would be a perfection without that which is highest, to wit, concrete subjectivity, which alongside of it would be a mere accident. On the principles of the system, this would be a demand to think God as eternally complete without absolute self-consciousness; for this latter it is supposed possible to realize solely in the world.

NOTE 24, page 166.

Page 36. Rosenkranz means the same thing ("Encyclopædie," Ed. 2, p. 64) when he describes it as the manner of the idea, that is, as a necessity of reason, to posit the individual as the unity of the particular and the universal, in other words, as punctual totality (punktuelle Totalität). Only that he draws too little distinction between nature and spirit. Nor can we, with Rosenkranz, say,—“Every man is all men; every spirit is all spirits.” For this formula posits and denies at the same time the distinction between the individual spirits, which is not rendered impossible by their being, as spirits, totalities. Conradi in particular (see his “Christus in der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft,” 1839, p. 58), has directed attention to the essence of personality. “It is precisely this, to be the reality of the conception in its infinitude.” Pp. 257 ff.: “The individuals of the natural *genus* are merely transition-points, indications of the life of the genus, specimens, samples. But with this natural relation between kind and individual, the conception of *humanity* is not attained: nor is it allowable then to say, that the idea is realized in humanity; for it is essential to the idea to be conscious of itself, that is, to be realized in a self-consciousness. The realization of the idea must, therefore, unquestionably be sought in the world of humanity, of *personal* beings.” To similar purpose Marheinecke, in his “System der Dogmatik” (p. 293), defines the conception of *personality* to

be that which solves the riddle of the apparent contradiction between the universal and the particular. In it takes place the transition of the absolute into egoity, and of the Ego into absoluteness; through it the incarnation of God is a possibility. This part of the school of Hegel thus arrives, not without adding the *will* to knowledge, at the very same point which we found in Schelling's doctrine of freedom, to wit, at the personality as the unity of the universal and the particular. Vatke also ("Die menschliche Freiheit, etc.," 1841) endeavoured to develop the system onwards in this direction; besides him, in greater independence of Hegel, Fischer, Fichte, Weisse.

NOTE 25, page 167.

According to the remarks made above in connection with Hegel, the *utmost* that follows from this empirical derivation is the necessity of faith in the perfect presence of God in Christ. Nor did this defect entirely escape his own notice, p. 93. Nay more, to judge from page 127, he also would seem to attribute a merely transitory significance to Christ. "The participation of all in the person and deed of Christ involves in itself undoubtedly a negation of the particular, individual Christ;" although he adds, it is never an actual and spiritual participation unless it is accompanied by as true a recognition also of the specific and distinctive character of Christ, unless His uniqueness is retained hold of, as the foundation of the whole of our Christian life. Still more distinctly does Conradi, in his "Kritik der christlichen Dogmen" (pp. 280 ff.), resolve the personality of Christ ultimately "into the infinitude of the personal spirit." Corporeality is merely in a relative sense the end of the ways of God, to wit, to the point where spirituality is born into the corporeality, into the finite individuality which is posited by it. From that point on we may say,—Spirituality is the end of the ways of God, and in spirituality the finite individuality is done away with.

NOTE 26, page 168.

I had already taken this course in the essay in the "Tübingen Zeitschrift," which formed the basis of the present work (1836, i. p. 239). The fundamental doctrinal thought is then repeated verbatim in the concluding dissertation of the previous

edition (pp. 527 ff.). After observing, namely, that the entire development of science shows that, be its will ever so good, it cannot preserve for Christ a specific, distinctive, and unique character, unless, continuing in the traces of the canonical doctrine (1 Cor. xv. 45-47; Rom. v. 12 ff.; Eph. i. 19-23, iv. 10-16, v. 23 ff.; Col. i. 13 ff.; Heb. i. 2, 3; John i. 1-14), it concede to Him also a metaphysical significance, the remark is repeated,—“As a deeper view of nature shows the subordinate stages of existence to be the scattered, disjoined momenta of one whole, of one idea, which is then summed up in the noble, godlike form of *man*, who, as such, is the head and crown of the natural creation; so may humanity be regarded as the discerpted plurality of a higher whole, of a higher idea, to wit, of Christ. And as nature is collected into unity, not merely in the idea of a man, but in actual man; so also is humanity summed up, not merely in an idea, in an ideal Christ, but in the actual God-man, who personally sets forth its totality, and collects in Himself the archetypes, or ideal personalities, of all single individualities. And as the first summing up of scattered momenta in Adam, although a summing up of nature, and itself still participating in nature, itself still a natural being, yet exhibits an infinitely higher form than any of the individual natural beings; so the second Adam also, although in Himself a summing up of humanity, and Himself still a man, is an infinitely higher form of humanity than any single representative of our kind. If Adam was the head of the natural creation, and as such reached over with his essence into the kingdom of spirit, and grasped over the natural world, Christ is the head of the spiritual creation, and as such points out away from and beyond humanity to a so to speak cosmical, or, as we have termed it above, metaphysical significance of His person.” This, then, is the place at which Christology comes into connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, through the medium of the Logos-idea, and where we may apply the words of Scripture concerning “the Word which was in the beginning, which was with God, and was God: all things were made by it, and without it was not anything made that is made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And this same Word became flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld His glory, a glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and

truth." In the previous edition of this work (see pp. 370-376), I entered at the same time into a detailed justification of this view, which I will not here repeat. I will refer in preference to the works of K. Ph. Fischer, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, which recognise, establish, and carry out, in one respect or another, the truth of the fundamental thought in question. So much, however, shall be verbatim *repeated*, even at the risk of having a view again attributed to me by such men as K. Schwarz ("Zur Geschichte der neuesten Theologie," 2 Ed. p. 261), the direct contrary of that which I really entertain,—that neither the opinion of the Church (which at all times, as is clear from the whole of the present work, has cherished and preserved this apostolic idea of the Person of Christ, and agitated it as often as it ventured into the domain of speculation), nor of myself in the above exposition, has been, that Christ is "the totality of individuals as they live and move, or the collective unity thereof." Against so glaring a misapprehension I ought to have been protected, both by the express repudiation of this notion given in connection with the above exposition (see Ed. i. p. 373), and by what is said regarding the first Adam. As regards the matter itself, it may be remarked, that the multiplicity of the descendants of Adam, each of which is a totality or microcosm in his own way, is no argument against the permanent uniqueness of Christ. All that we have to do is to pursue further the path indicated to us by the Apostle (1 Cor. xv.) :—as the first Adam became the progenitor of a multiplicity of beings like himself, although he alone remained the first father; so the second Adam also has become the progenitor of a new race like Himself, which through Him acquires a share in His divine-human essence. The sole distinction is, that the process which begins with the second Adam does not rise intensively any higher, but goes back to the already existing race of men, who all are born the children of Adam and not the children of God, though, because they are ethical, historical beings, they are capable, by their nature, of becoming the children of God. In this way the process, instead of ascending in a straight line, or advancing in a "*progressus in infinitum*," is closed, and forms as it were a circle. The second Adam is at the same time the last, the absolute apex of humanity, which becomes the centre of the family of the children of God. But He becomes that

which He is, because the absolutely universal principle, the Logos, the image of God, and the archetype of the world, has given Himself in Him cosmical actuality also, in agreement with His own ethical nature, which from the very beginning was directed to the production, not merely of a race of natural, psychical men (1 Cor. xv. 46), but of a race of pneumatic beings, nay more, to the establishment of the presence and life of God in that race. This mode of existence was found by the divine Logos in Christ; in the most perfect, not merely substantial, but *personal* form; and for this reason, there rests in this *person* the power or the "principle" of the regeneration of all out of the spirit. The Person of Christ, because it is the cosmical expression of the divine archetype of the world or of the Logos (2 Cor. iv.), His realization in an actual human form, has become the transforming, all-sufficient archetype of all, the personal power to realize also its own archetypal individuality. Nor does the fact that in Him is the point of the true life of all, and that He in this sense, and precisely as a person, is potentiâ their unity, involve the dissolution of His human personality, or, if we will, of His human individuality; for, on the contrary, the permanent peculiarity which distinguishes Him from all others consists in His being alone the head, by virtue of His, not one-sided, but absolute union with the Logos. The expression—Christ is the unity of the human individual and of the race, must undoubtedly be allowed to say either nothing at all or something inappropriate, if we use the term *kind* in the sense of the physically universal: but the essence of humanity is to be spirit; and there is no contradiction between spirit in its absolutely perfect form, that is, as absolutely united with and adequately revealing God, and as realizing Him in the world, on the one side, and the individuality and uniqueness of the Son of man, on the other side; for this distinct person, Jesus Christ, has universal significance and an influence corresponding to the unique character of the union between Himself as the central individual and the Logos, notwithstanding, but in virtue of, His personality and uniqueness.

NOTE 27, page 172.

Pp. 260 f. Similarly Rosenkranz (see p. 65). It is necessary that central individuals also make their appearance; the

breadth of the culture must be summed up also into its depth. P. 66. Christ is not an encyclopædia of powers, talents, but the true man. To speak of having genius for true humanity, is an improper expression. His mission was to set forth the necessity of freedom as the truth of spirit, and this alone,—this, however, as His own self. Marheinecke, agreeing chiefly with Conradi, says (see pp. 308 ff.),—We may allow to Strauss, that without His universal life in humanity, God (the idea) could not have attained to this concrete and separate being in Christ. But the multiplicity that characterizes the form of the appearance of the divine in humanity still leads strongly in the direction of heathenism; for it is precisely this multiplicity of the form that shows it at the same time to be finite. In giving utterance to the thought “humanity,” one supposes oneself to be dealing with the infinite, because it is an abstraction from multiplicity. But we must rather seek to understand personality, individuality, as the truly infinite. A single personality is the vehicle of a power and intensity that has no measure. In Christ is the spiritual and moral ground, without which the particular aspects of life (for example, talents and so forth) are destitute of worth; and this intensity is greater than everything phenomenal and extended. Accordingly, Christ, as the individual, is the universal, man; as a single individual, He is the absolute individual: He is humanity, but humanity in particularity: pp. 312 f. Page 310, he describes the Logos, after the manner of Göschel, as the primal personality:—indeed, he holds the significance of the doctrine of the anhypostasis of humanity to be, that God is the essence of humanity.

NOTE 28, page 206.

On the other hand, by the way in which he conceives the sinlessness of Christ, he renders a recognition of the full truth of His humanity an impossibility; though, at the same time, we must mention to his great credit, that he was far removed from treating evil, or even only imperfection, as something postulated by the very idea of our nature. On this point, there is an essential distinction between him and both Hegel and Schelling and Kant; and it is strange to find him charged

¹ “Es müssen auch Centralindividuen auftreten, die *Breite* der Bildung muss auch in ihre Tiefe zusammengefasst werden.”

by the school of Hegel with a relapse to the Kantian notion of the dualism between the *shall* and *being*, between the finite and the infinite :—a point of view which it itself occupies, if it have not sunk back behind Kant in an ethical point of view. Schleiermacher clung faithfully to the conviction, that the actuality of the archetypal does not go beyond our nature ; but to the truth of this our nature, a true moral process is also necessary ; and a true moral process is impossible without passing through opposed possibilities, without actual labour and moral gain. And yet Schleiermacher describes the sinless life of Christ as though it had flowed on without conflict, temptation, or trial, like a smooth, unrippled stream ; which makes the impression of a course that is physically necessary. Like Athanasius or Apollinaris, he held the existence of a remainder of mobility (*Beweglichkeit*) in the will (*τρεπτόν*) to be connected with sin (see Div. I. Vol. II. pp. 351, 360). Liebner has justly drawn particular attention to this as a defect of his system.

NOTE 29, page 218.

Günther and his school here come into consideration ; the movement against which in the Catholic Church is so violent, because the predominant tendency of that Church now is to resorb the human into the divine aspect of the Person of Christ, and to leave the former merely a semblance of reality. In opposition to this tendency, Günther and his school have justly protested. He lays stress on the independence of the human aspect ; appealing, as he justly can, in favour of his position, to Leo and the Synods of the years 451 and 681. In the emphasis thus laid on the truth of the humanity, there lies but one of the momenta which constitute the peculiar character of the Churches of the Reformation, for they assert no less vigorously the unity of the human and the divine ; for which reason, Günther is unable really to sympathize with them. Günther's opponents insist, with equal one-sidedness, though in an opposite direction, on the unity, which they deem to lie in the divine ; hence it happens that each, with equal justice and plausibility, charges the other with inclining to Protestantism. But also with equal injustice ; for neither Günther's distinction of the divine from the human, nor the unity maintained by his antagonists, is that asserted by the Reformation. On the contrary,

as this very double charge by itself indicates, the true Protestant view unites two things which the antagonists of the Reformation are compelled eternally to put asunder. The two parties in question, to wit, that of Günther and his opponents, do but embody afresh the antagonisms of the Middle Ages, and, though each may be well able to refute the other, neither of them either aids itself or its opponent in the attainment of the truth. Günther's fundamental thought is the dualism between God and the world. "The universe is the contra-position of the Triune God." Man is, in his view, an "union-being" (ein Vereinwesen), or a "marriage" between spirit on the one side, and body and soul on the other. The union between the two sides he supposes to be merely formal. In every person, namely, a distinction must be drawn between form and essence, or the substantial principle. The form is the thinking of the essence, through which *being* becomes subject. The thinking of the essence (of the two substantial principles in man), or self-consciousness, is the unity of man. But whereas the self-consciousness of an absolute person is immediate, that of a creature is arrived at alone through the discrimination of foreign existences and co-operation from our own being. These principles must be applied also to the Person of Christ. The eternal Son is an independent self-conscious subject. But to His humanity also, if it is to be such in truth, we must attribute a self-consciousness of its own, growth of that self-consciousness and increase of knowledge: no less too a free will, concerning which we are warranted in saying "potuit peccare." It is not sufficient to repudiate merely the doctrine of a Docetical *body* of Christ; we must reject Docetism also in relation to spiritual states; we must cast aside the Docetical will and knowledge, because otherwise the homousia is violated. Scholasticism, says Trebisch ("Die christliche Weltanschauung," 1852, p. 148), vacillated between Nestorius and Eutyches, when it, on the one hand, assumed a "scientia infusa" as habitual or actual, and with it the presence of perfect wisdom in the soul of Christ from the very beginning; and yet, on the other hand, recognised a "scientia acquisita;" as also, when it pursued the same course in relation to holiness. The one makes the other superfluous. The humanity, therefore, must be described as personal in itself; as also the Logos, on the other hand.—But if there are two per-

sons in Christ, which stand in no inner relation to each other, how can the unity of His person be maintained? Little importance can be attached to what Günther says, to the effect, that every real union between an absolute and a created substance is an hypostatical one, in so far as "the absolute personality is the agent in its accomplishment;" for all that this denotes, is that the Logos stands in the same relation to Jesus as He does to all. The humanity itself derives no advantage from this union. Of somewhat more weight is it, when he says that—"The Logos watched over and furthered from the beginning the moulding and the evolution of the soul of the holy child Jesus, which was bound to Him" (Trebesch, p. 151). But the properly qualitative momentum which pertains alone to Christ, and constitutes Him God-man, is supposed to lie in His self-consciousness; a point which strikingly reminds us of the Christology of Descartes (ii. 899). This is the common type of the divine and of the human substance, in that it is the essential form of its essence. As a common element, it is fitted for being the medium of the union of the Logos with Jesus. The creature, namely, is unable to lay hold of its own being, save as it appears in its determinateness for thought. Now the divine principle, which, on its part, united itself with human being, will therefore appear to the human self-consciousness by means of some sort of influence, by the communication of the thought of that union, in that it gives the man to know that it is, or appears as, united with him. Accordingly, this man now knows himself as the God-man. But how can Günther show it to be a determination of the humanity itself, that it should thus be the property of the Logos? We say nothing more than holds good of all beings, even of things without life, when we say that the Logos is hypostatically active in connection therewith, as with that which is His own. And how is the duplication of the like form to bring about unity of the person?—especially when the content of these forms is and remains absolutely different, and the equality consists solely in both being the spiritual form of one content? A substantial union between God and the human substance, a total penetration of the human self-consciousness by the content of the divine, must not be assumed, but merely a formal unity. The manifestation by means of which Jesus knows Himself as the God-man may recede, without involving the reces-

sion of His self-consciousness, or the termination of the union. All men are "union-beings" (Vereinwesen) through the formal unity of consciousness: such is the case also with Christ, with the sole difference, that His self-consciousness embraces in addition the absolute principle. In this "union-being," with its two permanently separate and distinct series of activities, Günther teaches that the divine and the divine-human spiritual life operate, each having the predominance by turn; only that the hegemonical divine will determines which shall have the predominance, the one or the other. Thus are the two persons embraced under one common personality (compare Div. II. Vol. I. Note 14). As a free debt can only be paid by the free merit of a being who belongs to one and the same organic whole, the satisfaction cannot be offered by any other than the Son of man. Günther asserts that this is rendered possible by his doctrine, according to which Jesus is a new, pure creation on the basis of the old, though His was a true humanity. Trebisch, in particular, seeks to effect a reconciliation with the doctrine of the Church, by representing it as churchly to draw a distinction between hypostasis and *πρόσωπον*, similar to that between the quiescent and the actual. There are two hypostases, but in their actuality they become one prosopon, one formal divine-human person. The Nestorians were Monothelites, and taught that the Son of man was a person from the very outset; whereas He first attained full self-consciousness when He received the knowledge of the hypostatical union. Compare Günther, "Vorschule der speculativen Theologie," 2 Bde. Ed. 2, 1848; "Lydia," 1849; "Peregrin's Gastmahl," Wien, 1850; Pabst's "Christus und Adam; der Mensch und seine Geschichte," Ed. 2, 1847; Merten's "Grundriss der Metaphysik," 1848; Knoodt, "Kath. Viertelj. J. 2, H. 2, 1848; Knoodt's "Günther und Clemens, offene Briefe," 3 Bde. 1853, 1854, Bd. 2, pp. 239-482; Baltzer, "Neue theolog. Briefe an A. Günther," 2 Ser. 1853, pp. 145-216. The opponents of this school are, in particular, Oischinger, "Die Günther'sche Philosophie," Schaffh. 1852, pp. 352 ff.; Clemens, "Die speculative Theologie Günther's und die Kath. Kirchenlehre," Cöln, 1853; G. Lieber, "Ueber das Wachsthum Jesu in der Weisheit, exeget. dogmengesch. Erörterung d. Stelle Luc. ii.," 1850; Volkmoth, and others. Against Günther's doctrine is urged

its incompatibility with the Council of Ephesus, with the *ἑνωσις φυσικὴ*, the *θεοτόκος*, and the like. Christ's actions are maintained by Günther in opposition to Leo's position, not to be common; but the one pertain to the divine, the others to the human nature, according to the alternation of the predominance. Clemens, who appears to know nothing about the antagonism between the Catholic, and specially the Jesuitical dogmatics, and the Lutheran Christology, complains of the absence of a real "*Communicatio idiomatum*," and maintains that, subsequently to the "*Unio*," the distinction of the natures was merely formal, whilst the unity was substantial; which is completely monophysitical (see Div. II. Vol. I. 133 ff.). Gratifying as are the efforts made by Günther to lay stress on the human and the ethical in Christ, still the unity of the person remains a merely external determination; for he represents the essence of God and of man as mutually exclusive, and not inwardly related to each other. For this reason, the humanity of Christ has, in his system, on the one hand, a dualistic independence; and yet, on the other hand, when the unity is in question, he represents this same humanity as ruled, and its independence as momentarily suppressed, by the deity. This is clear from his doctrine of the alternate predominance of the one over the other; in adopting which, he resorts again to the mode of thought usually prevailing amongst his antagonists.

NOTE 30, page 228.

The view on which judgment has just been pronounced, is shared also by Bunsen in his "*Hippolytus und seine Zeit*," Leipzig, 1852 (see i. 114 f., 217 f., but especially pp. 279 ff., 289 ff.), where, for the rest, he teaches also an immanent or ontological Trinity (that of the eternal divine self-consciousness), alongside of the œconomical world-forming Trinity; but he does not express any distinct opinion respecting the relation between the two. In consideration of the misrepresentations which his view has had to encounter, let me add here, that (in opposition to Hegel) he teaches that there is an eternal, self-conscious and infinite will in God, and in the world a finite copy and reflection of the same (pp. 281-290). He holds the metaphysical or ontological triplicity (being, thought, and the conscious unity of the two; or, God as the absolute essence,

the Word as the eternal revelation in God, and the Spirit) to be the necessary archetype of finite actuality and the key to the triplicity of God in religion. In the world, man corresponds to the Logos in God, humanity to the Spirit; at the Christian stage of revelation, the "Word" is the *Son*: Sonship, indeed, embraces both Jesus Christ and those who become His brethren through His Spirit; but still Jesus alone is the incarnate Word (Logos). The Spirit, however, relates always to believing humanity, to the Church, which is not merely a collocation and succession of individuals, but has a principle of development independent of the individual. Indeed, the Spirit neither has nor is destined to assume a finite and individual corporeal form, but manifests Himself solely as the totality of believers, as the Church.

NOTE 31, page 228.

A recent advocate of Patripassianism is the North American Horace Bushnell, author of "Christ in Theology," Hartford, 1851 (he has written also other Christological works, as "God in Christ," and "The Person in Christ, the Trinity and the Work of Redemption"), and acquainted with German theology.¹ He regards Christ Apollinaristically as destitute of human soul, as an union of God and man whose purpose is to humanify the idea of God, and thus to express or communicate God. "His humanity," says he, "has no end for me save that of bringing God. Whether there be a soul more or less, a drop in the sea, is a matter of indifference; but it is not a matter of indifference to have God, and to know Him as the one who is with us, and who has approached so near to our sympathy as to put Himself on our human level (pp. 92 ff.). Even supposing we had His human soul, it would do us no service. If it works nothing particular by itself, it is as though it were not; and indeed it is customary to speak of it as again absorbed into the divine nature. Therefore it is better to transfer the human to God. He has human feelings; and it is not blasphemy (as Dr Symington, in his work on "The Atonement," p. 154, pretends) to say that God suffers. The truth is, that He is not a rock, that He does *not* know all things and feel nothing, like a diamond, which receives

¹ I regret that I have not Bushnell's work at hand; otherwise, both to my own and the reader's advantage, I should have quoted the *ipsissima verba*, instead of translating a translation.—TRANSLATOR.

light without feeling; but that He feels intensively, in the depth of His own purity and tenderness, all the deeds and thoughts in the universe; that He is displeased, He has real repugnance; that when He looks on evil, He abominates it, He is angry with it, and so forth. As He is capable, in His goodness, of feeling so many evils, there is perhaps a necessary law of self-compensation in Him, of such a nature that infinite lessening of His joy are replaced by infinite increasings and by conscious growth in joy, of which latter the former furnish the occasion. Perhaps that which we term the impassibility of God has its ground in an infinite capability of suffering, over against which the equilibrium of joy is preserved by the compensations of an infinite goodness, which ever more well up in Him as waters of eternal life. In Christ, God reveals what He does not in nature and history, to wit, His passive virtues, and forces and brings me under their power: p. 104. Of course, such a person as Christ, God with us, is an abnormality. It is His will to be and live in the manner of an human brother, the eternal God Himself under human limitations. The entire movement is undoubtedly violent and abnorm (pp. 97, 98); but let us see to it that we do not put a mere man between us and God, and thus deny the incarnation. If we assume that Christ had an human soul, let us allow it also its personality, and let us consent to the double personality of the Redeemer (pp. 96, 114). Theories which represent the sufferings as affecting the soul and body instead of the deity, and yet cling to the unity of the person, lead us into doctrines which outbid chloroform in their effects. Like Griffin, he refuses to divide the unity, and maintains that the one person went through all the sufferings and performed all the works. This qualifies Christ for His mediatorship. The genuine, long-forgotten doctrine of the Church does not attribute a triplicity to the substance; but, in speaking of "generatio" and "processus," merely intends to teach a Trinity of "actus" (of will), in support of which he appeals to Calvin's relations in God without a Trinity of essence, and to John Howe (see his "Complete Works," Lect. xv. pp. 1096 ff.). He is willing to allow that the distinctions of revelation which make their appearance in time have eternal grounds in God, but demands that we take the temporal and historical as our point of departure (p. 185). "The triplicity is necessary without detriment to the

unity. Its significance consists in its enabling us to think God as transcendent and personal at the same time, p. 137. The spirit of God is no dead level, no abyss or plateau, but personal. For God, however, this triplicity has merely an instrumental significance; it is to Him a mere means, not an end, p. 165. As regards the Word (*λόγος*) in particular, it is a peculiar capacity of self-expression in God. In God is something which is the source of all the forms of things, and which gives outward expression to the inner life of God, the mirror of His creative imagination, into which God looks, and through which He brings to pass an express image of His person: p. 131. His intention is not to attempt a solution of the problem: he prefers to leave it standing as an insoluble mystery; for mystery is part of the necessary dynamics of the infinite, which, as such, cannot be defined: p. 117. As the immanent Trinity, also the logical and the psychological, have become a matter of indifference to pious interests, so is Sabellianism also too much a merely logical thing; even Schleiermacher's modalism he cannot approve. Like Twisten, Stuart requires that we go back from Schleiermacher's threefold revelation to a threefold principle of revelation in God. But, says Bushnell (in harmony with Monarchianism, as we have become acquainted with it especially from the *Philosophumena*), the Logos is alone the entire principle of revelation, although He reveals different things. This Logos is, therefore, Father, Son, and Spirit; for He is God as it is His will to be revealed and to be for the world. Hence, Christ declares Himself to be the Father; that is, the Father is virtually manifest in Him. Between God's inner essence and us there is no bridge. Nor does Bushnell feel any desire to seek for one. The triplicity may be a condescension to our weakness, instead of denoting a mode of God's being in Himself. As an instrumental expression, it is necessary for *us*; without its being necessary that there should be an ontological correspondent in God (pp. 147 ff., 164). In Himself God may be formless, even though forms are necessary for the expression of the formless, p. 165. But there resides in God an "originating power of form," which refers to the world. This principle of form is the Logos: it is not a particular person, but again the one God Himself, in whom resides this principle of form as relating to the world, presents to God the eternally self-conscious, as in a mirror, the thought of the cosmos. Christ,

however, sets God completely before us, as He wishes us to conceive of Him. If we rest satisfied with the persons as persons of the drama of revelation, we can say also, inasmuch as God is by nature eternally a self-revealing being, that He is to be recognised from eternity to eternity as Father, Son, and Spirit, that is, through a trinity of eternal generation, through His self-revealing activity. This theory is unmistakeably marked by a deep hiatus, which separates it into two opposing parts. When Bushnell speaks of the loving sympathy of God, no expression is too strong to draw down God's being and life itself into finitude and suffering; nay more, he then speaks of God as capable of suffering in Himself, and as actually suffering. He cannot, therefore, as did the old Patripassians, deem the incarnation necessary for God, in order that He might become capable of suffering. On the other hand, when he speaks of the revelation of God, he does not represent God's essence as, properly speaking, entering into it; but He is merely *virtually* in the flesh taken from Mary, which is deemed to be without soul. And yet, lastly, God is said to have given expression to His person in the face of Jesus; nay more, he even goes so far as to say that Christ is the incarnation of the divine nature for the ends of revelation. The only way to reconcile these different representations is to suppose that he deems Christ to be a living symbol of God, presenting itself in a dramatical form as a person, which reveals so much of God as He wills, but is not the revelation of His essence. But, on this supposition, God keeps His inmost being closed; nay more, He is subject to the law of not being able to disclose it;—which might be true if the essence of God were not love. We cannot term this theory Ebionitical; on the contrary, it may serve to show us what consequences follow, when the humanity is treated merely as a means, and not also as an end. The means becomes a matter of indifference, and unnecessary, so soon as the end is gained. In fact, Bushnell is just as incapable of ascribing an eternal humanity to Christ as the old Patripassians; He is to him a mere theophany. He says only,—God who appeared in Christ dwells, in a certain sense, eternally in an human body, so bright that it fills heaven with its rays; the *ἀπαύρασμα* about God is a sun-body; this is His eternal body. (Into this body the flesh which Christ derived from Mary appears to him to have resolved itself,—an idea

which may serve, perhaps, to throw light on the old Sabellian notion, that Christ deposited His body in the sun.) Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Christ continues to exist for us as the glorified man. For if Christ has wrought a perfect work in us by His revelation—which it was both His will and vocation to do—a character and a mould or retina of thought for God has been formed in our mind, so that God, in all that we may know concerning Him, is Christ for us, is humanized, is accessible to us (p. 114). Bushnell cannot, however, regard Christ's (that is, God's) endurance of suffering as an endurance of punishment on our behalf; for God cannot punish Himself, God expresses in Christ what He would have expressed by punishment. He thus substitutes His sufferings for the punitive sufferings of men. His sufferings accordingly are justificatory (p. 217); not a merely epideictical act, but operative. It deserves further to be mentioned, that he suggests to the Unitarians,—who regard Christ as a man, though differing from all others in being a pure revelation of God,—to worship the child Jesus, and calls upon them, in case they decline to worship God in the Son for fear of anthropomorphism, to let the Father fall also because of the same scruple. He is well able to do and demand this, so far as the worship of the child is to him, strictly speaking, the worship of the God who revealed Himself in the child: Christ is to him, as it were, the sacrament of humanity. The Unitarians whom he has in view and hopes to win, are undoubtedly men like Theodore Parker and others. They, however, in opposition to him, justly lay stress on the truth of the humanity of Christ.

As Patripassianism is revived in this theory of Bushnell's, we may here mention a view which, although decidedly meant to be based on the foundation of the Trinity, shows us clearly that Patripassianism inevitably follows in the train of the idea of the self-depotentiation of the Logos, which now numbers so many friends. We refer to the view expounded by Steinmeyer in his "*Beiträge zum Schriftverständniss in Predigten*" (see i. 1854, Ed. 2, pp. 38 ff.). "Christmas is the festival of the sacrifice of the Father. In the work of creation there was no sacrifice; in His works of blessing there is no loss. Communication is a necessity of love's own nature, and, consequently, when He (creatively) gave, He did not lose, but gained with those who gained. At the incarnation, however, He was called upon to

present the sacrifice of Abraham. It was necessary for Him to undergo deprivation, to make a sacrifice: compassion required to outweigh love. God is not exalted above the deprivations involved in the interruption of fellowship. God was bereaved; God was isolated! John says, 'In the beginning the Word was *with* God;' but this relation underwent a change at the incarnation, for the directness, and consequently the blessedness, of the fellowship ceased, as soon as the Son had chosen the form of a servant. The love of the incarnate one and the obedience of the humbled one could not sufficiently compensate for that which had been the Father's joy before the foundation of the world." On the other hand, he holds the sacrifice of the Son to have been the mere imitation of that which the Father Himself had made for the world. Nay more, Steinmeyer adds (p. 41): "When would the Father ever have received back that which He gave in this holy night?" From which it would appear as though the Son of God, when He quitted—as in his view He did—the loving life of the Trinity and became man, had put Himself into an eternal state of humiliation by the incarnation. The further development of these thoughts would naturally drag the Holy Ghost also, as well as the Father, into the same sacrifice and the same isolation, supposing, as seems to be assumed, the hypostases of the Father and the Spirit could continue, even though that of the Son, as such, should cease. It is painful to contradict an opinion which is clearly the product of so pious a feeling. But that is scarcely a correct description of perfect love, to bring against its self-communication, because it is followed by gain, as it were the charge of being a small thing and not the purest love. If it were only allowable to see love where to give involves a loss to the giver, then loss and pain must be supposed to be eternalized as well for the blessed as for God Himself, in order that the purest love may never fail. But the good would then be an inner contradiction. The love also which sympathizes with the sufferings of humanity, and which Steinmeyer terms *compassion*, however deep and pure it may be conceived to be (and who can explore its abysses with his thought?), will always appear to be a loser, measured by the standard of the Egoist; whereas, measured by the standard of love itself, which is the only valid one in God's eyes, it will always be a gain. In this respect, therefore, sympathetic has

no advantage over communicative love. Still less is it allowable to give credit to sympathizing at the expense of communicative love; and least of all is it allowable to require of love an act by which it would do away with itself, as active, sympathetic, and communicative,—which would be the case if the divine self-consciousness were to be surrendered. It is, perhaps, one of the signs of the times, that a work which maintains that God must be conceived as mutable and passible—we refer to the “*Kritik des Gottesbegriffs in den gegenwärtigen Weltansichten*,” Nordl. 1856, 2d Ed.—has excited the attention it has.

NOTE 32, page 229.

“Die christliche Dogmatik aus dem christologischen Principe dargestellt,” i. 1, pp. 65–269. At the basis of this work lies a grand conception. The book is also rich in striking judgments and thoughts; but I cannot consider its doctrine of the Trinity, so far as it has any distinctive features (Mertz, Stud. d. würt. Geistlichkeit, 1843, 1, 2), to be a success, and agree, on the contrary, with the judgment of Schöberlein (Reut. Repert. 1850, xxx. 213 ff.). Liebner supposes himself to have prepared the doctrine of the Trinity for his doctrine of the *κένωσις* of the Son, by representing the Son as making Himself dependent on the Father. But how if this same *κένωσις* were itself an untenable thought? In that case, this doctrine would become unnecessary. It would, moreover, be as much, or as little, fitted to justify the incarnation of the Father, unless the idea of the subordination of the Son should be added thereto. It does not set forth the ethical process of love in its entire purity; for love never gives itself up, but merely its property. Inasmuch as, further, according to Liebner, the personality of God is not conceivable without that of the Son, we cannot assume the *κένωσις* of the Son without endangering the personality of God. Compare pp. 319 f.

NOTE 33, page 233.

Others who belong to this connection, are Ehrenfeuchter, Schöberlein, Hamberger, Schmieder, R. Stier, Sartorius, Gaupp, Nägelsbach, Ebrard; as also the philosophers K. Ph. Fischer and Chalybæus, Secretan. This idea is less vitally presented by Thomasius and Hofmann. Regarding the for-

mer, Liebner remarks (see Reut. Repert. 1850, p. 212) :—"He appears (in his judgment of Liebner) entirely to lack insight into the truth, which may be said to have already become the property of the theology of the present day, that humanity is not a contingent mass, but even in its very creation (that is, agreeably to the original creative idea), a system, an articulated totality." Compare p. 243. In a similar manner, Delitzsch complains against Hofmann for maintaining the individualities to be transitory; without which an organism is not conceivable (Bibl. prof. Theol. pp. 217 ff.). The ground lies in the circumstance that these men are accustomed, both in Christology and in the doctrine of the Church, to direct their thoughts one-sidedly to the divine aspect; that is, the ground lies in the lack of a fully developed ethical system, not in the denial of the above truth.

NOTE 34, page 233.

They hold Christ to be an individual, not an "*homo generalis*," losing Himself in the undefined, nor a monstrous collective man. His individuality—the individuality which distinguishes Him from all others—rather consists in His being the head, and in His having constituted His human individuality the adequate organ of the true essence of the human kind, as it stands before God, and includes within itself the self-communication of God. Lange ("*Leben Jesu*" ii. 77) and Rothe (Ethik" ii. 279 f., 298) strikingly remark, that Christ, if He were intended to be the central individual, or the *principlial* (d. *principielle*) man, could not be the product of the mixture of particular human individualities in natural generation; the way was prepared for Him indeed, and His coming was conditioned, by the history of humanity prior to Him, but not caused (Rothe, ii. 264 ff.). Rothe lays, besides, special stress thereon, that Christ's *principlial* position as the central individual is based also, in a positive respect, on His own moral deed. His individuality has that uniqueness (perfectly?), not as it is the innate one of His still material being, but as it is the moral one of His spiritual being posited by Himself.¹

¹ "Seine Individualität hat jene Einzigkeit (vollkommen?) nicht schon wie sie die ihm angeborne seines noch materiellen Seins, sondern wie sie die durch ihn selbst gesetzte sittliche seines geistigen Seins ist."

"His religio-moral development, namely, was exclusively, and with unbounded intensity, directed to the universal substance of the religious-moral life purely as such, simply to the central-point of the same as such, to wit, in virtue of the individual mission devolving peculiarly on Him: for which reason, this limitation was in His case a thoroughly normal one" (p. 298). With his well-known doctrine of matter, and of the universal sinfulness conditioned by it, Rothe hopes to combine the *freedom of Christ from original sin*, in the following way (p. 280):—Not the material womb of the woman, as such, is the source of the physical corruption of the human beings arising out of it; but only so far as it is excited by the material or sensuous principle, which is active during the act of natural generation, by the sensuous sensations and the sensuous impulse; in other words, so far as it works autonomically. Nevertheless, Ernesti raises doubts ("Ueber den Ursprung der Sünde," 1855, pp. 179 ff.), which appear to me also not to be sufficiently set aside by Rothe's doctrine of sin (i. pp. 304–312; ii. 180, 221), inasmuch as he allows Christ's personality to participate in matter, that anti-divine thing, and in growth. For the rest, Rothe sees in Christ not merely a process which, without His participating in original sin, and through the medium of His human freedom, spiritualized Him, in the course of an absolutely normal development,—that is, produced a good and holy spiritual, natural organism, or animated body, for His personality, and thus potentiated His being to absolutely good and *holy Spirit*; but so far as His being was actually developed as personal and holily spiritualized, so far was it in each case absolutely filled by God and *realiter* united with Him; and thus His life, even in itself, was an *absolutely substantial revelation* of God (ii. pp. 281–284). The proper task of His life was to restore men to fellowship with God despite sin, by entering into absolute fellowship and unity with both. As such a Mediator, He had, on the one hand, to bring His own fellowship with God to the completion of an absolute unity, to allow an absolutely real incarnation of God to come to pass in Him—and this is His *religious* task: on the other hand, He had to unite Himself with humanity by a bond of absolute fellowship, to surrender Himself for humanity without reserve—and this is His *moral* task. His natural ripeness (baptism) formed the turning-point from the first to the second.

Both were accomplished in absolute intensity solely through love, which surrenders its property absolutely, entirely, consequently also the sensuous life itself; or in absolutely free self-sacrifice for God and humanity (§ 218, 254). He must testify God completely to the sinful world, and by unconditionally punishing, negative its sin; by both He stirred it up to full resistance to Himself. He became involved with it in an absolute conflict, which was at the same time essentially a conflict with the kingdom of darkness. For He was placed also into the midst of the kingdom of Satan in this world; and only on His showing Himself able to break through the hindrances laid in the way of His religious and moral career by the assaults of the devil, and to overcome this invisible enemy, could He be pronounced qualified for the office of Redeemer. Accordingly, the work of His life evidently was the deliverance of sinful humanity, the *absolutely* great work of human life; and His fate (the course of His life) was the absolutely intensive and tragical. The former must be recognised as the greatest, deepest, richest, fullest, nay more, one may say, the immensest conceivable: the course of His life as one that stirs, excites, and claims the personality in the deepest and most inward manner conceivable. This conflict, and the suffering and death therein included, the second Adam underwent, not for Himself or for His own sake—for He was completely free from sin—but solely for the sake of humanity, that He might overcome sin and its consequences on its behalf; in other words, because humanity was unable to conduct the conflict to victory, He suffered for it in its place, or as its *substitute* (pp. 284–288) and surety (p. 305). Thus undergoing development in absolute unity with God and humanity, He receives an absolutely central position, through His love to the whole of humanity, and His individualistic tendency and activity, which were foundation-laying, and exclusively directed to the substantial in its new life out of the spirit.¹ In the new humanity which is born again through Him out of matter into spirit, He be-

¹ "So schlechthin in Einheit mit Gott und der Menschheit sich entwickelnd erhält er durch seine sie ganz umfassende Liebe und durch seine grundlegende, ausschliesslich auf das Substantielle ihres neuen Lebens aus dem Geiste gerichtete, individuelle Tendenz und Wirksamkeit eine schlechthin *centrale* Stellung."

comes the principal vital centre, the primal, fundamental individual, the inmost universal wellspring out of which alone the individual life flows, and into which it returns; He becomes the mighty heart in which the pulse of the whole beats, and out of which life is diffused into the individual members; in a word, He is the head, the central individual, of the new humanity (pp. 289 f.). As individual, indeed, He is not yet by Himself alone the *full*, true man, but merely a particular individual formation of man. The full number of individuals which set forth the higher potency and the true conception of humanity belongs further thereto. But He is the essential principal individual, in which the genus in itself is already posited, and which He therefore represents. He is an individual, not because, like others, He is a merely one-sided and defective realization of human essence, but because He is a realization thereof in complete union of all its particular aspects. The relation of His individuality to the individualities of other men, who exhaust the idea of man, is similar to that between the centre and the other points of a circle. His is the primal and fundamental individuality, by virtue of their relation to which all others unite amongst each other to form an organism. Owing to its principal and potential all-sidedness, it includes for all the other individualities the place and immediate point of connection suitable to each, and is therefore the last, all-connecting ring, on which all the others hang. It forms for all the rest the basis of a normal, moral being, and unites them all organically together. For in the single individuality of the second Adam, the individualities of all the single beings who constitute the spiritual human race which descends from Him, are united to form the totality of one great collective person; and it is precisely in this totality, which is absolutely centralized in Him, that the actual, the true concrete man has his real existence. That which is contained *implicite* in Him, though in a closed manner, to wit, the entire fulness of the particular momenta or distinctions of human religious morality, must be also *explicite* unfolded and exhibited, and that in the full number of human individuals (pp. 297 f.). From Rothe's view of the matter, it follows that God cannot absolutely dwell in Christ till every material determination, and therewith every limit, is done away with, in

virtue of His complete spiritualization. The moment of His perfection is, as such, immaterialization (Entmaterialisirung), death, because it is complete spiritualization, but also because it is the completion of the indwelling of God. His death is at the same time immediately His resurrection, His elevation into heaven (into the divine state of His cosmical being). This elevation is not removal to a distance from the earth, nor the dissolution of His organic relation to the old natural humanity, but freedom from all material limits; and in His absolute spirituality (which, according to what has been advanced above, is real spiritualized corporeality), He is also absolutely present on earth (pp. 293 ff.). From the moment of His perfection onwards, also, the real union of God with Him, or the incarnation of God, was absolutely completed in Him. The incarnation of God in Him is both an incarnation of the divine personality in His, and an incarnation of the divine nature, through the ever more complete indwelling of the divine personality and nature in Him (p. 292). In the state of perfection, every separation between Him and God is absolutely removed, and He is *absolutely God*. He is true God; for He who is in Him, and in whom He is, is God *Himself*, to wit, as to His actual being, or as spirit; and so He is entirely and absolutely God, for His being is now extensively and intensively complete—filled with God. But, on the other hand, God is by no means entirely and absolutely the second Adam. For not even as to His actual being, or His being as spirit, is God absolutely absorbed in the second Adam (God has also an actual being in the Church). But because of His absolute unity of being with God, He is also absolutely one with the entire already complete world of spirits, and, indeed, immediately with the central individuals of the already absolutely spiritualized circles of creation. Accordingly, the completed second Adam, as the head of humanity, is immediately at the same time the organic head of the entire world of personal spirits. Then for the first time is the form of His cosmical being, notwithstanding its distinctively human character, an absolutely unlimited and infinite one. And so, also, the glorification of the second Adam then first finds its absolute perfection,—a perfection, however, which, though absolute, nevertheless grows infinitely through infinite time (p. 296).

This entire Christology, which contains so much that is beautiful both in thought and form, it is well known, Rothe supposes himself to have built up independently of the doctrine of an immanent Trinity. He also, it is true, has such a Trinity (§ 26: the divine essence, the divine nature, the divine personality); but he does not profess that his trinitarian conception of God is that of the Church; and he supposes that the biblical expressions, Father, Son, Holy Ghost, refer to entirely different relations than to those of the immanent being of God. Rothe, seeing very well that in relation to Christ we cannot rest in the mere thought of His being a man who *has* God perfectly, and that, on the contrary, Christ cannot be deemed to be entirely united with God, unless He knows and wills Himself as God, has converted the Sabellian idea of the unique actuality (Actualität) of God in Christ into a *being* of God (Sein Gottes) in Christ, and a knowledge of this being. But if this divine *being* in Christ, which, on the part of God also, is a self-knowing and a self-willing, and in so far personal, is, on the one hand, different from the actuality of God in the Church (which is also in a sense a *being*), and, on the other hand, eternally abiding; it would appear necessary, unless we assume that the being of God has undergone change, to say that the mode of existence which He has eternally in Christ (not through any other being outside of Himself, but as a self-determination through Himself) must also find place eternally *a parte ante*. And thus the lofty image set up by Rothe of the Person of Christ, and His cosmical significance, appears to be the revelation of an eternal, and so uniquely universal, relation and thought; nay more, through this thought as its realization, to stand in so intimate connection with the inner essence of God, that this Christology also seems to demand being brought to a corresponding conclusion in the Trinity. Further, if this be correct, the immanent Trinity taught by Rothe ought not to be represented as so foreign to that of the Church, especially if we retain our hold on what he says regarding the distinctions in God (i. 77). "Everywhere it is the same who exists, and everywhere it is something different which this same one is." Compare § 23, 24. For if this thought be firmly held, though the consequence therefrom is by no means a tritheistic unity of three persons or subjects, we do but simply carry out what is

contained in it when we say—The “essence of God” and His “nature” are not impersonal, but the personality which Rothe posits as a third something, is also eternally immanent in them themselves. The one divine personality, without which no conception can be formed of the essence of God, is reflected in the *τρόποι υπάρξεως*, and is immanent in them; indeed, they are the means by which it eternally arrives at and constitutes itself; it is not a merely abstract unity, but also the absolute organism, which is eternally a result, and eternally produces itself. Only that, from Rothe’s point of view, the name personality, as expressive of the eternal result of the process, ought further, also, to be reserved for the totality of the deity; in other words, merely the *principle* (not the result) of the union of that which is opposed ought to be spared for the third distinction. Compare above, Div. I. Vol. II. p. 331, and Note. But then the Trinity of Rothe would have essentially approximated to that of the Church.

According to Liehner also, the idea of spirit or of humanity as an unity, is to be seen in Christ. In general, mere abstractly personal, spiritually monadic being is an imperfect form of the being of the created spirit. For development of the spirit and a psychico-somatical natural being are essentially connected and co-extensive with each other; for the latter brings with it natural growth, a succession of external, cosmical impulses to ethical development, and is also the organ by which the personality acts on the world. As, therefore, created spirit, or spirit in the form of created existence, in general, is under the necessity of entering into nature, that is, into soulical corporeality; so also Christ. The basis for the realization of the work of the history of spirit (pp. 313 f.), to wit, the form of existence in nature, Christ also must needs have. But whereas, in us, spirit has become nature merely *one-sidedly*, the Logos, on the contrary, having entered into the form of personality, becomes all-sidedly nature, psychico-somatical, and brings it into connection and accord with the divine life by His holy development, constitutes it entirely the penetrated organ of the same. Relatively also to natural gifts, we, as individuals, are one-sided in comparison with the perfect nature of the God-man. The natural basis, however, is not under the necessity of being one-sided as a particular gift or talent; it may also be all-sided. The Adamitic humanity by itself consists, as to its psychico-

somatic aspect, in "membris disjectis;" no one is absolutely like the other; all form part of a system. The principle of the system also, in its natural aspect, the organic centre, embraces, as the realization of the perfect idea of humanity, all this in its nature. He is a single individual; but, at the same time, the individual in whom, even as to the natural aspect of His being, the individual is the universal, and the universal the individual. In this sense also, He is the principal or central individual (p. 315). The distinction between this view and that of Rothe is, that Rothe places that which gives Christ universal significance, or constitutes Him the central individual, on the spiritual side, in the substantial sphere of religion; whereas Liebner asserts His universality also in the natural aspect. But as, on the one hand, Liebner also acknowledges the necessity of an ethical development, and by no means understands by nature primarily the material; and, on the other hand, Rothe also is unable to represent the ethical development of the God-man as beginning with emptiness, and contrarywise is both compelled to, and actually does, form a conception of the individuality of Jesus, which was prepared beforehand from the beginning of humanity, as it is by nature, of such a kind that a central tendency, remote from every species of one-sidedness, is seen to belong to its normal development and task. As to this point, therefore, no essential difference exists between the two; and the less, as Liebner also objects to this summing up of nature in Christ, or this natural capacity for a principal existence, for the position of a central individuality being represented as a quantitative, external, and coarse summing up of men in Himself. It is only the opponents of a deeper Christology who would like to substitute for this thought a monstrous *composition*. Rather, says Liebner, is Christ the organic unity of all the potences scattered in humanity; even as the whole of external nature was summed up in the Adamitic man. Further, this organic unity was present in Christ merely as to its real *possibility*. His vocation was to found the absolute religion, and it did not require the all-sided, special actualization of His all-sided nature. At the same time, the other momenta, to wit, the principles of art, science, and so forth, were included in that which entered into actuality, in the highest and central element; and in the holiness of Christ, all possible human gifts

are already *realiter* sanctified (p. 318). Similarly Schneckenburger's "Darstellung, etc.," ii. 220. Liebner makes the striking remark, that we are led to a like antichristological result, whether we retain an exclusive hold on the natural aspect alone, or on the personal alone. If the ethical personality and its actuality are wanting, His universal essence also lacks actuality; and if this latter remains a mere potency, the real power to sum up into an unity fails, and Christ becomes again an individual man, an holy man like others. On the contrary, where the chief stress is laid, from the very outset, on the single personality of Christ, He is nothing more than the normally developed Adam. But Adam, no less than we, as to the natural aspect of his being, was a one-sided member of humanity. Christ must therefore be distinguished from Adam, in the personal as well as the natural aspect of His being. We need more than a mere normally developed Adam; we need a deliverer of all, an universal and central head, who sanctifies the whole of human nature in Himself; who not merely knows and diffuses, but *is* personally, the universal, religious truth. The all-deliverer must *realiter* be the all-delivered, and must bear in Himself that which He communicates. Even the greatest Adamitic saints, the Apostles, on the ground of the one-sidedness of their natural individuality, were only able to work in limited circles, where they found a kind of elective affinity. Christ, the holy principle of humanity itself, has affinity with all, and, attracting all, works upon all (p. 319; compare pp. 27-64). Martensen had already remarked, in his work "De antonomia conscientiae sui humanæ," 1837,— "The God-man is not merely *unum ex multis individuis*, sed *individuum absolutum*, *Monas centralis*. Cum *libertas absoluta*, cui subsunt non solum omnia universalia et abstracta verum etiam omnes monades finitæ, sit ejus *essentia*, non solum principium generis humani manifestat, imo ipse est illud principium." The true idea of God is that of the absolute personality; the unio of Christ with God is an unio personalis: for this reason the historical individual, with which God entered into the unio absoluta, must needs be omni subjectivitate *particulari* liberum; must reveal nothing save the absolute personality, and in revealing it, reveal itself. Christ may not be subsumed under the idea of humanity, as though humanity were His cause; but He, in whom and for whom all things were created, it is,

under whom the human race is to be subsumed ; and His history has for its principle, not the causal nexus of the universe, or a relative freedom, but absolute freedom ; and keeps not only a relative necessity, but even the principle of causality itself subjected to itself. Personality stands high above the idea of the genus, above species and individual, outside of which the genus has no existence. It is, indeed, also in them, and *embraces* them, for it is absolute ; but it is in itself, subjecting all things to itself ; and the human *genus* is subjected to the God-man, that He may raise it to personality. More fully carrying out the same thought, he says, in his "Christliche Dogmatik," 1849,—Christ is the individual, which, as the centre of humanity, is at the same time the revealed centre of deity, the point at which God and God's kingdom are personally united, who reveals in fulness what the kingdom of God reveals in distinct and manifold forms. The second Adam is both the redeeming and the world-completing principle. But the world-completing principle cannot be different from the world-creative, to wit, the Logos ; He is, therefore, also the self-revelation of the Logos. But as the incarnate Logos, He is not merely the centre of the world of men, but of the universe ; not merely the head of the human race, but head of creation (Col. i. 15), its First-born, for whom all things were created. For as man, the centre of creation, is the point at which spirits and the sensuous world are united, nobler than the angels ; so does this hold true in the highest sense of the second Adam, in whom the heavenly and the earthly, the invisible and visible, the powers of creation, the angels, principalities, and powers, are gathered together in one (§ 130, 131). One can say indeed,—the new Adam is a creature of the Logos ; but the proposition becomes false if we say nothing more. The creative activity of God must here be unconditionally one with His self-revelation. The truth is, that at this point, creation has no independence outside of the incarnation, but is originally deposited therein ; and the second Adam does not move in created alterity *outside* of the uncreated fulness, as may be affirmed of all the peripheral individuals who look back with strong yearnings to the fulness of eternity, and desire a mediator for it ; that, on the contrary, the fulness of the deity is originally and indissolubly introduced into created nature by this central

individual; and that *this indissoluble informing of the uncreated image of God* into creation is the fundamental determination of His person (§ 132). According to Martensen's doctrine of the Trinity, this image serves the purpose of the inner self-revelation of the Father; in such a manner, however, that as the *divine* image of the world, it was the medium of the creation of this actual world (§ 56). In forming an estimate of Lange's Christology, we must take particularly into consideration the "Positive Dogmatik," 1851, pp. 208 ff., 591-795; "Philosophische Dogmatik," 1841, § 33, 44, 56, 61-67; "Leben Jesu," 1844, i. 11-78; ii. a. pp. 66 f., 189-339; ii. 6, 1845; Vorrede vii.-xii. iii. 49 f., 228 f., 553, 714-760; "Worte der Abwehr gegen Dr Fr. W. Krummacher," 1846 (against monophysitic views, that is, views which curtail the humanity). His fundamental thought is, that though a distinction ought to be drawn between the triune essence of God and the revelation of His essence, it is not merely the eternal and essential form of the Son of God that should be represented as necessary, whilst His revelation in time is regarded as an arbitrary iteration of His form of existence and as an accidental occurrence. For the Son of God does not throw aside the human nature, as though it were the non-essential husk by which He manifested Himself, but sets it in the light of His majesty, glorified in eternal unity with His divine essence. The post-temporal, eternal glory of the humanity of Christ points back to its eternal, ideal existence in God. The eternal Son of God cannot, in the course of His temporal existence, have saddled Himself for ever with something accidental; or have assumed a form which, as purely historical, does not correspond to His eternal essence. We must, therefore, distinguish between incarnation and assumption of the form of a servant (as the dogmaticians of the Lutheran Church always have done). Whoso recognises the eternal issues of the humanity of Christ, must also learn to understand its eternal beginnings, in order that the incarnation may not appear to be a fact unconnected with, and unprepared by, the past. It must be brought into inner and essential connection with the creation, with the age of yore, and with the history of the Old Testament. The human nature of Christ or the incarnation has been growing, has been coming from the beginning. An immeasurably rich

series of steps prepared the way for the entrance of the Son of God into time and humanity. From the foundation of creation to the appearance of the God-man, the whole line of vital evolutions forms one uninterrupted chain. But in the God-man the highest idea of life (1 John i. 1) is realized, and the absolute self-determinateness of God has appeared. His person is borne up, therefore, by the entire ante-Christian development of the world and humanity, as the apex of a pyramid is borne by its base. This base is not dead, but a living movement towards the apex. Those middle steps lie principally within the sacred history of the Old Testament. A great hereditary blessing, opposed to the hereditary curse, developed itself in the seed of Abraham, in the blessed series of the Fathers. The history of the divine-human life commenced with the interaction between fallen man and the compassionate God; its primal individual beginnings manifested themselves in the patriarchs after Adam; it then acquired a fixed form in the believing life of a man, who through it became an historical power, and founded a genealogy of believers. In Abraham, the promise of God became the hereditary blessing of humanity; and thus the truth was expressed in the form of fact, that the divine-human life is not merely spirit without nature, or even against nature, but spirit in consecrated nature. The genealogy of the hereditary blessing began with faith in the word of promise, by which the divine-human life was posited in Abraham; it developed itself through continuous consecrations of human nature; through the medium of constantly heightened vital communications of the Spirit of God. It completed itself in the believing vision and assumption of the God-man; in the birth through Mary. The Periods are:—Promise, Law, Prophecy; finally, the individual concentration of the divine-human life. The husk is the Israelitish people; the bloomstalk is the Virgin; the bursting blossom is the Messias.

Lange's intention, however, in positing these preparatory steps, is not in the least to exclude the absolute novelty and immediateness of the proper God-man ("Philosoph. Dogmatik" 468). Precisely in that He is the one, the way for whose appearance was prepared by an infinite number of steps and means, does He show Himself to be the absolutely immediate one, the one who posited these preparatory means and

links for Himself. In point of appearance, the first grows out of the last, the eternal out of the temporal, the infinite out of the finite. But as the way of the first man, the youngest child of creation, was prepared by a grand preliminary geological history, and yet the pre-human creation does not supply a full explanation of his rise; for his life was original, new, and rather earlier than the creation: even so is it with Christ. Admirable as is Lange's fundamental thought,—a thought which is carried out by Rothe, specially by Nägelsbach ("Der Gottmensch," 1853; Bd. i. "Der Mensch der Natur," pp. 2 f., 18–38), and in relation to the Old Testament as the preliminary history of Christ, by Baumgarten and Hofmann,—we need here a far more careful determination of the mode of the pre-existence of Christ in history. Lange, in particular, does not show clearly enough how far the incarnation of the nature of the Logos in Jesus is to be distinguished from the incarnation of the *natura* of God, professedly already really begun in the *Fathers*. Nägelsbach represents even Adam as Elohim-Adam, on the ground that his spiritual essence was of a divine nature: but only by nature, and through the indwelling of divine *nature*. After he had fallen, an artificial indwelling of the Elohim in man, an artificial realization of the idea of the God-manhood was attempted (from the law onwards). But first when Elohim became man personally in the Son, did the God-man become an actuality on earth: in Him was first given the living principle of a new humanity and a new nature (compare pp. 286 ff., 282 ff., 446 ff.). Moreover, those who thus attempt the revival of typology in a more real and objective form, must be on their guard against darkening the preparation for Christ, which consisted in awakening the knowledge of sin and the consciousness of guilt; indeed, in general, against becoming so absorbed in the typical, as to overlook the historical life and struggles of the people of the Old Testament. The preparation for Christ was, on the whole, a preparation of *susceptibility* for Him; and this, though undoubtedly worked and developed by representations given of Him beforehand, can in no case be described as fulfilment.

NOTE 35, page 237.

Compare the Whitsuntide Programme (1831) of my late highly revered teacher, Dr Schmid:—"Quatenus ex eccl.

evangelicæ principiis existere possit doctrinæ chris. Scientia?" P. 11: "Neque vero inde (that the work of redemption rendered the God-man necessary) concludendum, *θεάνθρωπον* non exstiturum fuisse, nisi peccatum invasisset in genus humanum. Ut enim redemptionem sine *θεάνθρωπῳ* esse posse negamus, ita *θεάνθρωπον* sine redemptione quidni affirmemus? *Affirmandumque eo libentius, quo quisque magis veretur, aut incarnationem Christi fortuitam aut peccatum necessarium judicare.* Unde eadem quæstio a multis velut otiosa reprobata, tamen non modo ab aliis haud paucis sedula agitata est, sed videtur etiam idonea quæ ad *ἐνανθρώπησιν τοῦ λόγου* plenius ac subtilius intelligendam conferat." Pp. 12 f.: "Ac revera subest christianæ de *θεάνθρωπῳ* sententiæ, quamvis optimo jure a nobis ad tollendum maxime humani generis *peccatum* referatur, tamen quædam notio generalior ac metaphysica, *ut vel id negandum videatur posse redimere a peccato tanquam μεσίτην moralem*, qui non metaphysica ratione sit inter Deum mundumque *μεσίτης*." Martensen, in his "Die christliche Dogmatik," 3 Ed. pp. 297 ff., says:—Only when we regard Christ not merely from the point of view of the redemption of the world, but also from that of the perfection of the world, can we rightly understand His typical perfection in distinction from the antitypical union of God and man. P. 298:—Only when we view the Mediator in this His metaphysical and cosmical significance, do we secure a foundation whereon to build a doctrine of the Redeemer. Liebner mentions two respects in which it is necessary for Christology to take steps in advance. *Firstly*, we ought to cease advancing merely the hamartologico-soteriological (*ἁμαρτία, σωτηρία*) ground for the appearance of the God-man, and should look for an universal theanthropological basis; in other words, we should advance on to the knowledge, that the incarnation of God stands in an original, essential, and necessary relation to humanity, and therefore to creation as its perfection (pp. 12 ff.). *Secondly*, we should try to arrive at such an unity of the divine-human person as would render the sundering of the two factors into a dualism an impossibility. He recognises strikingly that all dogmas, even that relating to the creation, must be determined by Christology; that, without lessening the distinction between them, the creation and incarnation ought to be viewed in conjunction; and that they are absolutely united

in the idea of the divine revelation, to wit, in the idea of the world. Pp. 279 ff., 287:—Although humanity is constituted an unity even by the real Logos, the Logos is, in the first instance, merely the transcendent or essential, not yet the historically objective, actual unity of humanity. But humanity as an historical organism cannot be without head or principle; its principle, too, must be not merely over, but also immanent in itself, adequate to itself in its history; and this principle cannot be any other than that of the creation itself, and so forth. On Rothe and Lange, compare Note 34. Nitzsch, in his "System of Christian Doctrine," Ed. 6, p. 258, says:—The Logos is, as in Himself, directed to the incarnation; but as He was the organ of the revelation of the Father in eternity, before the world, so also was it His will and mission to be this same organ in time and history, in other words, to become man. Whereof the end was, to realize in human life that image which is merely the potency of divine life in the present nature of the creature; for since the fall the creature has borne this same potency indeed within itself, but without the capability of giving it realization. In this way He sought to carry out religion, or the vocation of man to be a child of God. Nägelsbach (see p. 31) says:—The appearance of the God-man can neither have been *accidental* nor *sudden*: He who is the uniting middle of all the factors of the history of the world, must have ruled that history from the beginning, and have led it on to the point at which His manifestation was a possibility. It would, however, have been accidental, if it had first been rendered necessary by the fall, and so forth. (Compare Kurtz's "Bibel und Astronomie," 2 Ed. p. 233; subsequently, however, he altered his view.) Ehrenfeuchter, "Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit insbesondere in ethischer Beziehung," Heidelb. 1845, Abschn. xi. "Christus und die Weltgeschichte," pp. 114 ff. All depends on our not measuring Christ one-sidedly, either by the standard of the idea of the genus, or by that of the individual. The truth unites both in the idea of the organism, which is set forth by humanity. Christ embraced the ends, to wit, genus and individual, in one: in Him was contained the idea of the entire genus; He was the Son of man, and at the same time the most individual form. The form of human existence yearns for the real, divine, vital

centre; and vice versa. This form is the most exact into which the divine creative Word can enter and live, in order to bring all things to perfection. Humanity is the adequate body, into which the eternal Logos is able to enter as into His property. Within this humanity the single individuals are as the points in the periphery, each of which possesses its own consciousness and conscience; but the periphery requires a centre, in which also a determinate consciousness and conscience must dwell: the centre must appear, therefore, as an historical, individual life. Through the God-man a full consciousness is awakened regarding the organism of history, regarding the unity of the speculative and the moral. Through Him also it becomes clear what an individual is, what eternal powers lie in the essence of the individual, which, as personality possessed of and using the faculty of volition, is the middle link or unity of the idea, and of the creative power. Inasmuch now as the centre also has appeared in the form of an individual life, a need is felt by all the single points of the periphery to inform themselves with the life of the centre; for the periphery subsists through the centre. Fischer, "Die Idee der Gottheit," 1839; "Grundzüge des Systems der Philosophie oder Encyclopædie," 1851, ii. 2, pp. 432 ff. "The absolute religion teaches us, that He who is both the fulfilment of prophecy and the absolute truth at which heathenism aimed, is the principle and centre of the divine kingdom. In speculative theology, the God-man must represent the perfection of creation and of the revelation of God, the apex and centre of unity, or the archetype and head of humanity. Schöberlein, in his "Die Grundlehren des Heils entwickelt aus dem Princip der Liebe," 1851, p. 42 ff., says (with J. Hamberger's "Gott und seine Offenbarungen," 1839, p. 220):—In a certain sense the incarnation of God may be termed eternal. The Son, he proceeds, taking upon Himself and accomplishing the Father's loving purpose to create, sinks Himself from eternity with the whole power of His love, into the idea of humanity, so that this idea has no subsistence save in this loving union of the Son with it. The incarnation of God is involved in the idea of humanity itself. (In the Catholic Church also, this doctrine has found scattered defenders, as, for example, in Staudenmeyer; Oischinger, "Die christ. Philosophie," 1853, p. 88; Pabst; Molitor, and others.

Günther had at an earlier period the thought, that the incarnation would still have been carried out even if the second Adam had fallen; but he justly gave it up subsequently.) Hofmann also, in his "Schriftbeweis," ii. a., teaches, that the necessity for the incarnation did not lie solely in the fact of sin; but that the "self-completion of God as the archetypal goal of the world" was had in view from the very beginning. He seems to hold, however, that Adam was created to be the candidate of God-manhood. But he fell. *For this reason*, sin may be said to have first rendered it necessary for *Christ* to come. P. 18. A dearly purchased contradiction to the above truth. To the same conclusion Thomasius also must be led. Compare i. 211.

NOTE 36, page 249.

Compare Nitzsch a. a. O. pp. 259 ff. At an earlier period, stress was laid on the "Majestas." We may further mention here, Liebner a. a. O. Even previously, König, "Die Menschwerdung Gottes," 1844, and Sartorius, Dorpat—"Beiträge i. 348; "Meditationen," 1855, pp. 41 ff.; after earlier similar declarations, Ebrard a. a. O. ii. 33 f., 199 f.; Lange, "Positive Dogmatik," p. 780; Schöberlein, "Die Grundlehren des Heils," a. a. O. pp. 58 ff.; Martensen, "Dogmatik," pp. 300, 326-334. With various changes from the publication of his "Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie," 1845, Thomasius; K. Ch. Hofmann, "Schriftbeweis" ii. a., pp. 1 ff.;—to whose number may now be added also Delitzsch, "Biblische Psychologie," 1855, pp. 279-288; Gaupp, "Die Union," pp. 112 ff.; Kahnis, "Die Lehre von dem heiligen Geiste," 1847, i. p. 56. Compare Besser's notice of this work in the "Zeitschrift für lutherische Theologie," 1848, i. pp. 139 ff. Oehler, in Reuter's Repertorium, 1851, lxxii. pp. 112 ff.; Steinmeyer a. a. O.; Schmieder, "Das hohepriesterliche Gebet," 1848, pp. 36 ff.; Hahn, "N. Test. Theologie," 1855; Kahnis, "Die Lehre v. d. heil. Geiste" i. 57 ff.

NOTE 37, page 250.

Most of the theologians whose names are mentioned in Note 36 favour, if in different ways, the Christology of the self-exinanition of the Logos, of His self-humiliation to the

rank of a potency or form. Most openly, König, Gaupp, Delitzsch, Steinmeyer; whilst Sartorius is more cautious in his expressions, though he also clearly believes in a self-lessening of the eternal Logos. Nietzsche, although he appears to incline towards the former form of *κένωσις*, because then the *unity* of the self-consciousness and activity of Christ is no longer threatened with vacillation and changes of the point of view; because then the monophysitic and Nestorian tendencies, and the doctrine of a double personality, appear to be overcome; adds, with the judiciousness characteristic of him as a dogmatist,—“It is true, the relation between eternity and time, even for the sake of this doctrine (compare Schöberlein, “Die Gundlehren des Heils,” a. a. O. pp. 67 f.); between the ethical and the physical; between the incarnation and the original man; between the historical God-man and the preceding temporal activity of the Logos: furthermore, the true and the false elements in Apollinarism, the *ἀσύγχυτον* of this view,—must be made clearer and more intelligible than has hitherto been the case, ere the entire scientific and practical blessing of the recent and most recent Christological speculations can be reaped. Much remains still to be done; this branch of theology is still young and tender.” For the rest, the theory of the self-lowering of the Logos makes its appearance now in different forms, just as it did in the age of Gnosticism, Apollinarism, and Theopaschitism:—now as a self-disguising of the Logos in the human form of existence, as growth and the like (so Ebrard a. a. O. § 364, 359, 374, pp. 35–47, 42:—“Divine nature is related to human, as essence is to the form of existence.” P. 40:—“The Logos gave up the form of eternity—even in an ethical respect—assumed the form of existence of an human soul, and reduced Himself as it were to the rank of an human soul”); now as *self-conversion* or change of the Logos into an human form of appearance: so, in particular, Gaupp, p. 113; König, pp. 339 ff. Even Liebner, in his proposition,—“The entrance of the Logos, as such, into growth, is *co ipso* an incarnation,”—inclines to this view (as far as the result is concerned; for he regards the temporary suspension of the process of the Trinity as preparing the way for this *κένωσις*). The logical consequence of this would then be, that in Christ there was no other soul but the divine Logos, who, as having

subjected Himself to succession and growth, is a man in time. This also is acknowledged both by Gaupp and Hahn, and by König. In his first Christological sketch, which was more fully cast in one mould than his later work, Thomasius likewise treated the Logos Apollinaristically as the soul of this man; for (as he had remarked with Hofmann), has not the Spirit of God become the Spirit of life in us men also? This he subsequently retracted: Liebner also has endeavoured to do away with the appearance of Apollinarism (pp. 320, 371 ff.). But he omits all mention of the question as to whether Christ had a true human soul or not. Apollinaris undoubtedly regarded Christ as *ἄρπεντρος*; and it is a step in advance on the part of König, Liebner, and also Martensen, to demand the recognition of an actual ethical process in Christ, in opposition to a one-sidedly theological Christology. In Liebner's case, however, this step is taken at the expense of denying the *ἄρπεντρος* to the Logos also, which Apollinaris himself did not do, but only his school, which was controverted by Athanasius (see Div. I. Vol. II. pp. 351 ff.). According to the present doctrine laid down by Thomasius, the immanent Trinity is not disturbed by the *κένωσις* of the Logos, because the kenosis relates to the œconomical aspect; in opposition to which, both Oehler (a. a. O. p. 112) and Schöberlein (p. 66) justly assert the inadmissibility of such a separation of the immanent from the œconomic Trinity; unless the Lutheran Christology is prepared to renounce its own existence. Not even the Reformed doctrine goes so far in distinguishing between the Logos in Himself and the Logos in Christ, as not to put the *immanent* Logos into relation to Jesus. But in regard to the œconomical Logos, Thomasius goes so far as to conceive Him subject to sleep, to divine desertion, and so forth, in Christ. Hofmann, who, though not denying the immanent Trinity, says, in reference to the position, "God is triune, in order to be the God of man" (i. 177),—"It was God's will to be *in the world*, according to His love (not merely to work upon it), as the ground of life within the world itself (Holy Ghost), and as the archetypal goal, which is to attain actualization in the world; in it too He is called Son. To this end, he supposes that those two nameless principles of the deity go forth out of God, pass over, prior to the creation of the world (ii. a., p. 20), into a state of inequality with them-

selves, that is, with the relation which they bore within God, and determined to complete themselves historically and gradually, as that which they are in themselves. In particular, he represents that potency within the deity, which the Church designates Son, as entering into an inequality with itself, as entering into a position of subordination, or emptying itself over against the Father, even for the end of the creation of the world. According to Hofmann, then, to call to mind related doctrines taught in recent times, the Logos passes over into altereity, as the Spirit of God, for the sake of the world; and though he does not represent that *κένωσις* as identical with the very beginning of the world, the beginning of the world is the beginning of the manifestation of Him who had become unequal to Himself; the world is the product of His activity (i. 237). Still the archetypal goal of the world (the Son) remained for a time supramundane, and possessed of power over the world; consequently, actual God over against the *world*, although, for the world, He had passed out of the self-equality which He had within God. But when sin came, a still deeper *κένωσις* became necessary, a new form of the inequality of the eternal relation within the deity. He exchanged the divine form of being for the form of a servant:” ii. a. p. 16. The relation of God, the archetypal goal of the world, to God, the supramundane Creator, has become a relation of the man Jesus to God His Father. He has ceased to be God, in order to become man; He has *exchanged* the predicate God for the predicate man, or *σάρξ*. The archetypal, self-emptying goal of the world, was formed in the womb of believing Mary, through the Holy Ghost (i. 112). Among the friends of this theory of depotentiation, there is a difference of opinion also, as to how far this self-exinanition of the Logos extended; and whether that which He renounced for the moment was deposited in God, or ceased to be, or continued to have a latent existence in the Logos (see Note 38, page 333). Martensen, Rothe, and Schmid keep at the greatest distance from this theory. Compare also Münchmeyer’s “Das Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche,” 1854, p. 169. At first inclined to favour the theory, he subsequently turned his back on it.

NOTE 38, page 258.

The one (see Note 37) represent the Logos as subjected to that *κένωσις* solely as far as the œconomical Trinity was concerned; whilst the eternal Logos in the immanent Trinity remained untouched;—a view which leads to a duplication of the Logos, consequently to a thought which is not only essentially empty, but also antichristological, in so far as it does not allow that the eternal Logos became man. At its basis, however, even though in a clumsy shape, there lies the just conviction, that the Logos can neither give up His absolute consciousness, nor be appropriated by humanity, from the commencement, as self-conscious. To the same result leads also “the Logos over the Line” (“der Logos über der Linie”) of the growing God-man, of which Thomasius spoke at a subsequent period:—to the noticeable detriment of the consistency of his Christological theory, which acquires in consequence an eclectic character. We must at once add, however, to the words, “over the line,” not merely, that the person of the Logos was in this man from the beginning; consequently at a time when he neither could, nor ought to have appropriated the Logos; but also, that the will of the Logos to become incarnate, always remained the same, and embraced the entirety of the union; that He consequently posited also the beginning as a beginning of the whole. Yet, there is no doubt that Thomasius also meant this, when, in order to supplement the formula, “over the line,” he adds other formulas, whose design is to keep hold of the Logos in His indissoluble alliance with humanity. Only that this is unattainable, unless we take our start with the Unio of the natures. The same thing shows itself also, when, in reply to a well-founded remark of Besser’s (a. a. O. pp. 141 f.), Thomasius allows that the *κένωσις* must not be considered as having taken place once for all—for otherwise, the actual love, which alone lends it its worth, would be extinguished—but as a continuous thing, as a constant sacrifice. If it is continuous, and, what is more, an act of the Logos (for potency is not actuality); then, plainly, the Logos, who is not yet humbled, but rather *humiliates*, is conceived as hovering over the humiliated Logos:—a notion which must either destroy itself, or lead to the supposition of a double Logos; unless we say, as we rather ought to do, that in general

it is not allowable to speak of the *κένωσις*—leaving out of view the language of edification, which itself furnishes a corrective of the liberty it uses in this matter (see Gerh. Loci Theolog. Tom. iii. p. 562)—in a way implying that the Logos Himself was reduced to unconsciousness or non-actuality.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL REVIEW

OF

**THE CONTROVERSIES RESPECTING THE PERSON OF CHRIST,
WHICH HAVE BEEN AGITATED IN BRITAIN SINCE THE
MIDDLE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
TO THE PRESENT TIME.**

BY THE

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APPENDIX.

HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL REVIEW.

THE work of Dorner on the Person of Christ is confessedly, as a whole, the most important and complete production extant in this department of theological inquiry. Indeed, for breadth of view and thoroughness of investigation, it stands comparatively alone. And now that it has become accessible to English readers, it may justly be expected to occupy a place here, in some degree corresponding to that which, by general consent, has been assigned it in the land of its birth. It cannot at least fail, from the copiousness of its materials, combined with the eminently fair, penetrating, and earnest spirit in which it handles them, to be much referred to, and to exercise a powerful influence over the future study of its great theme. It were consequently desirable, that the work should possess for the English theological student a specific, as well as a general measure of completeness, and should furnish him with a competent measure of information on those phases of the discussion, which, from local associations, as well as from their intrinsic importance, have naturally a more peculiar interest or value for him.

It is precisely here, however, that the work of Dorner is deficient; though the deficiency has, perhaps, arisen more from

the definite aim of the writer, than from imperfect acquaintance with the productions of this country, or a disposition to under-rate their merits. It was the *development* of the doctrine of Christ's person which he took for the subject of his historical inquiry; and however valuable some of the works in English theological literature are, as expositions or defences of that doctrine, it can scarcely be said that the doctrine itself has received from this quarter any fresh development, or even that the controversies respecting it have taken any remarkable turn, or assumed a form elsewhere unknown. There is substantial truth in what our author has stated, after his brief notice of the discussions which broke out on the subject in England between 1690 and 1730, that while they gave indication of a widespread agitation and unsettledness of belief concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, there appeared in them a tendency to return to by-gone theories, and to turn to account existing materials, rather than a disposition to contemplate the subject from any new point of view. Hence, as it was virtually the old errors that came forth on the one side, it was naturally the old weapons by which they were chiefly met on the other. The defenders of the Church's orthodoxy deemed it enough to show how the faith had in former times been maintained, and by what solid grounds and weighty authorities it was commended to men's acceptance.

Yet, while so much may, and ought to be said in explanation, it cannot be otherwise than disappointing to theological students in this country—considering the amount of talent and learning displayed in some of the greater controversies that have been waged among us on this important subject—to find that three pages only of so large a work comprise all that the author had to say of what, since the period of the Reformation, has in this department been accomplished in Britain. The learned treatises of Bull are but seldom, and very briefly referred to. Waterland is only once named, in company, too, with persons of quite inferior note, and as the author of a single performance on the subject of Christ's divinity. Horsley is not even once noticed, nor is any reference made to the forms which the controversy assumed here toward the close of the last, and the beginning of the present century—while those which emerged in Germany during the same periods have received full consideration. It

has, therefore, been deemed advisable by the publishers of the English translation of Dorner's Work, acting on representations that have been made to them by several friends, to have the work supplemented, for the convenience of students in this country, by some account of the discussions which have arisen here during the last two centuries, and of the relation in which they stood to phases of opinion prevalent in other regions, or in earlier times. It is with this view, and at the request of others, rather than from any personal desire or sense of fitness, that the following Review has been undertaken. That it will appear imperfect, especially in such a connection, no one will be more ready to admit than the writer himself. Let it be borne in mind, however, that the object here will be somewhat special and limited in its nature ; in particular, that it is only the greater lines of discussion which it is intended to survey, and that, from what has been already indicated of the character of the discussions in question, the survey will naturally take the form, not so much of an examination of the ulterior grounds of the opinions ventilated respecting the Person of Christ, as of an account of the opinions themselves, the causes that may have led to their ventilation at the particular time, and the manner in which they were propounded on the one side, and opposed on the other.

The subject will scarcely admit of any divisions, except such as are furnished by the successive periods in which the several controversies originated and were carried on. It is true, that in the earlier stages, Arianism occupied a place in the anti-Trinitarian exhibitions of doctrine, which it does not in the later, and occasionally appeared to be the chief assailant of the orthodox faith ; but as Socinianism was also from the earliest time in the field, and made common cause, on the more vital points, with the advocates of Arianism, to designate one period as a struggle with Arian, and another as a struggle with Socinian objections, would be to give only a partial representation of each. While on this account, however, we shall make our divisions simply chronological, it is not unimportant to notice, as a sign of the natural tendencies of things, that the opposition to Trinitarianism on the Arian hypothesis, has not, in recent, any more than in ancient times, been able to maintain its ground. The vigour and talent, which at one time it exhibited in this country, have long since disappeared ; and it has become plain, that no

distinctive position can for any length of time be held between the doctrine of the Trinity, in its strict and proper form, and simple Humanitarianism, after the Socinian type, or this with the Sabellian modification of a higher potency, energizing in the person and work of Christ, though without any personal conjunction of the divine and human natures.

SECTION I.

FROM THE MIDDLE TO THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, OR A LITTLE LATER.

THE discussions connected with this earliest stage naturally recall, as the most distinguished actor in the drama, the name of Bishop Bull. The controversy, however, did not strictly commence with him; nor, though Arianism was, perhaps, the more distinctive form of anti-Trinitarian doctrine against which his writings were directed, was this what more immediately brought him into the arena of strife. It was to repel a charge of Socinianism that he wrote his first treatise on the subject. In the course of a somewhat bitter controversy, which arose out of Bull's work on justification (*Harmonia Apostolica*), in which the Arminian view was strenuously maintained by the author, he was charged by a certain class of his opponents with a leaning to Socinianism, while another class thought they descried in his work the leaven of Popery. And partly to vindicate himself from the former of these charges, partly also in the hope of deriving from his pen a valuable contribution to the truth of our Lord's proper divinity, he was urged by his friends to throw into proper form, and enlarge, some notes he was known to have previously made on the views promulgated respecting the Person of Christ by the ante-Nicene Fathers. He did so, and in a few years accomplished his task; but found it more easy to elaborate the work of his brain than to find a bookseller willing to undertake its publication. No fewer than three were successively tried in vain; but Bishop Fell having heard of his dilemma, generously charged himself with the risk; and under such auspices there came forth in 1685 the *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*.

Bull, it may naturally be supposed, would not have been so

readily charged with a tendency to Socinianism, if there had not been already some persons in England known to have espoused the tenets of that party, or to be, at least, favourably inclined toward them. Such persons, undoubtedly, did exist, but they seem to have formed a very inconsiderable party. During the times of the Commonwealth, the attention of Parliament was drawn to certain efforts they were beginning to put forth for the circulation of their errors; and, as the greatest horror was at the time entertained respecting these, a law was passed in 1648, declaring it to be a capital offence to publish anything against the deity of the Son or the Spirit, as well as against the being and perfections of God. Everything of that description was held to be blasphemous, in whatever manner the opinions in question might be expressed. So slender, however, as yet were the sproutings of Socinianism, that the only things which attracted notice were a few tracts by a Mr Biddle, who had graduated at Oxford in 1641, and afterwards taught a school in the city of Gloucester; also, a catechism of his own composition, and a reprint of the Racovian Catechism, both issued in 1652. In the same year, too, appeared a translation of this catechism, which, as well as the reprint itself, was understood to be the offspring of Biddle's zeal in the Socinian interest. Biddle himself was cast into prison; and, after being tried and banished to one of the Scilly Isles for a time, was again imprisoned, shortly after the Restoration, and died of some disease he caught in his confinement (1662). But weapons of another and better sort, it is proper to add, were also employed by the authorities of the time. In particular, Dr Owen was charged by the Council of State with the task of replying to the catechisms of Biddle and Racovia (1654), which he did in the course of the following year, and, as usual with him, at no measured length. This work, bearing the title of *Vindiciæ Evangelicæ*, forms the 12th volume in the last edition of Owen's writings, and is still deserving of perusal, both on account of the information it contains respecting the early history of Socinianism, and the exposure it makes of the distinctive tenets of the system, as at variance with the plain teaching of Scripture. Other refutations appeared of the obnoxious pamphlets—among these, one by the annotator Poole, entitled a "Plea for the Godhead of the Holy Ghost;" but in solid learning and fulness of matter they were not to be com-

pared with the *Vindiciæ* of Owen. The few adherents of Socinianism, if not convinced, were at least silenced by the stringent measures adopted against them, but they were not extinguished; and with the greater freedom introduced by the Revolution, they also began, as we shall see, to assume greater boldness in the avowal of their opinions.

There was enough, however, in the state of matters at the time to make Bull anxious to vindicate himself from the imputation of being disposed to sympathize with Socinianism. And he could not more effectually do it, than by carrying out the purpose he had previously conceived, of defending the Nicene faith against Arian glosses, and those who sought to impose upon certain of the ante-Nicene Fathers, commonly reputed orthodox, Arian or even Unitarian sentiments. The writers whose sentiments he controverts in this his most elaborate treatise, were chiefly three,—Sandius, Petavius, and Zwicker. The first is simply referred to by Dorner (*Div. ii.*, vol. ii., p. 357) as standing in a kind of exceptional position to the prevailing sentiments of the time in Germany. There were properly two of the name, father and son; but it was a production of the son which called forth the animadversions of Dr Bull, entitled *Nucleus Historiæ Ecclesiasticæ*. The specific object of this treatise was to prove, that the Fathers who lived before the Council of Nice were chiefly of Arian sentiments, and that Athanasius was the real author of the Church doctrine on the Trinity. It was published in 1676, only four years before the author's death. Before this, however, had appeared a work of much greater calibre and profounder learning, yet to some extent espousing the same side. It was from the pen of Petavius, a French Jesuit, one of the most acute and accomplished theologians of his order. This learned writer, in the second volume of his great work on Theological Doctrines, where he comes to handle the subject of the Trinity (pub. 1644), so expounds the views of the ante-Nicene Fathers, as to establish concerning not a few of them (in particular, Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilus, Tertullian, Lactantius, Origen), that they substantially coincided with those of Arius, at least approached nearer to his than to the doctrine of Athanasius. They held, indeed, according to him, that "the Son, or Word, was of the substance or nature of the Father," but that "in dignity and power He was inferior to the

Father; that He had a beginning equally with other creatures; and that He was produced by the supreme God and Father, when He resolved to bring the universe into being, in order that He might administer all through His agency." Petavius, therefore, was of opinion, that when Bishop Alexander, and other Fathers, who wrote against the Arian heresy, charged Arius with being the inventor of a new and hitherto unheard-of dogma, "they spoke in an oratorical and exaggerated style, since ample testimonies have been produced from more ancient writers, showing that they taught the same doctrine" (i. 5, § 7; 8, § 2). For maintaining these positions, the learned Jesuit was judged by Sandius to have been himself secretly a convert to Arianism, and was thought to have stood for the defence of the orthodox faith only in the interest of his Church and his order. Bull shrunk from accrediting this charge against Petavius, but still was unwilling to acquit him of an improper bias; he deemed the evidence so clear against the conclusions arrived at by Petavius, that the only explanation he could think of was, that a desire to establish the necessity of an absolute submission to the authority of the Church, as the final arbiter in controversies, had led Petavius to exaggerate the differences among individual writers during the first centuries. The supposition, however, has nothing properly to warrant it; it is indignantly repudiated by the editor of Petavius' writings (Zechariae), and specially on the ground, that while the latter conceived Arius could with reason appeal for support to certain of the Fathers, he had at the same time, by solid arguments, confuted their views, and had also shown that the *majority* of the Church's leaders in those early times held opinions in conformity with the Nicene faith.¹ One needs only to compare the more free and thorough investigations of Dorner, to see how much the representation of Petavius had to countenance it in the writings of

¹ (Lib. i., Append.) Goode also, in his *Rule of Faith*, vol. i. p. 258, dissents from the opinion of Bull: he holds, that there is "no foundation for the insinuations of Bishop Bull;" and adds, "It is evident, that the Romish cause is as much injured by the proof of such a fact as that of our opponents, for it utterly overthrows the hypothesis upon which their whole system rests; namely, that there was a development of the truth, as delivered in the oral teaching of the Apostles, and handed down by all the Catholic Fathers from the time of the Apostles, fuller than what we find in the Scriptures."

the Fathers in question ; while still, it must be admitted, justice was scarcely done to them by his representation, and a fuller exhibition of their sentiments, if it might have made them appear less consistent with themselves, would also have placed them in a somewhat less intimate relation to the system of Arius.—Zwicker, the only other opponent whose views are frequently controverted in Bull's defence of the Nicene faith, was a physician at Dantzic, where he was born in 1612. Though bred in the Lutheran Church, he embraced Unitarian views ; and, among other productions written in support of them, he published in 1658 what he called *Irenicum Irenicorum*, which was explained to mean, A threefold Rule of the Reconciler of Modern Christians—the threefold rule being the sound sense of mankind, sacred Scripture, and traditions. It was only in respect to the last part of the work that it fell under the cognizance of Bull, in his defence of the Nicene faith. In that part, the author had the boldness to call the Nicene Fathers the founders of a new faith (*novæ fidei conditores*), and set forth with the utmost confidence a view of the early history of Christianity which brought it into accordance with his own tenets. The Nazarenes, with him, were the primitive Christians, and they knew Jesus simply as the son of Joseph and Mary. But the simplicity of their creed began to be corrupted by Simon Magus and his followers, who taught the doctrine of another Christ, that existed in a higher sphere before the birth of Jesus, but coalesced with Him. In process of time, forged Orphic verses and Sybilline oracles, together with the first verses of St John's Gospel, all held to be the productions of the school of Simon, wrought in the same direction ; and, along with a Platonizing spirit derived from the study of philosophy, led some, and in particular Justin Martyr, to complete the deification of the Person of Jesus Christ. Not only His pre-existence, but also His eternal generation and strictly divine nature, gradually obtained the place of received doctrines, and were at length authoritatively confirmed, and anything contrary to them forbidden by solemn anathema, in the Nicene Symbol.

Such were the adversaries—all of them, beyond question, men of ability and learning—whom Dr Bull set himself to oppose in his Defence of the Nicene Creed. With great patience and assiduity, he brought together the leading testimonies to be

found in the ecclesiastical writings of the three first centuries bearing on the subject of Christ's Person, and endeavoured to dispose of the false or hasty interpretations which had been put upon many of them by his learned opponents. In doing this, he distributed his proof passages into four main divisions: the first having respect to the pre-existence of the Son, the second to His consubstantiality with the Father, the third to His co-eternity, and the fourth to His subordination. The plan must be viewed with reference to the aim of the writer, which was simply apologetical, and sought to make good its object by a series of proofs on certain definite points of doctrine. For such an object, the course adopted has the advantage of a certain categorical order and precision; but it has also the very considerable disadvantage of carrying the reader over the same ground four times in succession, and keeping him but partially informed of the testimony of each witness till the whole has been perused. This, it must be admitted, is apt to produce a sense of tiresome iteration; and in regard to the particular authors examined, it can scarcely fail to leave a somewhat broken and fragmentary impression on the mind. Especially is this felt to be the case when one comes to the last division of the subject, and hears what those early Fathers thought on the matter of the Son's subordination; for often the nicest balancing of terms, and the most careful comparison of what is said on this point with what had been said on the previous points of inquiry, is necessary to give one an exact idea of the view actually entertained, and to perceive distinctly its relation to the several forms of heresy. The embarrassment thus created by the method of treatment, is not a little aggravated by the perpetual references that are made in the text to the reasonings of opponents, who were ever striving, we find, to make the testimonies produced under one point gainsay, or most materially qualify those which had appeared under another. The consequence is, that however often the work of Bull may have been consulted on particular parts of the subject of inquiry, it has, we fear, had a very limited circle of continuous readers. Especially since the publication of Dr Burton's Testimonies to the Divinity of Christ—which travels over much the same ground, but without the iteration, and with greatly less of the controversial element referred to above; written, moreover, not in

Latin, but in English—the *Defensio fidei Nicænæ* has found few even to consult it, and still fewer to make it the subject of careful and prolonged study.

Viewed, however, in reference to the age that produced it, the work served an important purpose, and deservedly procured for its author a high place in general estimation as an erudite and able theologian. The highest honours flowed in upon him as a present reward for his labours; besides being created a Doctor of Divinity, he received several preferments, and was ultimately raised to the Episcopal bench. He did not, however, remit his labours in this line, but published, in 1694, what was intended to form the proper complement of the *Defensio*,—namely, his *Judicium Ecclesiæ Catholicæ trium primorum Seculorum, etc.*; in other words, the just censure and condemnation pronounced by the early Church against those who denied the proper divinity of Christ. The object was to show, that not only did the Church of those times maintain by all her leading authorities and public creeds the doctrine of our Lord's divinity, but that she also refused to recognise as genuine Christians those who disowned it, denounced them as heretics, and cast them out of her communion. The person whom he took here for his chief opponent was Episcopius, professor of divinity among the Remonstrants at Amsterdam. In the Theological Institutes of this divine, published after his death by his successor Curcellæus, in treating of the Person of Christ, four grounds were adduced and specially urged for His being called the Son of God,—viz., His miraculous conception, His mediatorial function, His resurrection from the dead, His ascension to heaven; after which a fifth was added, viz., His divine filiation. But the question was presently raised, Whether this fifth mode of Christ's filiation was necessary to be known and believed in order to obtain salvation, and whether anathema should be pronounced upon those who deny it? (Inst. iv. 2, § 33, 34). The negative answer is given to this question; and the position is maintained (among other reasons) on this ground, that "in the primitive churches, for at least three centuries after the Apostles, the faith and profession of a special filiation of this sort was not held necessary to salvation; and, therefore, there is no reason why it should now be judged necessary." Horsley has said, that "he believed this opinion of Episco-

pius had its rise in no worse principle than the charitable temper of the man, and his just abhorrence of the spirit of persecution, with which Christians of every denomination were in his time much infected. Episcopus wished, as every good man must wish, to see a general toleration established; which he thought could not be more effectually recommended, than by the example of the harmony which subsisted among Christians in the early ages."¹ That considerations of this sort may have had some weight with Episcopus, is possible, though hardly, one can suppose, to the extent here indicated; for the view maintained, if valid, would go, not to the establishment merely of toleration by the State, but to the relaxation of all discipline for matters of faith in the Church; would introduce on points of highest moment a practical indifference. The probability rather is, it arose in good measure from that Socinian tincture which is known to have infected the party with which Episcopus was connected;² which in Conrad Vorstius, almost at the commencement, broke out in offensive manifestations, and which brought some of its leading men (for example, Grotius, Le Clerc, Wetstein) into such dangerous proximity to the Racovian school on several important points, that they were ever incurring the suspicion of actually belonging to it. Certainly, Episcopus, in adopting the position already mentioned, took the ground which was first formally propounded by the Racovian divines, and which afterwards received its most elaborate defence from the pen of an avowed Socinian, Dr Zwicker of Dantzic. This necessarily brought Dr Bull again into conflict with Zwicker; and the more so, as the views exhibited in his *Irenicum* respecting the early Church were now finding vent in England through sundry publications of the Socinian party, —in particular, one entitled the *Naked Gospel*, printed at Oxford 1690 (the production, as was afterwards ascertained, of Dr Bury, Rector of Exeter College, Oxford), and subsequently a *Historical Vindication* of it, of which Le Clerc was supposed to have been the virtual author. The object of these treatises, and several others of the same kind, was to identify the original and simple Gospel with Unitarianism, and to charge upon the Gnostic teachers and the philosophizing Christians of the second century, especially Justin Martyr, the blame of

¹ Tracts, p. 8.

² See Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doc.* § 235.

corrupting that simplicity by their notions respecting the pre-existence and divinity of Christ; and other doctrines of a kindred nature. They met with a solid refutation in the work of Bull, who brought out in a satisfactory manner the real relation of the Gnostic teachers to the Christian Church, as of an essentially antagonistic nature—proved the Ebionites, who held the simple humanity of Christ, to be different from the Nazarenes, and a mere sect, scarcely deserving the name of Christian, in the estimation of the general body of believers—in like manner, of the later Humanitarians, Theodotus, Artemon, Paul of Samosata, and such like, that their opinions were denounced as soon as they were known—and, finally, he confirmed his view by an examination of some of the rules of faith and creeds that are known to have been in use during the first centuries.

A few years later still (1703), another production issued from the pen of Dr Bull, which had for its special object the refutation of some of Zwicker's positions,—those especially respecting the innovations of doctrine alleged to have been introduced by Justin, and the character and influence of the Sibylline oracles—the opinions of those who bore the name of Nazarenes, and their relation to the Catholic Church—with some other things of a collateral nature. This treatise he called *Primitiva traditio de Jesu Christi Divinitate*; and may be regarded as partly an abridgment of his former publications, and partly also a more minute and supplementary investigation of certain incidental points connected with the controversy. It was more immediately occasioned by the persevering efforts put forth by the English Unitarians to falsify the history of the early Church after the fashion of Zwicker, particularly in a work called *The Judgment of the Fathers touching the Trinity*. Dr Bull's exposure was well fitted to serve as an antidote to such publications, and, there can be no doubt, was much employed by an educated clergy as a ready armoury from which to draw their weapons of defence against the plausible statements of the anti-Trinitarians. But it was a great mistake, in regard to this, and the treatise that preceded it, on the *Judgment of the Catholic Church*, to address himself exclusively to men of learning, and shut up the results of his labours in the Latin tongue. He had now to do with English still more directly than foreign adversaries, who freely used the English language for the dissemination of

their errors; and to select only a learned medium for the diffusion of the antidote, was virtually to leave the greater part of the field to themselves. His writings, indeed, found easier access abroad, on account of this very medium; on the continent of Europe, Latin still held its place as the common theological language; and not only did Bull in consequence soon become favourably known to Protestant divines of reputation in other countries, but he had the singular fortune of receiving in 1700, through Bossuet, the congratulations of an assembly of the French clergy for "his Judgment of the Catholic Church"—qualified, however, with an expression of astonishment that so learned a man, and one so capable of defending the doctrine and authority of the Catholic Church, should himself remain in a state of separation from her.¹ The misfortune was, that such foreign applause was purchased at the cost of circumscribed influence at home. His writings were little heard of by those among whom chiefly the new doctrines were spreading. And this, probably, is the reason why Leslie, in his Dialogues on the Socinian Controversy, which belong to nearly the same period, and were written not only in the English language, but in the popular form of dialogue, when discussing some of the same points, made nothing more than a passing reference to one of Bull's works.

Considered with respect to the subject itself of Christ's person, and in relation to the style of thought which was beginning to manifest itself on religious matters at the time, perhaps the chief defect of Bull's treatises, was their too exclusively dogmatical character. Taking for his sole aim the exposition and defence of the orthodoxy of the early Fathers, on the point in question, he seemed to feel as if nothing more was needed, than to bring forth his doctrinal quotations, explain their meaning, and guard them against apparent exceptions or hostile interpretations—proceeding on the assumption that the views of those Fathers were all fully formed from the first, and perfectly harmonious both with themselves and with each other. This, however, was not exactly the case; within certain limits, there were different currents and phases of opinion that succeeded each other on the subject. While they might be said to be agreed in regard

¹ Nelson's Life of Bull, p. 329. The letter was addressed to Nelson, who was personally acquainted with Bossuet.

to the essential divinity of Christ, tendencies so strong discovered themselves, now in the monarchian direction, and again in favour of a marked Subordinationism, that, until the circumstances are explained, and the *genesis* of the particular representations accounted for, it must always be possible, by a careful selection of passages, to extract from the writers of the earlier centuries expressions that appear to indicate somewhat variable and inconsistent views—positing either such a unity as admitted of no hypostatical diversity, or such a diversity as might seem incompatible with strict equality of nature. The root of the matter could only be reached by an investigation like that prosecuted by Dorner; and the treatises of Dr Bull, however they were fitted to confirm those who were already established in the faith, could not satisfy the theological disputant, where there was a disposition to search with sceptical inquisitiveness into the bottom of things, nor prevent people from still making such use of the patristic writings as might favour their preconceived opinions. Such a disposition did exist among a considerable class of thinking men about the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries: the question with them was, not simply what the Church believed, but how, or wherefore it believed, and what was conformable in its belief to right reason. If they were to be Christians at all, it must be as adherents of what could be emphatically termed a rational Christianity; and so, the doctrine of the Trinity, which presents so many debateable points to the merely speculative reason, was sure to be by some entirely repudiated, and by others, either thrown into abeyance, or received only in a qualified and secondary sense.

A variety of circumstances contributed to give this turn to religious thought in England. The reaction from Puritanism, now that the tide of fortune had set in so powerfully against it, and scope no longer existed for mental energy in that direction, was alone almost sufficient to account for it. Religious fervour was everywhere frowned upon, as inseparable from dangerous excess; and the religious teaching of the day naturally chose such topics and modes of discussion as were calculated to exercise the reason, or tame down the feelings to a cold sobriety. Partly springing, too, from the same reaction, though prompted, also, and inspired by other influences, a philosophy came into vogue, heralded by Cudworth, but properly founded by Locke,

which in its bearing on morals and religion was peculiarly cold and rationalistic. In morals it gave birth to systems, which were among the most notable examples of what Sir James Macintosh has justly designated "the abused extension of the term *reason* to the moral faculties;"¹ and in the religious sphere, it had its most exact representation in Locke's "Reasonableness of Christianity,"—a work which seemed to emanate from the frigid zone of Christianity, and embraced nothing in it which might not be subscribed to by a bald and meagre Unitarianism. The Socinians, it is well known, claim it as a production of their school; and ascribe partly to it, and partly to the example set by Locke "of a rational mode of studying and interpreting Scripture, which explains upon Unitarian principles almost all the passages that came in his way," a considerable influence in the propagation of their views. (See *Unitarianism in its Actual Condition*, p. 99.) Reason, with this school of philosophical divines, was placed in a sort of antagonism to faith; as the one element rose, the other fell. Hence Socinianism took a fresh start—Socinianism of the lowest type, standing at a very small remove from Deism, and, indeed, disclaiming the name of Socinian as no longer suitable, since it refused to pay that homage to Jesus, which the Polonian brethren so strongly insisted on, that they deposed from the ministry two of their party who declined to render it.² Avowed or covert Deism also burst into rapid efflorescence: Woolston, Morgan, Chubb, Tindal, all be-

¹ Works, vol. i. p. 89, Ed. 12th.

² See Leslie's Second Letter on the Socinian Controversy in vol. ii. of his Works, p. 44 (pub. 1697). In the preceding generation they were evidently very few in number, but those that were, appear to have been much of the same type; as may be inferred from the productions of Biddle formerly noticed, and also from the attempt made by some of the party to fraternize with Mohammedanism. For this end they addressed Ameth Ben Ameth, ambassador of the Emperor of Morocco to Charles II., and made formal proposals of mutual recognition and friendly counsel, as having substantially the same belief. Horsley, in his controversy with Priestley, taunted his opponent with this damaging fact. Priestley decried the letter as a forgery of Leslie's; but Horsley got hold of the original epistle, which is preserved in the Archbishop's Library at Lambeth. Priestley made no acknowledgment of his unjust suspicion. But the letter, it is right to add, purports to be simply from "two philosophers," who took upon them to represent the sentiments of the Unitarians. There is no evidence that they were authorized to do so by any organized body of professing worshippers, or

long to the earlier part of the eighteenth century ; and Tindal's "Christianity as old as the Creation," the ablest infidel production of the period—the work, too, of a clergyman, a Doctor of Divinity—was little else than the fitting sequel and complement of Locke's "Reasonableness of Christianity." So great was the success of such publications, and so generally diffused was the rationalistic spirit from which they sprung, that we find Bishop Butler, in the advertisement to the first edition of his *Analogy* (1736), uttering the mournful testimony, "It has come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry ; but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious : and, accordingly, they treat it as if, in the present age, this was an agreed point among all people of discernment." With those, however, who still maintained a certain belief in Christianity, the prevailing spirit chiefly operated in disposing them to rob it of its more distinctive features, and, as regards the specific subject of our Lord's person, led them either to reject altogether the doctrine of His divinity, or, with the Arians, to hold it but a quasi-divinity—something of an essentially subordinate nature to that of the Father.

The tendency in this direction, it would appear, displayed itself simultaneously in the Establishment and among the Dissenters. Absolute Unitarianism, probably, did not make extensive progress among either—though it is impossible to speak with any certainty on this point, as, from the heavy penalties to

that they were themselves more than Deists. And, indeed, the Unitarianism of England about that period, and to the close of the seventeenth century, was scarcely, as we have said, distinguishable from Deism ; and hence, in the *Preservative against Socinianism* by Dr Jonathan Edwards, Principal of Jesus College, Oxon, published in 1693, he treats Unitarians and Socinians as virtually of one class with Deists and Libertines. And though, in his preface, he speaks of "the nation being pestered with great numbers of Socinian books, swarming all of a sudden," yet, it would seem, these were chiefly little anonymous publications, in so far as they were of native growth, while the chief authorities on the anti-Trinitarian side were the works and treatises of Socinus himself and his Polonian coadjutors. The *Preservative* of Edwards is almost exclusively devoted to the refutation of those foreign Unitarians. Bishop Stillingfleet's representation regarding the Socinians of the time is much the same as that given by Dr Edwards ; while he speaks of their pamphlets as swarming of late years (*Vindication*, Pref. p. 1), none of the writers are mentioned by name, and they are distinctly charged with being kindly affectioned only to Deists (p. 56).

which persons exposed themselves by the promulgation of Unitarian sentiments, some who embraced them naturally preferred holding them in silence, and those who published, as a matter of course, published anonymously. That there must have been a considerable number of such publications even before the close of the seventeenth century, may be inferred from the circumstance, incidentally noticed by Emlyn (in the Appendix to his Narrative, § 4), that the Dissenters, who had especial reason to be vigilant in the cause of religious liberty, became alarmed at the state of things, and, through Dr Bates, presented in 1697 an address to the king, in which they prayed that a "restraint might be put on the liberty of the press, in relation to the books of Unitarians." The person who states this, Emlyn, refers to it in connection with his own case, and as a proof how the Dissenters had fallen away, in the matter of toleration, from their own avowed principles. He was himself an adherent of the Arian, rather than of the Unitarian creed. Unitarianism, in its more extreme form, was still somewhat of an exotic in England—a kind of reproduction of what under that name had established itself in Poland, rather than a thing of spontaneous growth. And standing as it did at but a small remove from Deism, and without any distinctive worship of its own, the deistical party would naturally serve themselves of the name for their particular ends, and were probably in part the authors of those Unitarian productions which caused so much concern. A scheme which might approve itself to the natural reason, without being so palpably dishonouring to Christ, and so entirely subversive of pious feeling, was more likely to find acceptance at the time among persons of a thoughtful spirit, and, we have reason to believe, was greatly the more common form which defection then took from the orthodox faith.

Besides, however, the rationalistic tendencies of the age, which, as we have said, had so great an influence in bringing about this result, there were manifestations of opinion exhibited in defence of the Trinity, so unguarded in expression, and so apparently indefensible in reason, as to work materially in the same direction. Bull's elaborate performances had sought merely to vindicate the doctrine of Christ's divinity, and therewith the doctrine of the Trinity, as a matter of belief in the Church from the earliest times; they did nothing, except quite incidentally, to

explain and vindicate the doctrine itself. But now that men's reason was stirred upon the subject of religion, and the articles of their belief must be able to stand the questionings of their philosophy, efforts were put forth in explanation of the *nature* of the Trinity, as received in the Church,—on the one side, maintaining it to be in itself reasonable and worthy of belief; on the other, assailing it as incapable of rational assent. Of these productions on the orthodox side, issued about the close of the seventeenth century, the work of Dean Sherlock (*A Vindication of the Doctrine of the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity*, etc., 1690) was the one that made the greatest noise, and called forth the severest animadversions. In this work, while the divine unity was of course affirmed, it was maintained that, with the exception of a mutual consciousness to each other, which no created spirits can have, there was nearly as 'great a difference between the three divine, as between three human persons.¹ Something similar had been said by Cudworth in his *Intellectual System*, many years before, when endeavouring to show, from the Platonic and early Christian writings, that by the proper notion of the Trinity the three persons were held to be possessed, indeed, of one common nature, yet not numerically of a singular essence, as if somehow to the three persons there corresponded so many distinct substances. So

¹ The words of Sherlock were,—“It is plain the persons are perfectly distinct; for they are three distinct and infinite minds, and therefore three distinct persons—for a person is an intelligent being; and to say they are three divine persons, and not three distinct infinite minds, is both heresy and nonsense. The Scripture, I am sure, represents Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as three intelligent Beings, not as three powers or faculties of the same Being, which is downright Sabellianism; for faculties are not persons, no more than memory, will, and understanding are three persons in one man. . . . It would be very strange that we should own three persons, each of which persons is truly and properly God, and not own three infinite minds, as if anything could be a God but an infinite mind” (*Vindication*, p. 66). Yet he says, “We do not divide the substance, but unite these three persons in one numerical essence; for we know nothing of the unity of the mind but self-consciousness; and therefore, as the self-consciousness of every person to itself makes them distinct persons, so the mutual consciousness of all three divine persons to each other makes them all but one infinite God; as far as consciousness reaches, so far the unity of a spirit extends, for we know no other unity of a mind or spirit, but consciousness” (p. 68).

Cudworth was understood to mean; but in his discourings upon this subject, there was so much of giving and taking, and such endless comparisons and adjustments between the Platonic and the Christian representations, that his statements had nothing like the precision of Dr Sherlock's, nor caused anything like the same agitation in the public mind. Sherlock's Vindication was ere long met by a counter Vindication from South (1693), in which the view of the former was vehemently assailed and denounced as Tritheism. Dr Wallis, Savilian Professor at Oxford, followed on the same side, but with more moderation of tone, in a series of letters to be afterwards noticed. That the general feeling was on their side, and that Sherlock's mode of representation was held to be offensive and dangerous, is evident from the strong step taken regarding it by the Vice-Chancellor and heads of Colleges at Oxford, who, in a general meeting, 25th Nov. 1695, decreed it to be false, impious, and heretical, contrary to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, and especially of the Church of England, to say, that "there are three infinite, distinct minds and substances in the Trinity, or that the three persons are three distinct, infinite minds or spirits." Yet Dr P. Allix, the French Protestant, who had settled in England, and became a dignitary in the Established Church, carried the matter fully as far as Sherlock had done, in a treatise he published a few years later, entitled *The Judgment of the Ancient Jewish Church against the Unitarians in the Controversy upon the Holy Trinity*. Here the Trinity was broadly asserted to be "a Trinity of uncreated beings and spirits," and of "creators and gods." It was to "uncreated beings" that God said at the creation, "Let us make man in our likeness;" and there, and elsewhere, *Elohim*, because it is a plural word, is translated *Gods*:—"The Gods created the heaven and the earth," and so on. Of commenting after this fashion Calvin has justly said, that "readers should be admonished to shun glosses of this sort; since, while thus seeking for a proof of the divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit against the Arians, they meanwhile fall into the heresy of Sabellius." It is strange that a man of any pretension to Hebrew scholarship should have taken up with such a style of exposition; and scarcely less strange, that, with evidence to the contrary so abundant in New Testament Scripture itself, he should have

undertaken to prove that the Jews, till a comparatively recent period, believed a "Trinity of uncreated beings and spirits," and expected their Messias should be "God from heaven." The work was solidly refuted, and its insufficient learning exposed, in a series of letters by Mr Stephen Nye, Rector of Hormead (with the title, *The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, etc.*, 1701),—a work which, indeed, runs too much upon the Platonic method of working out a Trinity, but which better deserved republication than that of Dr Allix, though it appears to have been denied the honour, and has even failed often to find so much as a place in the theological literature of its age.¹

Considering the temper of the times, it is not to be wondered at that Trinitarianism of the type of Sherlock and Allix produced in many minds a recoil; their reason was shocked by it. While some were led merely to reject the *form* of the representation, and contended not the less earnestly for the Scripture doctrine of the Trinity, there were others who abandoned it as no longer tenable, and fell off to a species of Arianism. This tendency by and by found its proper development and ablest representative in Dr Samuel Clarke. But there were earlier examples of it, at which it may be well, in the first instance, to glance, and also to notice the efforts made by men of sounder

¹ The good fortune of the rival work is somewhat extraordinary. Not only did it very soon reach a new edition, but, notwithstanding its extravagance and shallow scholarship, it was pointed to by Horsley with an air of satisfaction, as having most convincingly established the Trinitarian belief of the ancient Jews (*Tracts*, p. 242). This is one of the indications—of which a few more occur on incidental topics—that Horsley's learning was scarcely in all respects equal to his task. The positions respecting Philo's and the ancient Jewish belief generally, which are now all but universally received, were those which Nye affirmed in opposition to Allix. It is with regret we see, in a quite recent production ("*The Christian Verity Stated*," by Walter Chamberlain, M.A., 1862), the views and quotations of Allix substantially reproduced, under what is called Hebrew evidence for the doctrine of the Trinity. Such extreme conservatism in regard to points of learning, long since abandoned by the more thorough and impartial inquirers, is scarcely to be wondered at in one who can still cleave, and on such arguments as are advanced at pp. 428–432, to the genuineness of 1 John v. 7. It is not advocacy of this description that in the present day will advance the cause which the author has evidently at heart, either with properly enlightened believers, or with skilful adversaries; and is the more to be regretted, as many parts of the treatise are good.

faith and more mature judgments to prevent the defection from proceeding. The case of Mr Emlyn, formerly referred to, deserves in this connection particular notice. Having been settled for some time as a Nonconformist minister in Dublin, this person is occasionally spoken of as a kind of pioneer of Irish Arianism. But he was a native of Stamford in Lincolnshire, where he was born in 1663, of godly parents, who were not separatists, though they are said to have been inclined to Puritanism. Their son was educated partly at Cambridge, and partly in some Dissenting academies; and appears to have been a young man of good promise, both as to general acquirements and pious character. When residing in the family of Sir Robert Rich, in Suffolk, he contracted an acquaintance with a Mr Manning, a Nonconformist minister, who is said to have been of an inquisitive, or speculative, temper like himself. Sherlock's work on the Trinity coming out when he was there, set both of them a thinking upon that mysterious subject, and created a prejudice in their minds against it. Manning, we are told in Emlyn's Memoirs, "took to the Socinian way, and strove hard to bring Mr Emlyn into the same way of thinking; but Mr E. never could be brought to doubt either the pre-existence of our Saviour as the *Logos*, or that God created the material world by Him." In 1691 he accepted a call from a congregation in Dublin to be colleague to a Mr Boyse, who had been for a considerable period one of its pastors; and in this situation he seems to have acquitted himself for about ten years in such a manner as to acquire the esteem and affection of those who knew him,—necessarily, however, maintaining a reserve upon some of the more peculiar doctrines of the Gospel. Then came a declaration of his essentially Arian views (in 1702), which was followed not only by his deprivation as a minister, but shortly after by his prosecution as a heretic and blasphemer. Indeed, a furious storm rose against the man, in which the Dissenters were joined by certain dignitaries of the Establishment; and the Bench, participating in the general feeling, condemned him to a fine of L.1000, and at least one year's imprisonment. This, undoubtedly, was scandalous treatment; for while Emlyn's views were heretical on the Person of Christ, there was nothing offensive in the expression he gave to them: on the contrary, his exposition of his views was decorous and scholarly. And he

naturally complained of it as a proof of gross partiality and oppression in judgment, that he should have been thus treated as a criminal, while many holding the same sentiments, and perfectly known to hold them, were suffered to live at ease, and even to enjoy the benefices of the Establishment.

It does not appear that any considerable number of the Nonconformist ministers joined either Mr Emlyn or Mr Manning in a formal repudiation of the doctrine of the Trinity. The minds of several are said to have been unsettled, but we hear as yet of few desertions to avowed anti-Trinitarianism. In his latter days Emlyn stood comparatively alone, occasionally meeting with Whiston and Clarke, but apparently without a congregation to which he could minister, or find himself at home in. Another generation was required to prepare the descendants of the Puritans for so great a departure from the simplicity of the Gospel. In Emlyn's writings a perfect sincerity discovers itself in advocating the views he had embraced, and commonly also a certain air of seriousness and gravity in his mode of contending for them—as if the mantle of a believing and pious ancestry still hung about him. But he wanted that reach of mind and plastic power of combination which had been needed to constitute him the leader of a party, or the originator of a general movement. It is not quite easy, indeed, to learn from his writings what precisely were his views of Christ's person; for the most part, they are more negative than positive—most distinctly disowning the essential divinity of Christ, and rejecting whatever was at variance with the absolute simplicity and oneness of the Godhead, but leaving all besides in a certain vagueness and uncertainty. In his scheme of doctrine, there is nothing which rises beyond what is generally understood by Socinianism: Christ is simply the great teacher, the faultless example, the blessed martyr, the first-begotten from the dead; but He did nothing, He procured nothing for His people, which human virtue might not accomplish in connection with the larger measures of divine aid. Even His sufferings were but in a higher degree what Paul's were in a lower: to atone for guilt, in the sense of bearing the punishment due to it, belongs as little to the one as to the other; they were a sacrifice, indeed, of great value, but so also is repentance, so is prayer, and the other exercises of Christian grace. Yet, he speaks of the complete

Deity in its full conception, not a portion of God, or God only partially considered, being united to, dwelling and operating in Jesus; whence His miraculous works are ascribed to the divine nature of the Father in Him, or to the might of the Holy Spirit. That is, there was a certain singular energizing of the divine power and goodness in Jesus, for effecting the purposes of His mission; but whether from direct contact with a human soul, or by means of a personal inhabitation of the Logos, is not explained. The Arian hypothesis scarcely seems to have been needed for all that Emlyn associates with the agency of Christ; such an energizing from above as is compatible with simple Humanitarianism, and has often been combined with it, might have sufficed.¹

Various attempts were made, amidst the contentings of this period, to meet the allegations of Emlyn and his Unitarian allies, as to the contrariety of the doctrine of the Trinity to sound reason. The letters of Dr Wallis, already adverted to, were published with this view; but in this work the personal distinctions in the Godhead were so attenuated as to render his Trinity scarcely distinguishable from Sabellianism. Understanding hypostasis or persona much in the sense of character or manifestation, he conceived that the one suppositum or essence of Godhead might exhibit itself in diverse capacities, or modes of operation—as a man may sustain the parts of magistrate, merchant, and general, and still be the same in individual essence or nature. This, as justly objected by Howe, in one or two letters he addressed to Dr Wallis, was too shadowy a distinction to bear the superstructure raised on it in Scripture, and also tended to disturb the received notion of hypostasis among divines—since, apparently, one hypostasis might be all that was needed, if this explanation would stand—although

¹ His views may be learned from the Memoirs of his life, with the appendices attached; the Narrative of proceedings connected with his deprivation and trial; his Humble Inquiry into the Scripture Account of Jesus Christ; his Remarks on Mr Boyse's Vindication of the True Deity of Christ, and his Vindication of the Worship of Jesus Christ on Unitarian principles. His inquiry into the authority of 1 John v. 7, in opposition to Martin's vindication of it, and his examination of Martin's reply, are creditable to his scholarship. Here, where, as may be supposed, he took the negative side, his judgment has been sustained by the more mature results of biblical learning.

Howe admits the author to have intended by his scheme much the same as was usually meant by *modal distinctions* in the Godhead. Howe himself, in a subsequent and separate treatise (1694), entitled *A Calm and Sober Inquiry concerning the Possibility of a Trinity in the Godhead*, endeavoured to reason men into the intelligent belief of the doctrine by a sort of intermediate way between Sherlock and Wallis—reasoning upwards from the possible in the human, to the possible or conceivable in the divine, sphere—imagining the existence of three created spirits or intelligences, here knit together into a unity, while still retaining certain distinctive peculiarities; a perfectly conceivable thing, he considers, especially as in the one compound structure of our own natures we find a threefold element actually co-existing, the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual. And so, rising heavenwards, why should we doubt the possibility of three distinct essences united in the one Godhead, by a union inward and eternal, rooted in some necessity of nature? He guards himself against its being supposed that he meant by three essences, three distinct substances, three infinite minds or spirits; and declares his sole object to be, to help out the idea of such a trinal conception of God as is implied in the revelation God has given of Himself by word and deed. What he thus disclaimed, however, he soon found that people ascribed to him; he was understood to plead for a plurality or multiplicity of substances in the Godhead—as he himself notices in a letter on the subject addressed to a friend (H. H.), and refers particularly to one who had done so. After his death, too, Mr Emlyn, in the appendix to the narrative of his own case (p. 74), without qualification or reserve, classes Mr Howe with those who held Father, Son, and Spirit to be three infinite minds, each and all of them supreme God. This was not dealing fairly with Howe—though, it must be confessed, the illustrations he resorted to, and the forms of expression he employed upon the subject, made it but too natural to give that colour to the results of his inquiry.

Beyond all doubt, what was then, and had for long been with divines, the common mode of explanation, is what has been called *Modal Trinitarianism*. This, as already stated, was the method adopted by Dr Wallis, though, with certain peculiarities of his own, also by South, Stillingfleet, Nye, Boyse, and many others:—the Trinity was held to be one essence, and three

modes of subsisting; or, as it is sometimes put, one divine essence or substance, and three properties. "When we consider a divine essence," says Stillingfleet (p. 16), to make him speak for all, "there can be no distinction conceived in it, but by different modes of subsisting; or, what is the same, relative properties in the same divine essence." Not a *mere* mode, however, as he expressly guards himself by saying; "for there is a common nature which must be joined with this manner of subsistence, and we never conceive a person without the essence in conjunction with it" (p. 73). This mode of representation is quite true, if rightly understood; but, unfortunately, that has not always been the case, and the analogical explanations, which have been attempted by Trinitarian writers, in order to make distinct to the apprehension and satisfactory to the reason, what, from its very nature, must remain an inscrutable mystery, has helped not a little to produce misunderstanding respecting it. The anti-Trinitarians asked, How can a mode with any propriety be called a person? Or, how can a mode become incarnate? And with the view of explaining matters, resort was made at the period in question, as it had often been made before, especially since the time of Augustine, to certain modal distinctions, or characteristic properties in the human mind, as imaging, in a measure, the divine—a line of investigation in which, not the sacred penmen, but the school of Plato, set the example. The matter has been turned over in all imaginable forms: sometimes it is the understanding, the memory, and the will in man, which have been taken as the earthly type; or, with a different view of the human, there is got simple, eternal mind, reflex or generated wisdom, loving or willing self; with still another, there is found mind, self-knowledge, self-complacence; or still again, goodness, wisdom, power (and occasionally, instead of power, love). But when these, and such like forms of human things, were employed as an intelligible ground on which to set forth the essential oneness, yet immanent distinctions in the Godhead, it was replied (by Emlyn and others), that no one, not even Arius or Socinus, ever denied that the Most High God had life, wisdom and will, love and power, self-knowledge and complacency, or that He might be considered under such various modes: but how can it be said that one of these, apart from the rest, was incarnate in Christ? or is now

operative in the Spirit? Can such a thing be conceived without only a part of deity being associated with the mission of Christ and the agency of the Spirit? Or, if all are understood to have combined in the manifestation, wherein does the scheme differ from the successive phases of character included in Sabellianism?

The whole of this style of reasoning upon the mystery of the Trinity was so well met and exposed by Mosheim, in one of his notes to Cudworth's Intellectual System, which gave fresh vogue to such speculations, that we cannot do better than quote the main part of it. Cudworth, we should state, was labouring to establish a correspondence between the Platonic and the Christian Trinity—infinite goodness being supposed to be the characteristic of the first hypostasis, infinite wisdom of the second, and infinite, active love and power of the third; and these, as Dr C. adds, not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial. On which Mosheim remarks, "In my opinion, the very thing added by Dr C., that these three names, *goodness, wisdom, love*, are names, not of three virtues or qualities, but of three persons, or really existing natures, entirely destroys the force of his subtle argumentation. For, if these three words were to imply three modes, or three notions or perfections, Dr C.'s reasoning would have been intelligible, and we should have no reason to complain of this dogma of a triune God being involved in infinite darkness, since every one is aware that one nature can be viewed in various aspects, and be endowed with many perfections. In that case, however, there would be an end of all distinction, and there would be no more difference between the three persons of the divine nature than between three faculties of one soul, or three modes of action. The Sabellians, therefore, would be right; nor have I any doubt that the Socinians themselves, and the Jews, would readily adopt this Trinity. But if *goodness, wisdom, love*, are the names of three persons, I am at a loss to understand what aid these names can afford us towards a more clear conception of the divine Trinity. For, the expressing an abstruse thing by different names does not change its nature; and, therefore, if instead of the words *Father, Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, men make use of the names *goodness, wisdom, love* in the same notion, they do not thereby render it more intelligible, how three in

God are one. The same may be said of all those who, after the example of Augustine (De Trin. xiv. 8), fancied they discovered images of the Divine Trinity in our soul and its faculties. If the words *memory*, *intelligence*, and *love*, which Augustine and an infinity of others after him employed in this matter, retain the same signification which they possess when applied to the human soul, we can better understand, indeed, what is meant by a triune God, but at the same time we lose the whole mystery. If these names, however, receive a new meaning, and signify really existing natures, we come back again to the old difficulties, and have gained nothing by this image, inasmuch as the change of names can produce no change in the thing itself. Such being the case, Dr C.'s Platonic Christian will have a twofold risk to encounter. Should he acknowledge the names *goodness*, *wisdom*, *love*, to be designations of qualities and perfections, the Trinity of the Platonists will differ entirely from the Christian Trinity. But if he declares that persons are meant by these names, what have we gained thereby towards removing the barriers that separate us from the Platonists? Will the subordination of persons in the Platonic Trinity disappear, because the names of things, in which no difference in dignity is discernible, are applied to persons? There is a vast difference and disparity between a king, the son of a king, and the minister of both; but let us discard these names, and substitute in their stead *lord*, *governor*, *magistrate*, will this change of names cause the persons themselves, who before were so widely separated, to be equal to each other?" (Vol. ii. p. 429, Tegg's Ed.).

It is impossible to evade the force of this reasoning; and one is disposed to wonder how men so acute should have failed to see that the human analogies they pressed never fairly reached the mark they aimed at, and so were rather fitted to give a handle to adversaries, than minister help to sincere inquirers. Calvin had justly expressed his disinclination to such a mode of exhibiting the doctrine;¹ he was "doubtful if it was expedient to fetch similitudes from human things to bring out the force of the distinction (in the Godhead). The Fathers were sometimes in the habit of doing it; but they, at the same time, confessed that there was a vast difference between the things

¹ Inst. i. 13, § 18.

compared; whence I shrink here from all boldness, lest by producing something unsuitable, I should afford a handle either for calumny to the malicious, or for absurdity to the unskilful." He merely goes so far as to say, that as one's own mind naturally inclines to think of God first, then of the wisdom emanating from Him, and finally of the power by which He carries into effect the counsels of His will; so we readily accord with the distinction which ascribes to the Father the causal beginning, the primal source and fountain of things—to the Son, wisdom, counsel, and the actual disposal and administration of them—to the Spirit, the power and efficacy of working, which brings them to pass. It had been well if this reserve and moderation had been always observed; and especially, if the order and relation of the several persons in the Godhead had been thus contemplated more with reference to the overt acts and outgoings of the divine nature, less to its internal and hidden essence. For the Christian doctrine of one God in three centres of manifestation, each for itself disclosing the whole Deity, "is not to be reached in a purely metaphysical way, but develops itself through the exercise of faith on the facts of revelation" (Martensen). Through these alone can we rise to some apprehension—though still but an obscure apprehension—of the internal relations of the three in the Godhead, taking the *economical* as the reflex of the *essential* distinctions. And it is only when these facts, especially the great facts of redemption, are either undervalued for speculative thought, or by false interpretations thrust out of their proper place, that the doctrine of the Trinity can either lose its importance, or become a source of perplexity and metaphysical strife.¹

¹ It may be noted, that in the discussions of the earlier centuries the analogy between the human and the divine was often pressed in another form than that mentioned in the text, but with the same tendency to heretical results. As *Logos* in the Greek bears the double sense of thought internally conceived and outwardly spoken,—the one more fully expressed being called *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος*, the other *λόγος προφορικός*,—so, it was imagined there might be here also a parallel in the divine *Logos*: always existing, indeed, as thought is inseparable from the mind of Deity, therefore co-eternal with the Father, but, before creation, existing alone as silent thought, and from the moment of creation, or the execution of the purpose to create, as thought spoken;—hence, in this respect, having a commencement in time. This mode of representation is found in such writers as

Apart, however, from the wrong turn to the investigation by the employment of those human analogies, it is true that the distinctions in the Godhead must be viewed with reference to modes or properties,—only (as all sound writers qualify it, though the opponents of the doctrine usually contrive to overlook the qualification) with a due regard to the essential nature of the subject in contemplation, and the mighty distance at which it stands from what is material and finite. The terms Father, Son, and Spirit, while indicating modal distinctions, do not express *mere* modes or properties, *mere* powers or agencies; for, to each alike belongs the fulness of the Godhead; and all essentially divine perfections or attributes may be predicated of the Son and Spirit, as well as of the Father. “The Catholics, indeed,” to use the words of Dr Waterland,¹—who has put this matter in its proper light, as regards at least the better class of writers, repelling the assertion of Whitby, that from the fourth century a *person* in the Godhead had commonly been believed to be a *mode*,—“the Catholics, indeed, down from the fourth (I may say from the first) century, have believed that there is no disparity of nature, no division of substance, no difference in

Tertullian, Origen, Dionysius Alex., Theophilus of Antioch; as also in later writers, who meant not in so speaking to gainsay, but only to illustrate, the doctrine of the Son's proper divinity. Yet the application to strict Monarchianism was very natural, nor was it long in coming. The Sabellian tendency, as exemplified by Praxeas, by Sabellius himself, by Paul of Samosata, and still later by Photinus, made use of the analogy to disprove the existence of any hypostatical distinctions in the Godhead. Silent or inward thought, they said, is nothing properly distinct from the mind that conceived it; it has no independent, substantive existence; nor is outward speech a real, a permanent thing, but gone as soon as uttered; so that, either way, the Logos of St John is no more distinct from the Eternal One, than a man's thought or speech is distinct from himself. Dr Priestley and his school, though not correctly, yet with some show of plausibility, represented the early writers above mentioned, who introduced this application of the term Logos, as really using Sabellian language; and to avoid such language, Arius ascribed a real, though temporal hypostatical existence to the Logos. By Le Clerc, who belonged, as before noticed, to a school not far removed in some things from the Socinian party, the Sabellian view was, with a slight difference, embodied in his translation of the first verses of St John's Gospel: “In the beginning was Reason, and Reason was with God, and Reason was God Himself,” etc. (See Dörner under Sabellius; also Waterland's *Sermons on Christ's Divinity*, Ser. I.)

¹ Works, vol. ii. p. 204.

any perfection, between Father and Son ; but that they are equally wise, equally infinite, equally perfect in all respects,—differing only in this, that one is a Father and the other a Son, one *unbegotten* and the other *begotten*, as a third is *proceeding* ; and these three different *manners* or *modes* of existence distinguish the persons one from another, perfectly alike and equal in all other respects. The phrase, therefore, of *modes of existing*, was not designed to denote the *persons* themselves, but their *distinguishing characters*. This is what South's authorities sufficiently prove, and all that they prove ; and, I presume, all that he meant. For, though you are pleased to quote him against me, he is expressly for me, where he utterly denies that 'the three divine persons are only three modes of the Deity.' However, as to the *ancients*, I will be bound to answer for them, that what you say of them from the fourth century is pure invention and romance."¹

SECTION II.

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE SEVENTEENTH TO NEAR THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES.

IT has been remarked as a relative defect in Bull's writings, that, in vindicating the orthodoxy of the Fathers on the subject of our Lord's person (and by consequence on the doctrine of the Trinity), he makes no allowance for imperfect or partially erroneous representations : the ante-Nicene Fathers as a body all held the truth, so far as appears, in its roundness and completeness ; and it scarcely matters from which of them we might imbibe our impressions. This view, however, is a little one-sided ; for, with a general soundness on the essential features of the subject, there was also among the writers of the first centuries a certain growth, or development, in the right direction, implying, of course, in some relative deficiencies, more or less confused, biassed, perhaps inconsistent, statements on the points at

¹ Some good remarks to the same effect, though not quite so tersely put, may be seen in Stephen Nye's *Doctrine of the Holy Trinity*, 1st and 4th Letters.

issue. And in so far as such existed, it was inevitable that they should be laid hold of to guide to other conclusions than those of Bull's, whenever tendencies were astir, which disposed men to take up with a somewhat different type of doctrine.

There was nothing in regard to which this was more likely to take place, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, considering the rationalistic spirit then abroad among the learned, and none in which it did more prominently show itself, than that of the subordination of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to both. The substance of the doctrine maintained upon this point was correctly represented by Bull—so far as his representation went—to the effect, that God the Father is the *principium*, the head and fountain of divinity, from whom the Son and the Holy Ghost are derived, but so derived as not to be divided from the Father's being—they are of the same essence—the Father in them, and they in the Father by a certain inhabitation (*περιχώρησις*): so that the Son, when viewed simply in respect to His deity, might have, and had independent existence and supreme authority ascribed to Him, but derived and subordinate existence when viewed in relation to the Father. Dorner, too, admits that those Fathers were at one in deriving the essence of the Logos from the essence of the Father; and not only maintained, but gave decided prominence to the idea, that the Son and Spirit are of one substance, like honour, like glory, and co-eternal with the Father. He, therefore, regards the equalization of the hypostases as the goal, to which the collective efforts of the Church addressed themselves, and in consideration of which they stedfastly rejected everything, whether by way of consequence from their own positions, or by the introduction of other views that pointed in the Arian direction. But he justly discovers a defect in the representation sometimes made, as to the Father being the head and source of deity absolutely considered, or to His being identified with the Monas; since this inevitably led to the conclusion, that the Son and Spirit must have been evolved as parts from the primal unity. The more correct statement had been, as it came indeed to be, when the consequences of the other representation began to discover themselves, that the Father is not the source or root of the entire deity, or of the deity absolutely considered, but of the deity viewed with respect to its immanent distinctions;

the Son and Spirit having the same essence as the Father, only deriving from Him their distinct hypostases. Not, therefore, as apart from them, but as inclusive of them, was the Father to be characterized as the fountainhead, or *Monas*. This was seen by and by; and it was also seen, as matters proceeded, with growing distinctness, that the conception of the hypostases themselves, so far as it might have any positive element in it, must be attained, not from the direct contemplation of the divine nature in itself, but from its movements and manifestations *ad extra*; in short, that only through the parts severally sustained by the three in the Godhead, in divine works generally, and pre-eminently in the work of redemption, can any definite, though even thus but obscure, apprehension be obtained of the relations of Father, Son, and Spirit.

Bull was not well dead, till it began to appear what advantage was likely to be taken of the partially erroneous or defective representations of the early writers, connected with this point of Subordinationism. There were three persons in particular who came forward much about the same time, and took the part now indicated—Whiston, Whitby, and Clarke,—the latter, however, so much superior to the other two as a thinker and theologian, that their names were soon comparatively lost in his. Before the appearance of Dr Clarke's work on the Trinity (which was in 1712), Whiston had acquired some notoriety for his tenets on the same subject, insomuch that the University of Cambridge had, on account of them, deprived him of his Lucasian professorship, in which he succeeded Sir Isaac Newton. This was in 1710; and during the next two years he brought out his views at large in a succession of volumes, entitled *Primitive Christianity*, etc. In this, and in various other treatises which followed, he professed himself to be equally opposed to Arianism and Athanasianism; not these, but Eusebianism he maintained to be the true faith of Scripture, as exhibited by the great body of the ante-Nicene writers, and even by Athanasius himself in some of his earlier writings. His creed was shortly to this effect: There is but one supreme, infinite, eternal, and immutable God, who alone is to be primarily, and in the proper sense, worshipped and adored; and Jesus Christ is in a peculiar sense the Son of this God, the only-begotten and beloved Son, not begotten or made out of nothing, as Arius

held, but voluntarily, and in a singular, altogether unsearchable manner, derived from the Father—neither, on the one hand, of the essence of God, nor, on the other, possessed of a mere creaturely existence;—this wonderful, mysterious person, having by the Father been constituted Lord, and having formed the rational spirit in the son of Mary, has become our God, our Lord, and our King, though still far inferior to the Father in nature, attributes, and perfections. In like manner, the Holy Spirit is a divine person, but only in the third degree,—made, under the supreme God, by our Saviour, consequently inferior to the Son as well as the Father, and not properly the object of worship. Such, briefly, was Whiston's creed,—an extraordinary medley in itself, and coupled also, in its elucidation, with so many absurd notions and arbitrary interpretations, with such Rationalism on some points, and weak credulity on others, that his position was entirely unique; and though one of the most voluminous writers of his age, no party would acknowledge him as a leader.—Whitby was a person of a considerably different cast from Whiston—greatly less of a knight-errant in theology, and with much of that apparent shrewdness or sagacity which instinctively turns from things that seem out of place, or wear an aspect of extravagance—a man without neither parts nor learning—acute, versatile, active, ready in the application of his resources, whether natural or acquired, but withal somewhat narrow in his range of vision, and so strong in his prejudices, that when once fairly engaged on a particular side, he seemed incapable of distinctly apprehending, at least of correctly stating, whatever stood opposed to it. His chief art as a controversialist lay in exaggerating, or otherwise misrepresenting, the views he attacked; and doing it with such an air of confidence that one could scarcely doubt the candour and fairness with which he put them; and those who were not disposed to examine for themselves, were without difficulty led to acquiesce in his findings. These qualities were strikingly displayed in the part he took in the Trinitarian controversy. In one of his earlier publications he had maintained the divinity of Christ against the Arians and Socinians (*Tractatus de vera Christi deitate*, 1691); but in the course of time, though we know not through what particular influences, his mind received a bias in the other direction, which was first distinctly shown

in 1718, by the publication of a work which had been prepared in reply to some of Bull's representations concerning the views of the ante-Nicene Fathers (*Disquisitiones Modestæ in clarissimi Bulli Defensionem Fidei Nicenæ*). The specific object of the work was to show, that Bull's quotations were not sufficient to establish his conclusions, and that many of the ante-Nicene writers had given expression to a degree and measure of subordination in respect to Christ, quite inconsistent with their belief in His essential divinity. The positions in this treatise were attacked by Dr Waterland, rather by the way, than with any design of giving them a formal refutation, in his *Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, the first production that came from him on the subject. A reply was presently published by Whitby to Waterland's objections, which drew forth from the latter a fuller, and even more conclusive establishment of the objections previously advanced, in an answer to Dr Whitby's reply (1720). This was again met by a rejoinder from Whitby, in which considerable warmth was exhibited, and a reassertion of his former grounds; but with so little fresh matter, that Dr Waterland thought it needless to take further notice of him. Indeed, a weightier antagonist had entered the field even before Dr Whitby, and had not only been the occasion of first drawing Dr Waterland into the contest, but still continued to be personally, or through his abettors, the real head of the opposition with which Dr Waterland had to contend, as here also a wider and broader field of discussion had been opened up. For Whitby professed only to argue in behalf of an Arian or semi-Arian belief, as concerned the greater part of the ante-Nicene Fathers; his own belief, or his view of the real doctrine of Scripture, was kept in the background. And only after his death, when what was called his "Last Thoughts" came to light, was his formal adoption of Arian views made known.

The work of Dr Samuel Clarke on the Trinity made its appearance in 1712. He had previously acquired a high reputation, not only for his scholarship and attainments at the University, but also for his able performances in connection with the Boyle Lectureship, which became extensively known under the names of his "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," and his "Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion." Reason had so strongly the ascendant in Clarke's com-

position, that everything in a manner must be subjected to its rule and measure; that only must stand in matters of religious belief, which reason could distinctly grasp and make good by a formal demonstration. In the work on the Trinity there is the same effort perceptible, to rest the doctrine on a sort of demonstrative evidence, as far as the nature of the case would admit, and to show that it must be so-and-so, and cannot, consistently with right reason and the nature of things, be otherwise. For such a purpose the book was very artfully planned, and the whole subject drawn out in a method that seemed fair, natural, and conclusive. It is divided into three parts; in the first of which are set forth in regular succession all the passages in the New Testament bearing on the Father, then on the Son, and lastly on the Spirit,—certain of the passages, and particularly those relating to the Son, being accompanied, for the sake merely of explanation, with brief comments, partly furnished by the author himself, and partly taken from the writings of the Fathers and later theologians. In the second part, the sense and import of all those passages, as so explained, is gathered out, and presented in a series of propositions concerning Father, Son, and Spirit respectively—each proposition being accompanied, like the texts, with quotations from the writings of the Fathers, and indeed much more copiously, wherever the propositions bore upon the peculiar sentiments of the author. The last part is occupied with selections from the Liturgy of the Church of England, somewhat after the manner of the selections from Scripture in the first part, for the purpose of exhibiting the conformity of the propositions laid down with the devotional utterances of the Church, or putting an accordant sense upon them where they seemed to import something different.

It was impossible to deny that the method of inquiry adopted in this work was good, and bespoke the logical acumen and clear perception of the author's mind; since, first to present the testimony of Scripture, then to collect its sense, next to embody that sense in a series of categorical propositions, and finally to have all, as one proceeds, backed and confirmed by the expositions and deliverances of the most ancient, the most venerable, and most approved divines of the Church, is beyond all question the most orderly and safest course to arrive at the

truth. But all depended upon the simplicity of aim and uprightness of purpose with which the course might be prosecuted; for, if there was any failure here, then both the sense put upon the selected passages, and the quotations brought in support of it from patristic and later theologians, would be nothing more than partial evidence, sorted and arranged to confirm a foregone conclusion. That such was to a large extent the case here, became manifest to discerning minds on a very slight inspection. Even the collection of Scripture passages seemed to betray a purpose, these being taken exclusively from New Testament Scripture; while some of the most convincing proofs against the peculiar positions of Dr Clarke, as was shown by Waterland and others, were to be found in the writings of the Old Testament, as compared with correlative allusions and statements in the New. But in regard to the use made by him of the Fathers, which again directly bore upon his interpretation of Scripture, he has himself discovered the partial spirit that guided him, in the caution which he deemed it needful to indicate on the subject in his Introduction. He there advertises his readers, that the testimonies produced from ancient writers were to be regarded as illustrations rather than proofs of his propositions, and to show "how easy and natural that notion must be allowed, which so many writers could not forbear expressing so clearly and distinctly, even, frequently, when at the same time they were about to affirm, and endeavouring to prove, some things not very consistent with it." He therefore requests that no one should wonder if "many passages not consistent with, nay, perhaps, contrary to, those which are here cited, should by any be alleged out of the same authors." For, he naively adds, in regard to many of them, that "he did not cite places out of them, so much to show what was the opinion of the writers themselves, as to show how naturally truth sometimes prevails by its own native clearness and evidence even against the strongest and most settled prejudices, and how men are frequently compelled to acknowledge such premises to be true, as necessarily infer a conclusion different from what they intend to establish."

The plain English of this is, that the testimonies adduced, as intended to form a kind of authoritative exposition of the truth of Scripture, were culled sentences, reft from their con-

nection ; and, taken by themselves, speaking often a different, sometimes even directly opposite, sentiment to what would have been found to be the mind of the authors, if a full and impartial representation of their views were produced. What may not be proved by such a process ? In no case is it fair—not even in the case of modern writers, with whose circumstances, and language, and style of thought we are perfectly familiar—to extract from their remains isolated passages, in which they appear to have committed themselves to views, which we have good reason to think they would have disowned, or, perhaps, in other parts of their writings have expressly denounced. And if we judge this concerning them, much more should we do so in respect to those who lived in a remote age, who in youth and in manhood were wrought upon by influences extremely different from those now in operation, had modes of expression peculiar to themselves, and were obliged to give emphasis now to one, now to another aspect of the truth, in order to meet successive waves of error. Such, in a very special manner, were the Fathers who lived both before and a little after the Council of Nice, in respect to the subject now under consideration ; and nothing is more easy, than for one who holds either Arian or Sabellian views on the Trinity, to garnish his sentiments with a skilful array of quotations from their writings, which will apparently speak his mind. But nothing, at the same time, could be more unfair to them, or less fitted, in the long run, to serve the interests of truth. It is a peculiarly nice and intricate question, as formerly stated, to determine the precise import and bearing of the language used by the early Fathers on certain of the points at issue ; and there is, perhaps, no class of theological writers, that less readily admit of having their representations on these points exhibited in fragments, and by means of them made to do the part of umpires in regard to modern phases of the controversy. He alone is capable of doing justice to their views, who with patient and persevering industry has made himself properly at home with their productions, has imbibed the spirit that breathes in them, and is in a condition to give its due weight, and nothing more, to every element of thought, and every phase of opinion, which entered into their cogitations, and has left its impress on their pages. He, on the contrary, who con-

tents himself with such a knowledge of their writings as may just enable him to glean from them enough to serve a specific purpose, necessarily but skims the surface, and is as likely to exhibit a mistaken as a correct result.

Dr Clarke and Dr Whitby were both men of the latter description. They came to the study of the subject with a foregone conclusion, which they had derived from their philosophy; and, when searching into the writings of the Fathers for passages that seemed to express views and sentiments akin to their own, they had no great difficulty in finding them. Dr Waterland, who ere long became their chief opponent, was of the other class. He had nothing about him of the partisan, and, being of a somewhat phlegmatic temperament, was not easily roused to contend even for the truth. Though thoroughly persuaded of the vital importance of the doctrines which were assailed in Clarke's book, and from the time of its appearance generally regarded as the man most competent to deal with it, yet several years elapsed before he took any active part in the conflict; and a whole host of combatants had already rushed into the field—Mr Nelson in his *Life of Bishop Bull*, Dr Wells, Dr Knight, Dr Gastrell, Dr Edwards, Mr Welchman, Mr Eward Potter, Dr Bennett, Mr Richard Mayo, in separate treatises or letters. Several of these writers showed themselves perfectly qualified to handle particular parts of the controversy; and on the general question they so completely turned the tide against Clarke, that his views were formally presented as heretical before the Houses of Convocation in 1714, and were held to be such without a dissentient voice. But still no evidence had been given of such a mastery of the entire field of controversy as the occasion demanded. The writings that had appeared, though respectable, were only partial and ephemeral productions; nor was any of them fitted to take precisely that place on the orthodox side of the question that Dr Clarke's did on the heretical. Waterland, however, had all the qualifications requisite for supplying the deficiency—a singularly clear, dry intellect, admirably fitted for detecting sophistries, and threading its way through tangled meshes of obscure phraseology or subtle logic—a thoroughly honest, sincere, straightforward disposition, which instinctively abhorred all Jesuitical disguises, or paltering in a double sense—an unsophisticated

desire to know the simple truth, and, as regards the real sentiments of the Fathers on the subject in dispute, the ability to know it, from his intimate acquaintance with the patristic writings,—an acquaintance which was probably extended and matured after the publication of Clarke's volume, and turned more in this particular direction. How determined also he was in his investigations here to abide by the unadulterated truth—how resolute in withstanding any attempts to tamper, even in the smallest particulars, with the actual testimony of the Fathers, appears, we may say, from every page he has written on the subject, in which we perceive the same spirit that drew forth the following remarks, occasioned by one of Whitby's misquotations:—"For my own part," says he, "I declare once for all, I desire only to have things fairly represented, as they really are: no evidence smothered or stifled on either side. Let every reader see plainly what may be justly pleaded here or there, and no more; and then let it be left to his impartial judgment, after a full view of the case. Misquotations and misrepresentations will do a good cause harm, and will not long be of service to a bad one."¹ It may be added, that Waterland's style, in accordance as well with his constitutional temperament as his leading aim, was characterized by nothing almost but its clear nervous simplicity, entirely devoid of ornament or elaboration, conveying the impression of one who went straight to his point, and cared only for the plain and explicit utterance of the thoughts he desired to express. If it had no grace to attract, it was at least such that no one could be perplexed by its ambiguity, or fail to mistake its meaning.

These high qualifications for doing important service in this spiritual conflict, were unfortunately coupled with a considerable defect, which tended materially to mar, not indeed his immediate success as a controversialist, but his ultimate position and usefulness as a theologian. I refer to his comparative disregard of method, arising, in part perhaps, from his imperfect literary taste, and indifference to literary fame, but directly occasioned by the incidental manner in which he allowed himself to be at first drawn into the arena, and afterwards kept actively engaged in it. Instead of forming, as, from his strong intellect, and just appreciation of the important principles at

¹ Works, vol. i. p. 351.

stake, we might have expected him to do, an orderly and comprehensive plan, on which to ground the doctrine of the Trinity, and vindicate it from the formidable objections with which it was assailed, he only began to move, as he himself admits, when he was in a manner forced to act; and from first to last there was the same pliant surrender to the circumstances of the moment. Time after time he sent forth productions, displaying the highest powers of thought, and pregnant with the results of ample learning, but nearly all bearing the impress of their occasional origin. While in reality most valuable treatises, they carry the aspect of controversial pamphlets; and naturally, in such a case, following the track of the writers to whom he replied, and having respect to the immediate purpose which had stirred him into action, they conduct us with somewhat provoking alternation from one branch of the argument to another, and back again—from Scripture to the Fathers, then from the Fathers to Scripture, and from both to metaphysical considerations and personal charges of unfairness or inconsistency. We thus necessarily have the argument presented in an exceedingly broken and irregular manner, intermingled also with much that was merely of passing interest. And the annoyance is greatly increased by finding, when we pass from one treatise to another, not only that the same sort of alternations prevail, but also that the same ground substantially is travelled over again, only with occasional enlargements here, and abbreviations there, to meet the fresh forms the opposition had assumed; so that one must first pass from one part of a treatise to another, and then from treatise to treatise, in order to get the whole learning or argumentation, which the author has to communicate on any specific point. This, undoubtedly, constitutes a serious drawback on Waterland's productions, considered with reference to a place in the permanent theological literature to which they belong, and one that narrowed considerably the sphere of their usefulness. Had he either, before entering into the controversy, digested all his more important matter into a regular and systematic plan, or, toward the close, gathered it up again into a compact and orderly treatise, his labours would have told, especially upon future times, with much more effect than they actually did. How well he could have done so, had he set his mind to it, may be inferred from his Eight Lecture-

Sermons preached at the Lady Moyer's Foundation, and a much later work on the Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, in both of which the argument, as far as it goes, is conducted in a remarkably lucid and consecutive manner. The last treatise, in particular, forms a happy specimen of his powers, both as a man of thought, and as a learned theologian; and, though too brief on certain points, too prolonged on others, might still serve the purpose of a useful handbook on the subject of the Trinity.

To glance briefly in detail at the part he actually took in the controversy—it began in a private manner, and as an act of kindness toward a clergyman in the country, who had imbibed Dr Clarke's notions on the Trinity, and, to the concern of some of his friends, was beginning to spread them abroad. This person turned out to be, though at first Dr Waterland was ignorant of his name, Mr John Jackson, Rector of Rossington and Vicar of Doncaster; and with the view of leading him to a serious reconsideration of the whole matter, Dr W. drew out a list of queries (in all 31), suggested by Dr Clarke's scheme, and designed, if thoroughly gone into, to lead to a conviction of its unscriptural and heretical character. A correspondence ensued, and was prolonged for some years, though with no satisfactory result; till at last Jackson, unexpectedly, and, as it afterwards appeared, at the instigation of Clarke, committed the queries to the press, with his own answers to them. This obliged Waterland to enter the lists in the character of defender, and formally assume a public part in the controversy: he did so by publishing, in 1719, his *Vindication of Christ's Divinity, being a Defence of some Queries, etc.* This work was immediately recognised by all competent judges as a very masterly production. The queries themselves, indeed, bespoke a clear apprehension of the great features of the subject, and indicated with admirable precision the fatal objections, which lay against the propositions of Dr Clarke. But when the principles involved in them were wrought out and established, with such extensive knowledge of Scripture and antiquity, such searching analysis, accurate discriminations, and vigorous reasoning, as met together in this treatise, a very powerful impression could not fail to be produced in behalf of the ancient doctrine of the Church, and against the party that were now attempting to undermine

it. From this time Waterland was looked upon by all parties as the real leader on the orthodox side of the controversy; and Clarke himself readily discovered the superior strength of his new antagonist. Accordingly, in the following year (1720) he came out with a reply, under the name of the *Modest Plea continued; or, a Brief and Distinct Answer to Dr Waterland's Queries*—the Modest Plea, which professed to be the work of a country clergyman, being understood to have come from Dr Clarke's hand, acting in conjunction with Dr Sykes. To this Dr Waterland published no formal rejoinder; but noticed and refuted some of its leading statements in the Preface to his Sermons, preached on the Lady Moyer's Foundation. He had received the appointment to preach these sermons as a mark of respect for the service he had rendered by his Defence of the Queries; and the sermons themselves, as already noticed, are a luminous, succinct, and satisfactory exhibition of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the main proofs by which it is established. He designed them to form, as he intimates, a supplement to his earlier Vindication of the Divinity of Christ; and being less complicated in the matter, and in method less formally polemical, the work met with a more general acceptance. Presently, however, appeared Dr Whitby's reply to the objections which had been urged by Waterland against his *Disquisitiones Modestæ*, in the Defence of the Queries; and this was met by a vigorous, but not very lengthened answer from Dr Waterland, in the form of a letter to his opponent. Whitby's rejoinder to this, as previously mentioned, was left unnoticed by Waterland; but in 1722 appeared another reply—*A Reply to Dr Waterland's Defence of his Queries*, by his original opponent Mr Jackson, which obliged Dr W. to reconsider the whole matter (for the work was written with very considerable ability), and led to his publishing *A Second Vindication of Christ's Divinity*, under the form of a *Second Defence of some Queries*, 1723. This Second Defence follows precisely the track of the first, and again takes up the queries in their order; so that there is nothing strictly new in it. But it goes into some of the more delicate and difficult points at greater length, and as a whole is even a stronger proof than its predecessor of the varied powers and resources which the author had at command. He perceived, as he states in his preface, that the book he was now

called to examine had been got up with great care, that it "contained, in a manner, the whole strength of the Arian cause, real or artificial—all that can be of any force, either to convince or to deceive a reader." He therefore resolved to put forth his utmost energy to expose the hollowness of the Arian views, and establish the Catholic faith—the only regret being, that for those who would know the whole, it necessitates a second journey over the course, which, as regards the subject of inquiry itself, had been more agreeably and satisfactorily performed in one.

The controversy would probably have ended here, so far as the two disputants were concerned, each having exhausted his best efforts on the main topics, had not Dr W., at the close of his treatise, proposed a summary way of bringing the matter to an issue. This was by singling out the principal points, on which all might be said to hinge, and saying only what could really be said upon them. The points were,—1. What the doctrine to be examined is ? 2. whether it be possible ? 3. whether it be true ? In stating, under the first of these, what the doctrine is, he distributed it into three positions : *first*, "that the Father is God (in the strict sense of *necessarily* existing, as opposed to *precarious* existence), and the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, in the same sense of the word God ; *second*, that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son : they are distinct, so that one is not the other—that is, as we now term it, they are three distinct persons, and two of them eternally referred up to one ; *third*, that these three, however distinct enough to be three persons, are yet united enough to be one God." In respect to the next question, whether the doctrine be possible, he also had three points for consideration : *first*, whether there can be three persons *necessarily* existing ? *second*, whether three such persons can be one God, in the nature of the thing itself, or upon the footing of mere natural reason ? *third*, whether they can be one God, consistently with any data in Scripture—anything plainly laid down in sacred writ—such as subordination, mission, generation ? He admits, that if one of these questions can be determined negatively, with sufficient certainty, then the doctrine of the Trinity, as above stated, is not possible ; but if such questions cannot be certainly determined in the negative, then

the doctrine must be allowed at least possible ; and a few considerations under each were added, to show that the negative of none of them could be certainly determined. In regard to the last leading question, whether the doctrine be true, the appeal, he said, must be made exclusively to Scripture and antiquity, the possibility of the thing being in this branch of the subject presupposed. But the strength of the adversaries plainly lay, as he stated, in the question of the possibility ; for if they could produce a single valid demonstration on that point, the whole matter would be settled on their side ; while, if they could not, Scripture and antiquity should be held conclusive on the other.

The country clergyman (Mr Jackson) thought he was quite adequate to meet this challenge, and did so very much as Whitby had done before him, in regard to the opinions of the ante-Nicene Fathers (of which by and by), by shifting the real question at issue, and assuming the necessary identity of person and substance. In the face of Waterland's statements to the contrary, he set out with the assertion, that a person is an acting substance, an agent in the singular number ; hence there must be three acting substances, or three agents ; and so he held Dr W. to mean, by the Trinity, "three acting substances distinct, though not separate or disunited." Putting the state of the question thus, it was not difficult to prove that the thing contended for was impossible ; but then the result was gained by taking for granted what, so far from being conceded, was distinctly denied. And the same sort of shuffling was practised in regard to the Son's subordination to the Father : this was made to rest on a ground at variance with the supposition of true equality of nature. Such being palpably the manner in which Dr W.'s proposal had been met, he took no notice of the production of Jackson. But the principal on that side of the dispute (Dr Clarke) did not think good to let the matter so rest ; and under the title of "Observations on Dr W.'s Second Defence of his Queries, by the author of the Reply to his First Defence," a pamphlet appeared which Dr W. felt himself obliged to attend to. He expressed himself as doubtful whether it was Dr Clarke or Mr Jackson that he was here called to meet, but seems to have thought the former the real person. The paper, like the Modest Plea formerly referred to, has been included in Dr Clarke's works, doubtless on the ground that he had, if not the

sole, at least the main hand in its production. And in reply to it, Dr W. issued, in 1724, "A further Vindication of Christ's Divinity," which is short, in comparison of his two former vindications, but is vigorously written, and restates some of the points with remarkable clearness and ability. A feeble reply was made to this treatise by Jackson, under the name of Philalethes Cantabrigienses; with which finally closed the controversy, as conducted between these respective parties.

Various other treatises, however, bearing upon the subject, either had been, or were still produced by Dr Waterland; in particular, his "Critical History of the Athanasian Creed," 1723, a very full and thorough investigation, which contains all that is yet known upon the subject; his "Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity asserted," a very excellent and comprehensive treatise, already noticed, published in 1734, and having reference to statements in some recent pamphlets, as well as to the views generally which were agitated about the time; "The Case of Arian Subscription considered;" after which came a pretty long supplement to it, showing the incompatibility of Arian views with an honest subscription of the Articles, and adherence to the Liturgy of the Church of England. There were, besides, a few letters and smaller treatises, but calling for no particular notice.

I. But now, with the view of indicating some of the more prominent points discussed in this controversy, and trying to form some estimate of its results for the theology of our country, we shall first look at what may be regarded as its historical starting-point, and what with anti-Trinitarians has always been one of their most plausible grounds of opposition—the doctrine of the Son's subordination. This, we have stated at the close of last section and the beginning of this, was the point, in respect to which the language of the early writers was the most variable, most difficult to be reconciled with the Scripture doctrine, or even sometimes with itself, and in certain cases not altogether free from exception. Whiston had built largely upon this ground; and it is impossible for any one to look even cursorily over the work of Clarke, without perceiving how much he set by the advantage, which his cause seemed to derive from the apparently strong Subordinationism of the Fathers, and how he turned their occasional statements upon this point into a kind of master-prin-

ciple for adjusting all the relations of the subject, and overriding the testimony of Scripture itself. "I perceive," said Dr Waterland, "the subordination is what you lay the main stress upon, in order to overthrow the Church's doctrine of Christ's real divinity" (Works ii. p. 508). No sooner, indeed, had Clarke's work appeared, than people's attention was drawn to this, and considerable uneasiness arose from it. Dr John Edwards of Cambridge, one of the first respondents in the opening controversy, while he charged Dr Clarke with having made an improper use of the Fathers, at the same time dissented from the views they had expressed on the subject of subordination, and even blamed modern divines for going along with them, and thereby giving a handle to those who were opposed to the eternal being and essential divinity of the Son.¹ He believed that by pressing the idea of generation too far, and holding it to imply that in the divine, as well as in the human sphere, the begotten must be inferior to him that begat, occasion was given by the early writers to the erroneous opinion of the Son's being inferior to the Father. And he could not but consider "those very learned and worthy prelates, Bishop Pearson and Bishop Bull, with other modern divines, as having hurt the doctrine of the Trinity by listening to those writers, and by urging the inferiority of the Son to the Father, in respect of His divinity. Mr Whiston and Dr Clarke," he added, "have laid hold on these writings, and have made the Son of God a mere dependent being, and not worthy to be styled a God."

There is some want of discrimination in this statement, especially in regard to the two English bishops, who guard themselves against conceding such an inferiority as is here spoken of, by representing the subordination they contended for as one that had to do simply with relative place, or order, not with substance—that is, with the hypostatical distinctions, not with the essential being or essence of Godhead. But their language, it must be admitted, is not always strictly correct; nor do they take any exception to the Fathers as sometimes using incautious expressions, that necessarily conveyed inadequate ideas. Hence a series of isolated quotations from the

¹ Some Animadversions on Dr Clarke's Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, 1712.

Fathers, followed by others from such men as Pearson and Bull, which carried somewhat, at least, of the same aspect, could easily be made to bear a formidable and dangerous appearance. So it certainly is in some of Clarke's sections. Take, for example, his management of Proposition xxxiv., which runs thus : "The Son, whatever His metaphysical essence or substance might be, and whatever divine greatness or dignity is ascribed to Him in Scripture ; yet in this He is evidently subordinate to the Father, that He derives His being, attributes, and powers from the Father, the Father nothing from Him." Here he begins to illustrate by stating, from himself, that on earth a son derives his being from his father only as an instrumental, not as an efficient cause ; but God, when He is styled Father, must necessarily be understood to be a true and proper cause, *really* and *efficiently* giving life—which disposes, as he adds, of the argument usually drawn from the equality between a father and a son on earth. Then follow confirmatory testimonies from the Fathers ;—among others, from Justin, who says, "God alone is unbegotten and immortal, and for that reason He is God ;"—from Clement Alex., "There is one unbegotten Being, even God who ruleth over all ; and there is one first-begotten Being, by whom all things were made ;"—from Origen, "We affirm the Son to be not more powerful, but less powerful (*ὑποδεέστερον*, inferior in resources) than the Father ; and this we do in obedience to His own word, *My Father is greater than I* ;"—Alexander of Alex., "There is an immense distance between the self-existent Father and the things created by Him : a middle nature between which is the only-begotten" (*ὡν μεσ-τείουσα φύσις μονογενής*) ;—from Eusebius, "The Father is perfect of Himself, and first as Father, and as the cause of the Son's subsistence ; not receiving anything from the Son to the completing of His own divinity. But the Son, as being derived from a cause, is second to Him whose Son He is, having received from the Father both His being, and His being such as He is ;"—from Hilary, "Who will not confess that the Father is superior (*potiorem*) ? He that is unbegotten, than He that is begotten ? The Father than the Son ? He that sent, than He that is sent by Him ? He that commands, than He that obeys ? Our Saviour Himself testifies this to us, saying, *My Father is greater than I*," etc. Then come quotations from several modern di-

vines ; first and fullest from Bishop Pearson, who, among other things, says, " It is no diminution to the Son to say, He is from another, for His very name imports as much ; but it were a diminution to the Father, to speak so of Him ; and there must be some pre-eminence, where there is place for derogation. What the Father is, He is from none ; what the Son is, He is from Him ; what the first is, He giveth ; what the second is, He receiveth. The first is a Father, indeed, by reason of His Son, but He is not God by reason of Him : whereas the Son is not only so (Son) in regard of the Father, but also God by reason of the same." Again : " The Son has His being from the Father, who only hath it of Himself, and is the original of all power and essence in the Son. *I can of Mine own self do nothing*, saith our Saviour, because He is not of Himself ; and whosoever receives his being, must receive his power from another."

Now, it is scarcely possible to peruse such a list of passages—those especially from the Fathers—without having the conviction forced on one's mind, that however they may have suffered by being severed from their connection, they are not strictly defensible, and could scarcely have been expressed just as they are, unless some partial error or confusion had still hung over the minds of certain of the writers. It appears as if—supposing them to have held the essential and proper divinity of the Son—they had been struggling to give distinct form and consistence to the truth, in the face of certain antagonistic principles, and scarcely knew how to reach the mark on one side, without overreaching it on another. How otherwise could the Son have been designated inferior in resources to the Father, or less powerful ? or represented as a middle, mediating nature between the Creator and the things created ? How, again, could He have been spoken of as receiving His being as well as His Sonship from the Father ? It is not usual for orthodox writers to express themselves after this fashion now ; and we can scarcely understand, how it should have been done then, but from the throes and struggles, as it were, amid which the truth, in its entirety, was working itself into men's belief. Bishop Pearson, indeed (who is followed by several later writers), from a too great reverence of those ancient authorities, and a too close copying of their style, has gone so far as to say, that the second person is not only Son, but also God in regard of the Father,

and that from the Father He receives His being and essence as well as His power. To hold this, in any intelligible sense, seems plainly to identify the Father, not as God, but simply as Father, with the deity absolutely considered; and, by implication, to deny necessary existence to the Son and Spirit, since deity in the Father had existed complete without them. It is to ground the distinctions in the Trinity, not, as should be done, in respect to hypostases, but in respect to essence or substance.

Dr Waterland does not formally approve of this mode of representation, but neither does he formally object to it. He even occasionally slides into the same sort of language, and speaks of the Son's essence being held of the Father, as well as His dominion, and of the Father having communicated of His essence to the Son. But such is not his usual style of speaking on the subject; and, on one occasion, he admits that Whitby had some pretence for cavil at the word *communicated* (First Defence, Qu. 26); and again, with reference to Whitby's objection, "that the communication of the Father's essence to a person is inconceivable, because the person must be supposed to have it, to be a person," he replies by saying, that this was cavilling at what was but a popular way of expression, and that, in strictness of speech, the person of the Son was the very thing that is derived, communicated, generated.¹ More commonly—as might be inferred from the quotation already given at the close of Section First—he puts the matter thus, that in respect to essence or substance, there is no difference between the Eternal Three; that the hypostatical distinctions have respect to modes of subsistence, or distinguishing characters, and that, consequently, the priority belonging to the Father is one of order, office, or administration. *Self-existence*, in the sense of *necessary* existence, he held to be common to all alike, viewed as constituting the one eternal Godhead; only, that the Father, considered as Father, being unbegotten and underived, may be regarded as having self-existence in a manner peculiarly His own. In that sense, it is, as he says, simply negative and relative.² So also, in his First Defence of the Queries,³ he quotes with approbation the following sentence from Augustine's treatise on the Trinity: "All the Catholic interpreters of the Old or New Testament, that I could read, who have written before me

¹ Works ii. p. 208.

² Works ii. 545.

³ Works i. 502.

on the Trinity, which is God, intend to teach, conformable to Scripture, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do, by the inseparable equality of one and the same substance, make up the unity divine." On which Dr W. remarks, "Here you may observe the sum of the Catholic doctrine;—the same homogeneous substance and inseparability. The first makes each hypostasis *res divina* [in that respect, therefore, equally original, self-existent]; the last makes all to be *una substantia, una summa res*, one undivided, or individual, or numerical substance—one God" [hence affording ground for priority or subordination, only in respect to hypostatical distinctions within that individual essence].

Indeed, had it been Dr W.'s object to bring out Augustine's views upon this particular point fully, he might have adduced his testimony, as still more explicitly delivered against speaking of the personal distinctions in the Godhead, as implying derivation (in the ordinary sense) of essence or substance. Thus, in his work on the Trinity, v. 4, he refers to the argument of the Arians: "Whatsoever is said or understood concerning God, is said not according to accident, but to substance; wherefore it is in respect to substance that the Father is said to be unborn, and in respect to substance that the Son is said to be born. But there is a diversity between being unborn and born; therefore the substance of Father and Son is diverse." And to this he replies, "If anything is said concerning God, it is said concerning substance; therefore, when it is said, *I and My Father are one*, it is said concerning substance: hence there is one substance of Father and Son." He introduces also the text, *He thought it not robbery to be equal with God*; and after pressing the Arians with the *argumentum ad hominem* in reference to both passages, and noticing some of their subtleties, he says, § 7, "Father and Son are not so named in respect to themselves, no more than friends or neighbours. Relatively, one is called friend with reference to a friend; and if they equally love each other, there is the same friendship in both (so also, he adds, with respect to neighbours). Now, because the Son is so called, not with relation to the Son, but to the Father, the Son is equal to the Father, not according to that which is said respecting the Father; whence it must be according to what is said respecting Himself, that He is equal. But whatever is said in regard to

Himself, is said according to substance; it follows, therefore, that according to substance He is equal. The substance of both, consequently, is the same. But when the Father is said to be unborn, not what He is, but what He is not, is affirmed. But since a relative thing is denied, the denial is not made in respect to substance; because that which is relative is, from its very nature, not according to substance." Plainly, therefore, according to Augustine, it is right to speak of the Son as derived, simply *qua* Son (or in respect to His hypostatical existence), but not *qua* God, or as participating in the essence of deity; the one only is a relative, the other is an absolute quality of being.

It is rather to discourage the use of language which is not strictly proper, and is fitted to lead to erroneous results, than with the hope of imparting any positive information of an intelligible kind, respecting the divine nature in itself, that these explanations have been given. When some, both among the ancients and the moderns, have represented the very essence of the Son as being derived from or communicated by the Father, the object undoubtedly was, as stated by Waterland, to guard the divine unity: to give it to be understood, that the Sonship was no mere official distinction, or property held apart from the very being of Godhead, but one essentially connected with this. More correctly, however, the divine unity is made to stand simply in the possession of the same nature, substance, or essence, equally and without distinction, by the triune Godhead. So it is, for example, by Owen,¹ who, after stating this, goes on to say, in regard to what is relative, "The *distinction* which the Scripture reveals between Father, Son, and Spirit, is that whereby they are three hypostases or persons, distinctly subsisting in the same divine essence or being. Now, a divine person is nothing but *the divine essence, upon the account of an especial property, subsisting in an especial manner*. As in the person of the Father there is the divine essence and being, with its property of *begetting the Son*, subsisting in an especial manner as the Father; and because this person hath the whole divine nature, all the essential properties of that nature are in that person. The wisdom, the understanding of God, the will of God, the immensity of God, is in that person, not as the person, but as

¹ The Doctrine of the Trinity vindicated. Works by Goold, ii. p. 407.

the person is God. The like is to be said of the persons of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." Very similarly Martensen, in his *Dogmatik*, a quite recent work, § 52: "Father, Son, and Spirit are not properties, not powers or activities in the divine nature (or essence, *Wesen*): they are hypostases, that is, such distinctions in the divine nature as are not merely particular 'sides,' particular 'rays,' of the nature; but each for itself expresses the whole nature; momenta they are in the divine nature, which, nevertheless, severally for themselves manifest the entire God, the entire love, though in a different manner."

Closely connected with the mode of representation just noticed is another, which Clarke and his associates made prominent; viz., that the Son was generated or produced, not by mere necessity of nature, but by an act of the Father's incomprehensible power and will. This is the substance of the 17th proposition in the "Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity;" and it is supported by a plentiful array of patristic authorities, explicitly ascribing the Son's existence to the will as well as power of the Father. But here he has no modern authorities to back the old (for his single quotation from Dr Payne is as good as none, since it purposely decides nothing on the subject); and this alone seems to indicate, that in such a connection the Fathers must have attached some peculiar sense to the word *will*. So, we think, Dr W. has satisfactorily shown (both in his First and Second Defence of the Queries, under Q. 8). They used the expression, he contends, not as opposed to necessity of nature in the modern sense of the term, but as opposed to external compulsion; "it denied only such a supposed necessity as might be against, and a force upon the Father's will." He holds this to be manifest from Clarke's own quotations, many of which are from writers who held a generation both by power of will and by necessary emanation; so that power of will was by no means synonymous with arbitrary will. And the Council of Sirmium expressly took it so; for, when condemning those who said, "The Son was begotten, the Father not being willing," they explained this by saying, "The Father did not beget the Son, *as being constrained, or impelled by a physical necessity*." One cannot, however, justify the mode of expression, or vindicate the Fathers, in using it, from intruding too rashly into what may justly be termed the unknowable. Nor does Dr W.; he apolo-

gizes and explains, rather than defends, pointing out various senses which the Fathers might put upon *will*, when so employed, and indicating that in which he took it to be chiefly meant. Jackson and Clarke flouted at these senses, and said they could find no meaning in almost any of them. "But are you," he justly replied (Second Defence), "to sit down in your study, and make reports of the ancients out of your own head, without looking into them, to see in what sense they used their phrases? I was not inquiring what you or I should now express by the word *will*, but what ideas the ancients had sometimes affixed to the word; for by that rule we must go in judging of the ancients. What think you of those that gave the name of *Will*, or the *Father's Will*, to the person of the Son? They had a meaning, though not such a meaning as you or I now understand the word *will* in. They must, therefore, be interpreted by the ideas which *they*, and not *we*, affixed to the phrase or name. . . . It seems to be owing only to narrowness of mind, and want of larger views, that you would confine all writers to your particular modes of speaking. The word *will* had been used by some of the ancients to signify any natural powers of God. *Will*, in the sense of approbation or acquiescence, is very common with ancient writers; nor was it thought absurd to say, that God had willed thus or thus, from all eternity, and could not will otherwise. Whether there be anything very edifying in these notions or not, is not the question."

The chief defence, however, made by Waterland, of the essential orthodoxy of the Fathers, and of their including nothing in the Son's subordination at variance with His proper divinity (notwithstanding some of their peculiar modes of speech and forms of representation), consists in the ample proof he has given of their maintaining the strictly divine, uncreated, eternal being of the Son. He admits, what, indeed, is too patent to be overlooked or denied, that the Fathers did not understand filiation always in the same sense as applied to the Son—that many of them acknowledged no higher generation than an antemundane one, when through the Son there was the projection of the divine energies to create the world—that in respect to this, as also in respect to His incarnation, which likewise with them bore the name of generation, they sometimes speak of Him as coming forth by the will, or becoming a Son by the appoint-

ment of the Father. But with all this—while as a body they affirmed, with more or less freedom, the Son's subordination—while many held only a temporal generation (Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tatian, Tertullian, Hippolytus)—while Tertullian even went so far as to say, there was a time when the Son was not, and God was not always Father (contra Hermog. c. 3)—still there was a general agreement in the main points, and a difference only in words. For, (1.) they all asserted the co-eternity of the Logos, or Word, though not considered precisely under the formality of a Son. It was a maxim with them, that the Father never could be *λόγος*, without His Wisdom, any more than that an eternal mind could be without eternal thought. (2.) They did not, as is often alleged, mean by the Logos, or Word, any mere attribute, power, virtue, or operation of the Father, but a real or subsisting person, whom they believed to have been always in and with the Father, and distinct from the Father, before the temporary generation they speak of. (The proof of this is made to rest chiefly on the grounds, which had been previously urged by Bull,—*first*, that before the procession or generation, they suppose the Father not to have been alone, which could with no propriety have been said, if they only meant that He was with His own attributes, powers, or perfections; *second*, that the Logos is represented as having been ever with Him, so as to converse with Him, assisting in council, hence existing and acting as a distinct person; *third*, that the same Logos who after the procession was undoubtedly recognised as a person, was also contemplated as having existed before—proceeding from the Father *then*, but only as passing from a *previous* immanent state to one of active, outward manifestation, so that if a person after, necessarily a person before, since the relative change from quiescence to action cannot constitute personality; *finally*, that with one voice they held the Logos to be essentially different from the creatures, and not, like them, made out of nothing (*ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*); leaving it, of course, to be inferred that He was unmade, co-eternal and consubstantial with the Father.)

In the parts of Waterland's writings devoted to the establishment of these positions, there is nothing properly new; he treads very closely, and avowedly so, in the footsteps of Bishop Bull; and, as with Bull, so also with him, the investigation is

conducted simply with a view to the maintenance and hereditary belief of certain points of doctrine. Yet there is more of logical acumen in his mode of doing this, as called forth by the subtle explanations made and reasonings adopted by the adverse party; and more also of a spirit of discrimination evinced in respect to the forms of representation and modes of speech employed concerning it, at successive periods, by the Fathers. He owns,¹ for example, that the illustrations and similitudes, which they so frequently resorted to, such as of mind and thought, light and shining, however well meant, were inadequate to the end in view; that they were greatly too low and coarse for such a subject; while still, with all their imperfection, they clearly enough involved the element of the Son's co-eternity with the Father. He virtually admits also,² that the earlier statements concerning the eternal existence of the Logos, and the temporal generation of the same at the period of creation—even this, as some imagined, requiring to be supplemented by the incarnation to constitute complete and perfect filiation—could only be deemed true when rightly explained, and was by some of the Fathers themselves reckoned so liable to misconstruction and abuse, that it became necessary to apply the terms generation and Son to the Second Person in respect to His eternal existence as the Logos, and to call His twofold procession, first to create, then to redeem, by the name of manifestations, condescensions, or such like. Especially after it was seen what account was made by Arius of the doctrine of a temporal generation, was it found necessary to connect generation with His eternal being, and, with the Nicene Fathers, to denounce it as heretical to say that "the Son existed not before He was begotten"—meaning thereby, that His generation in time formed the commencement of His being. But with such concessions and explanations, Waterland successfully vindicates the Fathers, against all the sophistries of his opponents, from the two great positions of Arius—that there was a time when the Son was not, and that when He came into being it was by the creative power and will of the Father; and, on the other hand, charges these positions with conclusive force upon his opponents, notwithstanding all their efforts to the contrary. While they rejected the doctrine of Christ's consubstantiality with the Father and supreme dominion, they still

¹ Second Defence, Qu. 8.

² First Defence, Qu. 8.

maintained His divinity, and took it much amiss to be classed with Arians. Nothing can be better than some of Dr W.'s exposures and castigations here. "They deny," said he¹—to take but one specimen—"the *necessary* existence of God the Son. Run them down to but the next immediate consequence, *precarious existence*, and they are amazed and confounded; and instead of frankly admitting the consequence, they fall to doubting, shifting, equivocating, in a most childish manner, to disguise a difficulty which they cannot answer. Push them a little further, as making a creature of God the Son; and they fall to blessing themselves upon it: *they* make the Son a creature! No, not they; God forbid. And they will run you on whole pages to show how many quirks they can invent to avoid giving Him the *name* of creature, and at the same time assert the *thing*. Carry the consequence a little further, till their whole scheme begins to show itself more and more repugnant to the tenor of Scripture, and all Catholic antiquity; and then what do these gentlemen do, but shut their eyes and stop their ears? they do not understand a word you say; they will not be answerable for consequences; they never taught such things, nor think them fit to be mentioned."²

II. The *reasonableness* of the doctrine of Christ's essential and proper divinity, or of the Trinity as a whole, was another

¹ Works iii. p. 37.

² There was but too much reason for this caustic tone on the method of the adversaries. The real nature of Clarke's views on the Trinity was acutely tested by an able Roman Catholic of the time, a Dr Hawarden, who also wrote a treatise on the subject, entitled *An Answer to Dr Clarke and Mr Whiston*. This gentleman was invited by Queen Caroline to a conference with Dr Clarke, which was held in her presence, along with several others. Clarke unfolded his scheme, endeavouring to vindicate its conformity to Scripture, and freedom from any just charge of heresy. Hawarden heard the whole patiently, and said in reply, that he had just one question to ask, and that when the answer to it should be given, it should be expressed either by the affirmative or negative monosyllable. Clarke having assented, "Then, I ask," said Hawarden, "Can God the Father annihilate the Son and the Holy Ghost? Answer me, Yes or No." Dr C. continued for some time in deep thought, and then said, it was a question which he had never considered. Too plainly he could not answer it, without either confessing Son and Spirit to be creatures, or admitting them to be essentially and strictly divine. The anecdote is given by Van Mildert in his account of Waterland's life, prefixed to his works, from Mr Charles Butler's *Historical Account of Confessions of Faith*, and seems to be authentic.

point that came much into consideration in the controversies connected with the names of Clarke and Waterland; it was, in fact, the primarily questioned and disputed point, out of which arose all the efforts of the time to modify the sense of Scripture and the testimonies of the Fathers on the subject. Perpetually, as the course of discussion was stript of its ambiguities or accessories, and brought back to the one great theme, the rationalistic spirit was ready with its sceptical interrogation, How can it possibly be? One undivided substance, and yet three distinct persons or agents? Each person God, and still but one God? It defies comprehension, and is as contrary to sound reason, as the doctrine of transubstantiation.

Dr Whitby's summary way of managing the matter was to change the meaning of the terms—to hold, that as by one essence or substance must be understood one numerical or individual essence, and that this is all one with individual hypostasis or real person; so that to speak of one person and of one essence was all one in his account, and three persons could be nothing else than Tritheism. On this footing he quite easily disposed of Bull's proof for the Trinitarianism of the ante-Nicene Fathers, and made out the majority of the early writers to hold the unity in nothing but a Sabellian sense. In this he was not a little aided by the form of expression noticed under the preceding division, and there objected to, of the Father communicating His essence to the Son. For he argued, with some show of reason, "The essence of the Father, or of the self-existent being, is certainly one and the same in number; and if this essence be communicated, one and the same essence in number must be communicated to them, who by the communication of it become Son and Holy Ghost. I do not say that the same numerical essence is a person, but only that the same numerical intellectual essence is a person; and, therefore, if it be necessarily and essentially so, the communication of it must be the communication of a personal essence."¹ His object was to press the meaning of the words to what seemed their necessary conclusion, not considering that there were other forms of expression common with the Fathers, which if similarly pressed might have led to precisely opposite results. As Waterland justly replied, "A fair and candid adversary should make allowance for

¹ Reply, p. 5.

words, and attend to the thing." In respect to the meaning Whitby himself put upon numerical essence, the most he could prove was, that it was the only proper sense, not that it had never been used in any other, which was the main point here. But Dr W. denied he could prove that his was the only proper sense; because, said he,¹ "you can never fix any *certain principle of individuation*. It is for want of this that you can never assure me, that three real persons may not be, or are not one numerical or individual substance. In short, you do not know precisely what it is that makes one being, or one essence, or one substance. Here your metaphysics are plainly defective; and this it is that renders all your speculations upon that head vain and fruitless. Tell me plainly, is the divine substance present in every place, in whole or in part? Is the substance which is present here upon earth, that very individual numerical substance which is present in heaven, or is it not? Your answer to these questions may, perhaps, suggest something to you which may help you out of your difficulties relating to the Trinity; or else the sense of your inability to answer either, may teach you to be less confident in matters so much above you, and to confess your ignorance in things of this nature, as I freely do mine."

Substantially the same misrepresentations were made by Clarke and Jackson, and the same difficulties raised, which derived all their plausibility from the tacit assumption, that the analogy between human and divine things extends further than we have any reason to suppose it can be carried. "Can the same individual substance be derived and underived? Can there be a communication and nothing communicated? Or, if anything was generated, whatever might be the process of generation, must not the product have been a distinct individual substance?" It is easy to put such questions on this mysterious subject; but questions precisely similar might be put, as Dr W. stated in reply, respecting the being of God and any one of His infinite perfections, such as His omnipresence or His omnipotence. These are matters which, from their very nature, lie beyond human comprehension; we can attain to nothing more than general and vague ideas of them; and when we attempt to bring them under the keen but shallow inspection of our limited

¹ Answer to Dr Whitby, Works ii. p. 206.

reason, instead of getting into a clearer atmosphere, we only involve ourselves in doubt and perplexity. By no possibility can we know the particular mode or minute circumstances of anything pertaining to God's eternal existence or essential attributes; and, on the supposition that there are three persons in the Godhead, each God, and yet but one God, how should we expect to be able to penetrate the rationale of their union and distinction? Of itself, "the notion is soon stated, and lies in a little compass. All that words are good for after, is only to fix and preserve that notion, which is not improvable (without a further revelation) by any new idea. The most useful words for fixing the notion of distinction, are *persons*, *hypostasis*, *subsistence*, and the like; for the divinity of each person, *eternal*, *uncreated*, *immutable*, etc.; for their union, *περιχώρησις*, interior *generation*, *procession*, or the like. The design of these terms is not to enlarge our views, or to add anything to our stock of ideas; but to secure the plain fundamental truth, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are all strictly divine and uncreated; and yet are not three Gods, but one God. He that believes this simply, and in the general, as laid down in Scripture, believes enough, and need never trouble his head with nice questions. Minute particulars about the *modus* may be left to the disputers of this world, as a trial to their good sense, their piety, modesty, and humility."¹

The most characteristic part, however, of Dr W.'s reasonings upon this point, consists in the acute and vigorous manner in which he carried the war into the enemy's camp, and showed how these philosophical divines, who in their pride of reason were raising what they thought insuperable objections against the doctrine of the Trinity, were, in a cognate line, laying themselves open to objections not less, if not more irreconcilable with right reason. Not only was this done in regard to the contrary scheme which they set up, and which Dr W. held to be really, what the other was falsely called, one of Tritheism—presenting, as it did, three of different rank, yet each entitled to the name and prerogatives of God, and two of them of such an anomalous character, that they strictly belonged neither to Creator nor creature;—not only this, however, but some of Clarke's favourite positions on the subject of natural Theism

¹ Works i. 461.

were assailed, and his title to the credit of a profound thinker most materially shaken. When speaking of the alleged intelligibility of the doctrine of the Trinity, and seeking parallels for it in other things, Waterland had instanced the point of self-existence, and had said, that the learned are hardly agreed, whether it be a negative or positive idea—that is, whether *aseity*, a thing's being *a se*, or of itself, have any positive meaning, or simply conveys the notion, that it does not exist of another. This was ridiculed by Jackson, in his reply to the First Defence of the Queries, as something altogether absurd, and a proof that Waterland was somewhat behind the age in such matters. But this only furnished the latter with an opportunity to strike a blow at Jackson's principal in the cause. "Dr Clarke," said he,¹ "one of the latest writers, and from whom one might have expected something accurate, yet appears to be all over confused upon this very head, in his famous demonstration of the 'Existence.' His professed design there is to prove the existence of a first cause *a priori*; which has no sense without the supposition of a cause prior to the first, which yet is nonsense. The Doctor was too wise a man to say that God was the cause of Himself; and yet he says what amounts to it unawares. He speaks of 'necessity of existence' as being 'antecedently in order of nature, the cause or ground of that existence;' which is, in short, making a property or attribute antecedent, in order of nature, to its subject, and the cause and ground of the subject. And he talks in his letters of this necessity absolute and antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of the first cause, operating everywhere alike. As if a property operates in causing the substance, or making it to be what it is! All this confusion seems to have been owing to the Doctor's not distinguishing between *modal* and *causal* necessity; and his not considering that self-existence, or aseity, as the schools speak, is negative, and does not mean, that the first cause is either caused by anything *ad extra*, or by itself (much less by any property of itself), but has no cause, is absolutely uncaused."

This was touching too vital a point to be overlooked by the opposite party; and Dr W. was accordingly charged with not so much as understanding what the meaning of a proof *a priori* is. However, in his "Further Vindication," he took occasion to

¹ Second Defence, Works ii. p. 695.

show that he perfectly understood it; and indeed, ultimately, he published a separate and closely reasoned examination of the argument itself. With the latter, we have not properly at present to do; but the application made of the point in the former of these treatises, is so creditable to Waterland's philosophical acumen, and so good an illustration of the insufficiency of reason when soaring too high on such matters, that we cannot refrain from quoting it. It shows how distinctly he anticipated the verdict of posterity on the *a priori* argument itself, and how he could extract from the failure of reason in this, one of its highest efforts, a virtual homage to the truth. After again characterizing the *a priori* argument as in its very nature contradictory and impossible (Works iii. p. 42), he comes to notice Dr Clarke's mode of working it out: "He laid hold of the ideas of immensity and eternity as antecedently forcing themselves upon the minds of all men; and his notion of the divine immensity is, that it is infinite expansion, or infinite space, requiring an infinitely expanded substratum or subject—which subject is the very substance of God, so expanded." Upon this hypothesis, there will be substance and substance, this substance and that substance; and yet but one numerical, individual, identical substance in the whole. This part will be one individual identical substance with that part; and a thousand several parts will not be so many substances (though every one be substance), but all will be one substance. This is Dr Clarke's avowed doctrine; he sees the consequence, he owns it, as may appear from his own words (sixth Letter), in answer to the objection. And he must, of course, admit, that the one individual substance is both one in *kind*, in regard to the distinct parts, and one in *number* also, in regard to the union of these parts in the whole. Upon these principles does the Doctor's famed demonstration of the Existence proceed; and upon these does it now stand." He then refers to Dr Clarke's work on the Trinity, and to the leading argument maintained there against the doctrine, that "the three persons must be either *specifically* one (one substance in *kind* only, while three substances in *number*), which is Tritheism; or else they must be *individually* one substance, one in *number*, in the strictest sense, which is plain Sabellianism. Which reasoning at length resolves into this principle, that substance and substance, however united, must

always, and inevitably make substances; and that there cannot possibly be such a thing as one substance in number and in kind too, at the same time. And now (Dr W. continues), it could not but be pleasant enough to observe the Doctor and his friends confuting the Atheists upon this principle, that substance and substance united does not make substances, and at the same time confuting the Trinitarians upon the contrary supposition. Against Atheists, there might be substance, one in kind and number too; but against the Trinitarians, it is downright nonsense and contradiction. Against Atheists, union shall be sufficient to make sameness, and numerical substance shall be understood with due latitude; but against Trinitarians the tables shall be turned: union shall not make sameness, and no sense of numerical substance shall serve here, but what shall be the very reverse of the other. In a word, the affirmative shall serve the Doctor in one cause, and the negative in the other; and the selfsame principle shall be evidently true there, and demonstrably false here, to support two several hypotheses."

Argumentation of this sort could, of course, only prove the inconsistency of such persons as Dr Clarke, in reasoning as they did against the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity; but could not establish the reasonableness of the doctrine itself. It was something, however, to be able to show, that human reason, when endeavouring to construct for itself a pathway through the eternal and infinite, had been fain to take refuge in assumptions, which are certainly not less strange or staggering to the common apprehension, than any that require to be made in connection with the doctrine in question. It becomes fair and warrantable to conclude, that the subject is one, rather for faith to receive on the divine testimony, than for the natural reason to attempt of itself to fathom; and that it involves nothing, when calmly and dispassionately considered, which is at variance with aught that can be certainly known respecting the nature of Godhead. Reason, in the hands of some of its most gifted possessors, has at least failed to prove the doctrine impossible in the nature of the thing, and thereby left it open for Scripture to furnish evidence of its reality and its truth.

III. In regard to the mode of conducting this evidence from Scripture, in which stands the direct proof of our Lord's divinity, there is no need for going into much detail, as it was

not characterized by any remarkable peculiarity. Clarke, as previously noticed, had placed Scripture in the foreground, and professed so much to be guided by a regard to this, as the ultimate standard of appeal, that his book bore the name of the Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity. But in reality it proved to be Scripture only in a secondary respect, namely, as interpreted by the supposed opinions of the Fathers, and sanctioned by the light of reason. Hence, in the controversy that ensued, the investigation of the import, and the production of the evidence of Scripture, did not bulk by any means so largely as might have been expected, from the ostensible character of the work that gave rise to it. In the more peculiarly controversial part of his writings, Dr Waterland's object, in so far as he referred to the testimony of Scripture on the subject, was chiefly to press those texts which seemed utterly incompatible with that kind of semi-divinity and inferior worship, which, according to Dr Clarke's scheme, were all that could be attributed to Christ. This he did in a very judicious and conclusive manner—first presenting some of those passages from the Old Testament (such as Isa. xliii. 10, xlv. 8, xlv. 5), which assert the existence of but one supreme God, the object of adoration and worship, and then placing over against them certain passages from the New, which represent Christ as possessing that character (such as John i. 1; Heb. i. 8; Rom. ix. 5; Phil. ii. 6). The plain and inevitable inference from the two was shown to be, that Christ is in the strictest sense God, equal in power and glory to the Father; otherwise, there must be two Gods, a higher and a lower, one made and another unmade—rendering Christian worship a sort of *Ditheism*, which, however, is directly opposed to the express declarations and commands of one class of the passages referred to. The same thing was done in regard to the work of creation—certain passages being adduced, which speak of this as the peculiar and distinctive work of God, which He and no other could execute, and compared with other passages in which this same work is explicitly and unreservedly ascribed to Christ; whence, unless the testimony of one class runs counter to that of the other, Christ must be, as Creator, strictly and properly divine. The method of evading the force of such testimonies, and the conclusions, by just and natural inference, drawn from them, was to make a distinction

between God the Father as supreme, the one original source of all power and dominion, and God in a secondary or derivative sense, the representative and agent of the Supreme, and, as such, invested with certain attributes and prerogatives of Godhead. Much time was necessarily spent in exposing this subterfuge, showing its essential contrariety to the plain import of Scripture—its contrariety also to the reason of things, since it implied the communication of what, from its own nature, is incommunicable, the formation of one, who should possess what can belong only to Him who is eternal and infinite. There was room, it was made to appear with resistless logic, but for one of two alternatives—either that Christ is God, one essentially with the Father; or that there is an equivocation in the language of Scripture on the subject, and that it does not necessarily exclude the belief and worship of more gods than one. It is needless to say, which of the alternatives must be embraced by enlightened and consistent believers in the word of God.

Such, generally, was the line of proof and exposition adopted by Waterland on this branch of the subject—not intended, by any means, to give a complete view of the evidence, but to present those portions of it which were best adapted for meeting, in a somewhat brief and summary manner, the subtleties and evasions practised on the part of his opponents. In his *Lecture-Sermons*, however, preached at the Lady Moyer Foundation, there is a comparatively full exhibition of the entire testimony of Scripture in behalf of the essential divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit—accompanied by expositions generally fair and satisfactory, though not indicating any remarkable exegetical talent, and not free from occasional defects. For the important qualities of lucidness, integrity, and freedom from improper bias, he stands immeasurably superior to those who opposed him. And in contradistinction to the manifold subterfuges resorted to by them, and the mass of irrelevant matter they were continually endeavouring to bring into the discussion, he gives, toward the close of his *First Defence of the Queries*, a list of the points which they would need to make good, if they expected to succeed in their attempt. These showed the clear perception and firm grasp he had of the subject, and are as follows: (1.) “You are to prove, either that the Son is not Creator; or that there are two creators, and one of them a creature. (2.) You are to show,

either that the Son is not to be worshipped at all ; or that there are two objects of worship, and one of them a creature. (3.) You are to prove, either that the Son is not God ; or that there are two Gods, and one of them a creature. (4.) You are to show that your hypothesis is high enough to take in all the high titles and attributes ascribed to the Son in Holy Scripture ; and, at the same time, low enough to account for His increasing in wisdom and not knowing the day of judgment, His being exceeding sorrowful and troubled, crying out in His agonies, and the like. You are to make all to meet in the one *Logos*, or Word ; or else to mend your scheme by borrowing from ours." These alternative positions, it is needless to say, were never fairly met, and the controversy ended, on the part of the Arians, as it began, with unwarranted assumptions, clever shifts, and philosophical refinements.

The controversy had no immediate results in the form of ecclesiastical deliverances, or Church censure and deprivation. There is reason to believe that Clarke's opinions were embraced by not a few clergymen of the Church of England ; and Whitby, as has been already stated, became latterly a decided Arian. But a singular want of openness and proper Christian candour seemed to have been the general characteristic of the party : none of them manfully acted out their convictions, and withdrew from a Church whose tenets, on an important point of doctrine, they no longer held. When the Lower House of Convocation, in 1714, sent a complaint to the Upper, representing the book of Dr Clarke as containing opinions that were contrary to the faith of the Church, and calling for animadversion, Clarke first presented an apology, in which he stood to his explanations, and sought to maintain that some of the best divines were on his side. But this proved to be too much, and was withdrawn ; and a short statement was substituted for it, in which he declared it to be his belief, that "the Son was eternally begotten, by the eternal incomprehensible power and will of the Father ; also that the Holy Spirit was eternally derived from the Father, by or through the Son, according to the eternal incomprehensible power and will of the Father." He stated further, that he purposed henceforth to abstain from writing more on the subject of the Trinity (except in so far as might be necessary to refute misrepresentations or slanders concerning

his views), and that he had never omitted the reading of the Athanasian Creed at the eleven o'clock prayers, as had been reported to his prejudice. This paper gave no satisfaction to the Lower House, as they clearly enough perceived it contained no proper recantation of the heretical opinions; but the bishops, catching at the word *eternal*, used in connection with the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, and being anxious, on account of Clarke's high position, and the favour in which he was well known to be held at court, to get the matter quietly disposed of, resolved to proceed no further. Probably, they were afraid lest, if they did take further action, an injunction from high quarters might have laid a forcible arrest on their proceedings. But, assuredly, as regards the matter of dispute, the Lower House were right in the view they took of Clarke's communication. For anything that the word *eternal* implied, as coming from such a quarter, it bespoke nothing as to the proper divinity of the Son and Spirit; it merely indicated that the divine acts referred to took place prior to the creation of the material universe. And that Dr Clarke himself was actually conscious of an essential disparity between his views and those embodied in the constitution of the English Church, there can be no doubt. His attempt to reconcile these views with the worship of the Liturgy, scarcely professes to accomplish more than a partial success, as he merely tries to make one portion overrule the other. And Emlyn, who became acquainted with Clarke after his own deprivation, and has left a brief memoir of his interviews with him, mentions that on two several occasions, when the discourse turned on the probability of Clarke's elevation to some higher place in the Church, he expressly stated, that "he would take nothing which required his subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles." He was doubtful even if he could conscientiously accept the offer of a bishopric, since, though he should not be required himself to subscribe, he should be obliged to insist on subscription from others at their ordination. The question does not seem to have occurred to him—at least to have occasioned no qualms of conscience—how, in the position he continued to occupy, he could discharge the obligation virtually undertaken by his subscription in the past? By that he had declared his belief in what he no longer held, and became bound to teach what he was consciously labouring

to subvert. It may be added, that not a hint is dropt of such things in Hoadly's memoir of Clarke, prefixed to the works of the latter.

SECTION III.

FROM ABOUT 1750 TO 1800.

THE controversial discussions which originated with the publication of Dr Clarke's Scripture Doctrine, and which ran on till 1730 or a little after, were succeeded by a period of remarkable stagnation in theological literature, and general indifference to the interests of religion. In both respects, it is one of the bleakest portions of the religious history of this country. The prevalence of spiritual unconcern, and even of infidel sentiments, with their invariable accompaniment, looseness of morals, had unfortunately become fashionable in high places, and descended with their petrifying influence through the different grades of society. What was called "*rational religion*" grew more and more into favour, where the name of religion still existed—a thing more easily described by what it was not than by what it was—outwardly respectful to the claims of Christianity, and decorously observant of its rites, rather than sensibly alive to any of its more vital and important truths—consequently averse to intermeddling with what might tend to excite controversy, or rouse to action spiritual thought, and spending its energies, so far as it had any energies to spend, chiefly in such things as the working of societies for "the reformation of manners." There were, no doubt, exceptions: in the more retired spheres of private life, not a few who knew the truth in its purity, and exemplified it by the graces of a consistent life; men of God also, here and there, plying the labours of an evangelical ministry with single-hearted zeal, and contending earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints. But the general current of feeling and practice ran in another direction; and the style of preaching which was usually heard from the pulpits of the Establishment, and which might be said to represent the spirit of the times, was characterized by nothing

more than by its careful elimination of whatever is most distinctive in the Gospel scheme. It proceeded, as Bishop Horsley has graphically described it in his First Charge, upon two false maxims : one, that it is more the office of the Christian teacher to press the practice of religion upon the consciences of his hearers, than to inculcate and assert its truths ; the other, that moral duties constitute the whole, or by far the greater part, of practical Christianity. The result was, he says, that as the first "separates practice from the motives of practice, and the second, adopting that separation, reduces practical Christianity to heathen virtue," so the two taken together "have much contributed to divest our sermons of the genuine spirit and savour of Christianity, and to reduce them to mere moral essays. We have lost sight of that which it is our proper office to publish—the word of reconciliation—to propound the terms of peace and pardon to the penitent ; and we make no other use of the high commission that we bear, than to come abroad one day in the seven, dressed in solemn looks, and in the external garb of holiness, to be the apes of Epictetus."

A reaction had begun by the time this was written, originated by the fervent preaching of Wesley and Whitfield, as of men crying in the wilderness ; so that Horsley could "flatter himself they were at present in a state of recovery from the delusion," which he speaks of as almost universal when he first entered on the ministry (*viz.*, about 1760). Nor does it seem to have gone much better with the Nonconformist churches ; at least, a very considerable number of their leading men, especially among the section that still took the name of Presbyterian, became admirers of the so-called Rational Christianity ;¹ whence with them, as well as with the divines of the Establishment, a twofold result discovered itself. First, there

¹ Among the Dissenting ministers there were certainly marked and honourable exceptions ; among whom it is proper to name Watts and Dodridge, whose influence on the side of evangelical truth was both beneficial and lasting. Dr Watts wrote a good deal on the Trinity ; and, excepting the notion of the pre-existence of Christ's human soul, which he maintained, and tried without effect to render of some importance, his views do not appear to have differed from the common faith of the Church. The Socinian party, however, have claimed him, as in his latter days a convert to their views, on the ground of certain papers found among his writings by his executors, and by them destroyed as unfit for publication.

appeared a prevailing disregard of evangelical doctrine. This, if not altogether ignored, still did not awaken much interest, or call forth any strenuous efforts in its behalf; the evidences, rather than the doctrines of religion, were what engaged attention, and exercised the learning and talents of the Christian ministry. Accordingly, the only great works of the period are devoted to this branch of theological inquiry (those, mainly, of Butler, Warburton, and Lardner): and quite naturally so; for the low state of religion had brought all concerning it into jeopardy; there seemed little left but the foundations, which were now also rudely assailed, and men had to fight for the very existence of Christianity as a supernatural revelation from heaven.

But there was the further result, that, as the higher doctrines of the Gospel fell into abeyance, they became subject to doubt, suspicion, or disbelief. The doctrine, in particular, of the Trinity, in proportion as it was dissociated from the related doctrines of the guilt of sin, atonement by the blood of Christ, and regeneration by the Holy Ghost, necessarily lost its importance to men's view, and in great measure also was kept apart from the intelligible forms, through which alone it could distinctly body itself forth to their apprehensions. For such a religion as ministers of the Gospel then taught and exemplified, there was no proper need for a Trinity; it hung around their faith as a superfluous, or rather troublesome encumbrance, enveloping it in mysteries which might be dispensed with, and raising questions which it seemed alike needless and impossible to answer. So it came to be seen that the true doctrine of redemption and the doctrine of the Godhead must stand or fall together. The simply moral preachers of the Establishment—Horsley's apes of Epictetus—whatever they might be theoretically, were of necessity practical Unitarians: the doctrine of

Lardner speaks of having seen the papers, and affirms the doctrine advocated in them to have been Unitarian; but also admits that they were unfit for publication (Lindsay's *Memoirs*, p. 221). The materials are wanting for forming an independent judgment; but the opinion alike of his orthodox executors (Dodridge and Jennings) and of the Unitarian Lardner, that the writings were unfit for publication, seems plainly enough to indicate (as indeed is commonly believed), that they consisted of some crude and incoherent speculations of a mind, which had already sunk into the feebleness of dotage. They ought never to be named in comparison, or to the prejudice, of his matured productions.

the Trinity had no living place in their belief. They re-echoed the sentiment of Pope, which Warburton, in one of his letters, expressly quoted as applicable for the occasion, on the death of Waterland—

“For modes of faith let senseless bigots fight;
His can't be wrong, whose life is in the right.”

Not a few of them also, there is reason to believe, were in reality anti-Trinitarians, at least to the extent of favouring the scheme of Dr Clarke. And among the Nonconformists, where there was more of liberty of action, the traces of Clarke's influence soon became perceptible; not, perhaps, of this influence alone, but of that coupled with a corresponding foreign influence, which they derived from those holding similar views among the Remonstrants in Holland. For, as the universities of England were shut against the Dissenters, it was very common for the better educated portion of their students, during the first half of the eighteenth century, to repair to Holland, in particular to Utrecht and Leyden, in order to obtain the advantage of a proper collegiate training. This they got, and some of them even became distinguished for their scholarly and theological acquirements; but it was too commonly purchased at the great sacrifice of a corruption from the purity of the faith. Pierce and Hallet, of Exeter, both of them men of superior intellect and learning, especially the former, belonged to the class now mentioned; so at a later period (for Pierce was obliged to quit his place, and form a new congregation, on account of his Arianism, so early as 1718¹) was the still more eminent

¹ Pierce, who is best known for his commentaries on St Paul's Epistles, is supposed to have become first tinged with Arian notions from his intimacy with Whiston, with whom he had become acquainted at Cambridge. In 1713 he settled at Exeter, as colleague to Hallet, or rather as one of the ministers of three united congregations. They called themselves Presbyterians, though the accounts of the time say nothing of a presbytery in the proper sense of the term. For when it began to be noised abroad, in 1717, that Arian tenets were being disseminated by some of the ministers, the only parties that appear to have taken any oversight or management of the matter was a committee of thirteen persons—a body of managers belonging to the congregations, who, after some ineffectual efforts to ascertain the faith of the ministers and stop the spread of Arianism in Exeter, called to their aid some of the neighbouring ministers of Nonconformist congregations, and also took counsel of certain divines in London. As the

Lardner. It is known, too, that many of the young men who were educated at Dodridge's seminary in Northampton came forth tinged with Arianism. And we have the testimony of Dr Priestley¹ to the fact, that the seminary, shortly after Dodridge's death—now removed to Daventry—was presided over by two tutors (Dr Ashworth and Mr Clark), the one of whom took the orthodox view of each question, and the other the heretical; in consequence of which, he, and many others, became Arians, and nearly all left the Academy shaken in their belief respecting the atonement. Priestley himself did not rest long in Arianism; and before the last quarter of the century had commenced, the Arian tendency had very commonly been superseded by the Socinian among the more learned class of Non-conformist ministers. A general coldness and decay of piety among them gave rise to an indifference respecting orthodoxy of doctrine, and doctrinal distinctions became merged in a common desire to promote good morals. Lardner thus acted as afternoon preacher to Dr Harris, an avowed Calvinist, and Benson, a Socinian, succeeded Harris. Many similar assortments were made. And towards the latter part of the century, a tide of learned Rationalism, in connection with the interpretation of Scripture, the result of the Wolfian Philosophy, came pouring in from the Continent, which was greatly aided among the class now more particularly referred to by the extraordinary development in France of infidel principles in religion, combined with liberal views of constitutional government. Common political and philosophical sympathies naturally led to certain advances also in the religious direction.

Shortly after the middle of the eighteenth century, therefore,

result of their deliberations, a few resolutions were drawn up, asserting the importance of the doctrine of Christ's essential divinity, and the indispensable duty of ministers of the Gospel to preach it. Both Mr Pierce and Mr Hallet refused to give any satisfaction on the subject; and the committee above referred to, who held the property of the churches, excluded them from officiating in the places of worship. Pierce, who acted throughout as the leader of the Arian party, and who seems to have rivalled Dr Clarke and Mr Jackson in the manoeuvres of a shifting and evasive policy, complained loudly of the treatment he received, and called it persecution. (See Bogue and Bennett's *History of Dissenters*, vol. ii. pp. 168-184.)

¹ Memoir, p. 20.

matters evidently began to ripen, especially among the Dissenters, for a new struggle against the fundamental principles of the Gospel. In the Established Church the same tendency was at work ; but it was checked by the steady refusal given in high quarters to the attempts made, from time to time, by the movement party to be relieved from subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles. Theophilus Lindsey was the only person of any note who espoused Unitarian principles with such strength of conviction as to render actual secession necessary ; but neither his example nor his writings seem to have produced much effect within the pale of the Establishment. The example of Lardner, who was nothing, indeed, as a preacher, and was otherwise little qualified for becoming the head of a party, but had obtained just celebrity for the great merit of his apologetical writings, is likely to have exercised an influence of a proportionately stronger kind among the Dissenting communities. What he wrote, however, directly upon the subject of the Trinity, was so tame in thought, and so arbitrary in its style of interpretation, that there was manifestly needed some bolder and fresher spirit than his, to bring to a head the Unitarian tendencies which were at work, and give them some distinctive shape and form. Such a person was forthcoming in the well-known Joseph Priestley, who was nearly half a century younger than Lardner (the one having been born in 1684, the other in 1733), but, being as remarkable for his precocious and hasty, as the other for his slow and tardy development, took rank as a public man at no great distance from the other. Of a quick, versatile, inventive and restless cast of mind, more distinguished for clearness of apprehension than for breadth of view or solidity of judgment, Priestley, even when a youth, never seemed to doubt his competency to understand and grapple with any question that arose, and evinced a kind of instinctive dislike to authority in matters of faith. At the Academy of Daventry, he accordingly tells us, he invariably took the heretical side of the debated subjects ; and before he had left the Academy, and while still, as he himself confesses, almost unread either in ecclesiastical history or the critical study of the Scriptures, he drew up his *Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion*. Shortly afterwards we find him so far advanced in theological attainment, as to undertake a lengthened treatise on the doctrine of the atone-

ment, in which, of course, the Catholic view was utterly discarded; and not only so, but the reasoning of the Apostle Paul was shown "to be defective, and his conclusions ill supported." By the advice of Dr Lardner, these sentiments did not then see the light, but they were formally announced at a later period. Hitherto, he had not gone further than Arianism, in the heretical direction, but it was impossible he should rest long there; and we are not, therefore, surprised to find, that after being settled at Leeds in 1767, he saw cause, on reading Lardner's Letter on the Logos, to embrace the Socinian view of Christ's person. About the same time—amid an immense variety of other publications, scientific, literary, and theological—and apparently with nothing but the meagrest preparations on the subject, he had formed his views upon what he called the Early Corruptions of Christianity, and the history of which he resolved to write. He speaks in his Memoirs of consulting Dr Lardner regarding this, the year before Lardner's death, which took place in 1768. But owing to his change of life, by resigning his pastoral charge, and entering into connection with Lord Shelbourne, his purpose was not carried into effect till 1782, after he had withdrawn from the Shelbourne family, and gone to settle, for the prosecution of his philosophical studies, in Birmingham. He then published, in two octavo volumes, his *History of the Corruptions of Christianity*.

As a contribution to theological literature, and one that was destined to form the occasion of a considerable controversy, this work now astonishes one for the poverty of its materials, and, but for the circumstances of the time, it might have been passed over in silent contempt. Compared with the works which had appeared on similar topics, either in the immediately preceding generation, or at the close of the previous century, it scarcely deserves to be named, being at once palpably defective in learning and extremely superficial in thought. But in proportion to its marked inferiority in these respects was the calm assurance of its tone—the writer apparently having no doubt of the certainty of his conclusions, and seeming almost to think it enough, if from his own plenitude of knowledge and advanced position he announced them to the world. By this, greatly more than by any power of reasoning or show of research, did the work produce its effect. As a specimen of it,

we may take the opening statements, in which he sets forth the testimony of Scripture respecting the Person of Christ. "The Jews," says he, "were taught by their prophets to expect a Messiah, who was to be descended from the tribe of Judah and the family of David, a person in whom themselves and all the nations of the earth should be blessed; but none of their prophets gave them an idea of any other than a man like themselves in that illustrious character; and no other did they ever expect, or do they expect to this day. Jesus Christ, whose history answers to the description of the Messiah by the prophets, made no other pretensions, referring all His extraordinary power to God, His Father, who, He expressly says, spake and acted by Him, and who raised Him from the dead; and it is most evident that the Apostles, and all those who conversed with our Lord, before and after His resurrection, considered Him in no other light than simply as a man 'approved of God, by signs and wonders which God did by Him.' Not only do we find no trace of so prodigious a change in the ideas which the Apostles entertained concerning Christ, as from that of a man like themselves to that of the Most High God, or one who was in any sense their Maker or Preserver, that when their minds were most fully enlightened, after the descent of the Holy Spirit, and to the latest period of their ministry, they continued to speak of Him in the same style, even when it is evident they must have intended to speak of Him in a manner suited to His state of greatest exaltation and glory. Peter uses the simple language above quoted, of a man approved of God, immediately after the descent of the Spirit; and the Apostle Paul, giving what may be called the Christian creed, says, 'There is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus' (1 Tim. ii. 5). He does not say the *God*, the *God-man*, or the *super-angelic being*, but simply, the *man* Christ Jesus; and nothing can be alleged from the New Testament in favour of any higher nature of Christ, except a few passages, interpreted without any regard to the context, or the modes of speech and opinions of the times in which the books were written, and in such a manner in other respects as would authorize our proving any doctrine whatever from them."

Such is the easy and off-hand style in which this master of theology gathers out what he calls "the plain doctrine of the

Scriptures," and without more ado disposes of the cherished belief of ages. He holds it for certain that Scripture neither does, nor can teach otherwise; and the only room for inquiry is that which he proceeds to make—how what is so patent there, came to be obscured, and at length supplanted, by the unintelligible dogmas which have been so long enshrined in the creeds of Christendom. Let the brief and meagre summary thus jauntily sketched, and complacently presented as the sense in Scripture about the Person of Christ, be compared with the careful and searching examination of its testimony made by Dörner in the Introduction to this great work,—what a difference discloses itself, both in the *spirit* of the investigation and in the *results* arrived at! Now, when criticism and exegesis may be said to have done their utmost—when every text, and every expression bearing on the subject, have been made to pass through all the testing processes, which learning the most exact, and Rationalism the most inquisitive and suspecting, have been able to apply—the "plain doctrine" which comes out from New Testament Scripture, and even from every separate portion of it, is not the simple Humanitarianism of Priestley, but the complex, mysterious truth of an essentially divine as well as human Sonship, meeting together in the Word made flesh. The germs of this doctrine, more or less developed, are found scattered, when properly sought for, through all the volume which testifies of Him; they were, therefore, from the first recognised and embodied in the faith of the Church, before that faith had occasion to throw itself into distinct and formal propositions. And it may justly be hailed as one gratifying result of the thorough, even though not always reverent sifting, to which the words of Scripture in these last times have been subjected, that it has rendered such a bald and negative view of their contents as Priestley's no longer possible.

The work of Priestley was by no means confined to the subject of our Lord's person, or the doctrine of the Trinity. This only occupied about 150 pages of the first volume; after which he passes on to the doctrines of the atonement, of grace, of saints and angels, the sacraments, ritual, and discipline of the Church, and other related topics. The volumes are widely printed, containing little more than the half of what is now ordinarily put into the octavo sheet; so that 150 pages for a

historical exhibition of the way and manner in which the originally simple faith of the Church grew first into the Arian and then into the Trinitarian belief, was a comparatively limited space for such a purpose, and seemed to indicate that the writer felt as if he had no very difficult task to accomplish. Indeed, so natural is the course of development made to appear in these pages, by means of a few properly selected passages—so gradual and consecutive the advance from one stage to another, that if one had no other source of information than that furnished by our author, it might be supposed that all was perfectly plain sailing, and that there neither had been, nor could be, any occasion almost for difference of opinion upon the subject. It is one of the most extraordinary instances on record of collecting and sorting a few scraps of history to serve a purpose, and it seems difficult whether most to admire the audacity or the ignorance that characterizes it. For those who have any acquaintance with the original sources, the view that is given of the tenets of particular writers will often take them with surprise as a novelty; and sometimes they will even light upon statements which it seems impossible to account for, but by the writer having rapidly run his eye over a page to catch up any random expressions that might suit the object in view, however absurd the application made of them, when considered with reference to the known sentiments of the author, or the real question at issue. Thus, to refer to but one example, and one that did not come into notice during the controversy that ensued, we meet at page 121 with the following piece of information respecting Augustine. After having mentioned some things in which he differed from preceding writers, it is added—"He so far, however, adheres to the language of his predecessors as to say, that the Father alone is God of God (*ex Deo*); but by this he could not mean what the Nicene Fathers meant by it." The place pointed to for this singular statement is Augustine's work on the Trinity, B. xv. c. 17, where, undoubtedly, in reasoning upon two expressions of the Apostle John, "God is love" (*Deus dilectio est*), and "love is of God" (*dilectio ex Deo est*), the phrase, *God of God* (*Deus ex Deo*), does occur; but it is without any special reference to the Father, and solely with respect to the divine nature of love: "God, therefore, of God is love." Nay, so far from using such an expression

specifically of the Father, he distinctly declares it to be inapplicable; for, says he, "The Father alone is in such a sense God, that He is not of God; and on this account the love, which is in such a sense God as to be of God, is either the Son or the Holy Spirit." We say nothing of Augustine's interpretation of the language of the Apostle; but that any one undertaking to write on such matters should have gathered from the passage referred to, that Augustine thought it right to call the Father *Deus ex Deo*, or should have represented this as a mode of speech common to him with the earlier patristic writers, passes comprehension.

Deficient, however, as Priestley's work was in regard to the higher qualities by which such a treatise ought to have been distinguished, it created a considerable sensation, for which, as already stated, it was mainly indebted to mere audacity of assertion, and apparent unconsciousness of the defects it betrayed. Immediately after its appearance, it was attacked with sharpness in the "Monthly Review" (by Dr Badcock, as it turned out); even Dr Price, who was of the Arian party, entered the lists as an opponent; but the great antagonist, and the only one who, by the services he rendered in the cause, won for himself a permanent place of distinction, was Dr Horsley. He was then Archdeacon of St Albans, and in the full maturity of his powers (being in his fiftieth year). In 1783, the year subsequent to the publication of the *History of Corruptions*, he made it—that portion of it, at least, which concerns the belief of the early Church in the doctrine of the Trinity—the subject of his charge for that year to the clergy of the archdeaconry of St Albans. He did so in a very carefully prepared and elaborate performance,—as a whole, perhaps the most successful effort of the author, and the happiest specimen of his peculiar gifts and acquirements. The ground of assault, too, was well chosen; for, perceiving the gross blunders into which Priestley had fallen, and his palpably superficial acquaintance with the whole subject, the Archdeacon wisely disclaimed any purpose of disputing with him the opinions themselves that were brought into consideration—treated the matter, in this aspect of it, as altogether beneath his regard—and confined himself to the specific point of proving the utter incompetence of Dr Priestley for the task he had

undertaken. In this respect he was perfectly successful with all intelligent and impartial inquirers, though, so far from being so with Priestley himself, that after the most convincing, but ineffectual demonstrations of presumptuous blundering, he felt obliged to speak of "the effrontery of that incurable ignorance, which is ignorant even of its own want of knowledge."¹ At an earlier period, he justly said of Priestley's work, and gave ample proof of the characteristic, that "no work was perhaps ever sent abroad, under the title of a history, containing less of truth than his, in proportion to its volume."² Incidentally, however, both the scriptural argument for the essential divinity of our Lord's person, and the evidence of the early Church's orthodoxy on that point, were brought distinctly, though briefly, into view; but the main object, throughout, still was the incompetence of the narrator; and those instances only were selected for animadversion, which served the double purpose of at once vindicating the truth in some important particular, and invalidating the authority of him who had so flagrantly misrepresented and belied it.

It were out of place here to go into the details of this exposure, as the aim of this historical survey is not so much to show how certain controversialists were met and baffled, as to indicate the bearing which the successive controversies had to views contended for or held in other times, and to the conclusions which may have formerly been arrived at. Passing over, therefore, the charges brought and successfully established against Priestley, of inaccurate translations, misquoting of authorities, inconclusive reasonings, and ignorance of the peculiar shades of thought and meaning prevalent among the earlier Christian writers—things perfectly relevant, and of great moment as regarded the issue of the personal conflict between the parties concerned, but of no abiding interest—passing over all this, and looking simply to what formed, in a doctrinal respect, the main burden of the controversy, we find ourselves brought back, after the lapse of a century, to the precise point at which matters stood when Bishop Bull took up the defence of the Nicene faith. The question now, as then, was, What was the belief of the early Church, as expressed in the extant writings of its leading authorities, regarding the

¹ Tracts, p. 533. •

² P. 73.

Person of the Lord Jesus Christ? And in what relation to that Church did the Ebionites and Nazarenes stand? Were these the fair representatives of the primitive Church in the matter under consideration? or were they viewed and treated as heretics? It was especially on the ground of these points having been fully discussed, and in the most judicious and satisfactory manner decided by Bishop Bull, that Horsley excused himself from going at length into the investigation of them, and thought it enough to refer his clerical hearers to what had been already so well done. Bull's defence, it will be remembered, on the specific points referred to, was in good part maintained against the views propagated by Zwicker of Danzig, afterwards espoused to some extent by Episcopus; and the Archdeacon of St Albans justly deemed it extraordinary, that "any one should presume to revive the defeated arguments of those men, without attempting to make them good against the objections of a writer of Dr Bull's eminence." The only way he could think of accounting for such an insult to the learning and discernment of the age, was by supposing that Dr Priestley, while abstaining from any direct reference to Bull's labours, imagined he had virtually refuted his arguments by the new light he had been able to throw upon the subject, and had established the positions of Zwicker and Episcopus, in a way that rendered superfluous any particular notice of the previous discussion. The reply of Priestley to this, in his first series of letters to Horsley, was singularly characteristic of the self-complacent spirit of the man, in the face of even discreditable unfitness for the work he had in hand. "Whether it be to my credit or not," he said, "I must observe, that you make my reading to be more extensive than it is, when you suppose me to have borrowed my principal arguments from Zwicker or Episcopus. I do assure you, sir, I do not recollect that I ever met with the name of Zwicker before I saw it in this publication of yours. For Episcopus I have the highest reverence; and I thank you for informing me, that though an Arian himself, he was convinced that the Christian Church was originally what is now called Socinian."¹ Blundering even in this brief allusion to the past; for neither was Episcopus an Arian, nor did he go further in regard to the early Church than to say,

¹ Letters, p. 16.

that it tolerated in its communion those who did not believe in the proper divinity of Christ's person. To such a confession, Horsley very naturally rejoined :—"What is it but to confess that you are indeed little read in the principal writers, either on your own side of the question or the opposite? But as no man, I presume, is born with an intuitive knowledge of the facts or opinions of past ages, the historian of Religious Corruptions, confessing himself unread in the polemical divines, confesses ignorance of his subject. You repel the imputation of plagiarism by the most disgraceful confession of ignorance to which foiled polemic ever was reduced."

It was impossible, that with such an adversary, and with no other end in view than to prove his incompetency for dealing with such matters, any real advance could be made in respect to the proper investigation and knowledge of the subject itself. The controversy on Horsley's part has more the character of an episode to that, which a century previous had been maintained by Bishop Bull, than of a fresh and independent examination. The same views are maintained throughout, the same passages appealed to in proof of them, and much the same line of argumentation employed in respect to them, though, as with more brevity, so at times also with more vigour and energy of thought. Occasionally, too, one meets with a freer judgment in Horsley upon the partial or presumptuous representations of the Fathers respecting the divine nature of Christ, and the dangers therewith connected, than is to be found in Bull. Take the following as an example, from his Charge :¹—"If anything be justly reprehensible in the notions of the Platonic Christians, it is this conceit, which seems to be common to Athenagoras with them all, and is a key to the meaning of many obscure passages in their writings, that the external display of the powers of the Son, in the business of creation, is the thing intended in the Scripture language under the figure of His generation. A conceit which seems to have no certain foundation in holy writ, and no authority in the opinions and doctrines of the preceding age; and it seems to have betrayed some of those, who were the most wedded to it, into the use of a very improper language—as if a new relation had taken place between the first and the second person, when the creative powers were first

¹ Tracts, p. 63.

exerted. The indiscretion of presuming to affix a determinate meaning upon a figurative expression, of which no particular exposition can be safely drawn from holy writ, is in some degree atoned by the object which these writers had in view. It was evidently their intention to guard the expressions of Scripture from misconstruction. They thought to lead men away from the notion of a literal generation, by assigning to the figure a particular meaning, which it might naturally bear, and which, whether it was the sense of it or not, seemed not to clash with any explicit part of the revelation. The conversion of an attribute into a substance (applying himself now to correct the use made of the representation), whatever Dr Priestley may imagine, is a notion to which they were entire strangers. They held, indeed, that the existence of the Son necessarily and inseparably attached to the attributes of the paternal mind: inasmuch that the Father could no more be without the Son, than without His own attributes. But that the Son had been a mere attribute, before He became a person, or that the paternal attributes were older than the Son's personal existence, is a doctrine which they would have heard with horror and amazement—with horror as Christians, with amazement as philosophers."

This was well said; but there was scarcely the same cautious discrimination in regard to the mode of explanation adopted by the Platonizing Fathers, to account for the necessary and eternal relation of the Logos to the paternal mind of deity. The matter was referred to in a previous part of this historical review, and some notice also taken of the use made of the representation, both by the early impugnors of our Lord's proper divinity, and by Priestley (pp. 360–363); and need not be noticed at any length here. The subject was introduced by Horsley, for the purpose of correcting some of the gross mistakes of Priestley respecting the import of certain patristic statements, though with no effect of convincing him of error, or even of getting him to apprehend distinctly the points about which he had erred. "The Logos has existed from eternity in union with the Father, because God (so Athenagoras and others reasoned) being eternally rational, ever had the Logos in Himself. And the argument rests (Horsley added)¹ on a principle,

¹ Tracts, p. 61.

which was common to all the Platonic Fathers, and seems to be founded in Scripture, that the existence of the Son flows necessarily from the divine intellect exerted on itself; from the Father's contemplation of His own perfections. But as the Father ever was, His perfections have ever been, and His intellect hath been ever active. But perfections which have ever been, the ever-active intellect must ever have contemplated; and the contemplation which hath ever been, must ever have been accompanied with its just effect, the personal existence of the Son." Had this been given simply as an explanation of the language employed by the Fathers in question, and for the purpose of affording an insight into their mode of contemplating what may be called the interior relations of deity, it had been unexceptionable—unless, perhaps, in the last part of the conclusion, where the influence is made to run in support of "the personal existence of the Son." For, it could scarcely be said, that either the argument itself, or the manner in which it was pressed by the Platonizing Fathers, went further than to establish the eternal existence of the Logos: the contemplation of the Logos as Son was a different matter, and, as Horsley himself has stated in the previous quotation, was too closely identified by them with the creation of the world. In this one point he undoubtedly laid himself open to Priestley's rejoinder, that not the Son *as* Son, but simply the Logos was regarded by the Platonizing Fathers as existing in the Father prior to the creation. But when Priestley further affirmed,¹ that according to them this Logos was "the same thing in Him that reason is in man, which is certainly no proper person distinguishable from the man himself," that "there was nothing in the Son originally but what was necessarily contained in what they express by the term *Father*," he only furnished another proof of what had been too often exhibited in earlier times—the inherent insufficiency of such a mode of representation, and its extreme liability to abuse. When, however, he challenged Horsley to produce any authority for "the extraordinary opinion, that the second person in the Trinity had His origin from the first contemplating His own perfections," Priestley again betrayed his own ignorance and presumption. And Horsley in one of his *Disquisitions* has proved,² that the representation was, in sub-

¹ Letters to Dr Horsley, p. 71.

² Tracts, p. 513, 53, § 3.

stance at least, quite commonly made by some of the Fathers, that it was in express words taught in the Catechism issued by the Romanists after the Council of Trent (Art. Prim. s. 14, 15), and by Melancthon in his *Loci Theologici*, who says, "The Eternal Father, contemplating Himself, begets a thought of Himself, which is an image of Himself never vanishing away, but subsisting, the essence being communicated to the image. . . . He is called the Word, because He is generated by thought: He is called the Image, because thought is an image of the thing thought upon." Nor are there wanting other passages in Melancthon's works, where this form of representation is again repeated; he even seemed to have had a peculiar fondness for it.

So far, therefore, as regarded some of the Platonizing Fathers, and their successors in later times, there can be no doubt that Horsley's statements were entirely correct; and that Priestley should have continued to the last to affirm that his challenge was not answered, can only be ascribed to that stolid determination not to be convinced, or incapacity to estimate properly what *should* have produced conviction, of which his writings in this controversy furnish so many proofs. But as regards that Platonic mode of representation itself, to which Horsley gave a qualified approval, when he said it "*seemed* to be founded in Scripture," we stated formerly, that it proceeds on an attempt to carry the analogy further between the human and the divine than we have either rational ground or scriptural warrant for doing, and that its almost inevitable tendency is to give encouragement to views, which take another direction than that of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. On the present occasion, the only effect of even this partial acquiescence was, to give a plausible handle to the adversary in his endeavours to expose the fancifulness of the Trinitarian scheme, and the arbitrary methods employed to support it. Indeed, Horsley himself, in the Disquisition referred to, virtually expressed his regret at having gone so far as he did, in according a qualified assent to the mode of representation in question. He spoke strongly of the indiscretion of men attempting, on such a mysterious subject, to "mix their private opinions with the public doctrine," and declared that "the human mind is groping in the dark here, every step that she adventures beyond the point to

which the clear light of revelation reaches." He therefore declined all dispute upon the metaphysical difficulties of the subject, and would confine all he had to say to the single aim of explaining and vindicating what he had said respecting the manner in which the doctrine in question was understood by the Platonizing Fathers.

As regards the points already referred to about the belief of the early Christians on the Person of Christ, in particular the belief of the Nazarenes and Ebionites, and the relation of these parties to the Church at large—here, perhaps, if in anything, a little advance was made; it was the branch of the subject, on which Horsley was obliged to make the most careful investigation, in order to meet the palpable misrepresentations and pertinacious assertions of his opponent. There is no longer any diversity of opinion among the learned upon the matter worth naming; the results of the more free and unbiassed inquirers are given by Dörner; and they substantially agree with the views exhibited by Bull and Horsley—so far, at least, as concerns the leading positions of the Socinian party. They establish the great point, that neither the Nazarenes nor the Ebionites were ever understood in ancient times to constitute the body of Jewish Christians about Jerusalem, or taken for the proper representatives of the ancient Church:—they appear, from the earliest to the latest accounts we have of them, merely Hebrew sects; but sects which were so variously reported of by the writers of the three or four first centuries, that it is not quite easy to make out a very clear or consistent account of them. Horsley, however, has done a little more toward it than had been previously done by Bull or any other in this country, especially in respect to the Nazarenes. He admits, that the notions he had of this party at the commencement of the controversy were not very distinct;¹ but that he came ultimately to obtain what he deemed a pretty intimate and correct knowledge of them. And after noticing in detail all the passages from Irenæus to Eusebius bearing on both Nazarenes and Ebionites, he thus sums up:—"From all this I seem to gather, that after the destruction of Jerusalem, the Hebrew Church—if under that name we may comprehend the sects which separated from it—were divided into five different sets of people:—I. St Jerome's Hebrews

¹ *Tracts*, p. 424.

believing in Christ (in Isa. ix. 1-3). These were orthodox Christians of Hebrew extraction, who had laid aside the use of the Mosaic law; they were the same with the first set in Origen's threefold division of the Hebrew Christians (*Contra Cels.* L. ii. s. 3.).—II. Nazarenes of the better sort, orthodox in their creed, though retaining the use of the Mosaic law (*Jer. in Isa.* viii. 13, 14). As they were admirers of St Paul, they could not esteem the law generally necessary to salvation. If these people were at all heretical, I should guess it was in this simple point, that they received the Gospel of the Nazarenes, instead of the canonical Gospels.—III. Nazarenes of a worse sort, bigoted to the Jewish law, but still orthodox, for anything that appears to the contrary in their creed. These were the proper Nazarenes, described under that name by Epiphanius (*Hæc.* 29, 30), and by St Jerome in his Epistle to St Austin. These two sects, the better and the worse sort of Nazarenes, make the middle set in Origen's threefold division.—IV. Ebionites denying our Lord's divinity, but admitting the fact of the miraculous conception.—V. Ebionites of a worse sort, denying the miraculous conception, but still maintaining an union of Jesus with a divine being, which commenced upon His baptism [*Cerinthian Ebionites, as they are called by Dorner*]. These two sects, the better and the worse sort of Ebionites, make the last set of Origen's threefold division."

That the passages founded on by Horsley contain materials for this classification, cannot justly be doubted; only, it is not thence to be inferred, that so many distinct classes of Hebrew sects existed contemporaneously. The probability rather is, that the phases of better and worse, both in the Nazarenes and Ebionites, were successive, and arose out of a quite natural and progressive development of the carnal Jewish element which they so determinately clung to. This kept them apart from the great community of believers, and cut them off both from the sympathies and the teaching, which would have tended, had they enjoyed them, to carry them on to the higher degrees of Christian knowledge. In the absence of this, they naturally shrivelled more and more into their own narrow shell; their distinctive peculiarities took a firmer hold of them, and became relatively more important. So that Christian Fathers writing of them, some at one period, some at another, could scarcely fail to

give somewhat diverse representations of their tenets. But that they all sustained a sectarian character—that the Nazarenes, probably as a body in their earlier history, and also a portion of them in later times, approached, in their views of Christ's person, to the orthodox belief—and that even a section of the Ebionites, if not the whole of them for a time, had at least higher views of His person than modern Unitarians, though none of them ever rose to the orthodox belief,—on these points there is now a general concurrence among the more learned and impartial historians, and they may be regarded as conclusively settled.

It may not be improper to add, that on certain things incidentally connected with this controversy, Horsley showed some want of maturity. An instance was formerly referred to in a note, having respect to his judgment on a work of Allix, and the views therein maintained concerning Jewish opinions of Christ (p. 354). Another occurred in relation to the text 1 John v. 7, respecting the heavenly witnesses, and the Letters of Archdeacon Travis to Mr Gibbon on its genuineness. His mode of accounting for the omission of this text in the controversies of the first ages about the doctrine of the Trinity, that it does not relate to the consubstantiality of the three persons in the Godhead, will hardly be accepted by any impartial critic; especially when it is considered, that whenever similar controversies have arisen in modern times, this has always been one of the texts that most readily presented themselves in proof of the orthodox view, and also that the Fathers were wont to press into the argument texts that were far from bearing the same apparent relation to the subject. Then, to appeal with a kind of triumphant satisfaction to the proof adduced by Archdeacon Travis in support of the text,¹ can have no effect in the present day, but to give one a low idea of the state to which the criticism of the New Testament had then sunk, even among the more learned theologians of this country. Yet such things form comparatively trifling exceptions to the merit of Bishop Horsley's writings in this controversy. Coming forth with the energy, and relatively sufficient learning, which he exhibited on the occasion, he rendered invaluable service to the interests of divine truth. And though no appreciable advance was made upon the elucidation or establishment of our Lord's proper

¹ Tracts, p. 389.

divinity, beyond what had been done in the previous discussions, nor was the ground traversed in connection with it by any means so extensive as that, which was taken up between Clarke and Waterland, yet what had been already wrought was, on the whole, valiantly maintained, and the hearts of the doubtful or wavering were reassured and strengthened.

With Priestley, however, and the Socinian party in general, nothing was effected; they held fast to their convictions, and even affected to believe that the victory was on their side. Belsham, the successor of Priestley as a leader, openly asserted this, first in what he called his *Calm Inquiry into the Scripture Doctrine concerning the Person of Christ*, and afterwards in a preface to the Collected Letters of Priestley to Horsley. But they had so fortified themselves upon the philosophy of the subject, that their minds had become practically closed to any line of argumentation, which had for its aim the establishment of Trinitarian doctrine. The spirit of the party in this respect could not be more strikingly exhibited, than it was by Priestley in one of his letters to Price, as it showed that he would stick at no shift or supposition, however arbitrary and unreasonable, in order to get rid of the necessity of believing in the essential divinity of the Son. Referring to John vi. 62, where our Lord is reported to have asked the Jews, "What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before?" Priestley admitted that he had not found satisfaction in any interpretation of the words hitherto given; yet declares, that rather than believe our Saviour to have existed in any other state, before the creation of the world, or to have left some state of great dignity and happiness when He came hither, he would have recourse to the old and exploded "idea of Christ's actual ascent into heaven, or of His imagining that He had been carried up thither in a vision; which, like that of St Paul, He had not been able to distinguish from reality: nay, he would not build an article of faith of such magnitude on the correctness of John's recollection and representation of our Lord's language; and so strange and incredible does the hypothesis of a pre-existent state appear, that sooner than admit it, he would suppose the whole verse to be an interpolation, or that the old Apostle dictated one thing, and his amanuensis wrote another." For persons in such a state of mind, reasoning the most cogent, and evidence the most com-

plete, would necessarily be of no avail. And the great effort of the party for some time after this was by a forced exegesis to make void all the evidence of Scripture on the subject. On the opinions of the early Church, which occupied the chief place in the controversy with Priestley, the Socinian party have never formally abandoned the ground that was maintained by him against Horsley, neither can they any longer maintain it as he did. Dr Burton, in his "Testimonies of the ante-Nicene Fathers to the Divinity of Christ," not only produced a full exhibition of the evidence of the subject in a convenient form, but also, in his remarks and notes, met many of the misquotations and perversions, which had appeared in the writings of Priestley, Lindsey, and Belsham. It is, however, one of those points, which are likely to prove always more or less a subject of dispute; and quite recently, we observe, a Dr Lawson, of America, under the title of "The Church of the First Three Centuries," has published a work, in which it is broadly asserted, that "the modern doctrine of the Trinity is not found in any document or relic belonging to the Church of the first three centuries." But it is only the more rash or superficial of the Unitarian party, who would venture now on maintaining such a thesis; and the more cautious and learned will scarcely be disposed to go farther than Dr Beard, who says, that "Unitarianism certainly had an existence in the earliest Christian churches of which history has left any distinct record. This leaven made itself manifest by clear and undeniable signs during the three first centuries, when those who entertained the highest form of Unitarianism were called Monarchists, because they asserted the monarchy, or sole deity of God the Father."¹ This is modestly put, and with some regard to the results of modern research and impartial inquiry. Such of the party as have a due respect to themselves, or their cause, will certainly not carry it further; and if so, the controversy, in that aspect of it, may be allowed to rest.

¹ *Cyclopedia of Religious Denominations*, Art. Unitarianism.

SECTION IV.

FROM THE CLOSE OF LAST CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME.

SINCE the termination of the controversy discoursed of in the preceding section, there has been no great or general movement of any sort in reference to the subject of our Lord's person—none, that is, apart from a growing regard to scriptural exposition, and the investigation of topics more or less directly connected with the revealed character of God, and the person and work of His Son. Whatever there may have been of progression in the establishing of orthodox views, or of retrogression toward ancient errors, the change has taken place gradually, and by the combined influence of a variety of causes, rather than by any mighty impulse or sudden leap. There have certainly not been wanting, during the present century, publications on the subject of our Lord's person, or of the Trinity in general; for such have appeared in sufficient number, and varied enough in sentiment to represent all the leading phases of opinion on the disputed doctrines. Yet no work has appeared that could be said to constitute an era, or even to form a very prominent landmark in the course of theological inquiry. At the same time, the tone and aspect of matters in this department of theology have certainly undergone a material change. Unitarianism, as represented by Priestley or Belsham, has scarcely any longer a substantive existence amongst us; the foundations on which it leant have given way; while still Unitarianism of another and more subtle kind—Unitarianism of the Sabellian type—has been, especially of late, making steady increase.

Before noticing, however, the circumstances which have led to this result, and to render unnecessary any interruption of the subsequent narrative by the introduction of what is not strictly connected with them, we may refer to two phases of controversy on the subject of our Lord's person, which arose out of individual peculiarities rather than the general influences of the time, and ran a brief course of their own. One of these had respect to the eternal Sonship or filiation of our Lord: whether this could be predicated of Him in any intelligible sense? or

whether Sonship should not be understood simply of the relations held by Him, and the work accomplished in connection with these in time? Several respectable theologians, not doubting the article of our Lord's proper divinity, yet began to dispute the fitness of the term "eternal Sonship," nay, argued the incompatibility of the term with deity in the stricter sense, and explained it, where it occurs in Scripture, of His incarnation, or what belonged to Him as the divinely constituted Mediator. Of this class were the commentator Adam Clarke, Drew, Moses Stuart, and several others. The leading argument of all these writers (as, indeed, of the Arians and Socinians before them) was, that generation necessarily implies production, or a beginning in time; father implies precedency in time, or priority in being, with reference to son; so that eternity is excluded by the very form of the statement. Stuart, however, who was certainly the most learned and ablest of the writers who took this line of objection, did not go quite so far as the others; but he disliked the mode of representation, partly on account of what it seemed to imply, and of its apparent unintelligibility; but he did not absolutely reject it. "If the phrase *eternal generation* (he said) is to be vindicated, it is only on the ground that it is figuratively used to describe an indefinable connection and discrimination between the Father and the Son, which is from everlasting. It is not well chosen, however, for this purpose; because it necessarily, even in its figurative use, carries along with it an idea which is at variance with the self-existence and independence of Christ as divine; and, of course, in so far as it does this, it seems to detract from His real divinity."¹

It is to such statements, which had a certain superficial plausibility about them, and appeared to be producing some impression among orthodox believers, that we owe the excellent treatise of Mr Treffry, on the "Eternal Sonship of our Lord Jesus Christ." It was written specially to meet this phase of incorrect representation, which would soon have glided into actual error, and is the fullest and most satisfactory vindication that has come from an English theologian of the truth of Christ's Sonship, not as Messiah merely, but as the second in the adorable Godhead. With the exception of some imperfect

¹ "Letters to Channing," p. 32; also Com. on Rom. i. 4.

and partially mistaken representations concerning the views of Philo, the learning exhibited in the work, though not profound, was respectable, and adequate to the task which the author aimed at establishing; and as a controversial treatise the work is well entitled to commendation, both for the sound judgment and the Christian temper displayed in it. In regard to the specific point under discussion, Mr Treffry shows that the exception taken by Trinitarians to the Eternal Sonship arises partly from pressing the human analogy too far, and partly from a want of discrimination in respect to the senses in which self-existence is predicable of the three in the Godhead. There is much, he justly observes, in analogies derived from earthly relations, that is wholly inapplicable to the divine character; and priority of being, and pre-agency, which are inseparable from human paterinity, having their ground in men's animal natures, cannot possibly have place with God. "The essential ideas here, are generative production, identity of nature, inferiority of relation, and tender endearment. These may all exist irrespective of time. When generation has a beginning, it is either because the generator is not eternal, or because he must exist previously to generation. But if he has himself no beginning, and if there is no evidence that a generative emanation may not be essential to his nature, it is clear that generation does not necessarily imply beginning. God is eternal; and divine generation, for aught that can be alleged to the contrary, may be essential to the Deity." On the point of self-existence, Mr Treffry showed how Stuart and others failed to discriminate between self-existence as predicable of each person of the Godhead, and the same as capable of being attributed only to the divine essence and unity. "In the one case, the term is equivalent to necessary existence, and is true in application to the divine subsistences severally considered. In the other, it signifies existence in absolute and separate independency, and is not correct except as spoken of the entire Deity. For the Father is not without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit. The attribution to each person [namely, as apart from the others] of absolute independence and self-existence, is, in effect, the denial of all necessary and eternal relation in the Deity." Compare what has already been said on this point at p. 382 sq.

The other phase of partial error, which gave rise to a brief

controversy, and calls for some notice, has immediate respect to the humanity rather than the divinity of Christ, and is associated with the name of Edward Irving. In a volume of discourses (published in 1828) on the Incarnation, he set forth, and formally endeavoured to prove, in opposition to the prevailing belief, that the Son, in taking upon Him our nature, took it in its fallen, sinful state; that the flesh of Christ was in its proper nature mortal and corruptible; that it was liable to sin, nay, was "instinct with every form of sin" (p. 238), and had the grace of sinlessness and incorruption imparted to it from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. In maintaining and illustrating these positions, much unguarded and improper language was used—such as almost inevitably conveyed the impression of a conscious affinity to sin in Christ, of a natural leaning in His bosom to its evil propensities, which it was scarcely possible to reconcile with absolute purity. Yet the actual holiness of Christ's nature was most earnestly asserted; with endless iteration He was declared to be without the least taint of corruption, or stirring of impure affection; and the grand aim of the representation undoubtedly was to render perfectly patent to the understanding, and palpable to the feelings of men, the oneness of Christ's humanity with theirs, and the closeness of sympathy and relationship to which believers were thence admitted with Him. But it happened here, as so often previously in connection with this great theme, that the pushing to excess of a particular aspect, the disproportionate elevation of a single element, even though an element of truth, becomes, in other, and perhaps more important respects, a disturbing and perilous force. Drawing in such vivid colours the contest maintained with the innate tendencies of Christ's fleshly nature, and the greatness of the victory achieved over them, the work of our Lord in the flesh became not materially different from that of believers generally; it appeared but a higher form of the struggle with the powers of evil, and the successful issue out of it, which finds a perpetual exemplification in their experience and history; and, as a necessary consequence, the atoning death of Jesus fell into the background: the death was made account of chiefly as the consummation of the life; and even the divine nature, except as some more intense and energetic form of divine potency, seemed as if it

might have been dispensed with. Hence such extraordinary and startling representations as the following : that "all His life long the will of the flesh was successfully withstood by the will of the Spirit, yea, that the will of the Spirit enforced the flesh to do it unwilling service;" that "the humanity, sustained of the Spirit, was able to receive and unite itself to the divinity through all the perilous voyage from the nativity to the resurrection;" that "the Holy Spirit, having accomplished this momentous and perilous act of incarnate grace, did descend to the earth on the day of Pentecost, in order to do for the rest of the elect that which He had done for the first-born of the family, the first-begotten from the dead;" that the reconciliation between heaven and earth was not so properly wrought by Christ, as "wrought *in* Him, while tabernacling in flesh, and wrestling with its infirmities;" "it was begun in the Virgin's womb, and perfected in the womb of the earth," and is simply "the at-one-ment accomplished between God and man, in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ, through the union of the Godhead to fallen humanity." So that, while satisfaction, redemption, and substitution were by no means repudiated as terms or similitudes indicative of the nature of Christ's work, yet they were held to be "but poor helps for expressing the largeness, fulness, and completeness of the thing which was done by the Word's being made flesh, and which is exhibited as done by placing the God-man on the right hand of the Majesty on High." (Pp. 140, lxvi., lxxii., cxc., 224, etc.)

Had such representations stood alone, there could have been no doubt among orthodox Christians of the fundamental defectiveness and essentially erroneous character of Mr Irving's teaching. But there was, in truth, no steadiness of aim in it, or consistency of representation. Everything was denied and affirmed in turns; principles and statements, which apparently involved the most heretical conclusions, were again qualified by others, not less broadly asserted, which pointed in the opposite direction; and the whole being set forth in such a profusion of verbiage and imagery, that it was extremely difficult, often, to catch up any definite impression of what was meant, the result naturally was a considerable diversity of opinion as to the relation in which Irving's views stood to the Church doctrine respecting the person and work of Christ. After full dis-

cussions, however, had been had upon the subject, little doubt remained in the minds of intelligent and thoughtful believers, of the rashness of many of his representations, and of the essential contrariety of what in these was peculiar to the orthodox faith. And there exists, in proof of this—the only permanent literary result, indeed, of the controversy—the treatise of Dods on the Incarnation,—imperfect, certainly, as regards the entire bearings and aspects of the subject, but perfectly conclusive in respect to the main points of doctrine brought into consideration by Mr Irving—and valuable, were it only for the singularly clear and happy exposure it contains (in a discourse by the late Dr Maclagan of Aberdeen) of the fallacy which lay at the root of many of Mr Irving's aberrations, viz., that liability to temptation of necessity infers proclivity to evil in the tempted. There is much solid thought and sound theology in the volume.

The two waves of controversial discussion now referred to may be said to have risen and fallen by themselves. They had no very intimate connection with the prevailing current of thought and speculation in theological literature. And to this we now return, with the view of indicating the fresh direction things took in the hands of the more rationalistic theologians from near the commencement of the present century.

In accordance with the exegetical tendency which began to develop itself vigorously in Germany toward the close of last century, and from thence extended to this country, the minds of theologians came now to be turned, in connection with this subject, as well as others, more upon the text and interpretation of Scripture, than upon the elaboration of systematic and doctrinal treatises. The Socinian party were among the first to put forth efforts in this direction. They bent their strength to show that Scripture, when textually settled, and rationally interpreted, was really on their side, or, at least, contained nothing but what might be accommodated to their views. They perceived that, if they could only succeed in this—whatever might become of the argument from the Church of the first centuries—the great point was carried; other things would follow in due time, or fall out of sight as of inferior moment. Accordingly, Priestley spent a considerable portion of his later lifetime in the preparation of translations and comments of Scripture, intended to expound and justify his views. Those

who succeeded him in the defence of the Unitarian cause, employed themselves much in the same line, and, among other things, brought out what they called *A New and Improved Version of the New Testament*, in which the results of their biblical learning were embodied. This remarkable production was examined (to say nothing of other productions now less known) at considerable length by Archbishop Magee, in what ultimately became a supplemental volume to his important work on the Atonement; and its more objectionable parts were also ably exposed in the *Scripture Testimony* of Dr Pye Smith;—works that are still in general circulation. Here, it is unnecessary to do more than indicate the vein of thought which characterized the authors of that version, and the style of criticism by which they endeavoured to support it.

The Socinians of this school were, in the strictest sense of the term, Humanitarians in their views respecting the Person of Christ:—they held Him to be simply a man, born like other men, and entitled to no honour, possessing no right or prerogative, but such as in kind at least, if not altogether in the same degree, may fitly belong to any member of the human family. They did not, like the more extreme section of Rationalists on the Continent, deny the facts of His earthly history, or dispute the reality of at least the greater portion of His miracles; but they conceived Him to be constituted in all respects like other men—subject also to the same infirmities and prejudices—and though free from all charge of sin or shortcoming in His public life, yet not necessarily impeccable, or even, perhaps, actually without blemish in the more private parts of His behaviour. He stood, in short, upon the same footing as the prophets of former times, only at a more advanced stage of the divine dispensations; yet, like them, supernaturally endowed with gifts of knowledge and power, so far as might be needed to qualify Him for the execution of His mission to the world—*so far, but no farther*. Apart from what immediately concerned this mission, neither the opinions He expressed, nor the things He did, have any binding authority on the belief and observance of His followers. His work, too, was simply of a prophetic character; it had nothing to do with a vicarious atonement for sin; and, indeed, expiation for moral offences by the blood of Christ, or by sacrifices of any sort, is a doctrine unknown to Scripture. Conse-

quently, Jesus stood only a slight degree above His disciples ; and of that quasi-divine supremacy and worship, which the elder Socinians ascribed to Him after His ascension to heaven, it was only to be reckoned among the shreds of superstition belonging to a still imperfectly reformed faith. Such, briefly, were the views maintained by the Unitarian party, as exhibited in the writings of Priestley, the *Calm Inquiry* of Belsham, and in the explanatory comments of the New and Improved Version.

In the interest of these views, every effort was made to unsettle the received text of New Testament Scripture, wherever it bore on the higher nature and divine glory of Christ. As a rule, every reading was preferred, however slightly supported, which seemed to make in the opposite direction ; and where no reading would serve the turn, attempts, often far from creditable to the critical skill or even fairness of the writers, were made to bring the acknowledged text into suspicion. This was done particularly with the accounts of the miraculous conception, on no other ground than the alleged circumstance, that "the Ebionite Gospel of Matthew, and the Marcionite Gospel of Luke, did not contain these accounts ;" and sometimes the Nazarenes were joined with the Ebionites in respect to St Matthew, though without any just foundation ; for the better portion of them, at least, probably the entire body in its earlier stages, are known to have held the doctrine of the miraculous conception. It was admitted, too, by the earlier Socinians ; and in this country, Lardner not only received the accounts in Matthew and Luke, but ably vindicated their genuineness and authenticity. So, all later critics of any note, in conformity with the perfectly unanimous evidence of manuscripts and versions ; and in present times, the matter may be said to have passed out of the region of dispute altogether. For the first chapters of the two Gospels in question we have the same evidence, and evidence of the same amount, that exists for all the other chapters belonging to them. On this point, therefore, the authors of the Improved Version have been left behind by the more mature and exact criticism of the present age ; and if their learning and sagacity have there proved to be at fault, not less so did their integrity and fairness in others. Of this—to refer only to one instance—a notable example was given in their note on the word GOD (Θεός) in Rom. ix. 5. Their comment here is, "The word GOD appears

to have been wanting in Chrysostom's, and some other ancient copies : see Grotius and Griesbach." Belsham, who was probably the author of this comment, makes it somewhat more specific in his *Calm Inquiry*, and says, it was "wanting in the copies of Cyprian, Hilary, Chrysostom, and others, and is therefore of doubtful authority ;" and he refers to Erasmus, Grotius, and Dr Clarke as having all observed this. The statement in either form is false, and could not have been made by any one who was honestly desirous of giving a correct view of the matter. So far from the word appearing to have had no place in Chrysostom's text, the verse is quoted by Chrysostom precisely as it stands in our copies of the Testament ; only, he does not, in his remarks on the passage, apply the term in proof of the divinity of Christ. And *that* is the substance of what Erasmus says on the subject—merely that the *Commentary* of Chrysostom gave no distinct intimation that he had the word in his copy, yet admitting that its being there might be inferred from what he says on other parts of the verse. It is all, too, that Grotius and Griesbach said regarding Chrysostom ; viz., that he did not in his comment apply the word God specifically to Christ, not that he wanted it in his text. And if truth had been the primary object of the authors of the Improved Version, as it should have been, they might, by a little search into the writings of that Father, have found that in other places he quotes the passage for the very purpose of showing how the epithet God is applied to Christ (see on 1 Cor. viii. 4, 35). In regard to Hilary and Cyprian, also, none of the persons mentioned say that the word was wanting in their copies, but merely, that the passage is sometimes quoted without it, and yet in a manner that implied the word was in the eye of the writer, and should have been there ; hence probably omitted by the carelessness of scribes. But in other passages it is quoted by them, and the word expressly applied to Christ. So that the whole array of authorities falls to the ground ; and the use made of them is in a high degree discreditable to persons affecting peculiar exactness and fidelity. The word GOD (it may be added) is so certainly entitled to a place in the text, that Tischendorf, in his last edition, deems it unnecessary to make a single note or observation regarding it.

The polemical bias, however, displayed itself more in the

interpretation of New Testament Scripture, than in the adjustment of the text; for there it had more scope to exert its ingenuity, and could resort to arbitrary renderings where the plain import of the words seemed hollow against the Unitarian doctrine. For example, the texts which speak so plainly of Christ having created all things, or of His being the immediate representative and agent of deity in the work of creation,—such as John i. 3, Col. i. 17, Heb. i. 10,—are understood to mean simply, that the great moral change connected with the new state or dispensation of the Gospel, and especially as regards the relation of Jews and Gentiles, was by His instrumentality introduced and settled.¹ The statement in 2 Cor. viii. 9, which affirms of Christ, that “though rich (or being rich), for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might be made rich,” is rendered in the Imp. Version, “While He was rich, yet for your sakes He lived in poverty;” and a note explains that the construction requires us to understand the words, “not of a passage from a preceding state of wealth to a succeeding state of poverty, but of two contemporary states: He was rich and poor at the same time,”—i. e., was rich in miraculous powers, which it was at His option to employ for His own benefit; but He made no use of these for any selfish purpose, He employed all for the good of those He came to redeem. Again, when in John viii. 58, Jesus said to the Jews, “Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am,” the meaning, we are told, is, “Before that eminent patriarch was brought into being, My existence and appearance under the character of the Messiah at this period, and in these circumstances, was so completely arranged, and so irrevocably fixed in the immutable counsels and purposes of God, that in this sense I may be said even to have existed;” so that, for aught one can see, anything that is destined to be of more importance than another might be said to be before that other; for example, the Christian dispensation before the Jewish, or the end of the world before the beginning. Would one speak-

¹ The comment on Col. i. 17 is worth quoting: “This great change the Apostle here describes under the symbol of a revolution, introduced among certain ranks and orders of beings, by whom, according to the Jewish demonology, borrowed from the Oriental philosophy, the affairs of states and individuals were superintended and governed.”

ing so, speak as if he wished to be understood? In like manner, all the texts which indicate our Lord's pre-existence, or connection with a higher world than this, are got rid of by the supposition of some ambiguity or figure in the terms: His having been in heaven, or in the bosom of the Father, merely announces, in a figurative way, His superier insight into the plan and purposes of God; His coming into the world, and again leaving it that He might return to the Father, imports simply that He appeared in public as a messenger from God, and that He again ceased to do so when His mission closed; His being affirmed to be of the seed of David after the flesh, but declared to be the Son of God with power (Rom. i. 3, 4), "could not mean to assert or countenance the strange and unintelligible notion of two natures in Christ,"—"the sense plainly is, that Christ by natural descent was of the posterity of David, but that in a figurative sense He was the Son of God, or the promised Messiah." Sometimes even a bolder stroke is made, when the resort to figurative senses will not avail, as at 1 Cor. xv. 47, where an arbitrary change from the Past to the Future serves the turn: "The first man was from the ground, the second man will be from heaven [heavenly]." Belsham, in his *Calm Inquiry*, calls this expressly the rendering of the Vulgate—adopting, apparently, the same license in his own language that he commonly imputes to that of Scripture; for while it might justly be said to follow the *reading* of the Vulgate, it certainly departs most materially from its *rendering*,—there being no substantive verb at all in either of the clauses of the verse as given by the Vulgate; and if there had, no scholar can doubt that the Past tense, in both clauses alike, would have been employed.

These specimens may suffice: they give plain enough indication of the type of doctrine held by the Socinian party of this country about the beginning of the present century, and also of the style of criticism and interpretation by which they endeavoured to vindicate it. It is impossible for any unbiassed person to make himself acquainted with the class of writings referred to, without feeling that they were themselves conscious of having the natural sense of Scripture against them on the leading controverted passages, and that the grand aim of their critical and exegetical efforts was to find a sense, which,

however unnatural, might enable them still to maintain a certain belief in Scripture without foregoing the notions derived from their philosophy. As Christ with them did not differ from other servants of God, except in possessing superior degrees of knowledge and virtue, so the Christianity they extracted from the Bible was in no important respect different from the Deism of Herbert, Shaftesbury, and Tindal ; and it plainly did not greatly matter, if persons believed in the existence and moral character of one God, whether they took the name of Christians in the Unitarian sense or not. Hence it soon appeared, after the flush of its first efforts was over, that Unitarianism of such a type had no living warmth about it; and both from its own inherent meagreness, and the violence it did to the sense of Scripture, was incapable of growing into a compact and orderly system—nay, was not long in exhibiting symptoms of feebleness and decay. Its history has been little else than a struggle for existence, not a march to conquest over the ignorance, superstition, and wickedness of mankind ; the strictly religious annals of the country might be written without so much as mentioning its name. And notwithstanding the confident tone assumed by Priestley, Belsham, and the other authors of the Improved Version, as to the sense of Scripture being on their side, or, at least, being perfectly compatible with their views of the Person and the mission of Christ, there have never ceased to appear among the party strivings after a more distinctive association of divinity with Christ, and a desire to ascribe a really atoning and redemptive efficacy to His work, somewhat commensurate to the stress evidently laid on it in Scripture.¹ As the more impartial and exact study of the text and exposition of Scripture has proceeded, the criticism and exegesis of the Socinian leaders have been left more and more in the background ; their conjectural emendations of the text, and their forced interpretations, have become antiquated ; and when subjected to fair and scholarly treatment, Scripture has proved to be too determinate in its meaning, and decided in its evangelical import, for any general acceptance being given to the views they sought to impose on it.

Beside this tendency in the general course and direction of

¹ See, for example, the quotations given from Socinian productions in Magee's *Supp. Remarks*, pp. 68-72

things, there have been in more recent times two special influences, which have told with considerable effect on the foundations of the Unitarian cause—the one more of a philosophic, the other more of a theological nature. The so-called Rational Christianity, of which the Unitarianism of Priestley and his school was the proper development, took its rise in the philosophy of the last century—a philosophy, as formerly stated, which in its whole tone was rationalistic and negative, ever tending in its bearing on religion to depreciate faith in order to extol reason. This phase of things had its culmination in the extravagances and blasphemies of the French Revolution, when reason, as the concentrated essence of human nature, was formally deified and set up as the object of worship. But a reaction came, and philosophy itself began to look a little deeper, and to regard this exclusive exaltation of reason, and especially its exaltation at the expense of faith, as shallow and one-sided. It came to see, that however high the place which belongs to reason as an element in the human constitution, it still is but a part, not the whole; and that there are other powers and capacities which must be brought into exercise, in order to give reason itself its proper play, and render it productive of safe and abiding results. And that very principle of faith, which it was the practice of the elder philosophic school to ignore and decry, rose to a position of relative greatness and potency. “Man accomplishes nothing great or good without faith.” So says Michelet, a French philosopher of this age, virtually reversing the maxims of philosophy to which the savans of his country gave currency at the close of the preceding age. The prevailing deficiency or want of faith has been one of the standing laments of Carlyle, to which he would trace much of the degeneracy and corruption of the times. It is in the resuscitation of faith, rather than in the cultivation of intellect, or the sharpening of reason, that he would have us to look for the power of doing great and heroic deeds—not faith, indeed, as grounded in the revelation of God, but still faith exercised about matters pertaining to the duties and interests of men. Fichte—the forerunner and master of Carlyle in this line of thought—took it for his special aim (in his *Lectures on the Destination of Man*) to show how the mind, when it begins to philosophize, passes from doubt to science, and from science to

a faith, which unfolds the real, and thereby provides a solid basis for our confidence in immortality and God. "All my conviction," said he, "is but faith; and it proceeds from the will, and not from the understanding. . . . I know that every seeming truth, born of reason alone, and not ultimately resting on faith, is false and spurious; for knowledge, purely and simply such, when carried to its utmost consequences, leads to the conviction that we can know nothing. . . . We are all born in faith."

In this new phase of philosophic thought there is undoubtedly an element of truth—however it also may have sometimes been pushed to excess. It is founded on correcter views of human nature than that which took account only of reason; and so far harmonizes with the spirit of the Bible, that it assigns to faith in the human sphere the same relative place which the Bible claims for it in the divine. "Faith," therefore, in the language of a true Christian philosophy, as uttered by the accomplished Vinet, "faith, as the vision of the invisible, the absent brought nigh, is the energy of the soul, and the energy of life. It is the source of everything in the eyes of man, which bears a character of dignity and force. Vulgar souls wish to see, to touch, to grasp; others have the eye of faith, and they are great. It is always by having faith in others, in themselves, in duty, or in the Divinity, that men have done great things. Faith has been in all time the strength of the feeble, and the salvation of the miserable; and the greatness of individuals or of nations may be measured precisely by the greatness of their faith." Or, as it is expressed by Archdeacon Hare, in his Treatise on the subject, "Faith is the root and foundation of whatever is noble and excellent in man—of all that is mighty and admirable in his intellect—of all that is amiable and praiseworthy in his affections—of all that is stable and sound in his moral being. . . . When faith dies away, the heart of a nation rots; and then, though its intellect may be acute and brilliant, it is the sharpness of a weapon of death, and the brightness of a devouring fire." In what may justly be regarded as the higher philosophy of our time, the necessity of faith—of a faith rising above reason, and accrediting what the intellect can neither distinctly conceive nor conclusively demonstrate—has been argued with great

ability (whether always with sufficient caution or not), and applied to things immediately connected with the nature and attributes of deity. The philosophic reason is thus once more avowedly stretching out the hand to faith, and owning its authority. And now, the tendency of all this upon a creed, which may be said to have been formed on the principle of believing nothing, which cannot be distinctly conceived and understood, could not be other than adverse. Philosophy herself has come to demand a sphere for faith, and a place even for the mysterious and unknowable, which the elder Socinians rejected alike from their philosophical tenets and their religious belief. And the alternative has for the best part of a generation been facing them, of either approaching nearer to the spirit of the Bible, by making more account of the principle and the realities of faith, or of becoming antiquated at once as philosophers and as religionists.

But the same alternative has been forcing itself upon them from another side, and one more immediately connected with the theological province. The Rationalism of last century, which in the philosophical direction reached its apex in the deification of reason during the madness of the French Revolution, found a corresponding *ne plus ultra* in the theological direction, about half a century later, through the pantheistic development of Strauss. The constructive part of Strauss's theory—viz., his attempt to establish the mythical character of the Gospel narratives, and to build up on them a kind of pantheistic religion—has been without fruit; but not so the destructive part, or the bearing of his work on the existing Rationalism. He had discernment enough to see the arbitrary character of this, and the unsatisfactory nature of its attempts to explain the original records of Scripture. The scheme which he devised to supersede it, obliged him, in the first instance, to come into direct collision with it, and to maintain, what it had been labouring for near a century to disprove—the plain sense of Scripture, and that as carrying along with it the supernatural and mysterious elements commonly associated with it. However necessary he deemed it, in the other branch of his undertaking, to repudiate the historical verity of the evangelical accounts, as a preliminary to that, he could not dispense with their miraculous aspect (which with him was all one with the

fabulous); for he found therein a key to his theory of their origination. He must, therefore, endeavour to drive the elder Rationalism from the field, which sought by forced criticisms and evasive expedients to eliminate nearly all that was miraculous, and reduce them as much as possible to the level of things pertaining to ordinary life. This he successfully accomplished, exposing in a most vigorous and trenchant manner the feebleness and folly of the attempts that had been made to deprive New Testament Scripture of its proper character. The writers, he maintains, and justly maintains, intended to narrate wonders in almost every page; the whole form and aspect of their accounts bears unmistakeable evidence of it; and the only question which he held to be open for discussion was, whether what was related should be taken in its plain literality, or should be viewed as the cover of a higher truth—an instruction in the form of a myth. So far Strauss may be said to have done good service. By his bold and effective vindication of the natural sense of Scripture, he in a great measure drove the common race of Rationalists from the field; so that his work, which was in one respect the consummation of Rationalism, gave it, in another, its most deadly blow.

Nor did the work of Strauss tell merely in this general way against the tone and style of interpretation, to which the Unitarian writers in this country, as well as on the Continent, had committed themselves; but on the specific point of the incarnation, or the union of the divine and human in Christ, and by consequence on the doctrine of the Trinity, he held the meaning of New Testament Scripture to be perfectly explicit. Instead of excepting this, he took it, as it undoubtedly ought to be taken, for the very heart and centre of all that appears there possessing a supernatural import. It is emphatically the wonder of wonders—though, certainly, as explained by Strauss, the wonder again dissolves; but this so as merely to affect the constructive part of his own theory, or the use to which he turned the evangelical narratives, and not so as to interfere with the formal character of the narratives themselves. He made no question, that the central idea of these was the revelation of a God-man; but the realization of the idea he would find, not in a single individual, but in humanity as a whole. Humanity is with him God's Son; "it is the union of the two natures, of

the God become man, of the Infinite Spirit emptying itself into the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude ; it is the child of the invisible mother, and the invisible father, of nature and spirit ;" and so on. To attempt to build a religious belief on such a basis, or to seek thereby to account for the origin and growth of Christianity, was in the highest degree absurd ; but even in its extravagance it bore the aspect of a keen satire against the elder rationalistic or Socinian hypothesis ; for what was the object of special horror to this—namely, the union of the divine and human natures—it assumed as in some form essential to any scheme, which would meet the conditions that lie upon the very face of the representations of Scripture. Thus Rationalism, in its maturest development, came forth as a witness against the arbitrary and superficial nature of a Christianity, which professed to be founded on the testimony of Scripture, and yet rejected the most prominent feature of Scripture as a revelation from its creed.

The combined effect of the influences now referred to has been such as to shake the foundations of the Socinianism that was prevalent in this country at the commencement of the present century, and to render its forced interpretations and meagre results no longer available. Its hermeneutics have become in a manner antiquated ; and recent commentators, of the highest standing as scholars, and even in some respects not altogether free from a rationalistic spirit, either pass entirely over their evasive interpretations of important texts, or refer to them merely for the purpose of stamping them as wholly untenable. Fritzsche, for example, in his Commentary on the Romans (ch. v.), shows the utter impossibility of giving their plain grammatical sense to the Apostle's words, without finding in them the doctrine of a vicarious atonement, made to expiate the wrath of God on account of man's guilt. So, too, Meyer everywhere rejects the more distinctive comments of the Unitarian school, as contrary to the plain sense, and often passes them by as unworthy of notice. Thus at 2 Cor. viii. 9 he holds it for certain, that the *being* (ὢν) rich there spoken of, must be understood as the imperfect, denoting what He was previously ; for, " according to the context, the discourse is not of what Christ *is*, but of what He *was* before the incarnation ;" and the making rich, in like manner, he considers to have its

only legitimate reference to the reconciliation, justification, etc., which are the fruits of Christ's obedience unto death. The declaration of our Lord, at John viii. 58, "Before Abraham was, I am," is explained as capable of only meaning, "Older than Abraham's being is My existence," the Present (*εἰμι*) designating the continuousness of Christ's being out of the past. In like manner, the Socinian mode of applying texts, which ascribe creative energy to Christ—such as John i. 3, Col. i. 16, 17—of the *moral* change or figurative creation that was to be the result of His mission, is treated as quite opposed to the plain meaning of the passages, and not deserving of any serious refutation. And so in many similar cases. Men who in the present day would stand up for the views given of texts bearing on the pre-existence and the divinity of our Lord's person, or the nature of His work of reconciliation for the world, which are found in the writings of Lindsey, Priestley, or Belsham, could only gain for themselves the distinction of being miserably deficient or hopelessly prejudiced biblical scholars.

The general result in this country, as on the Continent, is one that may justly be hailed with satisfaction by evangelical Christians; the Church doctrine regarding the Person of Christ, and by consequence also of the Trinity, has become more extensively acquiesced in. What Dorner has said more especially of the continental aspect of matters, that the tendency of theological science now, more perhaps than at any former period, is to fall back on that doctrine,¹ may be still more confidently affirmed of English theology, whether at home or abroad. Here, too, it holds, and holds more generally than in the regions of German Protestantism, that many anti-Trinitarian forms may now be regarded as having ceased to exist; and that there is a growing desire and disposition in the Church to hold fast by the doctrine of an immanent Trinity in the Godhead, and to reproduce this in a manner adapted to the conscience of evangelical Christians, especially in its bearing on the constitution of Christ's person and the efficacy of His work, as the Redeemer and High Priest of His people. Nor, speaking of the Church generally in these lands—the Church as represented by those, whether clerical or laic, who really interest themselves in religious truth and duty—is there the same marked disproportion (of

¹ Div. ii., Vol. iii. p. 216, sq.

which Dorner takes notice) between the recognition of such doctrine, and the living energy of Christian piety. A certain disproportion, no doubt, exists, inasmuch as there are many who give a kind of doctrinal assent to Trinitarian views, which but too plainly has little or no connection with spiritual activity and fruitfulness. But, for the most part, persons of this stamp are only nominal believers in anything; and while there may be, and doubtless are not a few, who must be characterized as sticklers for what is little more than a dead orthodoxy on the subject, there can, on the other hand, be no reasonable doubt, that the number of such has been steadily decreasing, and the doctrines connected with the divinity of Christ lie at the root of, and give the chief impulse to, all that is most living and devoted in the Christianity of our age. This is a special ground of thankfulness; and the more so, as the ascertained practical fruits of the doctrine so palpably correspond with the scriptural evidence for it, and form, as it were, the response of enlightened consciences to the truth uttered in the word of God.

But if we are entitled to represent this as the most general result of the turn things have latterly taken in respect to the Trinitarian doctrine, it would be an entire mistake to suppose that it is the only one. Other and less salutary directions have also been taken, though only by particular classes, and these chiefly of a speculative and restless cast of mind. It is difficult to arrange and classify, where there is so much that is the offspring of merely local influence and individual temperament; but there may, without difficulty, be discerned three distinctly marked developments of doctrine on the subject under consideration, each diverging from the form recognised by the Church as orthodox, though in very different degrees.

(1.) The widest divergence is one so nearly akin in its leading features to that of Strauss, that it may be regarded as substantially identical with it—it is a sort of Christianized Pantheism. This is the direction which has been taken, under the combined philosophy and exegesis of the age, by the lower section of Unitarians both in this country and in America, who, on finding themselves unable to maintain the old position of a frigid, scriptural Deism, and shrinking from the spirit and mysteries of an evangelical creed, have sought a resting-place in a kind of spiritualistic or moral Pantheism. Theodore

Parker, of America, might be taken as the most conspicuous representative of this class in the pulpit, and one certainly not without respectable gifts, both natural and acquired. He is mentioned by Dorner, along with Channing, and in terms of commendation, which we should hardly have felt inclined to apply to him, even in his earlier career.¹ But in its last stage, as is now generally known, the pantheistic direction of his views became much stronger than before, and a philosophy rather than a Christianity was what obtained his final assent. The *Westminster Review*, in its theological articles, usually represents and advocates the same phase of opinion; and so also, with certain minor shades of difference, do F. Newman, and various writers of a kindred spirit. It is scarcely possible to say how much of fact is admitted by this school in connection with the origin of Christianity; for their statements in that respect do not always harmonize; but they are agreed as to the exclusion of every element strictly miraculous or supernatural, which, according to their pantheistic philosophy, is a thing simply impossible. And if Jesus Christ was really an historical personage, he could by no possibility be other than a man among his fellow-men—a superior Jewish peasant, who had somehow attained to better notions of truth and duty than his countrymen; but for anything further that is said concerning him, it must be ascribed to tradition, or the mythical formations of a later age. Plainly, this is but a species of infidelity; and it must be met, not on the territory of Scripture, but on that of nature and reason; for the view it assumes of God and the world is what properly distinguishes it, and its relation to Scripture is chiefly of a negative or antithetic description.

Dr Mill has said, in his work on the *Mystical Interpretation of the Gospels*, p. 343, "The sacred and mysterious doctrine of the Trinity in Unity has ever been the surest safeguard against Pantheism in the Christian Church. When consubstantiality with the divine Father of all is so restricted by the dogmatic symbols to the Son, in whom, as His expressed image, He is ever manifested externally, and the Spirit, by whom He is everywhere vitally and internally present, it must always be impossible, without conscious impiety and departure from the baptismal faith, to think of any soul or personality beside that of the three

¹ Div. ii., Vol. iii. p. 223.

divine Persons, as constituting in any sense part of the Pleroma of the Godhead." Whenever such impiety, he adds, has been practised within the Church's pale, or under a Christian garb, it has arisen either from the heated imagination of individual mystics, or from some infusion of Gentile philosophy leading particular speculators astray. This, undoubtedly, is the case; and in the present age, it will readily be understood, it is the philosophic influence, rather than the mystic temperament, which has led some, if not properly within the pale of the Christian Church, yet not willing to stand altogether dissociated from the Christian name, to adopt the pantheistic scheme, and, of course, to allow of no Trinity but the merely nominal one which is compatible with such a scheme. Indeed, they themselves leave us in no doubt as to the grounds which determine their choice; it is, they allege, the imperative demands of science. And yet instances are ever and anon occurring, which show how prone the human mind is, in matters of this nature, to relieve the cold and rigid deductions of science by a little of the dreamy speculativeness and enthusiastic glow, which are proper to the mystic temperament.¹ But such cases can be nothing more in our age than occasional and fitful; they are to be accounted for as recoils of natural feeling from the great

¹ Of this, a curious exhibition was given, some years ago, in the letters of Mr Atkinson to Miss Martineau—both Pantheists of the stamp now under consideration—indicating the faith they reposed in the wonders of mesmerism, and the satisfaction they derived from it. By these, it was declared, the case of Christ (that is, the apparently supernatural in His case) had become to the writer clear as day. His flannel waistcoat, through the potent mesmeric influence, could give out sparks of light, which enabled him to see what o'clock it was on his watch; a lady dreamt a dream, which had been breathed by him into a glove, and the glove sent to her; and another lady had been able to read a writing from the top of her head, or from any part of her body. Of course, all these, and such like wonderful exploits, were held to be the production of powers strictly natural and physical, yet powers very different from the mechanical action of organized matter, and bespeaking the mysterious and pervasive energy of the great soul of the world. It is undoubtedly to be ascribed to the same tendency in human nature—the felt craving after something more responsive to human sympathies than natural laws—which led Comte in his latter days to invent the worship of humanity as a necessary complement to his positive philosophy. The thought, that obedience to law was the only piety, proved too infrigidating.

gulf of silence and darkness, into which Pantheism plunges its votaries. And the connection of these with Christianity can in no case be more than nominal; at heart, they are consciously opposed to its teaching; and it is impossible they can feel otherwise, than that, so long as this teaching prevails in the world, the interest with which they are associated must be depressed. In short, the incarnation of the Bible, and the incarnation of Pantheism, so far from being homogeneous, are irreconcilable opposites; and in proportion as the one maintains its place, the other of necessity gives way.

(2.) A second class of persons, who have been led to adopt views at variance with the orthodox faith concerning the Person of Christ, though less directly and formally opposed to it than the one just specified, consists of those, whose notions appear to be essentially Ebionitic: that is, they don't dispute that, according to the plain sense of Scripture, the divinity of Christ, and other collateral doctrines, are expressed; but they do not conceive themselves bound thereby to believe more than that He was, as to the constitution of His person, simply a human being, or that He did, as to His work, more than a highly-gifted and enlightened teacher was competent to perform. The ground of this apparent inconsistency lies in the view held respecting Scripture, as being only in a qualified sense a revelation of God—a revelation, indeed, yet not without the prejudices and partial errors natural to the time and place of its appearance; and, consequently, entitled to credence and belief now, only in so far as its statements accord with the increased knowledge and rational convictions of the age. So that, even when it is ascertained what Scripture teaches respecting God or Christ, the question is still competent, whether the doctrine appear to be reasonable, and find a response in the conscience? And in the present age there is a considerable class, who in this respect do not rise above the position of the ancient Ebionites, especially of that better section of them, who admitted a certain potency or energizing of the Godhead in Christ, to fit Him for His reforming agency. The Ebionites mutilated and corrupted the Scriptures of the New Testament in order to vindicate their doctrinal position: their modern representatives, with the same view, assert their liberty to receive or modify at pleasure the testimony which they acknowledge to be contained in the Scrip-

tures. That this is done by a portion of professed Unitarians, needs no proof ; it flows so directly from the loose notions they hold on the subject of inspiration.¹ But it is no longer confined to them. A tendency in the same direction has, for a considerable time, been developing itself in the Church of England, and has latterly reached, though still only among a limited circle, a startling consummation. In a treatise on "The Letter and Spirit of Scripture," by the Rev. Thomas Wilson, Cambridge, published a number of years ago as a preface to an edition of the Bible (the Bampton Bible), the doctrine was distinctly set forth, that the teaching of Scripture could not, in the nature of things, differ from the light of the natural reason, or rise above it. "So far," it was said, "from the religion of the Gospel being at variance with the religion of nature, they are in reality one and the same. Were it otherwise, the religion of the Gospel, as being unnatural, would be untrue." Then, in regard to the specific doctrine of the Trinity, while its place in Scripture is not denied, it is no further made account of than as "shadowing forth a sublime truth." What that truth is, the writer presently informs us ; for, after speaking of it as one of those mysteries man should not meddle with, he tells us how he also believes in a Trinity : "We also believe in the creating

¹ The Unitarian preacher, Mr Martineau, may in this be allowed to speak for his party ; although, in the preface to the edition of the work from which we quote, he intimates that his views were not in all respects what they had been when it was written. But he professes himself to be a Rationalist in the proper sense of the term, namely, as holding the principle, that it is "the prerogative of reason to apply itself to the interior, as well as to the exterior of revelation." And he applies this principle specifically to the doctrines of the Trinity and atonement, which, without admitting them to be taught in the Bible, he is yet "prepared to maintain, that if they were in the Bible, they would still be incredible ; and that in every case the natural improbability of a tenet is not to be set aside as a forbidden topic, but to be weighed as an essential part of the evidence which must determine its acceptance or rejection." But withal he protests against the anti-supernaturalism of many Rationalist interpreters, who would reject everything miraculous as being intrinsically absurd and incredible. This he regards as an unwarranted and mischievous application of the principle ; and therefore he holds those justly condemned, "who have preferred, by convulsive efforts of interpretation, to compress the memoirs of Christ and His Apostles into the dimensions of ordinary life, rather than admit the operation of miracle on the one hand, or avow their

Father, the redeeming Son, and the sanctifying Spirit. For man (he adds by way of explanation), whose type is Christ, the incarnate Son of the universal Father, redeems his race from sin and sorrow through the sacred Spirit, that dwells in the temple of an upright heart." Man does it all, first typically and potentially in Christ, then in each believer personally, and by reason of some sort of indefinite connection with the power of the Highest, but with no essential difference, either as to personal constitution or active agency, between Jesus and His followers. Hence also the doctrine of "a physical atonement (as it is called) for mortal sin, by the shedding of the blood of the Son of God and Son of man, on the cross of Calvary," is repudiated as a crude popular belief, the offspring of a scholastic theology, building itself on the old fleshliness of the Levitical letter. An Ebionitish Messiah is thus the only result aimed at! and the *spirit* of Scripture is elicited by an arbitrary process to establish the foregone conclusion.

Views of this description, however, were only beginning to be mooted by English clergymen at the time the above treatise was written; and it is but recently that they have received a formal exhibition, and have met with any considerable adhe-

abandonment of Christianity on the other." (*Rationale of Religious Inquiry*, pp. 64, 70, 72, Third Ed. 1845.) Of Christ Himself, he says little; but speaks of Him as having a moral eminence above all others—"the object of perfect moral approbation, the image of finished excellence, on whose fair majesty even the eye of God cannot rest without delight" (p. 17).

And yet how far he has been from finding satisfaction in the intellectual and spiritual results arising from such views, the following confession but too clearly testifies. "Ebionites, Arians, Socinians, all seem to me to contrast unfavourably with their opponents, and to exhibit a type of thought and character far less worthy, on the whole, of the true genius of Christianity. I am conscious that my deepest obligations, as a learner, in almost every department, are to others than to writers of my own creed. In philosophy, I have had to unlearn most that I had imbibed from my early text-books, and the authors in chief favour with them. In biblical interpretation, I derive from Calvin and Whitby the help that fails me in Crell and Belsham. In devotional literature and religious thought, I find nothing of ours that does not pale before Augustine, Tauler, Pascal. And in the poetry of the Church, it is the Latin or the German hymns, or the lines of Charles Wesley, or of Keble, that fasten on my memory and heart, and makes all else seem poor and cold." In a word, he feels that the system his reason approves of is not favourable to profound thought, and fails to meet the deeper wants and convictions of the soul.

rence. They are now the principles of a school, having its ablest representation in the writings of Professor Jowett (more particularly in the essays interspersed with his Commentaries on St Paul's Epistles), and the well-known Oxford "Essays and Reviews." The primary object of these, and of various kindred productions, appears to be the circumscription, not so much of the sense of Scripture (which they are content to take in its natural meaning), as of the character and bearing of Scripture as a revelation. This, it is maintained, has only a relative, not an absolute value: it was sufficient for the age that witnessed its appearance; but partaking, as it did, of the imperfections and errors which inevitably cleave to all that is human, there were inconsistencies that must be kept in view, narrow and prejudiced ideas that must be discarded, in order to adjust it to the scientific conclusions and matured knowledge of modern times. The teaching of Jesus Himself is declared to be "on a level with the modes of thought of His age;" and on certain points His statements stand "in apparent contradiction both with the course of events, and with other words attributed to Him by the Evangelists."¹ If such was the character of the Lord's teaching, that of His disciples, of course, must have been at least equally fitted to produce inadequate, or partially incorrect impressions. Hence, after throwing together many of their announcements regarding the kingdom and coming of Christ, it is broadly affirmed, that they will not hold together; "the fact stares us in the face;" "the discrepancy is seen," and seen now "more clearly than in former times, between the meaning of Scripture and the order of events which history discloses to us."² It is added, by way of corollary, that "most of the difficulties of theology are self-made, and ready to vanish away when we consider them naturally. They generally arise out of certain hypotheses which we vainly try to reconcile with obvious facts; often they are the opinions of a past day lingering on into the present:"—in other words, they come from our giving too absolute a sway to the statements of the sacred writers, and basing our theology too exclusively on their defective conceptions and conflicting statements. The passage admits of no other meaning; and in the comment on Rom. xi. 32, we have it applied to a particular point, the Apostle's expressed belief in the future conversion of

¹ Com. on St Paul's Epp. vol. i. pp. 109, 110 (2d Ed.). ² P. 119.

the Jews. This is affirmed to be utterly irreconcilable with the facts of the case; and only to be explained by supposing the Apostle to speak "as an Israelite of the Israelites, within the circle of the Jewish dispensation, after the manner of the time; he could not but utter what he hoped and felt. There is no irreverence (we are told) in supposing that St Paul, who after the lapse of a few years looked, not for the coming of Christ, but rather for his own departure to be with Christ, would have changed his manner of speech when, after eighteen centuries, he found all things remaining as they were from the beginning. His spirit itself bids us read his writings not in the letter but in the spirit. He who felt his views of God's purposes gradually extending, who read the voice within him by the light of daily experience, could never have found fault with us for not attempting to reach beyond the horizon within which God has shut us up." There is no misunderstanding this: it means that the Apostle was himself partially mistaken; his views of Christian doctrine changed from one period to another; at the first (as is elsewhere stated) he preached a Christ after the flesh, and subsequently a Christ after the spirit; he was, therefore, no more infallible than we are; and we have the advantage of living at a more advanced stage of the divine dispensations, and consequently possess the means of seeing farther into the truth of things.

The same principle is applied also to other parts of the Apostle's doctrinal statements—to his judgment, for example, on the people and religions of the heathen world, concerning which, we are told, we cannot say what it would have been if he had known them as we do, but that it is impossible for us to regard them in the single point of view, which they presented to the first believers:¹—nay, it is applied even to his great principle of righteousness by faith, which should never be supposed, it seems, to stand in contrast to righteousness by works, for it was merely uttered in certain circumstances, when he had to teach men rather how to die than how to live, and they had to be led by the nearest way to peace.² So, indeed, generally; nothing is held to be definitely settled by the statements of Scripture; "niceties of doctrine are laid aside; controversies are dying out; the opinions respecting the inspiration of Scripture, which are held in the present day by good and able men, are not those

¹ Vol. ii. p. 436.

² P. 532.

of fifty years ago ; a change may be observed on many points, a reserve on still more."¹ And as regards the subject of our Lord's person and work—with which we have the more immediately to do—everything in the form of specific doctrinal statement is shunned : "in theology," it is expressly said, "the less we define the better. Definite statements respecting the relation of Christ either to God or man are only figures of speech ; they do not really pierce the clouds which 'round our little life.'"² Christ is spoken of frequently enough as our Lord ; He is represented as higher than we, as God's Son, and as having given Himself in free love for our sins. But whenever we turn to the more precise explanations given, we find nothing to indicate, that either as to His person or His mission Christ stood essentially above the level of humanity. He is represented³ as having, indeed, some sort of unity with the divine nature, but then He is also represented as communicating the same to His people. What is said both of Adam and of Christ in relation to mankind, is said to be so involved in figure, that it is scarcely possible to put either into a distinct doctrinal form ; but the most that can be gathered from it respecting Christ is, that He is "the natural head of the human race, the author of its spiritual life,"⁴—the one as well as the other, and both, we are left to infer, simply from the moral influence of His teaching, life and death. That there was anything properly vicarious or propitiatory in His death, is repudiated in the most express and pointed manner, as being contrary to all right views of God's character. When called a sacrifice, it is only by way of accommodation to old sacrificial notions, figuratively, and in a sense that is "the negation of all sacrifice." As an objective act on God's part, "we know nothing, and we seem to know, that we never can know anything." Christ died for His people in no other sense than He lived for them ; the doctrine of the Reformers about His imputed righteousness is "a fiction ;" His death was simply "the fulfilment and consummation of His life, the greatest moral act ever done in this world, the highest manifestation of perfect love ;" and all that is said about the procuring and offering of pardon through the death of Christ amounts only to this, that "God has manifested Himself in Christ as the God of mercy, who has forgiven us almost before we ask Him," and who warrants sin-

¹ P. 522.² P. 594.³ P. 245.⁴ P. 187.

pers "to look for forgiveness, not because Christ has satisfied the wrath of God, but because God can show mercy without satisfaction."¹

With such moderate views respecting the work of Christ, and its relation to the interests of men, it plainly mattered nothing whether any higher nature than the human mingled in His person; He was substantially an Ebionitish Messiah, and only in degree differed from what was accomplished by a Paul or a John. And hence the future destinies both of individuals and of the world are represented as standing in no necessary connection with their views and feelings respecting Christ. While it would be a happy thing for them to know and believe in Him, this is by no means essential either to their present well-being, or their final blessedness. There is no longer any real distinction between the world and the Church, none but what is artificial and ought to be abolished. "There are multitudes of men and women everywhere, who have no peculiarly Christian feelings, to whom, except for the indirect influence of Christian institutions, the life and death of Christ would have made no difference, and who have, nevertheless, the common sense of truth and right almost equally with true Christians. We cannot say of them, 'There is none righteous, no, not one.'"² Such, therefore, are as likely to pass the final reckoning with acceptance as if they had stood in the front rank of believers; in them may even be verified the saying, that many who are first shall be last, and the last first. And so, as regards the advance of truth and righteousness in the world—in India, for example—the propagation of the Gospel of Christ is only recognised as one of the means necessary: the mission is even said "to be one of governments rather than of churches or individuals; and in carrying it out, we must seem to lose sight of some of the distinctive marks of Christianity."³ No one will, of course, doubt, that Christian governments have a great responsibility in such matters, and can do much either to retard or advance the preparation of their heathen subjects for the Messiah's kingdom. But no one, also, who stands upon the foundation of apostles and prophets, and recognises the infinite worth and sufficiency of Christ as the sole Saviour of a guilty

¹ See *Essays on Righteousness of Faith and on Atonement*.

² Pp. 490-91.

³ P. 448.

world, could ever after this fashion throw the things of His great salvation into a common stock with political expedients, and place the ministers of His Gospel on a footing with the administrators of civil justice. What need, in such a case, one naturally asks, for the hypothesis of a really divine Sonship or higher nature in Christ? Plainly, it would hang as an incumbrance about the idea entertained of His mission, rather than form an element essential to its success.

In the "Essays and Reviews," the element in question is altogether ignored. Professor Jowett regards Christ merely as the world's great prophet, the teacher of a lesson. Dr Williams would seem to go a step further in the downward direction: "Though the true substance of deity took body in the Son of man, they who know the divine substance to be spirit, will conceive of such embodiment of the eternal mind very differently from those who abstract all divine attributes, such as consciousness, forethought, and love, and then imagine a material *residuum*, on which they confer the holiest name. The divine attributes are consubstantial with the divine essence. He who abides in love, abides in God, and God in him."¹ This seems so extremely like Pantheism, that, perhaps, the writer of it should have been assigned to the class who have gone off in that direction. But we adopt the more favourable explanation of the language, which would take it to be a somewhat mystical representation of humanity, as a kind of reflex of deity—embodying, sometimes in a lower, sometimes in a higher degree, the intellectual and moral qualities, which in their source and fountainhead belong only to God. But supposing this to be the meaning, it unquestionably leaves no room for any distinction as to nature or essence between Christ and other men. According to it, all are related to the Godhead in proportion as the moral perfections of Godhead are transfused into their hearts and lives; and Jesus rose above others only in so far as He surpassed them in the possession and exercise of that love which is the summation of moral excellence. That Jesus might therefore be the best of human-kind—that the divine attributes might appear in their highest potency in Him, as connected with an earthly frame—that He might be, in short, the noblest representation of deity in human

¹ P. 388.

form, and was such—is the whole that can be admitted as true, or even conceived as possible. And this does not carry us beyond the Ebionite idea of the Messiah.

It is manifest from the simple statement of these views, that while they involve derogatory notions of our Lord's person and work, and, at least, a virtual repudiation of the doctrine of the Trinity, they are to be met otherwise than by asserting the scriptural argument on these specific points; the prior and more fundamental position will require to be maintained, of the proper inspiration and supreme authority of Scripture itself. The real question between the defenders of the orthodox doctrine respecting Christ, and the school of which we speak, is whether God's word or man's—whether the teaching of Scripture, or the teaching of human reason and philosophy, is to prevail with us. It is not denied that, according to the plain import of the words, the doctrines comprised in the orthodox faith are to be found in Scripture; but it is alleged that, as taught there, they are not imperatively binding upon our consciences; and that rather than admit them to a place in our creed, we must resolve the language in which they are taught into figure, or, should this fail, must hold the doctrines themselves to be associated with so much that is erroneous and antiquated, as to warrant a perfectly free and independent exercise of judgment concerning them—to take only what appears to be accordant with the reason and philosophy of our age, to reject what is not. Persons who are bound by no ecclesiastical authority, and stand free from the trammels of any accepted creed, have nothing to prevent them from adopting such a course; and there can be little doubt that it is adopted by a portion of the professed Unitarians of the present day—though to what extent, we have no proper data for ascertaining. But the views are so palpably at variance with the Articles and acknowledged creeds of the Church of England, that it is impossible they should find any general acceptance with those who can with a good conscience minister or worship within her pale. The existence even of a few occupying such a position, has created astonishment in the public mind, and shocked the moral sense of the Christian community. And whatever may be the issue of pending litigations respecting them, it may be held as certain, that the views in question can

never find a proper resting-place in a church which has so deeply interwoven with her constitution and worship the higher doctrines of the faith.

What has happened, however, must be regarded by all thoughtful persons as a very remarkable sign of the times, and an indication of tendencies being at work, which will require to be met with a fresh examination of the foundations, and, perhaps, also much earnest controversy. It is quite possible, as has been said by an able writer,¹ that "some questions have been raised which are not likely to be settled in this generation. The elements which have thrown the mind of Europe into a state of disturbance, have undoubtedly penetrated deep into England. The progress of religious knowledge will in future be more beset by speculative and intellectual difficulties than has been the case in former years." But still, as the same writer adds, there is no ground for alarm as to the issue; as in the past, so in the future, Scripture will hold its ground. "The close, microscopic examination of the Book of Life is daily bringing its secret beauties into clearer light. The progress of historical research opens new fields of discovery, in which the scriptural exegetist finds valuable materials. The deep spiritual meaning of many an obscure passage or neglected fact is discerned more distinctly by those who candidly, but warily, scrutinize the objections of antagonists to the faith." And these objections, it may be added, will become less prominent—they will, if they do not totally disappear, at least cease to disturb men of inquiring and earnest minds, in proportion as they come to perceive the inner harmonies of Scripture, and the adaptation of its great truths to meet, as nothing else can, the profounder convictions of the soul, and the more fundamental evils of society.

(3.) There still is another class, and probably a much larger one than either of those already specified, or even than both put together, whom the combined influence of recent theological investigation and philosophical study have turned aside from the orthodox faith concerning the Person of Christ. We refer to the Sabellian direction, which since the time of Schleiermacher has undoubtedly won to its side some of the higher minds of Germany, whose writings have not been

¹ *Aids to Faith*, p. 185.

without a perceptible influence on the theology of this country. Here, however, it is extremely difficult to produce ostensible evidence of the result. It is the singular property of Sabellianism, that while denying the real doctrine of the Trinity, it can serve itself so adroitly of the Trinitarian phraseology, that where concealment is aimed at, detection is nearly impracticable; the threefold form of the divine manifestations is clothed in the aspect of a threefold personal distinction. And in this country, where the doctrine of the Trinity holds so prominent a place in the belief of the evangelical churches, and is so jealously guarded by the faithful, there is a natural tendency on the part of those whose leanings are in favour of Sabellianism, to conceal their sentiments, or to employ terms which seem orthodox, while they are susceptible of a Sabellian import. In Germany there is not the same temptation to use equivocal language; and, accordingly, it is comparatively easy to draw there the line of demarcation between those who hold Sabellianian, and those who hold Trinitarian views. Dorner appears to have found no difficulty in this respect. While he vindicates Schleiermacher from certain imputations which have, he thinks, erroneously been associated with his views, he is perfectly explicit upon this point, as one about which there could be no difference of opinion. Equally with Hegel and Schelling,¹ Schleiermacher denied the existence of an immanent Trinity in the Godhead; his doctrine was confessedly Sabellianism. All that Dorner can here allege in his behalf, is that he did not, with those two philosophers, so confound God with the world as to consider Him losing His absoluteness by entering into the finite, and in the life of the world arriving at self-consciousness. God still is, with him, an undivided, absolute unity, inconsistent with any Trinitarian distinction. Nor is it otherwise with Weisse, Ewald, and many of Schleiermacher's school. "They recognise in Christ the perfect revelation of God, which bears relation to the entire creation-circle of humanity, whose head He is. But they recognise no pre-existent personal form on the divine side; on the contrary, they continue to abide by a Monarchianism, which in the supreme God Himself admits of no distinction, but only a manifoldness of revelations, which have respect to the world, and which, under the direction of

¹ Div. ii., vol. iii., p. 208.

history, of Scripture, and of Christian experience, are then reduced to a Trinity.”¹

We are not aware, that any theological writer of the present day, in this country or America, could be pointed to, whose views admit of being so distinctly characterized as of a Sabellian nature. Many works might readily enough be mentioned, which in their general mode of representation might be said to carry with them a Sabellian impress, and which exhibit unmistakable traces of the influence of Schleiermacher and his school. But if we should single out certain statements or expressions as apparently embodying a Sabellian view of Christ's person, we should probably be met by others, which seem cast in the orthodox mould; a kind of vagueness or dubiety being purposely allowed to hang around the subject. Bushnell, of America, has spoken out perhaps more distinctly than any other person we could name, belonging to an evangelical church; and he is the only English writer referred to by Dorner (whether of this country or America) as giving forth in recent times a different view of Christ's person from the orthodox one. At the place in question, Bushnell is represented as a Patripassian, or more definitely an Apollinarian, holding, with Apollinaris, that there was no human soul in Christ; and that consequently, whatever there was manifested of thought and feeling by Him, must be ascribed directly to the Godhead. Yet Bushnell does not avow himself an Apollinarian; nor does he admit that humanity was imperfect in Christ, that He had no human soul. There may have been such a soul; it is only denied, that this “is to be spoken of, or looked upon, as having a distinct subsistence”²—meaning, we presume, that it is not to be isolated and viewed apart in the actions and sufferings ascribed to Jesus. No one, however, says that it should. But Dr Bushnell practically ignores the existence of a human soul in our Lord; he regards as utterly insignificant, “the humanities of a mere human soul” in Him. In one of his last and most elaborate productions, “Nature and the Supernatural,” he carefully avoids any specific reference to the component parts of Christ's person, but represents His being as superhuman: in His sufferings, he says, “we see the pathology of a superhuman anguish; it is the anguish of a mysteriously transcendent, or somehow divine,

¹ Div. ii., vol. iii., p. 224.

² God in Christ, p. 168.

character.”¹ Yet the growth of Jesus from youth to manhood is spoken of as a perfectly natural human development. Not only so; but on the divine side also we find a most important departure from the Apollinarian hypothesis; for the Trinity of Bushnell is a Sabellian, not a Nicene one—a Trinity of historical manifestations, not of distinct hypostases in the Godhead. The latter is denounced by him as quite unintelligible, unless it is understood as asserting three consciousnesses, intelligences, and wills in the divine nature. Nothing but confusion, he affirms, “is produced by attempting to assert a real and metaphysical trinity of persons in the divine nature;” for “any intermediate doctrine between the absolute unity of God and a social unity (that is, a unity made up of three distinct intelligences) is impossible and incredible.”

There can scarcely be a doubt as to the meaning of such statements; they plainly express a repudiation of the Church doctrine of the Trinity as contrary, not to Scripture, but to sense and reason. It is simply on rationalistic grounds, that this repudiation is made. Dr B. admits that the language of Scripture conveys distinctly enough the doctrine of a Trinity. “If anything is clear,” says he,² “it is that the Three of Scripture do appear under the grammatic forms which are appropriate to person,—I, Thou, He, We, They; and if it be so, I really do not perceive the very great license taken by our theology, when they are called three persons. Besides, we practically need, for our own sakes, to set them out as three persons before us, acting relatively towards each other, in order to ascend into the liveliest, fullest realization of God.” What more, one might ask, could be required to establish the doctrine of a real Trinity than these two—the explicit language of Scripture, and the felt necessities of our natures, requiring us so to conceive of God? Yet the assurance we thus win is again taken from us by our being presently warned to “abstain from assigning to these divine persons an interior, metaphysical nature, which we are nowise able to investigate, and which we may positively know to contradict the real unity of God.” It would seem, then, after all, that in speaking to us of a Trinity in the Godhead, Scripture merely plays upon us an illusion, and gives to what is but a Trinity of revelations the aspect of a Trinity of nature. It is,

¹ P. 297.

² God in Christ, p. 174.

in short, as he calls it in his *Nature and Supernaturalism* (p. 392), no more than a sort of "intellectual machinery" for setting forth to us a work of grace, or supernatural redemption, and which cannot be found in a "close theoretic Monotheism." Thus, what is said of the Son represents "what God may do, acting on the lines of causes in nature coming into nature from without, to be incarnate in it;" while the Holy Spirit "is inaugurated as a conception of the divine working, different from that which is included in the laws of nature, and delivering from the retributive action of those laws." But these, we are expressly cautioned, are to be viewed merely as "instruments of thought and feeling, and faith toward God," and in employing them, we are to "suffer no foolish quibbles of speculative logic to plague us, asking never how many Gods there are? nor how it is possible for one to send another, act before another, reconcile us to another? but assured that God is one eternally, however multiform our conceptions of His working." In reality, however, it is not what the speculative logic may quibble at, but what godly simplicity and common sense demand. For, if Scripture is found practising such an abuse of language on the highest of all themes, as to present diverse forms or conceptions of working under terms that inevitably suggest distinctions of being, how can we trust its representations on other things? Indeed, when we pass from the person to the work of Christ, we have the same sort of paltering in a double sense; for what is said in Scripture of Christ's death as a propitiation for sin, a sacrifice for the atonement of human guilt, or the objective ground of man's reconciliation with God, is to be understood, we are told, not with reference to the truth of things, but to the effect it is fitted to produce on the hearts of men: it is "God's form of art for the presentation of Christ and His work; and if we refuse to let Him pass into this form, we have no mould of thought which can fitly represent Him." All, however, that is really involved in Christ's yielding up His own sacred person to die, is that He thereby "produces in us a sense of the eternal sanctity of God's law, which was needful to prevent the growth of license, or of indifference and insensibility to religious impressions."¹ This internal feeling or impression is the grand thing; in it the reconciliation properly consists;

¹ P. 254.

only, "we must produce it outwardly, if possible, in some objective form, *as if it had* some effect on the law or on God." And when Christ is thus represented, "we are to understand that He is our sacrifice and atonement, that by His blood we have remission, not in any speculative sense, but as in art."

In short, whether we look to Christ's person or work, the whole, according to this system, is a kind of theophany—a series of make-beliefs, or artificial contrivances reflectively embodying the experiences of believers, but in themselves destitute of any proper substance or reality. Christ, according to it, is but a symbol of God (so Dörner justly characterizes the view), coming forth dramatically as a person, and giving such manifestations of God as He pleases, but making no revelation of His essential nature. And how can such a dramatic representation last? When no longer needed for giving objectivity to our thoughts and feelings, the whole must, or at least ought, like a piece of art that has served its purpose, be made to pass away; and only in the renovated natures and holy lives of the redeemed should the incarnation and the atonement find their abiding memorial. This is the natural sequel; and the poetical fancies, in which Dr Bushnell indulges respecting the state of things in the future world, cannot prevent its being so regarded. Viewed complexly, as a scheme of doctrine, Dr Bushnell's peculiar views have neither any solid foundation in Scripture, nor any proper coherence between one part and another. But the more distinctive feature in it is its Sabellian striving to get rid of an immanent Trinity in the Godhead, and yet preserve the form and advantage of a Trinitarian exhibition of the nature and operations of God in connection with the work of man's salvation:—and this with the avowed design, not of giving a more natural interpretation to the words of Scripture (the reverse, indeed, of that), but of obtaining a mode of representing divine things more conformable to the views of an enlightened reason, and in better accordance with the feelings and affections of a spiritual mind. So far, it may justly be regarded as a sign of the times—showing, as it does, how the vein of thought, and the philosophic influences, which in Germany have disposed Schleiermacher and his followers to substitute a Sabellian for a scriptural Trinity, and to adopt a merely subjective atonement and reconciliation, are finding con-

genial soil also in the Anglo-Saxon mind, and operating to the same results. The attempt, however, in this case looks somewhat less natural; the threads of the system seem less fitly woven together; and while in both alike there are great gaps between the human theorizing and the plain statements of Scripture, these become to some extent more palpable, when reproduced in the less speculative, more realistic region of Anglo-Saxon thought. Whatever modifications may be introduced into such views, so long as they retain an essentially Sabellian character, they can never be made to wear an aspect of truthfulness to Bible Christians in this country, unless it be with a limited and exceptional class of minds; nor will they generally be regarded as possessing an advantage over the orthodox faith in point of credibility, any more than in respect to agreement with the teaching of Scripture. At the same time, one must acknowledge a material difference between a scheme of this sort, which gives such prominence to the personal Christ, which finds in Him a real manifestation of the life of Godhead with special regard to the state and circumstances of mankind, and those more rationalistic schemes which would make Christ only an idea, or would reduce all His work to the teaching of some lessons. Where Christ is so honoured, and the connection between Him and the fulness of deity, on the one hand, and, on the other, between His people and their participation through Him in that fulness, there is undoubtedly a certain approximation to the great centre of Gospel truth and power. In apprehending particular aspects of Christ's character and work, and in bringing these to bear on the hearts and consciences of men, there may be—there actually is in Bushnell, and writers of the same school—a good deal of living warmth and freshness exhibited, which cannot but awaken a response in Christian bosoms. And although, where there is so much that is vague, unreal, unsatisfactory, as to the proper nature of Christ's person, and the objective ground provided in His salvation for the peace and comfort of men, it were vain to expect any solid building up to the Christian life from such quarters, either in individuals or in the Church, yet all that proceeds thence is by no means to be assigned to the Apostle's category of wood, hay, and stubble, fit only for burning; there is an intermingling also of more substantial material, which

with proper caution may be turned to good account. Still, it is a good accompanied with many unsafe elements, and, as a whole, theology of this description is greatly more fitted to unsettle, than to establish in the faith.¹

If respect be had to the mere *form* of doctrine, the views of Mr Maurice concerning the Person of Christ must be distinguished from those of Bushnell; and yet, considered in their tendency and bearing on theological literature, it is scarcely possible to assign them to any other class. No one can fail to perceive marked traits of resemblance between the two writers. They are alike dissatisfied with the prevailing theology of the Church, and have undertaken to do for it the part of reformers. In the execution of this task, they both reject the received Protestant doctrines respecting the guilt of sin, the vicarious and propitiatory character of the work of Christ, and the objective ground of a sinner's justification in the removal of the curse of sin through that work, and the laying open for him of a way of access to God's favour; and they assail these doctrines with the objections which are commonly urged against them by Uni-

¹ What has just been said may be applied particularly to some of Bushnell's vindications of the doctrine of the Trinity, which have no specific reference to his own defective views. Thus, in one place he says, "No doctrine is more paradoxical in its terms. None can be more mercilessly tortured by the application of a little logic, such as the weakest and smallest wits are master of. None has been more often, or with a more peremptory confidence, repudiated by sections of the Church and teachers of high distinction. . . . And yet for some reason the doctrine would not die. It cannot die. Once thought, it cannot be expelled from the world. And this for the reason, that its life is in men's hearts, not in their heads. Impressing God in His true personality and magnitude—impressing and communicating God in that grand twofold economy, by which He is brought nigh to our fallen state and accommodated to our wants as sinners, showing us God inherently related both to our finite capacity and our evil necessity, what can ever expel it from the world's thought? As soon shall we part with the daylight or the air, as lapse into the cold and feeble Monotheism, in which some teachers of our time are ready to boast as the gospel of reason and the unity of a personal fatherhood. No: this corner-stone is not to be so easily removed. It was planted before the foundation of the world, and it will remain. It is eternally woven into the practical economy of God's kingdom, and must therefore stand firm." This is good, and much, besides, in the same discourse on the "Christian Trinity as a Practical Truth;" but how long could it be said, if Bushnell's own view were adopted in place of the doctrine of the Church?

tarians. They still further agree in exalting the person and the life of Christ as the one and all, in a manner, of their theology—what He was, what He did on earth, what He still does in the heavenly places and by living communion with the souls of men, being with both of them alike the sum of all truth, and the substitute for all dogmas. The English theologian, in these respects, only differs from the American, that he signalizes himself by a more frequent and sweeping denunciation of the evangelical theologians of the day, by a more extreme and offensive caricature of their doctrines, by a peculiarly dramatic and intensive mode of exhibiting the subjective element in religion, as sometimes superseding, sometimes determining the objective, and by the remarkable facility with which he can either set aside Scripture, or, by infusing an unusual sense into its words, can make it appear to be on his side. Bushnell is far outshone in these peculiarities by Mr Maurice; and he is also quite distanced in the all-embracing grasp which is given to the redemption of Christ, or, we should rather say, in his mode of identifying redemption with creation, grace with nature. For, apparently, these coalesce in Mr Maurice's scheme; his universalism leaves no room for the distinctions which are maintained, in some form or another, by all evangelical theologians; and by reason of their relation to Christ—a relation actually existing, natural, unalterable—all are alike children of God. With him Christ is the archetype of all things, antecedently to creation the root of humanity, "in whom God from the first looked upon His creature man."¹ "He actually is one with every man. He is come to proclaim that He is, by His incarnation and His death."² So that, as contemplated by God, the created and the redeemed state of mankind are but two names for the same thing, and cannot by possibility indicate two diverse relations: the fall, sin, grace, election, make no essential difference. "What St Paul asserts [at the commencement of his Epistle to the Ephesians], on behalf of himself and the little band of those who had turned to God and believed in Christ, was a share in the privileges of humanity, as that is created, elected, known by God in Christ;" and "in Christ, whether circumcised or uncircumcised, men are one, by the law of their creation."³ Hence, Christian baptism is not the sign

¹ Unity of New Testament, p. 367.

² P. 220.

³ Pp. 526, 536.

and seal of any distinction between one person and another, but "God's declaration of that which is true concerning men, of the actual relation in which men stand to Him. It denotes the true and eternal relation of man to God." And only in this sense, we are told, was it submitted to by the Apostle Paul, namely, "because it denoted that he would no more be the member of any sect, or of any partial society whatever—that he was claiming his relation to the Son of God, the Head of the whole human race. It imported his belief, that this Son of God, and not Adam, was the true root of humanity."¹

If such be the proper reading of St Paul's Epistles, and of New Testament Scripture generally, it is clear that not only our theology, but our hermeneutics also, must be made new; we have yet to learn the language in which it is written. Or, if this is not the case, then Mr Maurice is merely, by a kind of legerdemain in terms and phrases, which he employs in another sense than any simple reader would ever dream of, or than the fair construction of language will admit, imposing on Scripture a meaning which is utterly opposed to its whole spirit and design. But the most singular thing (as it will, perhaps, appear to the mass of readers) is, that, with the rejection of so much in the orthodox faith as irrational and antiquated, he cleaves to what has ever been the most obnoxious, the pre-eminently incredible dogma to the so-called rational Christians—the doctrine of the Trinity. This Mr Maurice holds, and, as far as the language would indicate, in the plain sense of the terms: he maintains a Trinity in God of three persons and one substance, and thinks it, so far from being irrational, necessary to the maintenance of that universal charity or love in which he believes the whole human race are bound to God, and in relationship and calling united to one another. But, in his essay upon this subject, all is left in a sort of haze; there is no grounding of the doctrine on statements of Scripture, nay, the bearing and testimony of texts is scouted as a thing not fit for the occasion; and nothing is made account of but the aspect the doctrine carries toward men, or the light it is fitted to throw on their natural relation to God. By the doctrine of the Father, they are called to see the common paternity of Godhead; in Christ, the Word made flesh, they have living proof of their filial relation, or sonship,

¹ *Essays*, pp. 202, 203.

borne witness to by all that He was and is, all that He has done and is doing; and the Spirit of light and love is ever coming forth to convince them of the actual existence of this high relation, and to dispose them to feel and act suitably to it. This is the whole—as far as we can perceive, and, indeed, as far as Mr Maurice's scheme admits of. But it is, after all, only a Sabellian Trinity—a Trinity of historical agencies; and if Mr Maurice himself believes more—if he holds that the names of the Father, Son, and Spirit indicate distinctions immanent in the Godhead (as he himself affirms)—this appears no way essential to his Christian scheme; a Trinity of operations, as contradistinguished from a Trinity of nature and economical functions, is all that is actually required. And so Schleiermacher felt and ruled in regard to that part of his scheme, which almost exactly corresponds to this. For, as Dorner has stated,¹ it is not correct to say, that with Schleiermacher Christ is only a principle of life, and that His person has no necessary place. Christ is, indeed, with him the communicating principle of holy and personal life, because He has this; but then the life itself, from the very nature of things, requires a personal mode of existence. We ought rather, therefore, to say, "Because he is the archetypal, the divine-human person, He has the power, through His love, which by means of His personal form is rendered perpetually present, of constituting himself also in others the principle of the same holy and blessed life." What more does Mr Maurice ascribe to Christ in this respect with his Nicene, than Schleiermacher does with his Sabellian incarnation? We can perceive no essential difference; and where so many points of faith are discarded, as too hard for belief in our enlightened age, this one point, harder than all, and seemingly so little necessary, is not likely to meet with much acceptance from his followers, nor can it be expected long to retain its place.—The apparent singularity, it may be added, of this tenet having a place in the scheme of Mr Maurice, finds its explanation in what also accounts for the peculiarity of his confounding nature and grace, creation and redemption. In both cases alike it is the reflex of his Platonic philosophy—cleaving in the one to a Platonic Trinity, as in the other to a Platonic realism. This has been very clearly exhibited by Mr Rigg in his *Modern Anglican Theology*, c. vii.; and the *West-*

¹ Div. ii., vol. iii. p. 206.

minster Review (Jan. 1862) does not scruple to characterize Mr Maurice as "clearly unsound on the Trinity," because he has "Alexandrian notions about the Son of God rather than Anglican," though, among other inconsistencies, he still "defends the Athanasian Creed." As this, however, is only matter of inference, different opinions may be formed of it.

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
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